摩洛哥蘇丹阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼對法國的態度反映在他的內部通信（1844 - 1847年）[文章］
The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the French as reflected in his internal correspondance (1844 - 1847) [article]
sem-link Raphaël Danziger
Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée Year 1983 36 pp.
參考書目
R.O.M.M., 36, 1983-2
The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the French as reflected in his internal correspondance (1844 - 1847) [article]
sem-link Raphaël Danziger
Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée Année 1983 36 pp. 41-50
Référence bibliographique
摩洛哥蘇丹阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼對法國的態度
在其內部通信（1844-1847 年）中所反映的對法國人的態度*。
par Raphael DANZIGER
-I-
法國軍隊於 1830 年 7 月佔領阿爾及爾時，開始了近代史上歐洲強國對阿拉伯國家的第一次長期佔領行動。
因此，研究法國對阿爾及利亞的滲透對受影響的原住民領袖的影響是特別有趣的。
在阿爾及利亞本身，土耳其人對該國的統治立即被打破，土耳其人被流放；Abd al-Qadir 所領導的阿爾及利亞原住民對法國人的抵抗已在其他地方被研究 (1)。
在阿爾及利亞的兩個主要鄰國--突尼斯和摩洛哥--中，突尼斯貝伊的反應也得到了充分的研究(2)。
摩洛哥是一個例外：
摩洛哥的對外關係與國內情況已被充分研究(3)，但迄今尚未嘗試研究
法國佔領阿爾及利亞對蘇丹 Abd al-Rahman (1822-1859) 的觀念與態度的影響。
本文的目的就是要填補這一空白。
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本研究的主要文獻包括 Abd al- Rahman 的內部通信，主要是他寄給長子 Muhammad（後來的蘇丹 Muhammad IV，1859-1873 年）的信件。
其中許多信件是法國人於 1884 年 8 月 14 日在伊斯利戰役 (4) 結束時在穆罕默德 (Muhammad) 的陣營中發現的 (詳情請參閱下文)，而其他大部分信件則於 1920 年由摩洛哥的法國保護國圖書館 (5) 獲得。
儘管這些書信確實並不總是可以照單全收，但毫無疑問的是，父親寫給兒子的信件比起蘇丹發給外國代表的公文以及與外國代表的對話 (目前一般使用的資料來源)，是更可靠的指引，可以讓人了解他的私密想法與感受。
雖然所使用的樣本不多，但卻構成了值得考慮的足夠證據。
在現有的 23 封書信中，有 15 封是蘇丹寫給他兒子穆罕默德 (Muhammad)；6 封是阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼 (Abd al-Rahman) 寫給其他本地人士；兩封是穆罕默德 (Muhammad) 寫給他父親阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼 (Abd al-Rahman)。
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整封書信的日期是 1844-1847 年間，這段期間在摩洛哥歷史上舉足輕重。1844 年，在 Abd al-Qadir 於摩洛哥建立庇護所之後，法國與摩洛哥的關係出現危機，導致 Isly 戰役，法國軍隊在該戰役中完全擊敗摩洛哥人 (6)；由於 Abd al-Rahman 現有的信件是在此重要事件之前和之後發生的，因此可以評估該戰役對 Abd al-Rahman 對 法 國 的 態 度 的影響。
42 R.DANZIGER
1847 年 底 ， 阿 卜 杜 勒 卡 迪 爾 (Abd al-Qadir) 向 法 國 投 降 (7)， 這 個 關 鍵 時 期 終 於 結 束 ， 法 摩 關 係 的 主 要 刺 激 因 素 因 而 消 失 。
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到 了 1844 年 ， 蘇 丹 在 與 法 國 的 交 往 中 累 積 了 豐 富 的 經 驗 。
在法國佔領阿爾及爾之後，他立即試圖接管阿爾及利亞西部，但在法國特使在一艘法國戰艦的支援下抵達之後，他被迫在 1832 年 4 月從阿爾及利亞撤軍 (8)。
當 Abd al-Rahman 試圖通過向 Abd al-Qadir 提供大量援助來幫助法國人趕走阿爾及利亞人時，法國人在 1836 年讓他簽署了一份停止援助的承諾書 (9)。
但援助仍然源源不絕，從 1837 年到 1843 年，法國人透過法國駐丹吉爾領事的頻繁照會，有時在沿著摩洛哥海岸航行的法國軍艦的支持下，向蘇丹施加沉重壓力，要求他停止對 Abd al-Qadir 的所有援助 (10)。
1842 年 1 月法國佔領特倫森（Tlemcen，位於摩洛哥邊境）之後，法國與摩洛哥的緊張局勢加劇，1843 年 3 月阿爾及利亞軍隊在摩洛哥部落成員的協助下，攻擊了由 Bedeau 將軍（11）指揮的法國部隊。
1843年11月，Abd al-Qadir在摩洛哥找到了避難所，並開始利用摩洛哥的領土對法國發動行動（12），法國對蘇丹的壓力更大了。
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換句話說，從1830年到1843年，法摩關係的特點是：
