约翰-马基
布朗芬布伦纳教授、诺贝克教授和沃德教授的三篇论文涉及一个隐含的重要主题：占领与日本的社会变革。 这三篇论文都以日本社会经济、社会和政治领域的制度变迁现象为中心，但制度变迁的程度必然会带来社会价值体系的巨大转变。
布朗芬布伦纳讨论了占领政策在经济上的三个成功和三个失败。 土地改革是成功的，财阀改革和工会运动都被他视为失败，但它们都涉及相当大的制度变革。 尽管财阀改革和工会运动都可以归类为失败，因为它们没有达到可能达到的目标，但事实是，今天的大企业和劳工机构都与 1945 年时大不相同。 诺贝克描述了日本教育、宗教和社会机构的重大变化。 特别重要的是家庭制度的变化，尤其是对妇女地位的影响。 沃德强调了具有深远意义的政治体制变化：代议制和负责任政府的建立和有效运作、自由选举以及人民主权理论的接受。
我们所看到的是一系列影响从家庭到国家政府的制度变革。 这些变化不仅仅局限于结构上。 与此同时，日本的价值体系也发生了更为显著的变化。 我充分意识到，要确定任何社会的价值观体系的内容，以及这种体系变化的性质和程度，都是非常困难的。 我认为，一个社会的价值体系是社会成员普遍认同的一套规范、态度和信念，用来对个人和社会行动、情况和关系的 "好坏 "做出判断。
本文所讨论的三篇论文所涉及的制度变革中的几个例子，可以说明一般价值观体系的性质以及日本价值观体系所发生的变化。 占领前，工会被认为是 "坏 "的，其存在本身就是非法的；如今，工会作为一种制度被认为是 "好 "的，尽管许多日本人可能对其某些行动感到遗憾。 1945 年前，父权制家庭和妇女地位低下是 "好 "的，如今却遭到了反对。 1945 年前，以帝国主权为基础的专制政府是 "好 "的；如今，政治上的 "好 "是以人民主权为基础的民主政府。
令人印象深刻的制度变革伴随着价值体系的转变，这就提出了一个显而易见的问题： 为什么？ 我不打算试图给出答案。 我只想提几个问题，这些问题有可能导致答案的产生。 在我看来，一个有用的初步步骤应该是尝试更准确地描述占领下开始的变革过程的性质。
首先，我想指出，在我看来，有三种非常广泛的社会变革类型无法将日本的社会变革归类。 首先，1945 年以来日本所经历的显然不是 19 世纪末日本现代化所涉及的那种社会变革。 两者之间的差异显而易见，无需赘言。 其次，它也不是作为新国家当代现象的现代化所涉及的那种变革。 今天发生在他们身上的事情与日本在大约 1870 年至 1900 年间经历的事情大致相同。 最后，非常清楚的是，日本自 1945 年以来所经历的并不完全是所谓的自我变革过程，这种变革通常发生在任何社会内部，源于社会的本质及其持续的进程。 尽管正如诺贝克和沃德所强调的那样，日本显然存在着强烈的自生变化因素，但要理解 1945 年后的日本社会变革，关键还是要从本次讨论的中心主题--占领--出发。
我想到，也许任何分析日本近期社会变革的尝试最好都从这样一种观点出发，即日本的社会变革是独一无二的，因此必须在我所指出的可能参照范围之外对其本身进行研究。 我认为，日本的独特之处在于第二次世界大战结束时社会的三个主要特征。 首先，战争本身对日本社会的整个结构产生了破坏性影响，破坏性既是变革的表现，也是推动更大变革的力量； 其次，诺贝克和沃德都指出，日本社会在两代人之前就已经经历了现代化进程的最初阶段，因此拥有现代社会所特有的各种制度；第三，占领本身在几乎完全由美国人占领的外国社会与日本之间创造了一种特殊的互动状态。
在思考 1945 年以来日本的变革问题时，我越来越觉得，分析日本社会变革原因的最富有成效的途径，或许在于对日美文化间接触这一广泛问题的深入研究。 显而易见，尽管最初的接触是以军事占领的形式进行的，但迅速发生的是对日本全社会的影响。 我所说的精密研究，基本上是试图对美国和日本所谓的 "民族风格 "的要义进行相当清晰和准确的解读。 我认为，正如这三篇论文所有力证明的那样，我们已经对 1945 年及其后的日本民族风格有了一个相当不错的工作概念。 造成这种可喜局面的原因很简单，那就是当时发生在日本身上的事情以及此后发生的事情是如此显而易见、如此引人注目，以至于我们已经在这个问题的日本方面花费了相当多的精力。
因此，我们对日本为何在 1945 年准备好开始一场剧烈的社会变革有了相当清楚的认识。 但我们不知道为什么美国会 "准备就绪"，制定出如此符合日本国情要求的政策。 例如，我们知道美国占领日本的政策内容是什么，但据我所知，没有人真正弄清一个根本问题，即为什么美国社会通过美国政府中担任要职的个人能够制定出影响深远的政策，要求对日本社会的许多领域进行根本性变革。 也许不存在真正的问题；也许只要说在经济、政治和社会事务中的 "美国理想主义 "是该政策和执行该政策的行为的根源就足够了。 但是，如果我对问题的陈述接近合理，那么在我看来，美国方面的某些方面就应该像日本方面一样接受严格的审查。
即使我们最终对 1945 年的这两个社会有了比我认为我们目前所拥有的更为复杂的看法，我们对一个在我看来更为根本和引人入胜的问题的研究仍然仅仅停留在初始阶段： 为什么两个明显不同的社会能够在日本引入并维持迅速而广泛的社会变革的复杂过程中有效互动？ 我对这个问题的答案的可能性质一无所知，但我坚持认为，这是一个尚未得到认真解决的有效问题。
正如我所指出的，我认为日本人自己和一些研究日本社会的外国学生已经很好地研究了日本社会的这一半问题。 对于美国在这一过程中所扮演角色的平行研究的发展，甚至对于更仔细、更准确地描述互动关系中美国伙伴的性质的重要性的认识，我就不那么乐观了。
我希望看到至少有同样多的日本社会科学家对 1945 年以来的美国社会变革问题感兴趣，就像美国社会科学家研究日本社会变革现象一样。 我认为，美国人之所以没有更多地关注日美关系中美国伙伴的性质问题，有一个非常简单的原因：美国人专注于自称美国在亚洲政策的失败，同时似乎有一种近乎病态的倾向，即忽视合理的成功，比如美国在日本制度和相关价值体系的一系列广泛变革中所发挥的作用。
Comment
John M. Maki
The three papers by Professors Bronfenbrenner, Norbeck and Ward deal with an implicit theme of considerable significance: the Occupation and social change in Japan. All three of them center on the phenomenon of institutional change in the economic, social and political spheres of Japanese society, but the extent of institutional change was of such a degree that it necessarily brought with it a considerable shift in the society's value system.
