Introduction
The central geopolitical problem in the Middle East today—the tragedy of regional power politics, to borrow from political scientist John Mearsheimer—lies
in the inability of its states to build a stable regional order. This
comes as the influence and interventionist impulses of the region’s
former hegemonic power, the United States, are receding, creating a
vacuum in which strong, assertive countries have engaged in sustained
competition and tested the limits of their capacities, while resisting
domination by rivals. However, none is strong enough to dominate and
reshape the region decisively.
Now that the Gaza war appears to have ended,
Israel increasingly sees itself as a regional hegemon. Yet hegemony
requires not only power but also acceptance and legitimacy, which Israel
is far from securing. Following Israel’s attack against Qatar last
September, Gulf leaders also came to view Israel as a threat to their security interests. At the same time, tensions between Israel and Türkiye are deepening, particularly in Syria, while Israeli attacks in Lebanon show the country remains an arena of confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Yet
after more than a decade of upheaval, starting with the Arab uprisings
in 2010–2011, no mechanism has been found to organize regional
stability, along the lines of the 1815 Congress of Vienna
that ended the Napoleonic wars, and more broadly the revolutionary
phase that followed the French Revolution. Until regional states
acknowledge their limitations and negotiate a regional arrangement they
can all tolerate, the Middle East will remain trapped in recurring
tensions, shifting alliances, and systemic conflict. Defining the
contours of such an equilibrium will be essential for the region’s
future.
The End of Pax Americana
The end of Pax Americana
in the Middle East, the U.S.-led regional order that emerged after the
Cold War’s end in 1989, has been a driver of instability, creating a
void that countries in the region are now seeking to fill. The era of
American hegemony offers lessons for understanding the prospects for
stability in the coming decades.
First,
Pax Americana itself was not necessarily stabilizing. Regional
dominance usually provokes resistance to a hegemonic power, and
throughout the past four decades the United States has been contested by
multiple countries. Iran challenged the U.S.-anchored order starting in 1979 and continued doing so after 1989. Syria under the Assads both engaged with Washington and opposed it after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which many countries regarded as a threat to the status quo.
The Middle East is characterized by sectarian, ethnic, and ideological
divisions, weak state institutions, and persistent rivalries. This makes
it resistant to imposed order, particularly from a distant power such
as the United States.
Second, the U.S. repeatedly failed as a credible powerbroker
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Successive administrations have
been either unwilling or unable to resolve this paramount regional
concern, which continues to undermine stability and alienate Arab public
opinion. Washington has also struggled to balance the competing
ambitions of major regional powers—Iran, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and
Israel. The result has been an antagonistic political environment in
which U.S. leadership has lost coherence and authority.
Finally,
the end of unipolarity, accelerated by China’s rise, Russia’s renewed
boldness, and the emergence of a multipolar global order, has weakened
Washington’s ability to unilaterally shape outcomes. This has given
regional powers opportunities to diversify their military and economic
partnerships and extract better terms from the United States. If Pax
Americana failed to guarantee stability, its end has only produced a
struggle for regional influence.
The Abraham Accords of 2020
were a U.S. attempt to consolidate regional order around states aligned
with Washington. By normalizing ties between Israel and certain Arab
countries, the accords aimed to combine
Israel’s technological and military advantages with Arab financial and
diplomatic clout, creating a bloc capable of countering Iran. Yet the
limits were quickly apparent. Israeli brutality in Gaza provoked outrage in the Arab world, undermining the legitimacy of normalization with Israel. Saudi Arabia, in particular, lost interest after China brokered a rapprochement with Iran and Washington refused to provide security guarantees to the kingdom, even if the Trump administration designated
it a “major non-NATO U.S. ally” in November 2025. While the Abraham
Accords remain in place, they haven’t evolved into a U.S.-led
cornerstone of regional order.
U.S. hegemony may have ended, but genuine multipolarity remains a distant prospect. The Assad regime’s downfall in 2024 removed a major Russian ally in the Middle East,
reducing Moscow’s regional footprint, while China’s economic rise and
strategic partnerships have not meaningfully challenged the U.S. role.
Beijing was largely absent from the Gaza conflict, limiting itself to
rhetorical condemnation, and took no action even during Ansar Allah’s
blockade of Red Sea shipping. For now, China appears content to benefit
from the dividend of U.S. military preponderance, despite its
dependency on maritime trade routes and Middle Eastern energy. The
landscape is not yet one of a stable multipolar system.
What Will Define a Future Regional Order?
The
Middle East stands at a critical juncture. In the absence of a regional
hegemon, such as the United States, how can the region move beyond its
instability and build a regional order that reduces tensions? Stability
is possible if regional powers acknowledge their structural limitations
and recognize their mutual constraints.
Since
the beginning of the century, several developments have heightened
regional volatility. The expansion of Iran’s influence after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, like the emergence of a so-called “Shia crescent”
stretching from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, was perceived by
Saudi Arabia as threatening. At the same time, Türkiye and Qatar viewed
the Arab uprisings beginning in 2010–2011 as an opportunity to extend their influence through Muslim Brotherhood movements. This triggered a backlash
in many countries, mainly driven by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, whose actions could be inconsistent: they backed
counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt and Tunisia, but not in Syria, as
interests determined their choices. Israel, in turn, has seen its
campaigns in Gaza and the West Bank, and against Iran and its allies in
2024–2025, as major strides in expanding its power.
