書評： 納粹想像中的阿塔圖爾克
「畢竟，今天還有誰說要滅絕亞美尼亞人？希特勒聲稱（但未被證實）曾這樣說。Ihrig 顯示納粹對於種族清洗少數民族的迷戀，這使得一個新的同質化國家得以建立，但他們對於 MKA 的民粹非民主的勝利更感興趣。
凱末爾：一個以奧圖曼人身份上戰場，以土耳其人身份歸來的士兵
蔣介石：一個以中國人身份上戰場，以台灣人身份歸來的士兵
Review: Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination
在所有 20 世紀的歐洲強人中，穆斯塔法‧凱末爾‧阿塔圖爾克 (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) [MKA] 是唯一一個其權威與魅力在文化上、政治上、甚至法律上仍是其國家公共論述中不容置疑的組成部分。然而，他對希特勒和 20 世紀法西斯主義的影響卻沒有受到檢視。Stefan Ihrig 這本令人不寒而慄的著作《納粹想像中的阿塔圖爾克》將會改變這種情況。他對第一次世界大戰後二十多年來德國主流、右翼和納粹刊物的研究表明，現代土耳其的創始人實際上是納粹和希特勒的繆斯女神和榜樣。
「畢竟，今天還有誰說要滅絕亞美尼亞人？希特勒聲稱（但未被證實）曾這樣說。Ihrig 顯示納粹對於種族清洗少數民族的迷戀，這使得一個新的同質化國家得以建立，但他們對於 MKA 的民粹非民主的勝利更感興趣。他劃分了不同的論述階段，在這些階段中，德國極右翼、納粹本身，最後是希特勒與納粹幹部明確地啟發與運用土耳其的模式與領導。「Ihrig 指出，在第一次世界大戰之後，「對納粹而言，土耳其不是古老的東方，而是他們希望帶給德國的現代民族主義與極權政治的標竿。(p.7)
這不是一本關於 MKA 或土耳其的書，而是這本從鄂圖曼帝國的廢墟中興起的新共和國及其領導人如何被理解為鼓舞人心的敘事，以動員和證明納粹政治的領導、群眾和「行動」。早在希特勒成為全國性人物之前，「土耳其元首」就已經吸引了德國右翼的想像，他們試圖從第一次世界大戰結束後的條約所造成的惡劣環境中恢復過來。後來，希特勒親自將 MKA 讚譽為「黑暗中的明星」，而納粹的決策者與宣傳機器至少在兩方面深深投入於讚揚土耳其的「成功」故事：積極抵抗協約國，並迅速消除反對派與少數民族。
Ihrig 認為，土耳其從鄂圖曼帝國的廢墟中崛起為現代共和國，與德國一起處於大戰的失敗一方，是德國右翼戰後論述的核心，尤其是在前軍事部長、德國的堅定盟友 Enver Pasha 不再繼續說下去之後，更是一個色彩繽紛的故事。「在絕望而荒涼的德國眼中」，土耳其民族主義者抵抗帝國腹地被肢解的能力、保住家園的能力，以及修改戰勝國強加於他們的戰後和平條約的能力，是 「民族主義的夢想成真，或者說，類似於超民族主義的色情作品」。(第11頁)納粹是在這種戰後對新土耳其及其領袖的迷戀中成長起來的。
這種固著的中心主題是大戰的餘波，而 MKA 作為一種敘事，滿足了納粹意象的功能。早在希特勒加冕為元首之前，德國右翼就將 MKA 稱為「土耳其元首」。
這位元首對抗協約國裁軍的鬥爭、他在創造民族團結方面的成就、他在淨化人口方面的勝利，以及迅速解決少數民族問題，成為一個平行的故事，解釋納粹在強大領導下崛起和成功的原因。
很明顯，納粹使用了幾個元首人物，「從弗雷德里克大帝，顯然也包括墨索里尼，一直到羅斯福」，來支持和證明他們的元首國家。然而，Ihrig觀察到並記錄了 「因為阿塔圖爾克的故事已經有了一個美滿的結局[......]它在質上優於其他故事」(p.170)，並且在許多歌頌納粹的文章中得到了更多的報導。他們透過 MKA 這個政治人物，建立了強大的單一領導、純粹民族和反民主的思想。他的故事被用來讓公眾為德國元首希特勒本人做好準備。根據納粹的說法，MKA建構了一個沒有妥協、後果明確有效的國家。他們的核心意識形態是戰爭創造國家，MKA就是這樣的化身，他是 「一個以奧圖曼人身份上戰場，以土耳其人身份歸來的士兵」。(p.161)如此揭露「風光中的土耳其元首」，他們實際上是在表達他們的出發點，以及他們想去的意識形態障礙。
