這是一篇書評的中文翻譯：
審閱人：
查爾斯·D·馬斯格羅夫（Charles D. Musgrove）（簡介）
黃心儀（Grace Huang）著。《蔣介石的羞恥政治：領導力、遺產與中國的國家認同》（Chiang Kai-shek's Politics of Shame: Leadership, Legacy, and National Identity in China）。馬薩諸塞州劍橋：哈佛大學亞洲中心，2021年。xiv，245頁。精裝本 $55.00，ISBN 9780674260139。平裝本 $28.00，ISBN 9780674260146。
在習近平經常援引**「百年屈辱」這一說法，以動員人們支持共產黨國家在國內和國際上的目標之際，瞭解蔣介石在國民黨統治時期（1927-1949）如何運用「恥」——即「屈辱」或「羞恥」——來使其威權統治合法化的歷史背景，是很有啟發意義的。事實上，很難想到有哪位領導人比這位大元帥（蔣介石）更頻繁地援引「羞恥」。黃心儀的專著《蔣介石的羞恥政治》為他使用「恥」的歷史迴響提供了有根據的解釋，揭示了蔣介石是一位比學者們通常承認的更有效的領導人。蔣介石通常被嘲笑為一位殘暴的獨裁者，他將自己的權力置於人民的福祉之上，並因為缺乏進步的願景而在1949年「失敗」。黃心儀對蔣介石的動機和成就提供了更細緻入微的理解。她揭示了，儘管他缺乏足夠的物質和制度資源來在軍事上挑戰日本的侵犯，但蔣介石將「屈辱」作為一種文化資源來動員，以創造一種具有廣泛情感訴求的民族敘事**，這種敘事有時可以被利用來幫助他實現其國內和外交政策目標。
蔣介石的「恥」：動機與代理
前三章重點關注作為分析領導力的類別的**「代理性」（agency）。黃心儀通過廣泛使用《事略》**（shilüe，蔣介石日記條目、演講、電報及其他他本人言論記錄的彙編）揭示了蔣介石的許多代理性。《事略》的靈感來自於帝制時期編纂的「實錄」（或稱朝代史），蔣介石委託編纂《事略》是為了日後將自己塑造成一位領導人的「官方」歷史。與最終出版的歷史著作不同，《事略》是供國民黨內部使用的原始材料，不打算公開發行。然而，作為臺灣民主化進程的一部分，《事略》於2003年至2013年出版，每月一卷，涵蓋1927年至1949年的年份。儘管蔣介石寫日記時顯然著眼於後世，但日記和《事略》提供了大量的個人反思，為瞭解蔣介石的世界觀、動機以及他的看法隨時間的變化提供了真知灼見。
通過解讀《事略》，黃心儀發現1928年5月的濟南事件在塑造蔣介石作為領導人的態度方面比以往理解的要重要得多。這場日本軍隊與蔣介石的國民革命軍之間的暴力衝突發生在北伐統一中國的關鍵時刻。蔣介石的部隊損失慘重，他的代表遭到酷刑，他最終不得不發出道歉聲明並同意鎮壓反日情緒，以便恢復北伐。《事略》廣泛記錄了他義憤填膺的心情。據說，他的屈辱感深入骨髓。濟南事件之後，他每天都在日記中記錄至少一件他將要做的事情來「雪恥」。由於敵人實力佔優，蔣介石在他的公開聲明中，號召他自己和全國人民效法古代越國被吳國擊敗後臥薪嚐膽的國王勾踐（公元前496-465年在位）。勾踐被動地忍受了屈辱的侮辱，隱忍不發，直到能幫助他的人民逐步重建力量，最終戰勝吳國。蔣介石能夠成功地援引這個故事，因為它廣為人知，而且二十世紀初的中國人民可以將其與犧牲和堅韌的熟悉教訓聯繫起來，同時期待通過道德上的正直來實現最終的勝利。
在推廣他版本的「雪恥」敘事來證明避免直接軍事接觸、同時統一和訓練民眾是正當的時，蔣介石在隨後的歲月中表明，他仍然可以在這個框架內採取合理的行動，並在目標上取得進展。他努力抵抗外國帝國主義，贏回在不平等條約體系下喪失的主權（例如關稅自主權）。他並不只是像他的批評者所說的那樣，只專注於擴大自己的權力。他甚至在導致1931年9月日本佔領整個滿洲的九一八事變之前的幾個月裡，默許了對日本採取更具對抗性的策略。黃心儀認為，隨著日本佔領東北，蔣介石對勾踐模式的運用變得更具爭議性，因為學生抗議者和媒體憤怒地呼籲立即採取軍事回應，但蔣介石知道這肯定會失敗。儘管如此，蔣介石仍堅持他的敘事，忍受個人的屈辱和侮辱，同時試圖羞辱他的軍隊、黨內和民眾追隨者繼續有尊嚴地忍耐。事態發展似乎證實了蔣介石耐心的審慎：[結束頁碼 209] 通過將中國定位為向國際聯盟謙卑請求者，西方輿論轉向反對日本；當蔣介石謙遜地辭職，讓位給他最激烈的國民黨批評者時，他們的無力樹立信心，意味著蔣介石以比以往任何時候都更高的尊重和影響力重掌權力。
新生活運動與「羞恥感」
