美国占领日本 回顾历史
格兰特-K-古德曼
编译
国际研究，东亚系列研究出版物，第二号
堪萨斯大学东亚研究中心
The American Occupation of Japan: A Retrospective View
Grant K. Goodman
Compiler
International Studies, East Asian Series Research Publication, Number Two
Center for East Asian Studies The University of Kansas
评论
哈里-爱默生-威尔德斯
这不是一个乐观主义的时代，但听说只要有时间、灌输和一段时间的成功管理，人们就会适应几乎任何政治环境，这令人沮丧。 这一论断在历史上可能是正确的；毕竟，在人民生活富裕的时候，很少会爆发反对专制主义、仁慈的专制主义、法西斯主义、官僚主义或军国主义的起义。 不过，令人欣慰的是，正如沃德教授提醒我们的那样，从长远来看，政治恶魔对自由化和进步的社会力量束手无策。
大家都同意，战前的日本就有这样的力量。 令人遗憾的是，SCAP 以他的智慧没有指出，我们所认为的 "占领 "再形成的基础是存在的。 同样不幸的是，占领军领导人要么忽视了社会和经济形势，要么可悲地误读了这一形势。
正如布朗芬布伦纳教授和诺贝克教授所指出的，造成误解的原因是多方面的。 其中最主要的原因是军人认为，尽管没有受过足够的训练，但他们是比教授手下更有效率的社会科学家。 占领军包括一些助手，从整体上看，他们的素质至少相当于任何一所大学的教师，但军人往往不征求也通常不听取专业人士的建议。
并非所有的建议都是完美无缺的。 一些所谓的专家，也许是诺贝克教授所说的那些无能的专家，或者是沃德教授所说的那些被福音派的狂热所感动的专家，把日本看成是乌托邦实验的实验室。 在工作人员会议上提出的激进建议寥寥无几，但在提出的建议中，我却想不起来有哪一次提到过任何心理、历史、政治或社会学因素。
军事部门的负责人，也就是谣传中已经被最高统帅选为总统内阁成员的人，显然缺乏对社会科学的了解和尊重。
占领军的官方历史是如此以自我为中心，以至于其纯粹军事方面的撰稿人奉命在每一页上都提到麦克阿瑟将军的名字，将所有不能证明日本不断陷入专制、残暴、侵略和邪恶宣传的历史最小化。
没有人能够打消霸主们某些固执的想法。 其中最主要的是天皇崇拜的神话，日本一心想要称霸亚洲和太平洋地区（如果不是世界的话）的想法，以及右翼分子虽然因战败而彻底丧失信心，但即将重新获得最高控制权的信念。 人们认为，日本的每一个社会机构都主要致力于恢复军国主义。
SCAP 缺乏公正的信息。 决策者中会说日语的人寥寥无几，能读懂日语的人更是少之又少，而且几乎没有任何信息能在当地居民中自由传播。 除了政府总部的一个部门雇用了前日本总参谋部的一些军官作为反共情报小组外，在没有明令禁止的情况下，与被占领国称为 "土著人 "的接触都受到严格限制。
在占领的头一两年，也就是SCAP指令如纸质洪流般涌出的时期，占领军依靠三个来源来获取有关日本的最新消息，而这三个来源都很可疑。 在政府总部最强大的部门之一，每天都有一份来自谨慎的、甚至是经过严格审查的方言报刊的译文摘要。 对本地线人也有一定的依赖，他们的服务会得到各种津贴。 由于大清洗（真实的或假定即将发生的）使大多数经验丰富的日本人无法进入 SCAP 办公室，这些告密者大多是左翼分子，其中大多数是业余的，在投降前并不重要；其他告密者则是原则可调整的圆滑的操作者。 总之，这些告密者制造了大量有失偏颇的 "新闻"，其中充斥着错误信息、歪曲、两面三刀和自吹自擂。 他们还散布诽谤，而这些诽谤由于其 "启示 "性和辛辣性，很容易被接受。
然而，大多数占领军并没有这样的信息来源；他们从当时由极左派宣传家策划的军报《星条旗报》上获取信息。 正是他们在麦克阿瑟神圣的大一大厦六楼为流亡归来的野坂三藏安排了一场热烈的欢迎仪式，令日本震惊不已。 一些误入歧途的日本人将这次欢迎会解释为美国占领军事实上亲共的证明。
正如诺贝克教授所指出的那样，尽管存在种种弊端，包括美国人的无能，但 "占领 "仍取得了三篇论文所描述的成就，这应归功于日美之间的合作。 当然，占领军的压力进一步推动了个人主义、自由、平等、工会主义、新闻自由和宽容。 然而，一个恼人的疑问出现了。 既然战前的进步，无论多么微小，都在日本获得了相当大的势头，既然这些理想的改革在世界其他地方引起了发酵，那么如果占领从未存在，日本会发生多大的变化呢？
其他问题也随之而来。 占领军成员当然不是酗酒者、剥削者或无恶不作的人，尽管我们中的一些人可能确实不称职，但他们热衷于重塑日本。 他们是否总是准确地知道自己的计划意味着什么？ SCAP的指令中经常使用诸如 "民主制度"（Democ-racy）这样的字眼，而这些字眼对于日本人和美国人来说并不总是具有相同的含义。 无论是日本人还是美国人，他们都清楚地知道会有什么样的后果吗？
如果改革成功了，SCAP 会鞠躬致谢，但如果改革失败了，又该归咎于谁呢？ 显然，日本的教育体系存在缺陷，布朗芬-布伦纳（Bronfen-Brenner）教授所描述的经济计划也存在缺陷；是占领国的失误，还是日本破坏了这些计划，抑或是美国的方法不适用于东方人？ 那么，在未来的某一天，我们能否在越南使用这些蓝图呢？
那么，美国人是否圆满地解决了他们自己的问题？ 我们的农民是否幸福，我们的妇女是否对自己的地位感到满意，劳资双方是否完全一致，我们的种族关系是否和谐？
Comment
Harry Emerson Wildes
This is not an age of optimism, but it is discouraging to hear that given time, indoctrination and a period of successful administration, people will adapt themselves to almost any political circumstance. The thesis may be historically correct; after all, few uprisings break out against absolutism, benevolent despotism, fascism, bureaucracy or militarism while people are prosperous. It is, however, comforting that, as Professor Ward reminds us, the political devils are, in the long run, helpless against liberalizing and progressive social forces.
Such forces, as all agree, were operating within prewar Japan. Unhappily, SCAP, in all his wisdom, failed to point out that founda-tions existed for what we like to think of as the Occupation's re-forms. It was unfortunate, also, that Occupation leaders either ig-nored or sadly misread the social and economic situation.
