https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-2/the-fall-of-heaven.html
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《天堂的墮落：巴列維王朝和伊朗帝國的最後歲月》
The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran
哥倫比亞大學學者羅伯特·傑維斯的《情報為何失敗：伊朗革命和伊拉克戰爭的教訓》
Columbia scholar Robert Jervis’ Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War.
阿巴斯·米拉尼的《國王》（聖馬丁出版社，2012 年）
best biography of the last king of Iran—Abbas Milani’s The Shah (St. Martin’s Press, 2012)
安德魯·斯科特·庫珀（Andrew Scott Cooper）（亨利·霍爾特公司，2016 年），587 頁，索引。
評論者：布倫特G.
撰寫修正主義歷史的一個常見陷阱是，著手進行此類努力的作者傾向於認識到（至少在某些層面上）對歷史事件或領導人的正統解釋大有裨益。安德魯·斯科特·庫柏（Andrew Scott Cooper）為伊朗最後一位國王穆罕默德·禮薩·沙·巴列維（Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi）撰寫的傳記《天堂的隕落》就是這樣的情況。標題充分說明了作者可能想寫的內容，也說明了這本書最終會變成什麼樣子。庫柏希望他的讀者重新考慮國王以及他作為一個懦弱、推諉的暴君的普遍形象，他壓制民主，揮霍伊朗巨大的石油財富，並用（混合比喻）戴著天鵝絨手套的鐵拳進行統治。事實上，庫柏一開始就大膽宣稱，國王被誤解了，他的統治標誌著伊朗歷史的黃金時代。然而，當他完成時，庫柏表現出了更多的平衡，並專注於講述一個引人入勝的故事，講述沙阿家族如何結束王朝，並在此過程中為伊朗革命文獻做出了值得注意的貢獻。
庫柏在開篇中對巴列維的一些讚揚有些過分，甚至在見多識廣的通才看來，顯然是有問題的，而且可能沒有得到證實。例如，他聲稱國王“戰勝了艾森豪威爾、約翰遜和尼克森等無情而狡猾的美國總統”，或者他“引導伊朗渡過第二次世界大戰的危險潮流”。 (13-14) 在前一個例子中，大多數美國總統在考慮國王時，都將他視為對抗蘇聯入侵中東的必要盟友，並放棄與他合作，儘管他性格軟弱且自負。在後一個例子中，1941 年英軍與美國和蘇聯軍隊一起入侵並佔領伊朗並在戰爭剩餘時間裡將其推上王位時，國王才 21 歲。巴列維在二戰期間並沒有比他的父親禮薩沙(Reza Shah) 更「引導」伊朗，禮薩沙(Reza Shah) 被英國流放至南非，並於1944 年去世。可以明顯看出，庫柏在很大程度上依賴對國王的採訪。讀起來就像是他起草的一篇頌詞，目的是說服他們把時間和記憶借給他。
庫柏幾乎從一開始就在面對眼前的證據。如果他打算重新評價國王，他經常會遇到一些軼事和插圖，這些軼事和插圖表明國王是我們所認為的那樣。值得稱讚的是，庫柏並沒有試圖將這些問題全部解釋清楚，而是常常嘗試根據對認識巴列維的人的一系列令人印象深刻的採訪以及一些二手資料，描繪出一幅細緻入微的巴列維形象。然而，在一些案例中，庫柏未能充分重視證據，顯示他恢復國王形象的努力是徒勞無功的。例如，庫柏描述了國王如何愛他十幾歲的女兒，但逐漸忽視她，因為他的第二任妻子不關心她。 (68-69) 他指出，當他的女兒後來公開背叛他時，這一決定將會困擾國王，但庫柏沒有提及這如何反映了國王本人的弱點。在另一個例子中，庫柏回憶了國王在美國之行期間接受的一次採訪，他在採訪中宣稱，「這個國王的生意給我個人帶來的只是頭痛」（35）——庫柏稱這些評論是「傷感和自憐」（ 100）但暗示這是例外而不是規則。然而，問題是庫柏為讀者提供了足夠的證據來證明情況更可能相反。