蘇丹不斷努力消除法國在阿爾及利亞的危險存在--先是他自己的軍隊，後來通過Abd al-Qadir--以及法國的強大壓力，並由強大的法國海軍增強，以阻撓蘇丹的政策。
因此，在1844年上半年，法國與摩洛哥的關係以深刻的相互對立為標誌，這並不令人感到驚訝--事實上，這段時期的所有歷史記載都表明了這一點(13)。
-二
由於Abd al-Qadir在摩洛哥的存在，以及法國對摩洛哥採取的積極反制措施，1844年法摩關係惡化。
他們所沒有做的是揭露Abd al-Rahman對法國「異教徒」的宗教觀念，「這種觀念是由他更深層次的觀念所產生，而不僅僅是他與法國人的政治分歧。
這反映了伊斯蘭教對基督教入侵者的古老態度，
可以追溯到十字軍東征時代，
以及後來摩洛哥對西班牙和葡萄牙入侵的反應。
阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼對法政策的這個基礎，在他的內部通信中顯得很清楚。
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在 1844 年的前七個月，蘇丹阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼在提到法國人時常使用辱罵性的宗教用語：
「異教徒」(kuffar, kafi- run) (14)；
「真主的敵人」(a da Allah) (15)；
「宗教的敵人」(a da' al-din) (16)；
「多神教徒」(mushrikun) (17)；
以及「偶像崇拜者」(abid al- asnam) (18)。
這些提法被擴大，
例如「......法國人比所有其他基督教國家更狡詐、惡毒、狡猾......」(19)，
以及「我們要懲罰他們，因為他們是騙子。「(19)，
以及 我們不應該相信[異教徒]中的哪怕一個"(20)。
這些提法和聲明完全是傳統的模式，完全沒有受到阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼與法國人的長期經驗的影響，而他在十四年前，也就是法國佔領阿爾及爾僅三個月之後，就使用了完全相同的公式，這就證明了這一點 (21)。
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阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼的態度
毫不奇怪，在這些詞語之後，會出現
虔誠地呼籲真主懲罰法國「異教徒」的宗教逆反行為。
到目前為止，阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼對於法國人最常表達的願望是：
「願真主滅絕他們」(dammarahum Allah) (22)。
稍微溫和一些的祈禱是，「願真主分化 [ 法國人 ] 並毀滅他們的力量」(23)；
「願真主用痛苦壓倒 [ 法國人 ]」(24)；
「願真主用災難圍繞 [ 法國人 ]」(25)；
「願真主毀滅 [ 法國人 ] 的力量，使他們的智慧與他們背道而馳 」(26)；
「願真主使 [ 法國人 ] 事事不順 」(27)；
「願真主使 [ 法國人 ] 蒙羞受辱 」(28)；
「願真主使 [ 法國人 ] 無所適從 」(29)；
以及 「願真主使 [ 法國人 ] 倒退 」(30)。
當蘇丹聽從兒子穆罕默德 (Muhammad) 的說話，認為摩洛哥軍隊有能力擊敗法國人 (31)，
他便正式宣佈進行聖戰，
大概是為了讓自己的軍隊成為真主實現這些願望的工具：
「0 信徒們，與異教徒戰鬥並消滅他們，直到他們要求和平 (aman) 並支付血金 (diya)」(32)。
阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼(Abd al-Rahman)接著表示他有信心：
「......如果所有的穆斯林都同意，如果他們都決心為了聖戰和捍衛宗教而犧牲自己的財產和生命，那麼將會發生的事對基督徒來說將會是災難性的。
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這並不是說阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼的遠見被他的宗教眼罩所限制，以致於無法洞察現實。
蘇丹有時對法國的力量表現出徹底的現實觀念。
他在宣佈聖戰後，對其子穆罕默德 (Muhammad) 發出了以下警告：
「請記住，法國人是我們的敵人：
請記住，法國人，真主的敵人，已在 [ 阿爾及利亞 ] 居住多年，他已習慣了各種疲勞和危險。
戰爭的閃電已照亮了他的前線千百次，他的耳朵已習慣了戰爭的雷聲。
他有大約九萬人，但他沒有留下一個傷兵或逃兵；
他為此花了大筆的金錢。他還不滿足於此，還招收其他國家中願意投靠他的人，並為他們提供薪金、衣服和營養。[蘇丹顯然指的是外籍軍團）(34)。
阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼對於法國人明智地行使權力的能力也不抱任何幻想：
[法國人]在這些國家的陸上和海上都增派了眼線。法國人]在這些國家的陸上和海上都增加了他的間諜--他的眼線，他們注意著任何從這裏往你們那裏去的人。我寫給您的信，以及我寫給我在 Ouj- da 的代表的信，都會在敵人自己的信中重複。因此，所有的聯繫都被攔截了(35)。
有時候，Abd al-Rahman 的宗教信仰甚至使他高估了基督教的力量：
不要以為法國人是穆斯林唯一的敵人；所有的多神教徒8 都有同樣的情感，真主的話證明了這一點：€ 打擊猶太人。
44 R. DANZIGER
古蘭經第九章第 36 節）即是說，你們應當與所有的信士戰鬥，就像所有的人與你們戰鬥一樣；不要依賴任何一個異教徒，因為異教徒都是一樣的；在他們之間，他們都是沒有面目的。我聽說他們聚在一起......，他們同意十字架的崇拜者，在同一個符號下行軍，應該是一致的 (36)。
這種看法與歐洲內部，尤其是法國與英國之間的對立，以及英國竭力阻止法國對摩洛哥的敵對行動的現實，形成了奇特的對比 (37)。
此外，蘇丹經常將他對法國勢力的多彩描繪與對摩洛哥弱勢的辛辣診斷相提並論：
在我們這邊，我的兒子 [ 穆罕默德 ]，請注意我們花了多少時間試圖煽動穆斯林，我們為此目的使用了多少計謀，我們花了多少錢... 然而，我們只召集了和你在一起的軍隊。