在 1919-1923 年德國媒體圍繞土耳其的抵抗和戰後和約的修改進行炒作之後，土耳其的奇蹟一再被討論，證明創造歷史的是強者而非大眾。例如，戈培爾的主要教師和偶像之一 F. Hussong 在 1922 年將民主視為「群眾的谵妄」，他稱讚 MK 是「將無助和不穩定、迷失方向和搖擺不定的群眾轉化為統一國家的人；意志崛起並從厄運中創造上升；元首崛起並指明道路......在那裡，人們曾經只看到深淵和厄運」。(引文第58頁)
根據Hussong的說法，那些對 「demos 「抱有幻想的人有一種 」青蛙的歷史觀點「，而MKA的 」勝利[不是]環境的結果，環境[是]他的勝利的效果。「(引文第59頁)Ihrig指出，在那段時期，德國輿論中MKA的意象頻繁且無處不在，呼籲潛在的 」德國穆斯塔法」。
例如，《Vossische Zeitung》在 1922 年的一篇文章中辯論 「墨索里尼和凱末爾 」是未經考驗的榜樣，並批評他們 「幼稚的激進主義」，指出了一位德國 「擁抱土耳其模式的政治玩家，即希特勒」。
在他們的 「向土耳其學習 」中，許多納粹作家，包括慕尼黑政變中希特勒的同志埃里希-盧登多夫（Erich Ludendorff），提出希特勒是 「德國的穆斯塔法」，「嘗試以行動轉化土耳其的榜樣」。(p.67)
到了 1924 年，安卡拉政府因為創造了一個伏爾基希單一戰線、伏爾基希淨化、有效的民族動員，進而將「民族從協約國的壓迫下解放出來」(p.100)，而受到讚揚(讚揚者不是別人，正是唯一一個在土耳其民族主義者中戰鬥的德國僱傭兵、後來成為納粹記者的漢斯‧特羅布斯特(Hans Trobst))。
儘管墨索里尼經常（至今仍被視為）是納粹的首要榜樣，但 Ihrig 的廣泛研究顯示，尤其是在 1923 年慕尼黑政變之前，納粹官方報紙 Heimatland 和 Völkischer Beobachter 使用他們對 MKA 的敘述「作為製造支持政變氛圍的手段」，文章如「給我們一個安卡拉政府」(p.105)。
事實上，墨索里尼的「法律主義」很難得到納粹的認同，納粹對 MKA 表示欽佩，因為 MKA 一開始「在法律眼中是個叛徒，但事實上，根據人民的聲音，他是人民脫離苦難的救星」。MKA 與希特勒的人生故事經常被人相提並論；MKA 反對他的國家腐敗、充斥的中心，也就是伊斯坦堡，就像希特勒批判柏林一樣。根據希特勒自己的說法，君士坦丁堡不可能帶來拯救，因為「這座城市就像我們的情況一樣，被民主和平主義、國際化的人所污染，他們不再能做必要的事。它只能來自農民的國家"。(引自P.97)對於希特勒而言，他在1923年 「政变 」後的審判中這樣說，德國的復興 「只能來自德國相對健康的部分，那就是巴伐利亞」(P.96)，就像安卡拉拯救了土耳其民族一樣。希特勒在審判中的最後一次演說中，試圖將他們的政變合法化，他在墨索里尼面前使用了 MKA 的例子： 到底是什麼讓 Kemal Pasha 的行為合法化？為他的民族爭取自由"。(p.98)