《天堂的隕落》並非沒有優點。庫柏令人信服地認為，法拉女王可能值得比當代觀察家給予她的更多讚譽，他將她描繪成一位失意的改革者。他強調了她為緩和 1971 年在波斯波利斯古城遺址舉行的為期數週的過度慶祝活動所做的努力，以及國王及其家族內部的腐敗問題。同樣，他讚揚法拉赫促進婦女議題和女孩教育，以及促進藝術和公共衛生。此外，庫柏幾乎每天都對巴列維統治的最後幾個月和國王的管理不善進行了描述，這說明了一場對外部觀察者（包括中央情報局和國務院）來說難以想像的危機，直到損害基本上造成為止。
也許庫柏的敘述中最新穎的方面是他對受人尊敬的伊朗裔黎巴嫩神職人員穆薩·薩德爾的討論，庫柏認為穆薩·薩德爾是國王的秘密支持者，並準備於1978 年從黎巴嫩返回伊朗，與國王站在一起。關於薩德爾的失蹤有多種說法。他再也沒有出現過，但庫柏將他的死歸咎於阿亞圖拉魯霍拉·霍梅尼和他的革命者。這個故事很有趣，揭示了國王為尋找與霍梅尼抗衡的神職人員的努力，但沒有證據表明薩德爾可以在後期成功挑戰流亡的阿亞圖拉。
本書的另一個值得進一步檢驗的面向——即使庫柏的結論並不總是站得住腳——是表明國王政權不像人們普遍認為的那樣專制的證據。例如，庫柏重點介紹了前神學院學生、伊斯蘭共和國官僚埃馬德·丁·巴吉 (Emad al-Din Baghi) 的研究，他領導了對國王罪行的革命後調查。簡而言之，巴吉發現，國王下令因政治犯罪而被殺害或監禁的人數遠遠少於毛拉和其他政治對手所聲稱的人數。霍梅尼指控國王在其統治期間殺害了超過 10 萬人，而巴吉只能找到不到 4,000 人，這一數字包括 1978-79 年革命期間的 2,781 人死亡。與 1979 年至 1989 年霍梅尼執政十年期間據信被伊斯蘭共和國殺害的 12,000 人相比，這些數字顯得相形見絀，其中包括 1988 年 7 月一周內估計有 3,000 名政治犯。
庫柏並不是第一個向西方聽眾引用巴吉數據的人，但他利用這些資訊令人信服地證明，國王的鎮壓並不比智利的奧古斯托·皮諾切特等當代暴君更糟糕，而且他的鎮壓當然比伊拉克的鎮壓要溫和。然而，他最重要的失敗是將這種鎮壓置於伊朗人民及其領導人的適當背景下。庫柏指出，除了極少數皇室成員和家族成員外，到 20 世紀 70 年代中期，國王幾乎沒有與任何人分享權力。 (152) 1975年，國王廢除了伊朗兩個名義上的政黨，成立了拉斯塔赫茲（復興）黨，通常被稱為「國王黨」。正如庫柏所指出的，伊朗人民將此解讀為「最後的、公然的企圖埋葬他們所珍視的 1906 年憲法」。 (217) 最後，國王幾乎沒有真正的忠誠者願意為他而戰，反對霍梅尼及其追隨者，他只能責怪自己。
《天堂的墮落》雖然比不上伊朗最後一位國王的最佳傳記——阿巴斯·米拉尼的《國王》（聖馬丁出版社，2012 年），但它比迄今為止大多數其他國王傳記更加細緻和平衡。至少，它對法拉赫女王的仔細審視，對王室掌權最後日子的詳細描述，以及對沙阿時代鎮壓真實程度的重新思考，應該對伊朗歷史和政治的學生、政治心理學家和領導力有用。和政治分析家的觀點很明顯。
因此，本書也將為那些吸收了 1954-79 年期間有關情報的文獻的人提供信息，其中包括哥倫比亞大學學者羅伯特·傑維斯的《情報為何失敗：伊朗革命和伊拉克戰爭的教訓》等書籍。這部作品於 2010 年出版，部分基於傑維斯在國王倒台前對中央情報局分析的機密研究（現已解密）。[1]、[2]
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註腳
[1]請參閱 Torrey Froescher 在《情報研究》第 54 期第 3 期（2010 年 9 月）的評論。
[2]在準備本期時，國務院發布了大約 1000 頁有關 TPAJAX 的解密文件。它可以在美國國務院的數位外交關係館藏中找到。
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https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-2/the-fall-of-heaven.html
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The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran
Andrew Scott Cooper (Henry Holt and Company, 2016), 587 pp., index.
