罗斯福致裕仁天皇电报的背景（1941 年 12 月 6 日）
1941 年末，美国和日本之间的紧张局势达到了爆发点。 日本一直在中国和东南亚进行侵略扩张，而美国则实施了经济制裁（包括石油禁运），以迫使日本停止军事扩张。 外交谈判一直在进行，但进展甚微。
罗斯福为何发出电报？
到 12 月初，美国情报部门一直在追踪日本海军的动向，但日本的真正目标却扑朔迷离。 华盛顿的许多人认为日本将攻击东南亚的英国和荷兰领土，如泰国、马来亚或荷属东印度群岛，而不是直接攻击美国。
富兰克林-罗斯福总统仍希望避免战争，他在最后一刻于 1941 年 12 月 6 日亲自向裕仁天皇发出呼吁。 电文敦促天皇进行干预，以防止战争并阻止日本在太平洋的军事侵略。 电文以人道主义为出发点，呼吁裕仁作为日本领导人的角色。
递交和回应
电报于 12 月 6 日下午（东京时间）送达日本外务省。
然而，由于翻译和传送的延误，目前尚不清楚裕仁天皇是否在 12 月 7 日日本发动偷袭珍珠港之前看到了这封电报。
已经投入战争的日本政府没有对罗斯福的呼吁采取行动。
影响和意义
1. 阻止袭击为时已晚--罗斯福的电文是在日本已经决定开战之后发出的。 对珍珠港的袭击已经计划好并正在进行中。
2. 偷袭珍珠港（1941 年 12 月 7 日）--就在电报发出几小时后，日本对夏威夷的美国太平洋舰队发动了突然袭击，造成 2400 多名美国人丧生，导致美国于 12 月 8 日宣战。
3. 最后的外交姿态--这封电报通常被视为罗斯福防止战争的最后一次尝试，但实际上，它成功的可能性很小。
您想看看电报全文吗？
Context of Roosevelt’s Telegram to Emperor Hirohito (December 6, 1941)
In late 1941, tensions between the United States and Japan were at a breaking point. Japan had been expanding aggressively in China and Southeast Asia, while the U.S. had imposed economic sanctions (including an oil embargo) to pressure Japan into stopping its military expansion. Diplomatic negotiations had been ongoing, but they were making little progress.
Why Did Roosevelt Send the Telegram?
By early December, U.S. intelligence was tracking Japanese naval movements, but there was confusion about Japan’s true target. Many in Washington believed Japan would attack British and Dutch territories in Southeast Asia—such as Thailand, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies—rather than directly striking the United States.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, still hoping to avoid war, made a last-minute personal appeal to Emperor Hirohito on December 6, 1941. The message urged the emperor to intervene to prevent war and stop Japan’s military aggression in the Pacific. The plea was framed in humanitarian terms, appealing to Hirohito’s role as Japan’s leader.
Delivery and Response
The telegram was delivered to the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the afternoon of December 6 (Tokyo time).
However, due to delays in translation and transmission, it is unclear whether Emperor Hirohito saw the message before Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.
The Japanese government, already committed to war, did not act on Roosevelt’s appeal.
Impact and Significance
1. Too Late to Stop the Attack – Roosevelt’s message was sent after Japan had already decided on war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was already planned and under way.
2. Pearl Harbor Attack (December 7, 1941) – Just hours after the telegram was sent, Japan launched its surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, killing over 2,400 Americans and leading to the U.S. declaration of war on December 8.
3. A Final Diplomatic Gesture – The telegram is often seen as Roosevelt’s last attempt to prevent war, though realistically, it had little chance of success.
Would you like to see the full text of the message?