慕尼黑政變之後，納粹的官方報紙被查封，德國媒體對於安卡拉方案的爭論和希特勒對 MKA 的提法基本上沒有反應。德國政變之後，是納粹「合法」策略的年代，在這段期間，MKA與土耳其不再像納粹運動最初幾年一樣經常被提及。正如 Ihrig 所說：「這是完全可以理解的：把阿塔圖爾克當作榜樣來談，就意味著承認暴力奪權的願望，承諾對凡爾賽列強開戰、內戰，並建立強大的獨裁統治......因此，在整個魏瑪時期，宣稱土耳其是自己的榜樣是危險的。(1923年慕尼黑戰爭失敗後，墨索里尼更多地出現在納粹的論述中。希特勒在他的監獄作品《我的奮鬥》中既沒有深入討論 MKA，也沒有深入討論墨索里尼，據 Ihrig 觀察，其中只有一次間接提到凱末爾派的鬥爭，以及對 Enver Pasha 的欽佩。(p.110)
然而，隨著納粹上台，希特勒繼續將自己與阿塔圖爾克，以及他的運動與凱末爾主義者相提並論，即使這些論述與他新的「合法性」路線有嚴重衝突。
1928 年，希特勒在紐倫堡的 NSDAP 聚會上發表講話，討論德國在第一次世界大戰中的失敗，他將土耳其與德國相提並論，並稱讚 MKA：
「[土耳其國家] 的內在力量仍然存在，而這個人的出現，成功地提醒他的人民其偉大的傳統，並帶領他們向前邁進。這就是我們德國人的不同之處。(p.111)
在另一次演講中，他說：
「[今天]一個安納托利亞農民的價值高於一個收入最高的德國文人。
一個民族必須能夠為其理想犧牲自己"。隨著希特勒政治生涯的成型和風格化，他被描繪成MKA的形象：
一個來自國家邊緣、出身卑微的天生領袖，「從默默無聞的士兵過渡到政治家」（第157頁）；
一個選擇儉樸生活、過著「像普通士兵一樣」、「與士兵的關係比與同僚的關係更親密」（第158頁）的行動者。
Ihrig 認為，這種「各種各樣的實際、巧合和製造的相似之處」被用來建立對元首神話和原則的美化和崇拜，而且「具有非常明顯的說教性」，以將國家塑造成一個「戰鬥社群」，而這個「戰鬥社群」「需要被元首的信仰和對祖國的愛所約束」(p.162)
MKA 被描繪成對反對派採取不妥協的態度，他「以良好的軍人方式」嚴厲對待反對派。(p.164)
對納粹來說，他的專制和獨裁風格要求「不僅士兵完全服從，國家也要完全服從」，這使他成為「政治需要以戰爭的形式來進行」這句話的完美典範。(p.164)
Review: Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination
Of all the 20th century strong men of Europe, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk [MKA] is the only remaining one whose authority and charisma is still a culturally, politically and even legally, unquestionable component of the public discourse in his country. Yet his influence on Hitler and 20th century fascism has gone unexamined. That will change with Stefan Ihrig’s chilling book, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination. His research into more than two decades of mainstream, right-wing and Nazi publications in Germany following World War I demonstrates how the founder of Modern Turkey was actually a muse and a role model for the Nazis and Hitler.
“Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Hitler is claimed (but not confirmed) to have said. Ihrig shows the Nazis’ fascination with ethnic cleansing of minorities that enabled a new homogenized nation but they are even more interested in MKA’s triumph of populist non-democracy. He delineates different discursive phases during which the German far right, Nazis themselves and finally Hitler and the Nazi cadres expressively inspired and employed the Turkish model and leadership. “For the Nazis,” in the aftermath of the World War I states Ihrig “Turkey was not the old East, but standard bearer for the modern nationalist and totalitarian politics that they wished to bring to Germany.” (p.7)
This is not a book about MKA or Turkey; it is how this new republic, that emerged out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and its leader were construed as inspirational narratives to mobilize and justify Nazi politics of leadership, masses and “action.” Long before Hitler was a national figure the “Turkish Führer” had captivated the imagery of the German right that was trying to recover from what they perceived to be the harsh conditions of the treaties that ended the World War I. Later Hitler himself canonizes MKA as “a star in the darkness” and the Nazi policy makers and the propaganda machine was deeply invested in praising Turkey’s “success” story on at least two counts; actively resisting the Entente countries and swiftly eliminating the opposition and the minorities.
According to Ihrig, the emergence of Turkey as a modern republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, which was on the losing side of the Great War together with Germany, was central to the post-war discourse of the German right, especially after Enver Pasha, former Minister of War, and a staunch German ally ceased to continue as a colorful story. “In the eyes of a desperate and desolate Germany” Turkish nationalists’ ability to resist the dismemberment of the heartland of the empire, ability to secure a homeland, and revise a post-war peace treaty imposed on them by the victors was “a nationalist dream come true, or rather, something like a hypernationalist pornography.” (p.11) Nazis grew up in this post-war fixation with the New Turkey and its leader.
The central theme of this fixation was the aftermath of the Great War, and MKA as a narrative fulfilled a function in the Nazi imagery. Long before Hitler was crowned as one, the German right was referring to MKA as “the Turkish Führer.” This Führer’s fight against disarmament by the Entente, his achievement in creating a national unity, his triumph in purification of the population and swift solutions to minority problems became a parallel story to explain the rise and success of Nazis under a strong leadership. Obviously, Nazis had used several Führer figures, “from Fredrick the Great, obviously also Mussolini, all the way to Roosevelt,” to support and justify their Führer state. However, Ihrig observes and documents that “because Atatürk’s story was already crowned with a happy ending […] it was qualitatively superior to the others” (p.170) and received quantitatively larger coverage in many hagiographic Nazi texts. They built their ideas of strong one-man leadership, pure nation and anti-democracy ideas through the political person of MKA. His story was used to prepare the public for the German Führer, Hitler himself. According to the Nazis, MKA constructed a country without compromise and with clarity and effective consequences. Their core ideology that war makes a nation was personified in MKA who was “the soldier who went to war as an Ottoman and came back as a Turk.” (p.161) Exposing the “Turkish Führer in the limelight” as such, they were actually expressing where they were coming from and the ideological blocks of where they wanted to go.
Following 1919-1923 German media hype around the Turkish resistance and revision of the post-War peace treaties, the Turkish miracle was discussed again and again as the proof that it is the strong men that make history and not the masses. For example, one of the main teachers and an idol of Goebbels, F. Hussong, who viewed democracy as a “delirium of masses” in 1922 praised MK as “the man who transformed a helpless and unstable, disoriented and faltering mass into a unified nation; a will rises and creates ascent from doom; a Führer rises and shows the way… where once one saw only abyss and doom.” (cited p. 58) According to Hussong, those who had a vision of “demos” had a “frog’s perspective of history,” whereas MKA’s “victory [was] not the result of circumstances, the circumstances [were] the effects of his victory” (cited p.59) Ihrig shows that during that period, MKA imagery in German public opinion was frequent and ubiquitous, calling for potential “German Mustafas.” For example, an article in Vossische Zeitung debating “Mussolini and Kemal” as untested role models and criticizes their “childish radicalism” in 1922, identified a German “political player who embraced the Turkish model, i.e. Hitler.” In their “learning from Turkey”, many Nazi writers, including Erich Ludendorff, Hitler’s comrade during the Munich Putsch, proposed Hitler as a “German Mustafa” who “were to attempt to translate Turkish example by action.” (p.67) By 1924, the Ankara Government was praised (by no other than Hans Trobst, the only German mercenary to fight among the Turkish nationalist and later a Nazi reporter) for creating a völkisch unitary front, völkisch purification, effective mobilization of the nation, and thus liberating the “nation from Entente oppression” (p. 100).