Reviewed by Brent G.
A common pitfall in writing revisionist history is the tendency of authors who set out on such endeavors to realize—at least on some levels—that the orthodox interpretation of historical events or leaders had much going for it. Such is the case with The Fall of Heaven, Andrew Scott Cooper’s biography of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the last king of Iran. The title says a lot about what the author probably intended to write, but also about what the book becomes in the end. Cooper wants his readers to reconsider the Shah and the prevailing image of him as a cowardly, prevaricating despot who squelched democracy, squandered Iran’s enormous oil wealth, and ruled with—to mix metaphors—an iron fist, disguised in a velvet glove. At the outset, in fact, Cooper boldly declares that the Shah has been misunderstood and that his rule marked a golden era of Iranian history. By the time he is finished, however, Cooper shows more balance, and focuses on telling a compelling story about how the Shah’s family managed the end of its dynasty and, in the process, makes a noteworthy contribution to the literature on the Iranian Revolution.
Some of the praises Cooper showers on Pahlavi in the opening chapter are excessive and would appear to even the informed generalist as transparently questionable and probably unsubstantiated. Take, for instance, his claims that the Shah “outmaneuvered ruthless and wily American presidents” such as Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, or that he “steered Iran through the treacherous currents of World War II.” (13–14) In the former example, most American presidents viewed the Shah, when considering him at all, as a necessary ally against Soviet encroachment in the Middle East and resigned themselves to working with him in spite of his weak character and grating pomposity. In the latter example, the Shah was 21 years old when the British army placed him on the throne following its 1941 invasion and occupation of Iran—with American and Soviet forces—for the remainder of the war. Pahlavi no more “steered” Iran during World War II than did his father, Reza Shah, from British-imposed exile in South Africa, where he died in 1944. From his endnotes, it is clear that Cooper relied heavily on interviews with the Shah’s widow, Shahbanou Farah Pahlavi, the Shah’s children, and former members of the deposed royal court—and parts of his opening chapter read like a panegyric he might have drafted to convince them to lend him their time and memories.
Cooper struggles almost from the outset with the evidence before him. If he intended to reevaluate the Shah, too often he is confronted with anecdotes and illustrations that point to the Shah’s being who we thought he was. Cooper, to his credit, does not try to explain them all away and tries—more often than not—to paint a nuanced picture of Pahlavi, drawn from an impressive array of interviews with those who knew him and a smattering of secondary sources. However, in several cases, Cooper fails to give sufficient weight to evidence that suggests his efforts to rehabilitate the Shah’s image are in vain. For example, Cooper describes how the Shah adored his teenage daughter but grew to neglect her because his second wife did not care for her. (68–69) He pointed out that this decision would haunt the Shah when his daughter later turned on him publicly, but Cooper fails to mention how this reflected the Shah’s own personal weakness. In another instance, Cooper recounts an interview the Shah gave during a trip to the United States in which he declared, “this king business has personally given me nothing but headaches” (35)–comments Cooper calls “maudlin and self-pitying” (100) but implies were the exception rather than the rule. The problem, however, is that Cooper provides the reader sufficient evidence to argue that the opposite was more likely the case.
The Fall of Heaven is not without its merits. Cooper convincingly argues that Queen Farah probably deserves more credit than contemporary observers gave her, and he draws a flattering portrait of her as a frustrated reformer. He highlights her efforts to tone down the over-the-top, weeks-long celebration of what the Shah called 2,500 years of Persian monarchy at the site of the ancient city of Persepolis in 1971, as well as corruption within the royal family and its court. Likewise, he credits Farah for promoting women’s issues and education for girls, as well as promoting the arts and public health. Also, Cooper’s almost day-to-day account of the last few months of the Pahlavi rule and the Shah’s mismanagement illustrates how a crisis so unthinkable to outside observers—including the CIA and the State Department, until the damage was largely done—could unfold over a relatively short period of time.
