台灣可以從伊朗橫向升級與美國的戰爭中學習
3月16日，在美以與伊朗衝突期間，一架無人機襲擊了杜拜國際機場附近的油罐，現場升起濃煙。 © 路透社
聽
索希尼·查特吉是一位國際律師。她曾是美國總統巴拉克·歐巴馬和喬·拜登政府的任命官員和高級官員，也是哥倫比亞大學國際與公共事務學院的前兼職教授。
隨著美國和伊朗之間可能脆弱但又十分必要的停火協議生效，華盛頓仍然發現自己陷入了一場規模空前的軍事和政治泥潭，面臨兩種選擇。
在情境 1 中，美國總統川普宣布取得某種單方面勝利，並試圖重返談判桌（與一個更加激進、越來越絕望和懷疑的政權），希望挽救某種形式的伊朗核協議。
在第二種情景中，川普政府將違反停火協議，犯下犯下廣泛且明確的戰爭罪行的悲劇性錯誤（正如他最近暗示的那樣），和/或派遣地面部隊，從而危及更多美國軍人的生命，使美國損失數十億美元，並在伊朗本土與其地面部隊作戰。
伊朗的地形險惡且陌生；此外，儘管伊朗的海空力量極為薄弱，但其地面作戰能力卻十分強大。
我們是怎麼走到這一步的？
如果川普政府真心相信能夠殺死伊朗最高領袖及其高層領導，從而開啟一個全新的民主時代，那看來只是癡人說夢。
最高領袖在戰爭初期就被殺害了。
此後，伊朗的新領導層更加激進，也更加肆無忌憚。在這個新的（但顯然還不夠新的）伊朗，革命衛隊仍然掌控著一切……至少目前是如此。
暫且不論這場戰爭本身對於實現美國戰略目標是否必要（而這些目標至今仍不明朗），過去一個月我們所目睹的是一種獨特的非對稱戰爭形式——
擴散式橫向升級——
的出人意料且行之有效。
如果簡單地認為美國落入了美國歷史學家羅伯特·佩普所描述的“升級陷阱”，那就過於片面了。
Robert Pape
the escalation trap
escalation ladder
escalating vertically
negotiating with bombs
羅伯特·佩普
升級陷阱
升級階梯
縱向升級
用炸彈談判
誠然，戰術上的成功打擊未能取得可持續或戰略上的勝利，這使得美國走上了「升級階梯」。
但這種「升級陷阱」論證的根本錯誤在於，它假定交戰雙方都在進行垂直升級。而實際情況並非如此。
美國一直在進行縱向升級：
國防部長皮特·赫格塞斯最近表示，美國正在「用炸彈談判」——他和川普都明確表示，如果伊朗不開放霍爾木茲海峽，美國將繼續升級對伊朗的軍事打擊，並威脅要對伊朗犯下戰爭罪行。
這種公開認可針對平民的非法戰爭罪行的行為震驚了全世界。
或者說，它本應如此。
近幾週來，美國打擊的目標更多，包括更多類型的目標（民用基礎設施、橋樑），而且打擊力度也更大。然而，所有這些行動都沒有取得戰略上的成功。
伊朗持續採用橫向而非縱向的升級策略，將美國拖入了一場比其預想中規模更大、混亂程度更高、地域更複雜的衝突之中。
1月27日，在台灣台中舉行的年度聯合軍事演習前夕，台灣士兵與台灣國旗和包括地對空飛彈發射器和軍用無人機在內的車輛合影。 © 路透社非對稱戰爭是指交戰雙方軍事能力和資源有巨大差異；較弱的一方別無選擇，只能訴諸非常規手段來利用較強一方的弱點。
橫向升級是一種非對稱戰爭：
弱勢一方透過新的戰場（例如，伊朗襲擊鄰近波斯灣國家的軍事和民用基礎設施）以及進行經濟和資訊攻擊（例如，封鎖霍爾木茲海峽、駭客攻擊等）來擴大衝突的地理範圍。
橫向升級對伊朗有利。
想想看，就在幾週前——戰爭期間——美國甚至解除了對伊朗石油的製裁。
伊朗從石油中獲得的收益比和平時期還要多。
橫向升級不僅帶來了這些，還將波斯灣地區推入了暴力和混亂的深淵，迅速摧毀了該地區作為穩定和創新全球中心的形象。
此外，僅僅一個月的時間，它就將世界推入了歷史上最嚴重的能源危機。
這場戰爭也產生了深遠的意識形態和法律影響：
美國援引《聯合國憲章》第51條致聯合國的信函，試圖為對伊朗的軍事打擊尋找法律依據，但這封信函既不合法，也違背了道德準則。
川普總統發表了咄咄逼人、近乎瘋狂的言論，聲稱樂於對平民犯下戰爭罪行，並警告說“今晚一個文明將滅亡”，這向其他國家發出了一個危險的信號。
如果美國可以隨時規避國際法，那麼中國為什麼不能在台灣這樣做呢？
此外，中國可能認為（而且可能是對的），如果川普不會為了烏克蘭竭盡全力，更不用說為了北約聯盟（北約聯盟目前處於岌岌可危的狀態），那麼中國不太可能在台灣問題上採取任何沉著冷靜或咄咄逼人的立場。
換句話說，人們很容易認為美國支持台灣對抗中國潛在威脅的意願已降至最低點。
更糟的是，許多歐洲國家——由於與長期盟友美國關係緊張——已開始轉向中國。
這些國家或許不願採取任何可能危及與北京之間新興且日益緊密的經濟聯繫的立場。
這對它們來說或許難以接受，但現在它們可能比以往任何時候都更需要中國。
此外，歐洲人可能覺得，在保衛烏克蘭、維持北約穩定以及在民粹主義情緒高漲的情況下提升國內經濟地位等方面，它們已經疲於應對。
所有這些都可能助長中國對台灣的野心。
然而，台灣並非不可戰勝。
從這場戰爭中我們可以看到，較弱的軍事力量如何利用橫向升級來有效且迅速地利用實力遠強於自己的國家的弱點，從而迅速削弱全球經濟體系，並利用看似微小的權力槓桿不成比例地影響能源和金融市場，破壞整個地區的經濟和地緣政治穩定。
台灣應該檢視這場戰爭，思考橫向升級策略的運用及其奏效的原因。
一個經濟崩潰、民眾分裂、軍力薄弱、最高領導人遇刺身亡的國家，
是如何擾亂全球供應鏈、擴大戰爭地理範圍，並將世界上最強大的軍隊逼到絕境，以至於任何真正的戰略勝利——
無論是政權更迭還是摧毀核能力——都幾乎成為不可能實現的？
海峽的重新開放（戰前就已開放）在很大程度上促成了停火。
但伊朗政權比以往任何時候都更加強硬，其核野心（更依賴本土而非外來的科學技術）也並未被徹底摧毀。
那麼，我們是否可以說，伊朗——儘管傷痕累累——實際上已經贏得了這場戰爭？
這怎麼可能？
答案是：
有針對性地運用橫向升級策略。就是這樣。
😄😄😄😁😁😁😁
Taiwan can learn from Iran's horizontal escalation of the war with the US