While Mussolini was (and still is seen) often as the Nazis’ prime role model, Ihrig’s extenstive research shows that especially until the 1923 Munich Putsch, official Nazi papers Heimatland and Völkischer Beobachter used their narratives of MKA “as a means of creating a pro-putsch atmosphere” with articles such as “Give Us an Ankara Government” (p.105) As a matter of fact, Mussolini’s “legalism” was hardly approved by the Nazis who expressed admiration for MKA who had started “as a traitor in the eyes of the law, but was in fact and according to the voice of the people their savior from misery.” The parallels between the life stories of MKA and Hitler were frequently drawn; MKA was against the rotten, infested center, of his country, i.e Istanbul, as Hitler was critical of Berlin. According to Hitler himself no salvation could come from Constantinople because “the city was, just as in our case, contaminated by democratic-pacifistic, internationalized people, who were no longer able to do what is necessary. It could only come from the farmer’s country.” (cited in p.97) For Hitler, who was thus speaking during his post-Putsch trial in 1923, the German recovery “could only come from a relatively healthy part of Germany, and that was Bavaria” (p.96) just as it was Ankara saved Turkish nation. During his final speech at the trial Hitler tried to legitimize their coup d’etat, using MKA’s example before Mussolini “If we ask ourselves: What has legalized Kemal Pasha’s deed in the end? The gaining liberty for his nation.” (p.98)
In the wake of the Munich Putsch, the official Nazi papers were closed down, and the German press in general largely remained unresponsive to the debates about the Ankara solution and Hitler’s references to MKA. The aftermath of the Putsch were the years of Nazi ‘legal’ tactics, during which MKA and Turkey were not mentioned as often as it had been during the first years of the Nazi movement. As Ihrig states “this was all too understandable: to talk about Atatürk as a role model would have meant admitting to aspirations of a violent seizure of power, with the promise of war against the Versailles powers, civil war, and establishment of a strong dictatorship… Throughout the Weimar years it was thus dangerous to proclaim Turkey as one’s role model.” (p.109) Whereas Mussolini appeared more in the Nazi discourse after the failure of the 1923 Munich Pustch. Hitler discussed neither MKA, nor Mussolini in any depth in his prison oeuvre, Mein Kampf where, Ihrig observes, there was only one indirect reference to Kemalist struggle and an admiration note for Enver Pasha. (p.110)
However, as Nazis’ ascend to power, Hitler continued drawing parallels between himself and Atatürk, as well as between his movement and the Kemalists, even when such discourse heavily conflicted with his new “legality” course. In 1928, addressing the NSDAP gathering in Nuremberg, discussing the German defeat in World War I, Hitler compared Turkey with Germany and praised MKA: “The inner strength [of the Turkish State] had remained and the man came who managed to remind his people of its great tradition and who led them forward. That is what was different with us Germans.” (p.111) In another speech he said “[Today] an Anatolian farmer is worth more than a German man of letters with the highest income. A nation must be able to sacrifice itself for its ideals.” As Hitler’s political career took shape and stylized, he was depicted as MKA: a born leader who came from the periphery of the nation with humble backgrounds and transitioned “from unknown soldier to statesman” (p.157), a man of action who chooses to live a frugal life and lives “like a common soldier” and “closer to his soldiers than to his fellow officers (p.158). Ihrig argues that this “great variety of actual, coincidental and manufactured parallels” were utilized to establish glorification and veneration of the Führer myth and principle, and “had a very pronounced didactic quality” to forge the nation into a “battle community” which was “needed to be bound by the belief in the Führer and the love of the fatherland” (p.162) MKA was depicted with his no-compromise attitude towards the opposition which he treated harshly and “in a good soldierly fashion. (p.164) For Nazis, the fact that his autocratic and dictatorial style demands “total obedience not only from his soldiers but also from his nation” made him the perfect example of the dictum that suggests “politics needed to be carried out as a form of war.” (p.164)