The collapse of the Assad regime, the unravelling of the Iran-sponsored Axis of Resistance, the recalibration of Gulf-Iran relations, regional powers’ efforts to establish zones of influence, and the transactional U.S. approach
might well reorder the Middle East. Three factors will determine if a
cohesive regional system emerges, namely whether a more conservative,
even reactionary, political environment, defined by a balance of power
and counterrevolutionary instincts, can take shape, as this is what
states will gravitate toward and defend after securing their aims. A
second defining factor will be Iran’s trajectory, given its role as a
revisionist regional power. A third will be whether regional powers can
coexist in their respective spheres of influence.
Toward a New Counterrevolutionary Order
In the decade after the Arab uprisings, several Arab regimes, supported by key Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, worked relentlessly to close that chapter. Not all conflicts since then have been caused by counterrevolutionary dynamics,
or provoked by Gulf states alone. However, they have all been
instigated by the widespread nature of regional instability that has
recast power relations, with countries pursuing their contending
interests and seeking to anchor their gains in a more stable order.
This
has not altered the fact that authoritarian regimes viewed the
uprisings as a threat and sought to eliminate all revolutionary
potential. That to which they aspired was similar to the post-1815
European order, in which monarchies agreed to restore a balance of power and neutralize forces unleashed by the French Revolution. Even Syria’s new leaders framed the Assad regime’s downfall as a transition aligning with the geopolitical consensus, not as part of a revolutionary wave. Ahmad al-Sharaa signaled his moderation, reassuring Gulf capitals and emphasizing that Syria would maintain the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Israel and prevent foreign actors from using Syrian territory against anyone in the region.
A
core condition of a new conservative order is the eradication of
ideological movements regarded as destabilizing. Several Arab regimes are pushing
for a post-ideological phase centered on nationalism, technocratic
modernity, and state-driven development. Their animus toward the Muslim
Brotherhood has shaped domestic and regional politics alike, and these
regimes seek to marginalize political Islam and defang transnational
ideologies of all stripes. In parallel, some analysts
see Iran’s regional setbacks as paving the way for a more conventional,
nationalist state, ushering in the end of transnational Shiism.
However,
a conservative, even counterrevolutionary, regional order requires more
than eliminating ideological foes. Its viability depends on the ability
of countries to deliver economically and a settlement of the
Palestinian question. Authoritarian restoration can only endure if
states meet the minimal expectations of their populations for economic security.
This is not guaranteed. Several countries—Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq,
Lebanon, and Jordan—face acute fiscal stress, institutional decay, and
environmental degradation. Governance failures and corruption make it
difficult for elites to sustain legitimacy and contain social
discontent.
The Palestinian issue remains an enduring obstacle as well. Public opinion across the Arab world remains deeply attached to the Palestinians’ plight, and Gaza’s devastation has intensified grievances. The fate of the Palestinians continues to erode the legitimacy of regimes seen as disregarding Palestinian rights, particularly from countries that joined the Abraham Accords.
The region cannot stabilize around a conservative order that ignores
Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Jordan and Egypt would perceive
Israeli plans for the West Bank’s annexation or the displacement of
Gaza’s Palestinians as deeply destabilizing, reinforcing the conviction
among Arab regimes and publics that Israel is a settler-colonial project
driven by territorial expansion. Saudi Arabia, the only Arab state with
the capacity to forge a regional consensus, has tied normalization with
Israel to credible progress on a Palestinian state. Although the two-state solution appears increasingly illusory, launching a viable peace process remains essential to consolidating a conservative regional order.
Iran’s Trajectory as a Determinant of the Region’s Direction
A
second, and decisive, factor shaping the likelihood of a sustainable
Middle Eastern equilibrium is Iran’s future. What will ensue after the
passing of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains uncertain,
but it is likely the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology will be
contested, if not fully revised, given its failures and growing public
discontent.
For decades, much of the West, Israel, and many Arab states have viewed Iran as a primary source of regional instability. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Tehran has relied on a “forward defense”
strategy to insulate its territory from conflict. Shaped by the trauma
of the war and U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and
Iraq (2003), this doctrine rested on three pillars: a network of allied
armed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization
Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen; a ballistic missile and drone
program providing strategic capabilities; and a naval posture based on
asymmetrical tactics to deter U.S. forces and be effective in key
Persian Gulf waterways.
The
two main objectives in this approach were deterring Israel and the
United States from attacking Iran directly; and securing influence in
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, turning them into buffers or platforms
for Iranian action. However, the Gaza war’s ramifications showed that
Iran’s Axis of Resistance project had its limits. Hezbollah’s effective surrender in November 2024, Gaza’s devastation, and a twelve-day war in June 2025
that saw Israel and the United States bomb Iran, including its nuclear
facilities and missile capabilities, exposed the shortcomings of its
transnational proxy network. Instead, it consolidated a counter-axis
including the Gulf states and Israel, leaving Iran isolated and
strategically constrained.