Perhaps the most novel aspect of Cooper’s account is his discussion of the revered Iranian-Lebanese cleric, Musa Sadr, whom Cooper argues was a closet supporter of the Shah and was prepared to return to Iran from Lebanon in 1978 to stand with the king in a call for national unity before disappearing during a trip to Libya. Many theories exist about Sadr’s disappearance; he was never seen again, but Cooper lays his death at the feet of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his revolutionaries. This story is interesting and shines a light on the Shah’s efforts to find a clerical counterweight to Khomeini, but no evidence indicates that Sadr could have successfully challenged the exiled Ayatollah by that late stage.
Another aspect of this book that bears further examination—even if Cooper’s conclusions do not always hold up—are points of evidence that suggest the Shah’s regime was less repressive than is commonly believed. For example, Cooper highlights the research of former seminarian and Islamic Republic bureaucrat Emad al-Din Baghi, who led the post-revolutionary investigation into the Shah’s crimes. In short, Baghi found that the number of those the Shah ordered killed or imprisoned for political crimes was far smaller than what the mullahs and other political opponents had claimed. Where Khomeini had accused the Shah of killing over 100,000 people during his rule, Baghi could only find fewer than 4,000, a number that included 2,781 fatalities during the 1978–79 revolution. Those numbers pale in comparison to the 12,000 who are believed to have been killed by the Islamic Republic during Khomeini’s decade in power from 1979 to 1989, including an estimated 3,000 political prisoners in one week in July 1988.
Cooper is not the first to cite Baghi’s data to a Western audience, but he uses that information to argue convincingly that the Shah’s repression was no worse than that of contemporary despots such as Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, and that his was milder, certainly, than Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or Syria’s Hafez al-Asad. What he fails most importantly to do, however, is to put that repression into the proper context of the Iranian people and their leaders. With the exception of only a very few members of the royal court and family, Cooper points out that the Shah shared power with practically no one by the mid-1970s. (152) In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two nominal political parties and established the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party, commonly referred to as the “King’s Party.” As Cooper points out, the Iranian people interpreted this as “a final, brazen attempt to bury their cherished 1906 Constitution.” (217) In the end, the Shah had few true loyalists who would stand and fight for him against Khomeini and his followers, and he had only himself to blame.
The Fall of Heaven falls short of the best biography of the last king of Iran—Abbas Milani’s The Shah (St. Martin’s Press, 2012)—but it is more nuanced and balanced than most other Shah biographies to date. At the very least, its careful examination of Queen Farah, detailed account of the royal family’s last days in power, and reconsideration of the true level of Shah-era repression should prove useful to students of Iranian history and politics, political psychologists, and leadership and political analysts writ large.
Thus the book will also inform those who have absorbed literature addressing intelligence in the period 1954–79, including books such as Columbia scholar Robert Jervis’ Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. The work, published in 2010, is partly based on Jervis’ classified research—since declassified—into CIA analysis before the Shah’s fall.[1],[2]
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Footnotes
[1] See Torrey Froescher’s review in Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 3 (September 2010).
[2] As this issue was being prepared, the State Department released about 1000 pages of declassified documents concerning TPAJAX. It is available in State’s digital Foreign Relations of the United States collection.
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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this journal are those of the authors. Nothing in any of the articles should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of their factual statements and interpretations. Articles by non-US government employees are copyrighted.
Posted: Aug 22, 2017 05:51 PM
Last Updated: Aug 22, 2017 05:51 PM
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本期刊中所表達的所有事實、觀點或分析的陳述均屬於作者的觀點。任何文章中的任何內容均不應被解釋為斷言或暗示美國政府認可其事實陳述和解釋。非美國政府僱員的文章受版權保護。
發佈時間：2017 年 8 月 22 日 05:51
最後更新時間：2017 年 8 月 22 日 05:51
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