By 1933, Nazi publications were full of references to MKA and the New Turkey. Kemalism was described as “Turkish National Socialism” in Hamburger Nachrichten; re-established Völkischer Beobachter attributed the ascent of the Turkish nation to the “deed of this one single man, who with iron will and undiminished determination leads his nation to independence” (p.112) and in Kreuzzeitung, it was stated that “the German National Socialism of Adolf Hitler and Turkish Kemalism are closely related” (p.113) Hitler’s 1933 interview with Milliyet, a Turkish daily newspaper, was extensively reprinted in several German papers citing his famous phrase that elevates MKA to an iconic status as “a shining star in the darkness” (p.115).
In 1938, Ihrig cites Hitler saying the following to a delegation of Turkish politicians: “Atatürk was the first to show that it is possible to mobilize and regenerate the resources that a country has lost. In this respect, Atatürk was a teacher; Mussolini was the first and I his second student.” (p.116) In 1941, on the occasion of the Turkish-German Friendship Treaty, Deutche Allgemeine Zietung reiterates to the readers the significance of MKA for the Nazi Germany “The Führer has always thought that the heroic deed of liberation by Kemal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, was a marvelous role model for the uprising against this system of coercion of international disorder.” (p.117) Similarly Frankfurter Zeitung, explained why following the Turkish model was of paramount importance for Germany, albeit belatedly because they lacked a leader until Hitler came around “Lacking a Führer who would have been able to realize the dream of national birth, the German nation saw its old ally, followed with a hot heart the unparalleled victorious march with which Kemal Pasha blew away the enemies of the Turkish nation only to lay the foundations for a truly modern state in the middle of the raging battle.” (p.118)
What would come as a surprise to the racists of 21st century, but not for the ideological climate of the Third Reich, Nazis were eager to claim that the Turks were not one of the lesser races and in 1936 NSDAP office for Racial Policy announced that “The Turks are Aryans!” (p.128) This was also compatible with the racial purification policies which facilitated the creation of the modern Turkey and admittedly an inspiration for the Nazi Germany.
MKA was equally admired for, and the success of his story was attributed to the ways in which he handled the minority questions as the Nazi writers discussed the positive role the destruction of minorities had for the völkisch power of the Turks. According to the Nazi commentators, the Ottoman Empire “lacked any healthy, sustainable or völkisch foundations” (cited on p.174) and collapsed for the reasons external to the Turks and their racial characters. These reasons were identified as “the multiethnic character of the empire in general, the influence and even rule of ‘foreign elements,’ and the heavily retarding character of Islam (p.174) According to this view, “the Turk was never sick, but he had to carry the incredible weight of an unorganic empire” (p.175) According to Froembgen, the author of the book Kemal Atatürk: Soldier and Führer, which came out in seven editions during the first year it was published in 1935, “Turkendom was dying slowly but surely of the poison that pours out of the racial mishmash of the subdued peoples, this famous sputum of peoples of the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, of the Levantines, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs, and the Jews, who like the resistant weed cover the ground [everywhere]” (cited on p.175) In that sense, the “sneaky, parasitic and unworthy” Armenians were seen as the “Jews of the orient” who had “stabbed the Turks in the back” during the war. As early as in 1924, on the front page of Völkischer Kurier, it was suggested that “what had happened to the Armenians might very well happen to the Jews in