你一定很了解摩洛哥的人民：他們缺乏耐性，他們不願離開自己的居所。
他們就像懶惰的駱駝。無論是勸勉或懲罰，都無法提起他們的精神（38）。
根據阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼 (Abd al-Rahman) 的說法，這種虛弱的原因是
「......今日穆斯林的信仰非常薄弱；他們不再渴望進行社會戰」(39)。
鑒於這些對法國人與摩洛哥人之間勢力均衡的悲觀評價，
如何解釋蘇丹宣佈對法國人進行聖戰的致命決定？
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除了通常的解釋，即 Abd al- Rahman 屈服於來自國內的無情壓力而這樣做 (40)，似乎還必須注意另一個層面。
儘管如我們所見，Abd al- Rahman 的悲觀觀點部分是以宗教為基礎的，但他的伊斯蘭思想促使他得出這樣的結論：
法國的力量基本上是短暫的，真主不會不允許穆斯林擊敗異教徒：
"異教徒的力量不會持久，他們的狀況也不會穩定。如果真主允許，異教徒的時代很快就會過去，而統帥權和優勢將重新回到穆斯林手中」(41)。
因此，蘇丹給他的兒子下了以下命令 ：
「我有理由相信，真主會讓基督徒成為穆斯林的牧場；因為我們是為了真主的榮耀而戰鬥，而這些至高者的敵人則是為了撒旦而戰。
- 三．
摩洛哥在伊斯利戰役中戰敗後，法國與摩洛哥於1844年9月10日簽訂了《丹吉爾條約》(43)，該條約被大多數歷史學家視為摩洛哥歷史的轉捩點，尤其是法摩關係的轉捩點。
有人強調，法國在條約中的要求出奇地溫和，加上法國軍事優勢的有力證據，使法摩關係逐漸改善。
最重要的是，在《丹吉爾條約》簽訂後一年內，兩國政府密切合作，
追求共同的目標 - 打倒卡迪爾 (Abd al-Qadir) (46)。
這個詞賦予了條約充分的宗教合法性。
是包含在針對 Abd al-Qadir 的謾罵中，
在符合蘇丹的利益時寄送給摩洛哥部落酋長，
以維護他的政策及譴責 Abd al-Qadir 的政策。
上面引用的其他三段陳述來自蘇丹寫給他兒子穆罕默德的信件，因此它們很可能確實表達了他的想法。
法國人傾向於誇大阿卜杜勒-卡迪爾（Abd al-Qadir）的勢力，
以迫使摩洛哥人立即採取行動對付他時，蘇丹欣然承認了這種可能性 (53)。
他們在本質上仍然是不可信的：
請記住《聖經》中的一句話：
「小心那些看似誠懇、實則冒名的人」。
我們能期望宗教的敵人有什麼誠意和忠告呢？我們宗教的敵人何曾幫助過穆斯林？
The attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd el-Rahman towards the French as reflected in his internal correspondance (1844 - 1847) [article]
sem-link Raphaël Danziger
Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée Année 1983 36 pp. 41-50
Référence bibliographique
doc-ctrl/global/pdf
doc-ctrl/global/image
doc-ctrl/global/bookmark
doc-ctrl/global/reset
R.O.M.M., 36, 1983-2
THE ATTITUDE OF MOROCCO'S SULTAN ABD AL-RAHMAN
TOWARDS THE FRENCH AS REFLECTED IN HIS INTERNAL CORRESPONDANCE (1844-1847)*
par Raphael DANZIGER
-I-
When the French army occupied Algiers in July 1830, it started the first long- term occupation of any Arab country by a European power in modern history. It is, therefore, of particular interest to examine the impact of the French penetration into Algeria on the affected indigenous leaders. In Algeria itself, the Turkish rule over that country was instantly broken and the Turks exiled ; the indigenous Algerian resistance to the French led by Abd al-Qadir has been studied elsewhere (1). Among Algeria's two principal neighbors — Tunisia and Morocco — the reaction of the Tunisian Bey has also been adequately studied (2). The case of Morocco, whose Sultan was the only indigenous ruler in North Africa combining temporal and religious legitimacy, is an exception : while Moroccos foreign relations and domestic conditions have been amply treated (3), no attempt has been made so far to examine the impact of Algeria's occupation by the French on Sultan Abd al-Rahman's (1822-1859) conception of them and attitude towards them. The purpose of this article is to fill this lacuna.