以下是富兰克林-D-罗斯福总统 1941 年 12 月 6 日给裕仁天皇的电报全文：
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美国总统致日本天皇陛下
1941 年 12 月 6 日
> 将近一个世纪以前，美国总统曾致电日本天皇，表达了美国人民对日本人民的友好之意。 这一提议得到了接受，在随后漫长的和平友好时期，我们各自的国家通过其志向高远、爱好和平的人民的美德，繁荣昌盛，为人类做出了巨大贡献。
> 只有在对我们两国特别重要的情况下，我才需要就国家大事向陛下致函。 我觉得我现在应该这样做，因为似乎正在形成一种深远的紧急情况。
> 太平洋地区的事态发展有可能使世界失去和平的希望。 美国人民反对战争。 美国政府在努力避免战争的过程中，对贵国政府于 1941 年 11 月 20 日提出的建议给予了应有的考虑。 我衷心希望能够找到一个公正和公平的办法来解决目前的局势。 你们会理解，美国政府必须从我们自己的国家安全和维护整个太平洋地区和平的角度来考虑目前的局势。
> 在过去的几天里，全世界都清楚地看到，日本的军事行动一直在向新的征服地区发展。 这种发展趋势如果继续下去，就会清楚地表明，日本政府并不是在追求和平，而是在推行武力和征服政策。
> 日本不能推行这种政策，美国也不能容忍这种政策，否则就会危及我们两国的持久和平与安全。
> 显然，目前的局势是不可想象的。 如果日本接近并威胁邻国的安全，世界将目睹更多的死亡和毁灭。
> 此时此刻，我向陛下致辞，热切希望陛下能像我一样，考虑如何驱散目前似乎正在太平洋上聚集的乌云。
> 带着深深的敬意和友谊
富兰克林-罗斯福
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罗斯福电文分析
罗斯福提到了日本过去与美国的关系，强调了过去的友谊。
他敦促裕仁考虑和平，呼吁他发挥天皇的作用。
他警告日本不要继续进行军事侵略，并暗示了后果。
信息暗示，如果日本不改变路线，战争即将来临。
接下来发生了什么？
1941 年 12 月 7 日（夏威夷时间）--日本偷袭珍珠港，导致美国卷入第二次世界大战。
虽然无法确定裕仁是否在袭击前看到了电报，但日本政府已经决定开战。
您想了解更多有关日本政府对这封电报的反应的信息吗？
Here is the full text of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s telegram to Emperor Hirohito, sent on December 6, 1941:
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The President of the United States to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
December 6, 1941
> Almost a century ago, the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their high-minded and peace-loving peoples, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.
> Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now do so because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.
> Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive the world of the hope of peace. The people of the United States are opposed to war. The government of the United States, in its efforts to avoid war, has given due consideration to the proposals presented by your government on November 20, 1941. It is my sincere hope that a fair and equitable solution to the present situation can be found. You will understand that the United States Government must consider the present situation from the viewpoint of our own national security and the maintenance of peace throughout the Pacific area.
> During the past few days, it has become clear to the world that Japanese military operations have been moving toward new areas of conquest. This developing trend, if continued, would make it clear that the Japanese Government is not in pursuit of peace, but has embarked upon a policy of force and conquest.
> Such a policy cannot be pursued by Japan and tolerated by the United States without endangering the long-lasting peace and security of both our nations.
> It is clear that a continuance of the present situation is unthinkable. If Japan approaches and threatens the security of neighboring nations, the world will witness further death and destruction.
> I am addressing Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which now seem to be gathering in the Pacific.
> With deep respect and friendship,
Franklin D. Roosevelt
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Analysis of Roosevelt’s Message
Roosevelt refers to Japan’s past relationship with the U.S., emphasizing past friendship.
He urges Hirohito to consider peace, appealing to his role as emperor.
He warns against Japan’s continued military aggression, implying consequences.
The message suggests that war is coming if Japan does not change its course.
What Happened Next?
December 7, 1941 (Hawaii time) – Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, leading the U.S. into World War II.
It is uncertain if Hirohito saw the telegram before the attack, but Japan’s government had already decided on war.
Would you like more context on how the Japanese government reacted to this message?