A post-Khamenei nationalistic Iran may well remain authoritarian
and become inward-looking. This would have profound implications:
Iran’s proxies would need to review their role and reposition themselves
internally, potentially evolving into more nationalistic, less
militarized actors. Their future will be shaped mainly by the direction
Iran chooses.
Yet Iran’s greatest vulnerability lies at home.
The regime faces domestic fragility, declining legitimacy, and a
deteriorating economy. External confrontation may briefly generate
nationalistic solidarity, but it cannot resolve the country’s structural
crisis. A young, disillusioned population increasingly rejects the
ideology of wilayat al-faqih,
which combines supreme judicial, religious, and political power in a
single Islamic jurist, and views Iranian regional adventurism as costly
and leading to international isolation.
The
prospects for a stable regional order depend heavily on Iran’s
strategic direction. The more Tehran moves toward national
prioritization, economic reconstruction, and deescalation, and away from
regional adventurism, the greater the chances of reshaping the Middle
East around a sustainable equilibrium. Conversely, if Iran doubles down
on confrontation and ideological resistance, regional instability will
deepen.
Redrawing Regional Spheres of Influence
U.S.
disengagement, a decade and a half of transformative conflicts, and the
rise of new regional powers have unleashed unprecedented competition
among Middle Eastern states to expand their spheres of influence. Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, in turn, have become contested arenas in which Israel, Türkiye, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are seeking to advance their interests,
usually at each other’s expense. A decisive factor shaping the region’s
future will be whether these spheres of influence can be reconciled or
will remain zones of rivalry.
While
Israel sees itself as the region’s hegemonic power, in practice it has
become a major driver of instability. Guided by the “Iron Wall” doctrine of imposing outcomes through overwhelming military force, Israel’s “peace through strength”
approach disregards the political and historical roots of conflict, the
humanitarian toll of military campaigns, and the interests of other
regional powers that must be factored into sustainable regional
settlements. The limitations are evident. First, Israel’s violent
actions in Gaza and the West Bank, like its aggressiveness in general, have triggered defensive counterreactions
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan, and even Pakistan, amid a
growing perception that Israel threatens Arab interests. In light of
this, even before Israeli strikes weakened Iran’s regional military
network in 2024, Gulf states had already begun reengaging with Tehran.
Second, Israel’s ambitions are undermining the sovereignty
of neighboring states, particularly Lebanon and Syria. Israel occupies
both countries’ territory and frequently bombs them, while preventing
the rebuilding of state capacities and even of areas destroyed by war.
This has clashed with Turkish and Saudi priorities. Türkiye seeks
to restore state authority in Syria to contain Iranian networks, while
preventing the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous zone. For Israel, a
strong Syrian state, especially aligned with Ankara, potentially
challenges Israel’s ability to shape events to its north. Southern Syria
is a microcosm of these tensions. Segments of the Druze community’s
leadership increasingly want to escape Damascus’ grip, while Kurdish groups in the northeast are also reluctant to accept the new leadership, furthering Israel’s preference for empowering Syria’s minorities.
Lebanon faces similar risks: the Shia community is caught between outside pressures to disarm Hezbollah, Iran’s desire to retain leverage,
and its own need for a state that can provide protection and services.
Saudi Arabia and other countries aim to curtail Iran’s influence in
Syria and Lebanon, but will not accept Israel’s destruction of southern Lebanon or actions in Syria that create circumstances for Iran to reconstitute its Axis of Resistance.
Israel’s strategy relies on a dangerous assumption
that regional fragmentation and state collapse can secure long-term
Israeli domination of its political environment. Forcing Hezbollah’s
disarmament, for instance, risks pushing Lebanon into civil war.
Normalizing relations with Syria while occupying the country and
widening sectarian fractures could further weaken the state and
delegitimize its leaders. No Arab government will accept a regional
order built on state collapse, particularly if accompanied by the mass
displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, which would
destabilize Egypt and Jordan. Yet such plans enjoy explicit support
within Israel’s political class.
Ultimately,
the Middle East’s future will be determined by whether regional powers
reach an understanding over their spheres of influence and commit to
building functional states. Without a negotiated framework delineating
roles, limits, and responsibilities, the region will remain trapped in a
cycle of confrontation and fragmentation.
Conclusion
The
Middle East may be evolving toward a balance-of-power system,
reminiscent of post-1815 Europe. However, that era lacked a single
dominant state, and stability emerged from a mutual recognition of
limits. The Middle East has never had a Congress of Vienna, but the
structural conditions for one are taking shape. The next phase will
require constructing a more sustainable regional order, based on
negotiation and grudging acceptance of a balance of interests, agreed
among regional capitals and anchored by global powers.
About the Authors
Hamza
Meddeb is a research fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East
Center in Beirut, where he co-leads the Political Economy Program.
Mohamed Ali Adraoui is a research professor at Georgetown University and the author of Salafism Goes Global: From the Gulf to the French Banlieues (Oxford University Press, 2020).
卡爾‧坎農，RCP執行主編
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