除了「雪恥」的觀念外，蔣介石還將「恥」作為一種新儒家的「羞恥感」，它根植於上下級關係的二元對立之中。一種得到恰當培養的「羞恥感」會推動一個人改正缺陷，以避免羞辱自己和家人。社會上層人士有責任羞辱下層人士，以改變他們的行為。正是本著這種精神，在1934年，當他的領導地位相對穩固時，蔣介石發起了新生活運動（NLM），試圖將中國人民轉變為有紀律、忠誠的公民。
長期以來，蔣介石的批評者一直將他貼上反動派的標籤，部分原因是他宣揚儒家美德。黃心儀對此提出了異議，從而促成了一種日益增長的認識：那些認為自己是革命者的國家建設者，往往援引「傳統」來使雄心勃勃的改革計劃更容易被公民理解。事實上，新生活運動融合了其他來源的影響，運用儒家觀念來構建新型的集體身份，並將忠誠導向現代民族國家。批評者也嘲笑新生活運動冗長、平庸的禁止和規定行為清單：例如，說話謹慎，坐姿端正，不要隨地吐痰。黃心儀認為，這種方法與儒家強調**「正行」（orthopraxy）是一致的，即一個人首先執行適當的儀式化行為模式，而智慧和理解隨後會通過持續的學習而產生。顯然，蔣介石（與後來的毛澤東不同）認識到人們不會願意遵守所有這些規定，但他（與毛澤東不同）接受了實施的局限性，這是當使用道德勸說而非強制手段來改變行為時必須接受的。蔣介石似乎滿足於緩慢的進展，因此，黃心儀認為，新生活運動並不是一次徹底的失敗。總而言之，黃心儀揭示了蔣介石確實比仍然流行的敘事所描繪的更為複雜。她也令人信服地論證了蔣介石不是法西斯主義者。然而，眾所周知的是，蔣介石也非常願意容忍為他工作的法西斯分子所採取的強制行為**，他經常授權對他的敵人進行暴力鎮壓。黃心儀確實指出，新生活運動呼籲懲罰那些違反規則的人，即使蔣介石接受了這些規則最終是不可能強制執行的。因此，蔣介石對道德勸說的依賴是有限度的，儘管他在精心策劃一種能引起許多人共鳴的民族敘事方面的創造性代理作用被低估了。
結構與比較：袁世凱、毛澤東與甘地
本書的第二部分重點關注**「結構」，主要指影響領導人達成目標能力的政治背景。在最後兩章中，黃心儀將蔣介石運用「恥」作為民族敘事的方式，與袁世凱和毛澤東進行了比較，並與甘地宣揚的「非暴力抵抗」（satyagraha，真理力量或真理鬥爭）**進行了比較。
與袁世凱的比較 雖然蔣介石在運用屈辱敘事來推進其國內和外交政策目標方面取得了合理的成功，但結構性條件使得袁世凱無法做到這一點。對於國際受眾而言，帝國主義被更廣泛地接受，將帝國主義行為定性為「屈辱」是不利的。袁世凱在與外國列強進行更傳統的談判以爭取更好的交易方面更為有效。對於國內受眾而言，大眾政治直到1919年的五四運動才出現。因此，似乎很難出現任何能夠引起人民共鳴的民族敘事，因為尚未發展出培養領導人與「公民」之間個人親近感的渠道。通過這種比較，黃心儀闡明了蔣介石如何能夠動員「屈辱」而不一定因領導失誤而受到指責。一方面，他已經因其反抗帝國主義而具有信譽；另一方面，由於民族意識的發展更為完善，他能夠將屈辱描述為整個民族共同承擔的事情，而不僅僅是領導人。如果沒有大眾政治的發展，「屈辱」的說法在1925年傷害了袁世凱，當時他被單獨認定為「接受」日本**《二十一條要求》**的責任人。
與毛澤東的比較 談到毛澤東，黃心儀說，1937年日本的全面侵華戰爭改變了政治背景，這給了毛澤東一個機會，將「屈辱」敘事轉變為對付蔣介石的武器。由於毛澤東在戰爭期間不是中國的官方領導人，他不會因失敗而受到指責，而他仍然可以將公眾的怒火引向蔣介石。同時，戰爭給了毛澤東空間和時間，將他的信息轉向更基於民族主義，利用國民黨相對成功地培養的民族認同。蔣介石繼續他的「屈辱敘事」，但隨後適得其反，因為他在仍與日本作戰時，卻承擔了軍事攻擊共產黨軍隊的責任。
與甘地的比較 黃心儀對蔣介石和甘地的比較提供了同樣合理的見解，她指出「恥」的動員與「非暴力抵抗」之間有一系列相似之處。兩者都受到傳統觀念的啟發。兩種敘事都被用來在人民中創造一種羞恥感，以激勵他們團結和轉變。兩位領導人都採取了一種看似被動的斯多葛主義。兩者都將這種民族敘事與他們自己的個人故事聯繫起來。黃心儀將甘地作為更具變革性領導人的聲譽歸因於有利於甘地努力的「結構性背景」，例如印度有更大的國家能力來促進改革者之間的團結，以及甘地沒有掌握政府或反對黨的日常權力。儘管她更看重結構性因素，但她也指出，甘地選擇了更為自由的方法，要求人民在實際的反抗行為中更積極地參與，而蔣介石不願意容忍。動員人民進行即時的非暴力行動，可能為其他潛在的領導人提供了一個更引人注目的效仿公式（正如我們所知，他們確實效仿了），而不是蔣介石強調耐心地專注於自我修養、同時等待領導人帶領與壓迫者對抗的「民族敘事」。[結束頁碼 211]