The principal documentation on which this study is based consists of Abd al- Rahman's internal correspondence, mainly letters he sent to his eldest son Muhammad (later Sultan Muhammad IV, 1859-1873). Many of these letters were discovered by the French in Muhammad's camp on August 14, 1884, at the end of the Battle of Isly (4) (about which see below), while most of the others were acquired in 1920 by the library of the French Protectorate in Morocco (5). While it is true that this correspondence cannot always be taken at face value, there is little doubt that letters from father to son are a more reliable guide to his intimate thoughts and feelings than are a sultan's dispatches to and conversations with representatives of foreign powers — the sources generally used so far. Although the sample utilized is modest, it constitutes a sufficient body of evidence to merit consideration. Among the twenty-three available letters, fifteen are from the Sultan to his son Muhammad ; six are from Abd al-Rahman to other indigenous personalities ; and two are from Muhammad to his father Abd al- Rahman.
The entire correspondence dates from the period 1844-1847, which was one of great importance in Morocco's history. In 1844, the crisis in Franco-Moroccan relations, following Abd al-Qadir 's establishment of a sanctuary in Morocco, led to the Battle of Isly, in which the French army completely routed the Moroccans (6) ; since Abd al-Rahman's available letters date from both before and after this important event, it will be possible to assess the battle's impact on Abd al-Rahman's attitude
42 R.DANZIGER
towards the French. At the end of 1847, a critical epoch came to a close with the surrender of Abd al-Qadir to the French (7), which removed the principal irritant from Franco-Moroccan relations.
By 1844, the Sultan had acquired considerable experience in dealings with the French. Having attempted to take over western Algeria immediately after the French occupation of Algiers, he was forced, in April 1832, to withdraw his troops from that country following the arrival of a special envoy from France backed by a French warship (8). When Abd al-Rahman tried to help dislodge the French from Algeria by providing massive aid to Abd al-Qadir, the French made him, in 1836, sign a commitment to stop it (9). But the aid continued to flow and, from 1837 to 1843, the French applied heavy pressure on the Sultan — through frequent notes transmitted by the French Consul in Tangier, sometimes with the backing of French warships sailing along the Moroccan shores — to cease all aid to Abd al-Qadir (10). Following the French occupation of Tlemcen (on the Moroccan border) in January 1842, Franco- Moroccan tension increased, and in March 1843 Algerian forces, aided by Moroccan tribesmen, attacked a French unit commanded by General Bedeau (11). France's pressure on the Sultan intensified even more after Abd al-Qadir had found refuge in Morocco in November 1843 and began using its territory to stage operations against the French (12).
In other words, Franco-Moroccan relations from 1830 to 1843 were characterized by the Sultan's continuous efforts to eliminate the dangerous French presence in Algeria — first with his own forces and later through Abd al-Qadir — and by heavy French pressures, reinforced by the powerful French navy, to thwart the Sultan's policy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the relations between France and Morocco during the first half of 1844 were marked by profound mutual antagonism — as indeed indicated in all the historical accounts of this period (13).
-II-
In concentrating on the deterioration of Franco-Moroccan relations in 1844, spurred by Abd al-Qadir 's presence in Morocco and by the energetic counter-measures taken by the French against Morocco, the historical accounts have painted an essentially correct picture of the situation. What they have failed to do is to expose Abd al- Rahman's religious notion of the French « infidels » , « which was fed by far deeper layers of his conception than merely his political differences with the French. It reflected age-old Islamic attitudes towards Christian invaders, dating back to the times of the Crusades and to later Moroccan reactions to Spanish and Portuguese invasions. This substratum, as it were, of Abd al-Rahman's policy towards the French is clearly revealed in his internal correspondence.
During the first seven months of 1844, Sultan Abd al-Rahman routinely used abusive religious terms in his references to the French : « infidels » (kuffar, kafi- run) (14) ; « enemies of God » (a da Allah) (15) ; « enemies of the religion » (a da' al-din) (16) ; « polytheists » (mushrikun) (17) ; and « idol worshippers » ( abid al- asnam) (18). These references were amplified by statements such as « ... the Frenchman is more than all the other Christian nations deceitful, malevolent, and wily... » (19), and « We should not trust even one of [ the infidels ] » (20). That these references and statements were entirely of the traditional mold, not influenced at all by Abd al-Rahman's long experience with the French, is proved by his use of the exact same formulae fourteen years earlier, barely three months after the French occupation of Algiers (21).
