台灣危機即將到來——習近平可能不會等太久。

A Taiwan Crisis Is Coming — and Xi May Not Wait

Hal Brands

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西太平洋地區正在發生一些不祥之事，而美國對此毫無準備。

本月初，中國海警在台灣東部附近國際水域攔截了三艘船隻，要求它們說明出發地和目的地。中國並未攔截這些船隻，但此舉顯示其有權監管台灣附近海域的海上交通——或許，這也預示著一場可能在一兩年內爆發的重大危機。

許多中國觀察家擔心，明年可能會爆發台海危機。據美國情報機構稱，習近平總書記已指示解放軍做好2027年對台採取行動的準備。然而，關鍵時刻或許是2028年1月。屆時台灣將舉行總統選舉，習近平可能會決定在台海議題上採取強硬手段。

誠然，目前局勢看似平靜。上一次台灣危機發生在近四年前，當時眾議院議長南希·佩洛西訪問了台灣。美中關係似乎暫時休戰：習近平主席和美國總統川普在五月於北京舉行的會晤中承諾維護「建設性戰略穩定」。

但不要被蒙蔽。

習近平正在集結軍事力量，意圖鎮壓台灣並強迫其與大陸統一，同時不斷加大日常施壓，而這些施壓行動並非直接訴諸戰爭。台灣始終被中國海軍艦艇包圍。中國軍隊挑戰台灣的領空和水域；他們進行模擬入侵或封鎖的突擊演習。北京持續不斷地對台灣發動網路攻擊、散播假訊息和進行間諜活動。表面上的平靜只是因為習近平已經將這種惡性、多線作戰的心理戰常態化了。

中國的目標是不戰而勝，同時做好動用武力的準備，以防萬一。習近平試圖打擊台灣民眾的士氣，並散播對美國支持的懷疑。他希望一個孤立無援、脆弱不堪的台灣最終會接受強加的統一。而且越快越好：73歲的習近平時間有限。

因此，他的策略需要扶植一個順從的台灣政府上台。這使得2028年的選舉成為關鍵的爆發點。

中國官方宣傳機構抨擊台灣總統賴清德是主張台獨的激進分子。如果賴清德發表強硬的台獨言論來動員其民進黨支持者，習近平絕對不會袖手旁觀。習近平可能會試圖透過更強硬的脅迫手段來影響選舉結果——例如進行飛彈試射和大規模、令人神經緊繃的軍事演習——以此表明賴清德若勝選，將帶來未來四年的危險局面。

然而，自2016年以來，這種壓力已使台灣選民遠離北京屬意的候選人。因此，第二種可能性是，習近平會對一個他不喜歡的選舉結果做出強烈反應。

習近平屬意的候選人是國民黨主席鄭麗雯，這位在野黨領袖天真得令人擔憂。今年春天，鄭麗雯曾前往北京尋求與大陸建立更緊密的關係。但她的當選是在僅限國民黨黨員參與的閉門投票中取得的。她曾利用台灣安全問題玩弄政治，阻撓一項旨在武裝台灣以應對中國威脅的特別預算的關鍵部分。

鄭建國的政策可能會疏遠那些在國家安全問題上本就對國民黨抱持不信任感的溫和派選民。賴清德雖然支持率不高但正在回升，或許能勉強連任。又或許，國民黨會放棄鄭建國，轉而支持一位策略更穩健的候選人，從而贏得大選。

無論如何，台灣政府在統一問題上都不會像習近平希望的那樣走得那麼遠、那麼快。由此產生的挫敗感可能會促使他進一步加強施壓度。

這無需入侵。習近平可能會效法海警近期的舉動，以實施「海關檢疫」。北京可能會選擇性地騷擾往返台灣的空中和海上交通。它可能會要求駛往台灣的船隻先在大陸辦理清關手續。其目的在於嚇阻台灣體制，向世人展示中國可以多麼輕易扼殺台灣，以及美國反擊的難度有多高。

在任何情況下，打破隔離都將十分困難，因為這需要美國對北京施加反制壓力——或許包括貿易、金融和技術制裁，以及國際社會的譴責，並在必要時做好以武力打破隔離的準備——同時還要避免局勢升級。不幸的是，川普在去年發起的貿易戰中做出的讓步，讓北京誤以為華盛頓不會冒著被脅迫的風險。

事實上，川普已顯示他對台灣危機並不熱衷；他正在放緩對台軍售，以免影響他計劃於9月與習近平的會晤。五角大廈更關注入侵的威脅，而非隔離或其他灰色地帶的情況。而且，到2028年初，美國將深陷於自身的選舉狂潮之中。屆時，習近平可能會趁華盛頓注意力分散之際，大力推動台灣局勢，希望將其瓦解。

美國應該採取一些措施來做好準備。川普應該完成對台140億美元的軍售計劃，以表明他不會為了討好習近平而犧牲台灣的安全。美國需要完善對中國經濟施壓的策略，例如進一步限制中國取得噴射發動機零件和先進半導體。美國應該加強與日本和其他夥伴的合作，以便在危機中協助台灣。值得肯定的是，川普政府正在透過更大規模的多邊演習、部署飛彈和其他先進裝備等方式擴大軍事合作。此外，在與賴政府保持密切關係的同時，華盛頓也應該避免在競選活動中出現激烈的言論。

如果「建設性戰略穩定」在 2028 年演變成下一場台灣危機，那麼堅定的威懾和審慎的外交都將是必要的。

Brands 同時也是美國企業研究所的高級研究員，著有《歐亞世紀：熱戰、冷戰與現代世界的形成》一書，並且是 Macro Advisory Partners 的高級顧問。

更多來自彭博觀點：

• 哈爾布蘭茲：價值140億美元的台灣軍售是川普對華政策的試金石
• 卡里什瑪·瓦斯瓦尼：中國最大的風險或許在於輕信自身炒作。
• 五角大廈印太司令部更名損害美國和印度利益：詹姆斯·斯塔夫里迪斯

想了解更多彭博觀點？請閱讀OPIN。或訂閱我們的每日新聞簡報。

Something ominous is happening in the western Pacific, and the US isn’t ready for it.