The causes for the misconception, as Professors Bronfenbrenner and Norbeck note, were manifold. High among them was the assump-tion by military men that, despite an insufficient training, they were more efficient social scientists than were their professorial under-lings. The Occupation included aides whose quality, taken as a whole, at least equaled that of the faculties in any university, but the military men often did not consult and usually did not heed profes-sional advice.
Not all the advice was flawless. Some of the supposed experts, perhaps those whom Professor Norbeck terms inept, or whom Profes-sor Ward describes as moved by evangelical zeal, looked upon Japan as a laboratory for Utopian experiment. Few of the more radical suggestions came before staff meetings but, of those that did, I fail to recall one instance in which any psychological, historical, political or sociological factor was even mentioned.
The military section chiefs, the men whom, as rumor ran, the Supreme Commander had already chosen as his Presidential Cabinet, apparently lacked knowledge of, and respect for, the social sciences.
The Occupation's official history, so egocentric that its writers, on the purely military side, worked under orders to mention General MacArthur's name on every single page, minimized all history which did not prove Japan's steady lapse into autocracy, brutality, aggres-sion and evil propaganda.
American ineptness, the Occupation achieved such successes as all three papers describe, can be credited to Japanese-American co-oper-ation. Advances toward individualism, liberty, equality, unionism, press freedom and tolerance were furthered, certainly, by Occupa-tion pressure. An annoying query rises, however. Since prewar prog-ress, however slight, had picked up considerable momentum in Japan and since these desirable reforms were causing ferment elsewhere in the world, how much change would have occurred in Japan had the Occupation never existed?
Other problems present themselves. Occupationaires who cer-tainly were not drunkards, exploiters, or ne'er-do-wells, though some of us may indeed have been incompetent, worked zealously to re-make Japan. Did they invariably know precisely what their plans implied? All too often SCAP directives used words such as democ-racy which did not always convey the same overtones to Japanese as to Americans. Did either Japanese or Americans understand in full detail just what consequences to expect?
SCAP takes bows if the reforms succeeded, but who is to blame if they fell short? Apparently there are flaws in Japan's educational system and also in the economic program which Professor Bronfen-brenner so well described; did the Occupation blunder, did Japan sabotage the plans or are American methods inapplicable to Orien-tals? Then, too, can we use these blueprints, some future day, in Vietnam?
For that matter, have Americans satisfactorily solved their own problems? Are our farmers happy, our women pleased with their position, are labor and management in full accord and our race rela-tions joyous?