The attitude of Abd el-Rahman 43
Not surprisingly, these phrases were followed by pious appeals to God to punish the French « infidels » for their religious adverseness. By far the most frequently expressed wish Abd al-Rahman made with regard to the French was, « May God exterminate them » (dammarahum Allah) (22). Somewhat milder supplications were, « May God divide [ the French ] and destroy their power » (23) ; « May God overwhelm [ the French ] with misery » (24) ; « May God surround [ the French ] with calamities » (25) ; « May God destroy [ the Frenchmen's ] power and turn their wile against them » (26) ; « May God make everything go wrong for [ the French ] » (27) ; « May God abase and humiliate [ the French ] » (28) ; « May God confound [ the French ] » (29) ; and « May God reverse [ the French ] » (30).
When the Sultan allowed himself to be persuaded by his son Muhammad that the Moroccan forces were capable of defeating the French (31), he officially proclaimed the jihad, presumably in order that his own forces might become God's instrument in fulfilling these wishes : « 0 Believers, combat the infidels and exterminate them, until they request peace (aman) and pay blood money (diya) » (32). Abd al- Rahman then expressed his confidence that « ... if all Muslims are in agreement, and if they are all determined to sacrifice their possessions and lives for the sake of the jihad and the defense of the religion, what will happen will be calamitous to the Christians » (33).
This is not to say that Abd al-Rahman 's vision was so curtailed by his religious blinders as to fail to perceive reality. The Sultan demonstrated, at times, a thoroughly realistic conception of French power. This was nowhere more clearly expressed than in the following warning to his son Muhammad, which he made after his proclamation of jihad :
Remember that the Frenchman, enemy of God, has inhabited [ Algeria ] for many years, and that he is accustomed to every fatigue and every danger. The combats have a thousand times illuminated his front with their lightning flashes, and his ears are used to the sound of their thunders. He has about 90 000 men, and he leaves behind neither a casualty nor a deserter ; he spends enormous sums of money for this purpose. Not content with all this, he also enrolls those among the other nations who want to come to him, and he salaries, clothes, and- nourishes them. [ The Sultan was obviously referring to the Foreign Legion ] (34).
Nor did Abd al-Rahman have any illusions with regard to the Frenchmen's ability to exercise their power intelligently :
[ The Frenchman ] has multiplied his spies — his eyes in these countries both on land and on sea. They take note of anyone who leaves from here in the direction of your area. What I write to you, and what I write to my representatives in Ouj- da, is repeated back to me in the enemy's own letters. Thus all contacts have been intercepted (35).
At times, Abd al-Rahman 's religious convictions even led him to an overestima- tion of Christian power :
Do not think that the French are the only enemies of the Muslims ; all the poly- theist8 share the same sentiments, as verified by the words of God : € Fight the
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polythéiste all together as they fight you all together » [ Qur'an IX, 36 ], that is, fight with all the believers, as all the others fight you ; do not rely on any of the infidels, for the infidels are all the same ; among themselves they are all unveiled. I have heard that they got together..., and that they agreed that the vorshippers of the cross, marching under the same symbol, should be in common accord (36).
This opinion curiously contrasted with the reality of intra-European rivalries, especially between France and Great Britain, and of the strenuous British efforts to prevent French hostilities against Morocco (37).
Furthermore, the Sultan frequently adjoined to his colorful depictions of French power pungent diagnoses of Moroccan weakness :
On our side, my son [ Muhammad ], notice how much time we have spent trying to stir up the Muslims, how many stratagems we have employed for this purpose, and how much money we have spent on it... And yet, we have assembled only the troops which are with you. You must know well the people [ of Morocco ] : they lack patience, and they are unwilling to leave their abodes. They resemble camels overwhelmed by laziness. Nothing can lift their spirits — neither exhortations nor punishment (38).
According to Abd al-Rahman, the reason for this weakness was that « ... faith is very weak today among the Muslims ; they no longer desire to enterprise jihad » (39).
In view of these pessimistic evaluations of the balance of power between the French and the Moroccans, how can the Sultan's fatal decision to proclaim jihad against the French be explained ?
It seems that in addition to the usual explanation, according to which Abd al- Rahman succumbed to inexorable pressures from within his country to do so (40), another dimension must be noted. While it is true, as we have seen, that Abd al- Rahman 's pessimistic view was partially couched in religious terms, the Islamic cast of his mind impelled him to the conclusion that France's power was essentially transitory, and that God would not fail to grant the Muslims victory over the infidels : « The power of the infidels will not endure, and their condition will not stabilize. If it please God, in a short while the time of the infidels will have passed, and the command and preponderance will return to the Muslims » (41). Thus the Sultan gave his son the following order : « You will, then, lance [ against the French ] the forces of the Muslims from all directions, and I have reason to believe that God will render the Christians pasture for the Muslims ; for we conduct the war for the glory of God, while these enemies of the All-High fight for the sake of Satan » (42).