Earlier this month, the Chinese Coast Guard contacted three ships in international waters near eastern Taiwan, demanding they identify their points of origin and destination. China didn’t stop these vessels. But it was asserting a right to police maritime traffic near Taiwan — and, perhaps, previewing a major crisis that could be just a year or two away.

Many China-watchers worry that a Taiwan crisis might occur next year. According to US intelligence agencies, General Secretary Xi Jinping has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for action against Taiwan in 2027. Yet the critical moment might instead be January 2028. That’s when Taiwan holds its next presidential election, and when Xi might decide to force the issue.

Admittedly, things seem calm now. The last major Taiwan crisis occurred nearly four years ago, when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island. US-China relations seem to be at a temporary truce: Xi and President Donald Trump committed to “constructive strategic stability” at their May meeting in Beijing.

But don’t be fooled.

Xi is assembling the military strength to subdue Taiwan and force unification with the mainland, while steadily increasing the day-to-day pressure in actions short of warfare. Taiwan is consistently ringed by Chinese naval vessels. Chinese forces challenge Taiwan’s airspace and waters; they conduct short-notice exercises that simulate an invasion or blockade. Beijing continually pummels Taiwan with cyberattacks, disinformation and espionage. Things only seem calm because Xi has normalized this malign, multifront war of nerves.

China’s goal is to win without fighting, while readying the military hammer if a fight proves necessary. Xi seeks to demoralize the Taiwanese population and sow doubts about America’s support. He hopes that an isolated, vulnerable society will ultimately accept coerced unification. And sooner, rather than later: The 73-year-old Xi doesn’t have all the time in the world.

His strategy thus requires bringing a compliant Taiwanese government to power. Which makes the 2028 election a flashpoint.

Chinese propaganda outlets deride Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, as a pro-independence radical. Xi won’t stand by if Lai rallies his Democratic Progressive Party base with strong statements about Taiwanese sovereignty. Xi could seek to influence the election through sharper coercion — for instance, missile tests and large, nerve-wracking military drills — meant to show that a Lai victory will bring four more years of danger.

Yet since 2016, such pressure has pushed Taiwanese voters away from Beijing’s preferred candidates. A second possibility, then, is that Xi will react badly to an electoral outcome he doesn’t like.

Xi’s favored candidate is Cheng Li-wun, the woefully naive chair of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), who traveled to Beijing this spring to seek closer ties with the mainland. But Cheng won her position in a closed vote limited to KMT party members. She has played politics with Taiwanese security by blocking critical parts of a special budget meant to arm the island against the Chinese threat.

Cheng’s policies may repel moderate voters who already distrust the KMT on national security issues. Lai — despite his low but improving approval ratings — could squeak through to reelection. Or perhaps the KMT will win by ditching Cheng in favor of a more strategically sober candidate.

Either way, Taiwan would have a government that won’t go nearly as far or as fast on unification as Xi wants. The resulting frustration could cause him to dial up the pressure even more.

That wouldn’t require an invasion. Building on the Coast Guard’s recent moves, Xi might impose a “customs quarantine” instead. Beijing might selectively harass air and maritime traffic to Taiwan. It could demand that ships bound for Taiwan first clear customs on the mainland. The point would be to shock the Taiwanese system by showing how easily China can suffocate the island — and how hard it would be for the US to push back.

Breaking a quarantine would be difficult under any circumstances, because it would require the US to exert counterpressure on Beijing — perhaps trade, financial and technological sanctions combined with international diplomatic condemnation and preparations to break the quarantine militarily, if necessary — without bringing unwanted escalation. Unfortunately, Trump’s climbdown in the trade war he started last year has given Beijing the impression that Washington won’t risk a contest in coercion.

Indeed, Trump has signaled that he has little appetite for a Taiwan crisis; he is slow-rolling arms sales to avoid spoiling his next meeting with Xi, planned for September. The Pentagon is more focused on the threat of invasion than on a quarantine or other gray-zone scenarios. And in early 2028, the US will be consumed by its own electoral madness. Xi might push hard in hopes of breaking Taiwan while Washington’s attention is elsewhere.

There are steps the US should be taking to prepare. Trump should conclude a planned $14 billion arms sale to Taipei, showing he won’t appease Xi at the cost of Taiwan’s security. The US needs to refine options for hitting China’s economic pressure points, such as further constricting its access to jet engine components and advanced semiconductors. It should intensify preparations with Japan and other partners to assist Taiwan in a crisis. To its credit, the Trump administration is expanding such military cooperation through more ambitious multilateral exercises, deploying missiles and other advanced capabilities, and other means. And while hugging the Lai government tight, Washington should also discourage hot rhetoric in the election campaign.

Firm deterrence and prudent diplomacy will both be necessary if “constructive strategic stability” turns into the next great Taiwan crisis come 2028.

Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the author of The Eurasian Century: Hot Wars, Cold Wars, and the Making of the Modern World, and a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.

More From Bloomberg Opinion:

• A $14 Billion Taiwan Arms Sale Is Trump’s Litmus Test on China: Hal Brands
• China’s Biggest Risk May Be Believing Its Own Hype: Karishma Vaswani
• Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Name Change Hurts the US and India: James Stavridis

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