a future Germany” in an article written by Trobst, the German mercenary who fought among the Turkish Nationalists (p.179). At a general party meeting in 1927, Hitler likened the Greeks and Armenians, to the Jews because “they have these specific, disgraceful characteristics we condemn in the Jews” (p.180). The destruction of the Armenians was seen as the “one precondition for Atatürk’s success” as defined in Nazi texts (p.182) In addition to the cleansing of Anatolia of the Armenians, in order for Turkey to become a state that was “national and only national” another minority questioned had to be solved: the Greeks in Anatolia. The exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, that uprooted and dislocated millions of people, was lauded by the Third Reich papers: “something truly unique was accomplished in the sphere off military politics and population science” (cited in p.183) because it provided the harmonization and standardization of their populations. According to Nazi writers, these double-ethnic cleansings constituted the precondition of the New Turkey; “only through the annihilation of the Greek and the Armenian tribes in Anatolia were the creation of a Turkish national state and the formation of an unflawed Turkish body of society within one state possible” (cited in p.184)
Ihrig shows that the Nazi publications were not equally content and often confused by MKA’s relationship with the Soviet Union or the Arab nationalist, yet they employed an embracing and understanding tone since “Atatürk was able to get rid of all weakening influences, which had worn out the Ottoman Empire” (cited on p.186) including Bolshevism and Islam. The Völkisch revival of the New Turkey was regarded more important than passing and pragmatic alliances with the Bolsheviks or competing Turkish and Arab territorial claims (in Alexandretta).
Obviously, the way Hitler and Nazis narrated MKA and the New Turkey were more about themselves, their plans and prospects, than the actual Atatürk and the Turkish Republic. In their constructed and imagined narratives, the Nazis were attempting to justify their own power and ideology as they made selective use of history. Certainly MKA may not be responsible for being an inspiration and a shining star for the Nazis. However, a comparative reading of the Turkish official historiography, as founded in the grand oeuvre of MKA, Nutuk (a 36-hour speech delivered in 1927), and Nazi glorifications of the Turkish success story since 1919 reveals uncannily parallel narratives of militarism, exclusive nationalism and undemocratic veneration of a leader. What’s more, while Nazis’ take on history and society might have been heavily discredited, their narration of the Turkish success story is still taught in the history textbooks in Turkey and evidenced by the omnipresence of the Atatürk sculptures and busts throughout the country. It would not be surprising for the cautious researchers to discover that the public and pedagogic discourses on Atatürk in Turkey to this day still follow a parallel story line of territorial anti-imperialism, unified nation, strong state and determined leadership.
Ihrig, in his nuanced and detailed treatment of Nazi constructions of MKA shows that they might have misunderstood and fully ignored one of Atatürk’s main dictums “peace at home, peace abroad” (p.170) in their attempts to highlight his martial qualities for their own purpose and goals. Amidst his remarkable research on the Nazi war cries, crimes and consequences, it may so be that Ihrig himself might have neglected to see the cost and consequences of the kind of “peace” MKA had established for Turkey. Atatürk’s “peace at home” in practice was experienced as the criminalization of Kurds, Islamists, and any claim regarding Armenians, thus stifling public discourse and democratization for decades to come. But identifying the ills of the Atatürk’s regimes was not Ihrig’s task. Yet, anyone who is doing research to revise and reconsider Turkish official historiography still needs to engage with Ihrig’s discussion, as much as any student of nationhood, militarism and democracy.
納粹領袖阿道夫·希特勒在其職業生涯早期，從他的法西斯主義資深同事貝尼托·墨索里尼那裡獲得了靈感；這一事實是眾所周知的。但對希特勒和納粹黨來說，同樣重要的榜樣是現代土耳其的創始人穆斯塔法·凱末爾·阿塔圖爾克。以色列海法德國和歐洲研究中心主任、歷史學家史蒂芬·伊里格在其著作