— Ill —
The Treaty of Tangier, signed between France and Morocco on September 10, 1844 (43), following Morocco's defeat at the Battle of Isly, has been marked by most historians as a turning point in Morocco's history in general and in Franco-Moroccan relations in particular. It has been underlined that the combination of surprisingly moderate French demands in the treaty and the crushing evidence of French military superiority, helped bring about a period of gradual improvement in Franco-Moroccan
The attitude of Abd el-Rahman 45
relations and of French ascendancy at the Moroccan court (44). Indeed, there is no doubt that despite several crises in these relations (45), this evaluation is essentially correct. Above all, within a year after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tangier, the two governments closely cooperated in pursuing their common goal — effecting Abd al-Qadir's downfall (46).
Nevertheless, it remains to be examined whether this rapprochement, to which Abd al-Rahman was largely motivated by military and political considerations, brought about a corresponding change in his inner attitude towards the French, as they themselves assumed it did. Certainly, in his meetings with French officials and in his correspondence with the French, a marked change had taken place, with led the French to this conclusion (47).
A number of phrases and references in Abd al-Rahman 's internal correspondence during the years 1845-1847 indeed seem to indicate a real change. Thus he referred to the Treaty of Tangier as « the lawful peace » (al-sulh al-shar i) (48), a phrase which bestowed on the treaty full religious legitimacy. In a remarkable departure from previous usage, he actually condemned the killing of Frenchmen : « [ Abd al-Qadir ] attacked [ the Christians ] and killed most of them. Only those who fled were saved. All that he wants is to arouse immorality... » (49). In addition, Abd al-Rahman had certainly learnt to respect French shrewdness : « For the Christians... establish subtle reasonings for the words, and set writings aside in order to use them eventually and obtain satisfaction » (50). « [ Writings ] are, for [ the French ], a means.., of knowing our words and opinions. For a writing is always a mirror of its author's thought » (51). Furthermore, at least on one occasion, the Sultan attributed to the French not only a thorough understanding of the situation in Morocco, but also reliability in transmitting information to the Moroccan Government :
Compare, moreover, these propositions [ by a Moroccan agent ] with the intelligence provided by the Consul of France [ in Tangier ] in his letter we have sent you. He is the best informed man about the situation of Abd al-Qadir, for he maintains in all parts [ of Morocco ] intelligence agents and spies for this purpose, and he is more desirous than anyone else to put an end to [ Abd al-Qadir's ] career. Also, the outcome will confirm his words and not those of the others (52).
A closer look at these statements will, however, reveal that the changes in Abd al-Rahman 's attitude towards the French were not nearly as significant as they first seem to have been. The first two declarations — about the lawfulness of the peace treaty and the wrongfulness of killing Christians — were included in a diatribe against Abd al-Qadir, sent to Moroccan tribal chiefs when it was in the Sultan's interest to defend his policies and condemn Abd al-Qadir's. Thus these affirmations did not necessarily reflect Abd al-Kahman's real opinions. The other three statements quoted above are from letters addressed by the Sultan to his son Muhammad, and therefore they probably did express his thoughts. There is no doubt that he was greatly impressed by the way the French used letters they received in order to further their aims, and he possibly adopted this useful practice. It is also clear that he had much respect for French familiarity with the situation in Morocco. On the other hand, the confidence Abd al-Rahman expressed in the information transmitted to him by the French consul
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did not necessarily reflect any real trust in him. As the Sultan himself explained to his son, the reason this information could be accepted was that the French would transmit reliable information on Abd al-Qadir because they wanted to cause his downfall. When Muhammad pointed out to his father that the French tended to exaggerate Abd al- Qadir's power in order to stampede the Moroccans into immediate action against him, the Sultan readily admitted this possibility (53).
The bulk of the evidence leaves little doubt that Abd al-Rahman 's fundamental attitude towards the French remained virtually unchanged, and that he continued to perceive them according to the traditional Islamic perspective. Even after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the French continued to be, in the Sultan's view, « infidels » (54), « enemies of the religion » (55), and even « enemies » or « infidel enemies » of Morocco (56) (despite the « lawful peace ! »). They were still inherently untrustworthy :
All [ the French ] suggestions [ to the Moroccan Government ] conceal artifices, and if they are sometimes correct, this is by pure chance. Remember the words of the hadith, « Beware of the one who appears sincere and is really an impostor >. What sincerity and what counsels can we expect from the enemies of our religion ? And when has the enemy of our religion ever assisted the Muslims ? (57).