Through this type of asymmetric warfare, the weaker party expands the conflict's geographical scope
Sohini Chatterjee
April 10, 2026 17:05 JST
Smoke rises from an area near Dubai International Airport after a drone attack hit a fuel tank amid the U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran on March 16. © Reuters
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Sohini Chatterjee is an international attorney. She was an appointee and senior official in the administrations of U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden, and a former adjunct professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.
As a potentially tenuous but much needed ceasefire takes hold between the U.S. and Iran, Washington still finds itself in a military and political quagmire of blockbuster proportions, with two options.
In scenario 1, U.S. President Donald Trump declares some sort of unilateral victory and tries to get back to the negotiating table (with a more radical and increasingly desperate and skeptical regime) in the hopes of salvaging some version of the Iran nuclear deal.
In scenario 2, the Trump administration will violate the ceasefire and make the tragic mistake of committing widespread and unequivocal war crimes (as he's recently suggested doing) and/or sending in ground troops, thereby risking the lives of more American service members, costing the U.S. billions, and fighting Iran's ground force on their home turf. Iran's terrain is treacherous and unfamiliar; moreover, while Iran's naval and air resources are incredibly weak, their ground game is strong.
So how did we get here?
If the Trump administration sincerely believed that it could kill the ayatollah and senior leadership in Iran and thereby birth an entirely new era of democracy, that appears to have been a pipe dream. The ayatollah was killed in the early days of the war. Since then, Iran's new leadership is more radical and less risk-averse. In this new (but certainly not new enough) Iran, the Revolutionary Guard is running the show ... at least for now.
Putting aside the question of whether the war itself was ever necessary to achieve U.S. strategic objectives (which remain muddled), what we have seen unfold over this last month is the surprising and effective use of a distinct form of asymmetric warfare: diffuse horizontal escalation. It is reductive to suggest that the U.S. has simply fallen into what
American historian Robert Pape
describes as
"the escalation trap."