Bronfenbrenner has discussed three economic successes and three failures resulting from occupation policies. Land reform, a success, and Zaibatsu reform and the union movement, both of which he treats as failures, all involved institutional changes of considerable magnitude. Even though both Zaibatsu reform and the union move-ment can be classed as failures because they fell short of what might have been, the fact remains that both big business and labor, as institutions, are far different today from what they were in 1945. Norbeck has described significant changes in Japan's educational, religious and social institutions. Of special importance are changes in the family system, particularly as they affect the position of women. Ward has emphasized institutional changes in politics of far-reaching significance: the establishment and effective operation of representa-tive and responsible government, free elections, and the acceptance of the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
What we observe is a battery of changes affecting institutions ranging from the family to the national government. These changes have not been confined merely to structure. They have been accom-panied with an even more striking alteration in the Japanese system of values. I am fully aware of the difficulties involved both in deter-mining the content of a system of values in any society and the nature and extent of change in such a system. Although it may appear simplistic, I believe it is not misleading to state that a soci-ety's system of values is that set of norms, attitudes and beliefs generally shared by members of the society and used to form judg-ments of the "goodness" or "badness" of individual and social ac-tions, situations and relationships.
Both the nature of a system of values in general and the changes that have come over Japan's can be illustrated by a few examples drawn from the institutional changes dealt with in the three papers under discussion. Prior to the Occupation labor unions were held to be so "bad" that their very existence was illegal; today unions as institutions are accepted as "good," even though some of their ac-tions may be deplored by many Japanese. Prior to 1945 the patriar-chal family and the inferiority of women were "good"; today they are rejected. Prior to 1945 an authoritarian government based on imperial sovereignty was "good"; today the politically "good" is a democratic government based on popular sovereignty.
The impressive degree of institutional change with the accompa-nying shifts in the value system raises the obvious question: Why? I do not propose to attempt an answer. I simply wish to mention a few matters that may conceivably lead toward an answer. It seems to me that a useful initial step would be to try to describe somewhat more precisely the nature of the process of change initiated under the Occupation.