日本政府对罗斯福的电报有何反应？
当罗斯福总统于 1941 年 12 月 6 日向裕仁天皇发出电报时，日本已经承诺参战。 几周前，日本军事领导层就已决定偷袭珍珠港，舰队也已在途中。
1. 递送电报的延误
罗斯福的电文于 1941 年 12 月 6 日下午（东京时间）送达日本外务省。
然而，由于翻译和通信方面的官僚延误，电文没有立即呈递给裕仁天皇。
这意味着裕仁即使想干预，也很可能没有及时看到电文。
2. 日本政府的回应
东条英机首相的内阁和日本外务省收到并审查了这份电报。
此时，日本的军事领导层已经敲定了战争的决定，因此该电报被认为太少、太迟。
日本没有向罗斯福发出正式答复。
3. 裕仁天皇的角色和观点
裕仁并不是日本政府的最终决策者--他经常听从军事领导人的建议。
历史学家认为，裕仁对战争持保留态度，但最终批准了日本的军事行动，因为他认为外交失败了。
即使他能更早收到电报，也不太可能阻止进攻，因为日本的军事领导人（尤其是东条将军）已经启动了计划。
4. 进攻的时机和日本的最后外交行动
在罗斯福的电报被处理的同时，日本正在准备给美国的最后外交信息。
1941 年 12 月 7 日，日本驻华盛顿使节奉命递交了一份由 14 个部分组成的电文，有效地结束了谈判。
然而，由于解密和打字延迟，这份电文在珍珠港袭击开始后才送达。
主要启示
1. 罗斯福的电报是防止战争的最后尝试，但为时已晚，无法改变事态发展。
2. 日本政府已经承诺参战，没有做出回应。
3. 3. 不确定裕仁天皇是否在进攻前看到了电报，但他阻止战争的能力有限。
4. 4. 对珍珠港的袭击按计划进行，导致美国加入第二次世界大战。
您想了解更多有关日本在袭击前的决策过程的细节吗？
How Did the Japanese Government React to Roosevelt’s Telegram?
By the time President Roosevelt sent his December 6, 1941, telegram to Emperor Hirohito, Japan had already committed to war. The decision to attack Pearl Harbor had been made by Japan’s military leadership weeks earlier, and the fleet was already en route.
1. Delays in Delivering the Telegram
Roosevelt’s message was delivered to the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo on the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (Tokyo time).
However, due to bureaucratic delays in translation and communication, it was not immediately presented to Emperor Hirohito.
This meant Hirohito likely did not see the message in time to intervene, even if he had wanted to.
2. The Japanese Government’s Response
The telegram was received and reviewed by Prime Minister Hideki Tojo’s cabinet and the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
By that point, Japan’s military leadership had already finalized their decision for war, so the message was dismissed as too little, too late.
No official response was sent to Roosevelt.
3. Emperor Hirohito’s Role and Views
Hirohito was not the ultimate decision-maker in Japan’s government—he often followed the advice of his military leaders.
Historians believe that Hirohito had reservations about war but ultimately approved Japan’s military actions because he was persuaded that diplomacy had failed.
Even if he had received the telegram earlier, it is unlikely he could have stopped the attack, as Japan’s military leaders (especially General Tojo) had already set the plan in motion.
4. The Timing of the Attack and Japan’s Final Diplomatic Moves
While Roosevelt’s telegram was being processed, Japan was preparing a final diplomatic message to the U.S.
On December 7, 1941, Japanese envoys in Washington were instructed to deliver a 14-part message, which effectively ended negotiations.
However, due to decryption and typing delays, this message was delivered after the Pearl Harbor attack had already begun.
Key Takeaways
1. Roosevelt’s telegram was a last-minute attempt to prevent war but was too late to change events.
2. The Japanese government, already committed to war, did not respond.
3. It is uncertain if Emperor Hirohito saw the message before the attack, but his ability to stop the war was limited.
4. The attack on Pearl Harbor proceeded as planned, leading the U.S. to enter World War II.
Would you like more details on the Japanese decision-making process before the attack?
卡爾‧坎農，RCP執行主編