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the nature of the wishes expressed by Abd al-Rahman with regard to the French changed little since the previous period : « May God exterminate them » (dammarahum Allah), « ... annihilate them » (ahlakahum Allah), « ... curse [ the French Consul ] (qatalahu Allah) (58) ;and « May God cause the extermination and the perdition of the infidels » (Zada Allah al-kafirin halakan wa-bawaran...) (59). >.
A particularly striking illustration of the difference between the attitude Abd al- Rahman demonstrated towards the French in direct contacts and his attitude as reflected in his internal correspondence is the case of Léon Roches, chargé d'affaires at the French consulate in Tangier. In an exceedingly lengthy report on his mission to Abd al-Rahman 's court in Rabat, Roches described in great detail the friendship and warmth towards the French in general and himself in particular the Sultan had exhibited, which moved him to approach Abd al-Rahman, kneel down and kiss his rosary. « As soon as I lowered my head », wrote Roches, « he covered it with one of the flaps of his burnous and told me in a loud voice : ' May God cover you with his protective shade as I cover you with my garment... ' » (60). Compare this with the following reference to Roches made by Abd al-Rahman in a letter to his son barely a year and a half after that remarkable occasion : « [ The French are ] guided by the infidel Ibn al- Rush [ Léon Roches ], who knows the [ Arabic ] language and who apostatized (irtadda) after accepting Islam, who knows the Muslim society, its manners and customs — may God annihilate the Christians... Amen ! » (61).
The attitude of Abd el-Rahman 47
FOOTNOTES * The bulk of the research for this article, conducted in Paris and London during the summer of 1978, was made possible by generous grants from the Faculty of the Humanities and from the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa.
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(1) For an overall account, see Paul Azan, L'émir Abd-el-Kader 1808-1883 ; du fanatisme musulman au patriotisme français, Paris, Hachette, 1925, p. 1-236. For a recent account of Abd al-Qadir's resistance during the years 1832-1839, see Raphael Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians ; Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation, New York & London, Holmes & Meier, 1977. (2) See L. Carl Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey 1837-1855, Princeton, N J., Princeton University Press, 1974. (3) For Morocco's domestic conditions and foreign relations in general, see Jean-Louis Miège, Le Maroc et l'Europe (18301894), Paris, P.U J., 1961-1963, 4 vol., especially vol. H. For Morocco's relations with France, see Philippe de Cossé Brissac, Les rapports de la France et du Maroc pendant la conquête de l'Algérie (1830-1847), Paris, Larose, 1931. For Morocco's relations with Great Britain, see Francis R. Flournoy, British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmers- ton (1830-1865), London, King, 1935. For Morocco's relations with the United States, see Luella J. Hall, The United States and Morocco, 1 7761 956, Metuchen, N J., Scarecrow Press, 1971. (4) Léon Roches, Trente-deux ans à travers llslam (1832-1864), Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1885, vol. II, p. 412. (5) Ismael Hamet, « Le Gouvernement marocain et la conquête d'Alger (documents chérifiens) », Académie des sciences coloniales ; Annales, vol. 1, 1925, p. 53. (6) For a detailed, fully documented account of the Battle of Isly and the deterioration of Franco-Moroccan relations that led to it, see Albert Latreille, La campagne de 1844 au Maroc ; la bataille dlsly, publié sous la direction de la section historique de l'Etat -major de l'Armée, Paris, R. Chapelot, 1912. (7) For an account of Abd al-Qadir's surrender, see Azan, op. cit., p. 231-236. (8) For a detailed account of this affair, see Cossé Brissac, op. cit., p. 21-27. (9) For the details, see ibid., p. 47, 50. (10) See ibid., p. 52-73. (ll)Jbid.,p.65-73. (12) Ibid., p. 73-81. (13) See, for instance, Latreille, op. cit., p. 1-122 passim ; Azan, op. cit., p. 197-201 ; Cossé Brissac, op. cit., p. 73-92 ; Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine ; la conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (18271871), Paris, P.U J., 1964, p. 195-197. (14) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, Archives Historiques de la Guerre (AHG) : H-94 (copy) ; Proclamation of Abd al-Rahman to the Moroccans, July 19, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 479-481 ; Abd al-Rahman to his son Muhammad, July 15, 1844, July 28, 1844, and August 1, 1844, AHG :H-97. (15) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 20, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 486 ; same to same, July 28, 1844, and July 31, 1844, AHG : H-97 ; Abd al - Rahman to the Jama a of Ait Hatta, July 20, 1844, AHG : H-97. (16) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 20, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 486 ; same to same, July 25, 1844, and July 28, 1844, AHG : H-97 ; Abd al-Rahman to the Jama a of Ait Hatta, July 20, 1844, AHG : H-97 ; Abd al-Rahman to Sidi Muhammad al- Remlich, July 27, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 493. (17) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy). (18) See, for instance, Muhammad to Abd al-Rahman, August 5, 1844, text in Hamet, op. cit., p. 104-106. (19) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 1, 1844, AHG : H-97. For a similar statement, see Abd al-Rahman to Sidi Muhammad al-Remlich, July 27, 1844, AHG : H-97. (20) Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy).