總結
最終，黃心儀對我們理解處於不理想環境中的領導人如何利用文化資源來構建有用的集體「敘事」，從而更有效地實現各種目標，做出了寶貴的貢獻。她還提供了對蔣介石作為一位成就和遺產都很重要的領導人的更複雜理解。黃心儀的論點在使用《事略》來分析和理解蔣介石的理由，以及將他對「恥」的運用（既作為屈辱又作為一種羞恥感）置於背景中時，最具說服力。或許未來的研究可以以此為基礎，將蔣介石的著作與民國時期存在的更廣泛的「屈辱」論述進行比較，以更精確地理解這種「民族敘事」的競爭性質。無論如何，正如黃心儀所展示的，蔣介石在現代中華民族國家的「模板」上留下了深刻的印記。
查爾斯·D·馬斯格羅夫
查爾斯·D·馬斯格羅夫是馬里蘭州聖瑪麗學院的歷史學教授，專攻現代中國和臺灣歷史。
Reviewed by:
Charles D. Musgrove (bio)
Grace Huang. Chiang Kai-shek's Politics of Shame: Leadership, Legacy, and National Identity in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2021. xiv, 245 pp. Hardcover $55.00, isbn 9780674260139. Paperback $28.00, isbn 9780674260146.
As Xi Jinping regularly invokes the "century of humiliation" trope to mobilize support for the Communist Party-State's domestic and international goals, it is instructive to understand the historical context of how Chiang Kaishek deployed chi—"humiliation" or "shame"—to legitimize his authoritarian rule in China's Nationalist era (1927–1949). It is, in fact, difficult to think of another leader who invoked shame more often than the Generalissimo. Grace Huang's monograph Chiang Kai-shek's Politics of Shame provides a grounded explanation of the historical resonances of his use of chi, revealing how Chiang was a more effective leader than scholars have typically acknowledged. Chiang Kai-shek has generally been derided as brutal dictator who prioritized his own power over the well-being of the people and then "failed" in 1949 because of his lack of progressive vision. Huang offers a more nuanced understanding of Chiang's motivations and accomplishments. She reveals that while he lacked sufficient material and institutional resources to challenge encorachments of the Japanese militarily, Chiang mobilized humiliation as a cultural resource to create a national narrative that had broad emotive appeal that could, at times, be parlayed into helping him achieve his domestic and foreign-policy goals.
