愛爾蘭至今無法實現全島統一，並非單一原因所致，而是歷史遺留問題、複雜的政治現實、巨大的經濟代價以及深層的社會心理矛盾共同作用的結果。
根據 Ronan McGreevy 在文中的論述，愛爾蘭無法（或尚未）統一以及分治造成的局勢，責任歸屬可以劃分為以下幾個關鍵主體：
https://deepltranschinese.blogspot.com/2026/10/blog-post_357.html
1. 核心歷史責任：倫敦（英國政府與威斯敏斯特）
文章明確指出，愛爾蘭分治的根本責任在於英國：
分治的創造者： 文中開宗明義提到「分治是威斯敏斯特（英國議會）一手造成的」（Partition was created by Westminster）。
排除愛爾蘭人的意志： 在制定《1920年愛爾蘭政府法案》時，除了極少數議員外，沒有任何愛爾蘭民族主義者獲得諮詢或投下贊成票。
強加既成事實： 到了 1921 年《英愛條約》談判時，倫敦從一開始就將北愛爾蘭的地位排除在談判之外，使其成為既成事實。
縱容歧視與強硬壓制： 倫敦與由聯合派主導的斯托蒙特（Stormont）議會，必須為北愛天主教徒遭受的歧視負起責任；且當愛爾蘭人試圖挑戰邊界時，邱吉爾動用軍隊進行毀滅性反擊，斷絕了南方短期內推翻分治的可能。
2. 次要與政治失誤責任：愛爾蘭南方政府（歷屆領導人）
文中強調，南方民族主義者雖然「不是分治的製造者」，但也犯下了嚴重的歷史與策略失誤，導致分治被進一步鞏固或無法解除：
3. 和解前提的認知責任：北方民族主义者
文章同時點出北方民族主義者在「責任認知」上需要調整的部分：
總結作者的觀點
作者 Ronan McGreevy 認為：製造分治與北愛不公的「罪魁禍首」是英國政府（倫敦）；而愛爾蘭南方政府的責任不在於「冷眼旁觀」，而在於歷史上犯下一連串笨拙、適得其反且鞏固了分治的政治失誤。因此，若要進行南北和解，討論責任時必須「建立在歷史事實之上」。
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歸納起來，核心問題主要出在以下 四個重大層面：
一、 歷史與政治現實：《受難日協定》的機制約束
「多數決機制」的法律門檻： 根據 1998 年簽署的《受難日協定》（Good Friday Agreement，又稱《貝爾法斯特協定》），北愛爾蘭是否脫離英國並與愛爾蘭共和國統一，完全取決於北愛爾蘭（以及愛爾蘭共和國）民眾的民主投票。只有當北愛爾蘭多數民眾投票支持統一時，英國政府才有義務啟動統一程序。
民意與政黨僵局： 雖然隨著人口結構變化，北愛爾蘭的天主教（傳統民族主義者）人口比例已微幅超越新教徒，但「天主教徒不等於必然支持統一」。目前北愛爾蘭民意中，支持保留在英國體制內的「聯合派」（Unionists）和中立派，依然構成一股強大的阻力，尚未達到公投必勝的壓倒性多數。
二、 深層的集體身分認同與陣營對立（新教與天主教）
百年深植的「聯合派」認同： 北愛爾蘭約有一半民眾（主要是新教徒背景）在文化、歷史和情感上強烈認同自己是「英國人」（British），而非「愛爾蘭人」。對他們而言，併入愛爾蘭共和國意味著「喪失國家主權與集體身分」。
對歷史衝突與報復的恐懼： 北愛爾蘭曾經歷長達 30 年的「北愛爾蘭問題」（The Troubles，1968–1998）流血衝突，造成 3,000 多人死亡。許多新教聯合派擔心，一旦統一，他們將從過去北愛的「多數群體」淪為全島的「少數弱勢」，甚至遭到極端共和派的報復或政治邊緣化。
重燃暴力衝突的風險： 許多政治分析家警告，若在未取得聯合派充分諒解的情況下強行推進統一，可能會激怒北愛的保皇派（Loyalist）武裝組織，導致北愛重新陷入社會動蕩與極端暴力。
三、 巨大的經濟轉型負擔與制度差異
雖然愛爾蘭共和國近年經濟發達（以高科技與跨國企業為主），但統一依然面臨極為現實的經濟難題：
巨額的財政補貼負擔（The "Subvention" Problem）： 北愛爾蘭的公共支出長期高度依賴倫敦中央政府的巨額轉移支付（每年補貼數百億英鎊）。如果統一，這筆龐大的公共財政缺口將全部轉嫁給愛爾蘭共和國的納稅人，可能拖累南方自身的財政。
公共服務與福利制度的巨大鴻溝：
四、 英國政治與南方（愛爾蘭共和國）的實質態度
倫敦當局的態度： 儘管英國歷屆政府多次表示「對北愛爾蘭的去留沒有私利」，但英國保守黨及右翼力量長年與北愛聯合派政黨（如 DUP）結盟，在政治上並不急於推進愛爾蘭統一。
愛爾蘭共和國南方的「現實考量」： 雖然愛爾蘭南方政府與主要政黨（如 Fianna Fáil、Fine Gael）在憲法層面上支持全島統一的遠景，但在現實操作中態度非常謹慎。南方政府深知，吸收一個經濟相對落後、政治極度對立、甚至可能爆發騷亂的北方地區，會給南方帶來難以承受的政治與經濟風險。
總結
愛爾蘭無法統一，本質上不是地緣政治的阻隔，而是「人」與「制度」的裂痕。
要實現愛爾蘭統一，不僅需要英國政府同意舉辦公投，更需要愛爾蘭南北雙方克服如何接納約 100 萬強烈認同英國的聯合派人口、如何消化北愛的財政黑洞，以及如何重新制定一部能同時包容新教與天主教傳統的新憲法。在這些根本性問題尚未找到解方前，愛爾蘭統一依然面臨重重阻礙。
文中論述的愛爾蘭統一責任問他在哪裡？
翻譯成中文
Opinion
Leo Varadkar thinks we should apologise to northern nationalists for partition. Why?
No southern Irish nationalist wanted partition. Partition was created by Westminster
Ronan McGreevy's picture
