美國外交政策正經歷「百年一遇」的調整，其特徵在於「全面收縮」，並逐漸意識到「除了與中國長期和平共處，美國別無選擇」。
←
貼文
阿諾·貝特朗
@RnaudBertrand
訂閱
這觀點極具啟發性：一位在中美關係領域最具影響力的中國學者指出，美國外交政策正經歷「百年一遇」的調整，其特徵在於「全面收縮」，並逐漸意識到「除了與中國長期和平共處，美國別無選擇」。
吳新波教授現任中國頂尖學府復旦大學國際問題研究院院長暨美國研究中心主任，多年蟬聯中國高被引學者榜單（詳見iis.fudan.edu.cn/en/6f/fe/c1667...）。
他指出，當前的政策調整並非源於川普政府，而是「歷經數屆政府、跨越黨派的漸進演變過程」，其驅動力來自「美國面臨的國內外雙重壓力」。
他指出該進程始於首屆川普政府時期，「後續並未實質逆轉」：美國精英階層日益認知到，維持「美國主導的國際秩序」代價過高且成效不彰，如今已「別無選擇，只能調整優先順序並重新聚焦」。
他描述川普第二任期中的美國陷入「在勝利主義與衰落焦慮間搖擺」的狀態，其「戰略重心明顯回歸西半球」。
針對中國議題，他特別指出2025年將成為「中美長期戰略博弈的轉折點」，原因有二：
1）美國已開始意識到其對華「工具箱」的局限性——正如關稅升級期間所見，其用以強加意志於中國的手段根本無效；
2） 「中國對關鍵資源的掌控力改變了競爭格局」（稀土事件即為明證）。
他指出這促使美國「內部重新評估對華戰略目標」，並意識到「中國難以被『壓制』，更不可能被擊垮」。具體而言，這意味著「除了與中國長期和平共處，美國別無選擇」。
這將導致美國逐步「接受中國持續發展並可能在特定領域超越美國的現實」，並「在其對華政策中更突出地將避免與中國衝突——尤其是軍事衝突——置於重要位置」。
關於台灣問題，他指出「局勢已發生重大變化」，且「美國國內已開始正視此現象」，部分智庫正「嚴肅探討華府是否真有能力阻撓中國統一」。
在他看來，這意味著美國「真正需要思考的不是如何阻撓中國實現統一，而是如何確保自身合法權益與關切在該進程中獲得考量」。
他表示，若今日有機會向美國總統提問，必將直指核心：
「既中國統一進程已然啟動，美國應如何調整其台灣政策？」
吳新博向來以務實著稱，絕非勝利主義者，其觀點因而更具分量。例如早在2024年9月（chinaffairsplus.com/
p/wu-xinbo-on-...) 他仍認為美國持續「升級對中國的遏制與打壓」；早在2020年1月（thediplomat.com/2020/01/wu-xin...）他便預言「中美競爭與摩擦將加劇」。
他從預測「摩擦加劇」轉變為宣稱美國「別無選擇」只能共存，這反映出中國知識精英如何深刻感知到，短短數年間國際力量平衡已劇烈轉移。
我當然完全認同他的觀點。事實上，五天前我在重慶的演講中幾乎闡述了相同論點（演講全文見此：open.substack.com/pub/
09:15
←
貼文
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
訂閱
This is really interesting: one China's most influential scholars in US-China relations sees a "once in a century" adjustment in US foreign policy, defined by "overall retrenchment" and the gradual realization that "other than long-term peaceful coexistence with China, the United States has no alternative."
Professor Wu Xinbo is the Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, one of China's best, and the Director of its Centre for American Studies. He's been one of China most-cited researchers for several years (iis.fudan.edu.cn/en/6f/fe/c1667...).
As he puts it, the current adjustment is not caused by Trump but it is "a cross-administration, cross-party process that has gradually emerged and been advanced over time," driven by "both domestic and international pressures facing the United States."
He says the process started in the first Trump administration and "was not meaningfully reversed afterwards": the belief that the cost of "constructing and maintaining a U.S.-led international order" was too high and not working. As he puts it, American elites now increasingly realize that the US "has no choice but to adjust priorities and refocus."
He describes the U.S. in Trump's second term as having entered a state of "swinging between triumphalism and decline anxiety" with its "strategic centre of gravity [having] visibly shifted back towards the Western Hemisphere."
On China specifically he sees 2025 "as a turning point in the long-running strategic contest between China and the United States," for 2 reasons: 1) "the United States has begun to recognise the limits of its China 'toolbox", their tools to impose their will on China are simply ineffective as could be seen during the tariff escalation 2) "China's leverage over key resources changed the dynamics of the contest" (the rare earths episode being a proof of this).
He says that has "pushed the U.S. side internally to reevaluate its strategic objectives toward China" and to realize that "China is difficult to 'hold down,' and even more impossible to crush." Which means, concretely, that "other than long-term peaceful coexistence with China, the United States has no alternative."
This will mean that, in time. the U.S. will slowly "accept the reality that China will continue to develop and may surpass the United States in certain fields," and that it "will place avoiding conflict with China - especially military conflict - in a more prominent position in its China policy."
On Taiwan, he says that "the situation has changed in important ways" and that "this is already being recognised within the United States", with "some think tanks seriously examining whether Washington in fact has the capacity to prevent China's reunification."
To him, this means that what the U.S. "truly needs to think about is not how to block China from achieving reunification, but how to ensure that its legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account in the course of that process."
He says that if he had the opportunity to ask the US president one question today, it'd be: "Given the reality that China's reunification process is already underway, how should the United States adjust its Taiwan policy?"
His views are all the more significant given that Wu Xinbo is a very level-headed scholar, far from a triumphalist. For instance in September
2024 (chinaffairsplus.com/
p/wu-xinbo-on-...) he still
saw the U.S. as continuing
"to escalate its containment
and suppression of China"
and back in January 2020 (thediplomat.com/2020/01/wu-xin...) he predicted that "competition and friction between China and the United States will increase."
The fact that he has moved from predicting "increased friction" to declaring that America "has no alternative" but coexistence tells you something about how dramatically Chinese intellectual elites perceive the balance to have shifted in just a few years.
I of course fully agree with his views. As a matter of fact, I just gave a speech in Chongqing 5 days ago arguing virtually the same thing (the transcript of my speech here: open.substack.com/pub/
留言
張貼留言