The first three chapters focus on "agency" as a category for analyzing leadership. Huang reveals much about Chiang's agency through her extensive use of shilüe, compilations of Chiang's diary entries, speeches, telegrams, and other records of his own words. Inspired by the imperial-era creation of "Veritable Records," or dynastic histories, Chiang commissioned the shilüe in order to later construct an "official" history of himself as leader. Unlike the final [End Page 208] published history, shilüe served as raw material for internal Kuomintang (KMT) use and were not intended for public consumption. As part of the democratization process in Taiwan, however, the shilüe were published from 2003 to 2013, with monthly volumes covering the years from 1927 to 1949. While Chiang clearly wrote his diary with an eye for posterity, it and the shilüe offer extensive personal reflections that provide real insights into Chiang's worldview, motivations, and how his perceptions changed over time.
Through her reading of the shilüe, Huang discovered that the Jinan Incident of May 1928 was far more important in shaping Chiang's attitudes as a leader than previously understood. This violent confrontation between Japanese forces and Chiang's National Revolutionary Army took place at a key moment in the Northern Expedition to unify China. Chiang's forces took heavy losses, his representatives were tortured, and he ultimately had to issue an apology and agree to suppress anti-Japanese sentiment in order to resume his Northern Expedition. The shilüe extensively record his righteous indignation. His humiliation, reportedly, ran deep. After the Jinan Incident, he included a daily entry in his diary noting at least one thing he would do to "avenge humiliation." Because their foes were superior in strength, in his public pronouncements Chiang called on himself and the nation to emulate the ancient King of Wu, Goujian (r. 496–465 B.C.E.) whose state was defeated by the more powerful Yue. Goujian passively endured humiliating insults, biding his time until he could help his people gradually rebuild their strength to overcome the Yue. Chiang could successfully invoke this story because it was widely known and people in early twentieth-century China could relate to its familiar lessons of sacrifice and perseverance while anticipating the ultimate victory attainable through moral rectitude.
In promoting his version of the "avenging humiliation" narrative to justify the avoidance of direct military engagement while unifying and training the population, Chiang showed in subsequent years that he could still take reasonable action within this framework and make progress on his goals. He worked to resist foreign imperialism and win back sovereign rights lost under the unequal treaty system (such as tariff autonomy). He was not simply focused on furthering his own power, as his detractors claim. He even condoned more confrontational tactics against the Japanese in the months leading to the Mukden Incident, when Japan overran all of Manchuria in September 1931. With the Japanese takeover of the northeast, Huang argues, Chiang's deployment of the Goujian template became more problematic, as student protestors and the media indignantly called for an immediate military response that Chiang knew would certainly fail. Nevertheless, Chiang stuck to his narrative, enduring personal humiliation and insults while simultaneously trying to shame his followers in the military, party, and the populace to continue to endure in dignity. Events seemed to confirm the prudence of Chiang's patience: [End Page 209] by positioning China as a humble supplicant to the League of Nations, Western public opinion turned against the Japanese; and when Chiang humbly stepped down in favor of his most vociferous KMT critics, their inability to inspire confidence meant that Chiang returned to power with more respect and influence than ever.
In addition to the notion of "avenging humiliation," Chiang also employed chi as a Neo-Confucian "sense of shame" embedded within dyarchies of superior–inferior relations. A properly cultivated "sense of shame" propels one to correct flaws in order to avoid shaming oneself and one's family. Social superiors had a responsibility to shame inferiors in order to change their behavior. In this spirit, then, Chiang sought to transform the Chinese people into disciplined, loyal citizens through the New Life Movement (NLM) launched in 1934, when his position as leader was relatively secure. Chiang's critics have long labeled him reactionary, in part, for his promotion of Confucian virtues. Huang disputes this assertion and thus contributes to a growing recognition that nation builders, who considered themselves revolutionary, often invoked "tradition" to make ambitious programs of change more relatable to citizens. Indeed, the NLM, blending influences from other sources too, employed Confucian notions to construct new forms of collective identity and direct loyalty to the modern nation state. Critics have also mocked the NLM's long, mundane lists of proscribed and prescribed behaviors: Speak cautiously, sit up straight, do not spit in public, for example. Huang argues that this approach is consistent with a Confucian emphasis on "orthopraxy" where one performs the proper ritualized modes of behavior first while wisdom and understanding follow later through continued study. Apparently, Chiang (unlike Mao Zedong later) recognized that people would not be willing to follow all these prescriptions, but he (unlike Mao) accepted the limitations of implementation, which one must when using moral suasion instead of coercion to change behaviors. Chiang seemingly was content with slow progress, and hence, Huang argues, the NLM was not a dismal failure. Altogether, Huang reveals that Chiang was, indeed, more complicated than the still conventional story depicts. She is also convincing in arguing that Chiang was not a fascist. However, it is well established that Chiang was also more than willing to tolerate the coercive acts of the fascist elements who worked for him, and he routinely authorized violent repression against his enemies. Huang does note that the NLM called for punishment of those who violated the rules, even if Chiang accepted that the rules were ultimately impossible to enforce. Thus, there were limits to Chiang's reliance on moral suasion, though his creative agency in crafting a national narrative that resonated with many has been underappreciated.