Ronan McGreevy
Tue Oct 20 2026 - 06:00
•
5 MIN READ
Former taoiseach Leo Varadkar speaking at a recent Conversations on Constitutional Change conference in Dungannon, Co Tyrone
Former taoiseach Leo Varadkar speaking at a recent Conversations on Constitutional Change conference in Dungannon, Co Tyrone
Leo Varadkar believes people living south of the Border will one day have to apologise for abandoning northern nationalists after partition a century ago. The former taoiseach’s words in Dungannon earlier this month will be taken as a statement of the obvious by many, or most northern nationalists, since they have believed it for generations.
However, Varadkar’s speech deserves far greater scrutiny than it has so far attracted, especially his argument that southern nationalists “went off and built our State and largely forgot about what happened up here for a very long time”.
Varadkar does not elaborate on what should be on the apologies list. Reconciliation, however, should start with everyone acknowledging – especially northern nationalists – that southern Irish nationalists did not create partition. Nor were they responsible for, or could they have done much about Stormont’s discrimination against Catholics. That responsibility lies with London and a unionist-dominated Stormont.
No Irish nationalist wanted partition. Partition was created by Westminster. With the exception of a tiny number of Irish Parliamentary Party MPs, no Irish nationalist was consulted about the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, nor voted for it.
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Northern Ireland was a fait accompli by the time the Anglo-Irish Treaty talks began in late 1921, when London made clear from the off that Northern Ireland ‘s status was not up for negotiation.
Nevertheless, Arthur Griffith won a Boundary Commission to redraw the Border in line with inhabitants’ wishes; it would, the Irish believed, make Northern Ireland unviable. But it proved a disaster for nationalists. The Cumann na nGaedheal government took it seriously, producing thousands of documents to back up its claims. However, it appointed Eoin MacNeill, who proved a clueless interlocutor and inept Free State negotiator.
If Varadkar believes an apology is owed, he should start here. Two critical errors made by Fine Gael’s Cumann na nGaedheal forebears copper-fastened partition in its early days.