It is certainly true that tactically successful strikes have failed to achieve sustainable or strategic success, leading the U.S. onto an
"escalation ladder."
But the fundamental error in this
"escalation trap"
reasoning is that it assumes both warring parties are engaged in vertical escalation. That is not what is happening here.
The U.S. has been escalating vertically: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently said that the U.S. was "negotiating with bombs" -- both he and Trump explicitly said that the U.S. would continue to escalate military attacks on Iran, threatening war crimes against Iran if it did not open the Straits of Hormuz. This sort of public sanctioning of illegal war crimes against civilians shocked the world. Or it should have. The U.S., in recent weeks. has been hitting more targets, including more types of targets (civilian infrastructure, bridges), and hitting them harder. Yet, none of it has worked towards strategic success. Through the persistent use of horizontal -- not vertical -- escalation, Iran has pulled the U.S. into a much more expansive, chaotic and geographically complex conflict than it bargained for.
Taiwan's soldiers pose with a flag of Taiwan and vehicles, including a surface-to-air missile launcher and a military drone, ahead of an annual military exercise in Taichung, Taiwan, on Jan. 27. © ReutersAsymmetric warfare involves two warring parties with vastly different military capabilities and resources; the weaker party resorts to unconventional methods -- because it has no other choice -- to exploit vulnerabilities of the stronger party.
Horizontal escalation is a type of asymmetric warfare: The weak party works to expand the geographical scope of the conflict through new theaters of war (e.g., Iran's attacks on both military and civilian infrastructure in neighboring Persian Gulf states) and engaging in economic and informational attacks (e.g., closing the Straits of Hormuz, hacks, etc.).
Horizontal escalation has been working to Iran's advantage. Consider that the U.S. even lifted sanctions on Iranian oil weeks ago -- in the middle of the war. Iran made more money off its oil than it did during peacetime. Horizontal escalation did this -- it also catapulted the Persian Gulf region into violence and disarray, destroying in short order its image as a stable and innovative global mecca. It has also -- over just one month -- thrown the world into the worst energy crisis in history.
There are far-reaching ideological and legal ripple effects of this war as well: The U.S. Article 51 letter to the United Nations, which attempted to justify the legal basis for the military attacks on Iran, was both legally unsound and ethically unscrupulous. President Trump's aggressive unhinged rhetoric about happily committing war crimes against civilians, warning that "a whole civilization will die tonight," was a dangerous signal to other nations.
If the U.S. can skirt international law at a moment's notice, then why can't China in Taiwan?
Moreover, China probably believes (and perhaps rightly so) that if Trump will not go to the mat for Ukraine let alone the NATO alliance (which is in a precarious state), it is unlikely to take any sort of unflappable or aggressive stance regarding Taiwan.
In other words, one could easily think that U.S. appetite for backing Taiwan against a potential threat from China is at its lowest point. To make matters worse, many European nations -- due to their current strained relationships with the U.S., a longtime ally -- have begun turning eastward toward China. Those countries may or may not want to take any position that could jeopardize their new-ish and growing economic ties to Beijing. It may be a hard pill for them to swallow but they may now need China -- more than ever before. To boot, the Europeans probably feel that they have got enough on their plate between defending Ukraine, trying to keep NATO afloat, and achieving domestic economic saliency in the face of rising populist sentiments. All of this may embolden China's ambitions toward Taiwan.
However, Taiwan need not be a sitting duck.
One can see -- in this war -- how weaker militaries can employ horizontal escalation to effectively and rapidly exploit the vulnerabilities of much larger powers to quickly cripple global economic systems and disproportionately use seemingly small levers of power to impact energy and financial markets and undermine the economic and geopolitical stability of entire regions.
Taiwan should be looking at this war and thinking about the use of horizontal escalation and why it worked. How did a nation with an economy in shambles, a fractured populace, a weak military and a murdered supreme leader manage to disrupt global supply chains, expand the geographic scope of the war and push the world's most robust military to a point where any true strategic victory -- whether it be regime change or an obliteration of nuclear capabilities -- has become virtually impossible?
The re-opening of the Straits (which were open before this war) has more or less prompted the ceasefire. But Iran has a more hardline regime than ever in its history and their nuclear ambitions (predicated more on indigenous than imported scientific expertise) have not been decimated. So would one say that Iran -- badly bruised -- has still effectively won this war? How is that even possible? The targeted use of horizontal escalation. That's how.
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