In the first place, I would like to point out that it seems to me that there are three very broad types of social change under which Japan's cannot be classed. First, it is apparent that what Japan has been going through since 1945 is not the type of social change that was involved in its modernization at the end of the 19th century. The differences are so obvious that they require no comment. Sec-ond, it is not the kind of change that is involved in modernization as a contemporary phenomenon of new nations. What is happening to them today is roughly equivalent to what Japan experienced between about 1870 and 1900. Finally, it is perfectly clear that what Japan has gone through since 1945 is not exclusively the process of what might be termed self-generated change which normally takes place within any society and that arises from the very nature of society and its ongoing processes. Although there is clearly a strong element of self-generated change in Japan, as Norbeck and Ward both empha-size, it is crucial to an understanding of post-1945 Japanese social change to start from the central theme of this discussion, namely, the Occupation.
It has occurred to me that perhaps any attempt to analyze Japan's recent social change might best start from the view that it is unique and, consequently, must be studied in itself outside the possible terms of reference I have indicated. What makes the Japanese situa-tion unique, I think, are three key features of the society at the end of the Second World War. The first was the disruptive effect of the war itself on the entire fabric of Japanese society, disruption being both a manifestation of change and an impelling force toward even more change; the second, the fact, set forth by both Norbeck and Ward, that Japan's society was one that two generations earlier had passed through the initial stages of the broad process of moderniza-tion and was therefore possessed of the panoply of institutions char-acteristic of a modern society; and the third, the Occupation itself which created a peculiar state of inter-action between a foreign soci-ety as represented by the almost completely American Occupation and Japan.
As I have considered the problem of change in Japan since 1945, I have come increasingly to feel that perhaps the most fruitful avenue for an approach to an analysis of the causes of Japanese social change may possibly lie in a sophisticated examination of the broad problem of inter-cultural contact between Japan and the United States. It is obvious beyond challenge that although the initial contact was in the form of a military occupation, what occurred rapidly was a society-wide impact on Japan. What I mean by a sophisticated examination is basically an attempt to reach a fairly clear and accurate reading of the essentials of what has been referred to as "the national style" of both the United States and Japan. I think that as the three papers so ably demonstrate we already have what amounts to a fairly good working concept of the Japanese national style as of 1945 and since. The reason for this happy state of affairs is simply that what was happening to Japan at that time and has happened since has been so-visible and so spectacular that a considerable amount of effort has already been expended on the Japanese side of the problem.
As a result we have a fairly good idea of why Japan was ready in 1945 to embark on a course of drastic social change. But we do not know why the United States was "ready" to come up with a policy that would fit so elegantly into the requirements of the Japanese situation. We know, for example, what the content of American policy for the Occupation of Japan was, but no one, to the best of my knowledge, has really come to grips with the fundamental issue of why it was that American society operating through individuals in key positions in the United States government was able to create its far-reaching policy calling for fundamental changes in many areas of Japanese society. Perhaps no real problem exists; perhaps it is enough to say that "American idealism" in matters economic, political and social was the source of both the policy and the acts that imple-mented it. But if my statement of the problem approaches validity then it seems to me that some aspects of the American side should be subjected to as searching an examination as has been applied to the Japanese side.
Even if we do end with a more sophisticated view of the two societies as of 1945 than I believe we currently possess, we would still be at only an initial stage in our investigation of what appears to me as an even more fundamental and fascinating question: Why was it that two such obviously dissimilar societies were able to interact as effectively as they did in the complex process of the introduction and maintenance of rapid and extensive social change in Japan? I have no idea as to the possible nature of an answer to this question, but I stoutly maintain that it is a valid one which has not yet been seriously addressed.
As I have indicated, I think that the Japanese themselves and a number of foreign students of Japanese society have already soundly approached the study of the Japanese half of the problem. I am less sanguine about the development of a parallel study of the American role in the process or even of an awareness of the importance of a more careful and accurate delineation of the nature of the American partner in the interacting relationship.
I would like to see at least as many Japanese social scientists as seriously interested in the problem of American social change since 1945 as there have been American social scientists working on the Japanese phenomena of social change. I think that there is a very simple reason why Americans have not paid more attention to the problem of the nature of the American partner in the Japanese-American relationship: the American preoccupation with self-pro-claimed failures of American policy in Asia coupled with what seems to be an almost pathological inclination to ignore reasonable suc-cesses such as the American role in the generation of a broad series of changes in Japanese institutions and the associated system of values.