Firstly, they reinforced the hard Border in 1923 by establishing customs posts. Customs were governments’ main source of revenues then. Equally, they were intended as a declaration of Irish sovereignty but they made partition a reality for Border communities – on both sides of the religious divide, and on both sides of the Border – who did not want to be where they were on the map.
When the Boundary Commission’s findings were leaked in November 1925, showing only modest adjustments and even ceding parts of the Free State, the Cumann na nGaedheal government sought to suppress it. In return for keeping the Border in place, the British government agreed to write off Ireland’s share of the UK imperial debt, the equivalent then of 80 per cent of the new State’s annual GDP.
William T Cosgrave and his northern counterpart, James Craig, promised a new era. Cosgrave took the debt write-down but they never met again. Indeed, the leaders of both jurisdictions would not do so for 40 years, when Fianna Fáil’s Seán Lemass and the Ulster Unionist Party’s Terence O’Neill met in Stormont Castle in January 1965.
If Cumann na nGaedheal’s attitude to partition can be characterised as one of cynical neglect, the same cannot be said of Fianna Fáil. In and out of office, Éamon de Valera was obsessed with partition. Articles 2 and 3 of his 1937 Constitution refused to recognise it, with Dublin claiming jurisdiction as a matter of law. In 1938, he did make progress with Neville Chamberlain during talks to end the Economic War.
Chamberlain was prepared to state that Britain had “no selfish, strategic or economic interest” in Northern Ireland and that Britain would leave when, and if, a majority wanted.
However, such a declaration was scuppered by the IRA’s 1939 bombing campaign and the second World War. In 1940, de Valera rejected Winston Churchill’s offer to end partition in return for Ireland’s entry into the war, believing it would not be honoured. De Valera continued to campaign against partition after leaving office, but his international tour was a failure. Back in Dublin, the inter-party coalition government led by John A Costello decided to fund nationalist candidates in the North.
Instead of aiding the nationalist minority, however, the action galvanised the unionist majority into coalescing around the Ulster Unionist Party in the 1949 Stormont elections.
Successive Irish governments failed to end partition not because they were uninterested, but because their campaigning to end it was counterproductive.
[ No friends in the North: Partition has become embedded in the daily lives of people on the islandOpens in new window ]
Ireland’s second World War neutrality meant there was never any realistic chance of bringing international pressure on London. Meanwhile, Costello’s government was busy creating a confessional Catholic state inimical to Ulster unionists.
Lemass wanted to end partition, but he saw the problem differently to de Valera. De Valera blamed the British for it. Therefore, only the British could end it. Lemass saw it as an issue between unionists and nationalists. “I could see it as almost a disease which would ultimately destroy the nation, and I therefore began to talk about unity as a spiritual and not a political conception,” Lemass remarked.
Lemass and O’Neill parked partition, concentrating on issues of concern. Their lead was followed by Jack Lynch, but Northern Ireland erupted when the Troubles began in 1969. In August 1969, Lynch made his “standing idly by” speech, raising expectations that the Irish army would save northern nationalists from loyalist mobs. In reality, it was in no position to invade anyone, let alone a large military power.
That imbalance in strength was there from the beginning.
Could partition have been overturned in the 1920s? There were attempts, beginning with the IRA’s May/June 1922 offensive, but it was a complete failure.
When a contingent of pro- and anti-Treaty forces captured the villages of Pettigo and Belleek in June 1922, Churchill deployed 1,000 British troops, who shelled the Irish positions.
Churchill’s action was overkill, but it was deliberately done. Any adventurism by Irish nationalists would be met by an overwhelming response. The message was understood clearly in Dublin.
Irish governments in later years were central to one effort after another to bring peace: Sunningdale, the Anglo-Irish Agreement; the 1993 Framework Document, the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Varadkar leveraged EU support to prevent a hard Irish Border after Brexit. Taoiseach Micheál Martin established the Shared Island fund which is backing projects on both sides of the Border. None of these are the actions of bystanders.
The reconciliation sought by Varadkar between southern and northern nationalists must first answer a few key questions: what should, or could the South have done differently? What options did it have?
If Varadkar, and the many others who agree with him, believes there should be a process of reconciliation between northern and southern nationalists, it should be informed by facts.
Ronan McGreevy is an Irish Times journalist and a historian.
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