The second part of the book focuses on "structure," primarily referring to the political contexts that affect a leader's ability to accomplish goals. In the final two chapters, Huang compares Chiang's use of chi as a national narrative [End Page 210] to that of Yuan Shikai and Mao Zedong, and to Gandhi's promotion of satyagraha (truth struggle). Whereas Chiang had been reasonably successful deploying a humiliation narrative to further his domestic and foreign policy goals, the structural conditions made it impossible for Yuan Shikai to do so. For the international audience, imperialism was more broadly accepted, it would not have been advantageous to characterize imperialist acts as "humiliations." Yuan was more effective in more conventional negotiations with foreign powers to secure better deals. For the domestic audience, mass politics did not emerge until the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Hence, it was difficult, it seems, for any kind of national narrative to emerge that would resonate with the people because the conduits that fostered a sense of personal closeness between leaders and "citizens" had not yet been developed. Through this comparison Huang illustrates how Chiang was able to mobilize "humiliation" without necessarily being blamed for faulty leadership. On the one hand, he already had credibility for his resistance to imperialism; and on the other, thanks to a better developed sense of mass national consciousness, he was able to depict humiliation as something shared by an entire nation of people, not just the leader. Without the development of mass politics, the "humiliation" trope damaged Yuan in 1925 when he was held solely responsible for "accepting" Japan's Twenty-One Demands. Turning to Mao, Huang says that the Japanese full-scale invasion of 1937 changed the political context giving Mao an opportunity to turn the "humiliation" narrative into a weapon against Chiang. Since Mao was not the official leader of China during the war, he could not be blamed for failures while he could still direct public anger toward Chiang. Meanwhile, the war gave Mao the space and time to pivot his message to one based more on nationalism, tapping into the KMT's relatively successful cultivation of national identity. Chiang continued his "humiliation narrative," but it then backfired as he shouldered the blame for military attacks on the communist forces while still at war with Japan.
Huang's comparison of Chiang and Gandhi provides similarly plausible insights as she points out a series of parallels between the mobilization of Chi and Satyagraha. Both were inspired by traditional conceptions. Both narratives were used to create a sense of shame among the people to motivate them to unite and transform. Both leaders embraced a kind of seemingly passive stoicism. Both tied this national narrative to their own personal stories. Huang attributes Gandhi's reputation as a more transformative leader to "structural contexts" that favored Gandhi's efforts, such as a greater state capacity in India that fostered more unity among reformers and the fact that Gandhi did not wield day-to-day power in the government or in the opposition party. While she gives more weight to the structural factors, she also points to the Gandhi's choice to utilize more liberal approaches that called for more active participation of the people in actual acts of defiance than Chiang was willing to [End Page 211] condone. Mobilizing people for immediate nonviolent action may have provided a more compelling formula for other would-be leaders to emulate (as we know they did) than Chiang's "national narrative" stressing patient attention to self-cultivation while waiting for leaders to lead the confrontation with the oppressors.
Ultimately, Huang makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of how leaders in less-than-ideal circumstances can utilize cultural resources to construct useful collective "narratives" that help them more effectively meet various goals. She also provides a more complex understanding of Chiang Kai-shek as a leader whose accomplishments and legacies were significant. Huang's arguments are most convincing when using the shilüe to analyze and make sense of Chiang's rationales and to contextualize his deployment of chi as both humiliation and a sense of shame. Perhaps future research can build on this work to compare Chiang's writings to the wider discourse of "humiliation" that existed in the Republican era to gain a more precise understanding of the contested nature of this "national narrative." In any case, as Huang shows, Chiang's imprint on the "template" of the modern Chinese nation-state has been large.
Charles D. Musgrove
Charles D. Musgrove is professor of history at St. Mary's College of Maryland, specializing in the histories of modern China and Taiwan.