The attitude of Abd el-Rahman 49
(21) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to the Algerians tribes, October 5, 1830, text in Hamet, op. cit., p. 64-65 ; Abd al-Rahman to Hommane al-Jarrari, October 10, 1830, text in ibid., p. 65-67 ; Abd al-Rahman to his cousin Mulay Ali, December 4, 1830, text in ibid., p. 70-71 ; same to same, December 18, 1830, text in ibid., p. 73-75. (22) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 15, 1844, and August 1, 1844, AHG:H-97. (23) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 1, 1844, AHG : H-97. (24) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 28, 1844, AHG : H-97. (25) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 1, 1844, AHG : H-97. (27) Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy). (28) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 18, 1844, AHG : H-97. (29) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 20, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 486. (30) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 15, 1844, AHG :H-97. (31) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 18, 1844, AHG : H-97. (32) Proclamation of Abd al-Rahman to the Moroccans, July 19, 1844, text in Roches, op. cit., vol. II, p. 479-481.. (33) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 1, 1844, AHG : H-97. (34) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 31, 1844, AHG : H-97. For additional statements by the Sultan referring to French power, see same to same, July 15, 1844, and August 1, 1844, AHG: H-97. (35) Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy). (36) Ibid. For similar statements, see Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 15, 1844, and July 25, 1844, AHG: H-97. (37) See, for instance, Cossé Brissac, op. cit., p. 89-91. (38) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 31, 1844, AHG :H-97. (39) Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy). (40) See, for instance, Azan, op. cit., p. 197-201 ; Cossé Brissac, op. cit., p. 89-92. (41) Abd al-Rahman to Abd al-Qadir, February 16, 1844, AHG : H-94 (copy). (42) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 28, 1844, AHG : H-97. (43) Text in Jacob C. Hurewitz, comp., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics ; a Documentary Record, vol. I '.European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven & London : 2nd éd., rev. & enl., 1975, p. 286-287. (44) See, for instance, Latreilte, op. cit., p. 175-178 ; Cossé Brissac, op. cit., p. 101-103 ; Miège, op. cit., vol. II, p. 203-211. (45) For the crisis of January-April 1846, see Georges Yver, « La question marocaine en 1846 », Revue africaine, vol. 53 (1909), p. 199-270. (46) For a detailed account, see Raphael Danziger, « From Alliance to Belligerency : Abd al-Qadir in Morocco, 1843-1847 », Maghreb Review, November-December 1979. (47) In referring to letters written by Abd al-Rahman in mid-1846, the French Consul in Tangier stated : « There are a hundred years of difference between this correspondence and that discovered at [ Muhammad's ] camp after the Battle of Isly » : Chasteau to Foreign Minister, Tangier, June 13, 1846, n 81, Archives des Affaires Etrangères (AAE) : Correspondance politique (CP)- Maroc, vol. 16. (48) Abd al-Rahman to the shaikhs of Beni Snassen and Angad, August 15, 1847, text in Muhammad b. Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'ri, Tuhfat al-Zatr fi Tarikh al-Jazatr wa-al-Amir Abd al- Qadir (Beirut, 2 nd rev. ed. 1964), p. 487-489. (49) Ibid. (50) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 8, 1846, text in Hamet, op. cit., p. 114-117.
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(51) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 21, 1847, text in ibid., p. 139-141. (52) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, May 20, 1847, text in ibid., p. 128-130. (53) Muhammad to Abd al-Rahman, June 1, 1847, text in ibid., p. 131-132 ; Abd al- Rahman to Muhammad, June 14, 1847, text in ibid., p. 133-134. (54) See, for instance, ibid. (55) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 8, 1846, text in ibid., p. 114- 117 ;same to same, July 21, 1847, text in ibid., p. 139-141. (56) See, for instance, Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, June 14, 1847, text in ibid., p. 133- 134 ; Abd al-Rahman to the shaikhs of Beni Snassen and Angad, August 15, 1847, text in al- Jaza'iri, op. cit., p. 487489. (57) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 21, 1847, text in Hamet, op. cit., p. 139-141. (58) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, August 8, 1846, text in ibid., p. 114-117 ;same to same, July 21, 1847, text in ibid., p. 139-141 ; same to same, July 14, 1847, text in ibid., p. 133- 134. (59) Ibid. (60) Roches to Chasteau, Tangier, November 5, 1845, AAE : CP-Maroc, vol. 16. (61) Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad, July 21, 1847, text in Hamet, op. cit., p. 139-141. (62) See Raphael Danziger, « Abd al-Qadir and Abd al-Rahman : Religious and Political Aspects of their Confrontation », Maghreb Review, January-February, 1980.
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