比较政治道歉辩论中的两本名著： "使用与滥用 "和 "抱歉的国家"

Comparing Two Great Books in the Political Apologies Debates: "Uses and Abuses" & "Sorry States"

比较政治道歉辩论中的两本名著： "使用与滥用 "和 "抱歉的国家"

2017年2月26日在美國評論

关于国际关系（IR）中公开道歉的书籍与关于谈判艺术、文化间对话、创造性外交、耐心的美德、语言分析的政治重要性、宗教分析和过渡时期司法的书籍同属一类。 战争和国际关系理论书籍通常在图书馆的几条走廊之外。 学术上的距离往往转化为实践上的脱节。 这些美德或实践都不是战士或外交官的专属领域。 道歉并不是国际关系的软肋。 在适当的地方，它是勇敢和必要的 IR。

本书的 "使用与滥用 "一开始就强调了道歉在国内、国际和后殖民环境（本书的三个类别）中的重要性。 在美国 "道歉总统"（奥巴马）、"不道歉"（罗姆尼）或 "我们也不无辜"（特朗普）的辩论中，这一应用非常及时。 道歉是一个非常有趣的战场，通过它我们可以确认一种必要的美德，同时剖析和纠正我们自己对政治道德的期望。 为什么我们自己的个人骄傲会使政治对手的谦逊士气低落，同时又赞扬另一个政治对手具有破坏性的骄傲呢？

詹妮弗-林德（Jennifer Lind）的 "抱歉的国家 "是对 "使用与滥用 "案例研究的一个很好的平衡。 后者对多个案例研究中的道歉理论进行了一般性讨论，其目的显然是要在国际关系中将公开道歉的做法正常化。 另一方面，"对不起的国家 "通过挖掘二战后德国和日本的重要舆论档案、国家教科书证据、纪念碑和领导层声明，对国家成功道歉的 "时间 "和 "原因 "进行了定性。

道歉需要考虑一系列问题。 什么才是真诚的道歉？ 会对自我形象和国家形象造成什么损害？ 什么时候对错误行为的赔偿根本没有必要，也许不切实际，或者在策略上被忽视？ 国家领导人可以向谁道歉？ 任何谨慎的对外关系人员都应该思考接受者对公开道歉的反应。 作者丹尼尔-戈德哈根（Daniel Goldhagen）揭穿了德国公众对外来评论家的严厉批评却心甘情愿接受的 "神话"（Lind, 148-9），这是一个具有启发性的讽刺。 谁的意见重要？

没有十全十美的道歉，但最好的道歉包括悔恨、承认行为，如果可行的话，或许还可以恢复原状（"使用与滥用"）。 道歉应使行为者易受公众舆论的影响。 但是，谨慎、真诚和民族自豪感是一个奇怪的组合，它们试图控制公众的反应，缩小过错的范围，限制赦免的程度。 日本 1998 年的公开道歉是在确认韩国的预期反应之后才做出的（Lind）。 加拿大最近就对待原住民的问题道歉，但仅限于教育系统的弊端（"用途"）。

由于多种原因，有关道歉的理论很难进行，其中最主要的原因是记录的可获得性。 澳大利亚、加拿大、德国和日本都是很有价值的例子，但在文化和社会方面肯定不具有代表性，无法形成更全面的理论。 其次，有些道歉允许相互忏悔，例如戴高乐向阿登纳承认法德之间长达 100 年的仇恨。 另一方面，东帝汶总统奥尔塔为其 2008 年与印尼的共同道歉辩护，是为了 "真相"，而不是忏悔，尽管印尼有明显的侵略行为（Strassner，"道歉与和解"）。

真相与和解有时是摆脱因大规模暴行或长期占领而造成的痛苦和自尊的唯一途径。 对于采用严酷殖民手段的肇事者来说，道歉至少是对过去的时间、国家声誉和赔偿控制权的一种计算......更不用说那些经济和社会条件仍然直接受到近代历史影响的受害者的宽恕了。 对 "语言和文化的丧失"（"使用"，144 页）进行赔偿是否可能？ 在非洲的前法国和英国殖民地是如何回应这个问题的，以及他们自己的宽恕回应，在某些情况下，这既是对治愈性谦卑的赞誉，也引发了更多关于不健康的后殖民禁锢的问题。

正如科琳-墨菲（Colleen Murphy）教授在其关于过渡时期司法的处方中所指出的：仅有宽恕是不够的。 人类应该渴望和解，而和解可以从道歉和宽恕开始。 但是，"使用 "和林德都描述了没有最初道歉或宽恕的成功和解。 阻碍和解的不是日本的道歉，而是它拒绝如实回应自己的历史。 民族主义并不总是爱国主义，它们也不一定是良好国际关系的敌人。 道歉有时需要民族自尊心无法忍受的脆弱，但良好的爱国主义可以弥补这种脆弱。

在国际关系中，个人和国际领域被视为不同的道德和政治层面。

个人道歉的做法确实而且应该对政治忏悔产生影响。 当精神狂热最活跃、争议最少的社区可以自下而上地影响和解时，一个国家是否应该等待自上而下的和解榜样？ 个人道歉的脆弱性是公开道歉在政治舞台上所无法比拟的（"用途"，第 10 章）。

我们把道歉说成是一门科学，把宽恕说成是一种感觉。 忏悔、救赎与和解的过程是强大的！ 它不能局限于政治散文，但它可以成为炼狱之火。 道歉，就像其 "书架邻居 "中的许多其他思想一样，以非常迷人的方式，甚至是精神上的信息方式，跨越道德层面（"用途 "第 5 章）。 许多人可能会回避讨论宗教和道歉，但事实上，宗教对真诚悔改和宽恕的概念影响很大。 基督徒和其他人一样需要他们所教导的宽恕，这不应该是一个讽刺；权力的诱惑也不会腐蚀宗教虔诚的纯洁，这是对约翰-道尔的《战争文化》（我的书评，17 年前出版）的回答。

耶稣曾问他的听众，哪一个儿子值得称赞：

是口头上承认顺从却坐视不管的儿子，

还是口头上拒绝任务但还是完成了任务的儿子。 

答案是后者，现在也是（马太福音 21：28-31）。 

日本言行不一。 日本用言语发表了它没有兑现的行动。

德国的悔恨首先体现在赔偿、无声的忏悔和民众的谦卑上，后来才转化为多次发自内心的公开道歉。 

公开的仪式和措辞严谨的道歉，就像宽恕一样，需要紧随其后的行动。 国际和解最有力的证明不一定来自高层，但全球化、移民、语言能力，甚至对难民的关怀，都能让公民自下而上地培养政治往往无法自上而下表达的东西。

这两本书都提到，道歉在每种文化中的接受程度和内涵都不尽相同。 我曾在数十个国家生活和工作，与欧洲人、阿拉伯人、非洲人和东亚人密切合作，有幸在每个国家都犯过错误。 在一些个人交往中，我需要道歉，这不仅仅是文化上的误解，也仅仅是我自己或我的团队诚实犯错的结果。 然而，在文化上，我的歉意并不总是以我的文化背景所期望的方式得到回应。 在某些情况下，我的道歉会受到惊讶和优雅的欢迎，而在另一些情况下，我的道歉很快就会被当作抨击我整个人格的素材。 难道道歉就不重要了吗？

在政治上，道歉是零和游戏。 悔过者将道德 "制高点 "拱手让给了竞争对手，而后者实际上根本不配登上领奖台；这就是 "板眼政治 "的弊端。 投资者关系理论中的一个流派深知人类的自尊心，因此很快拒绝了道歉。 另一派 IR 理论则希望得到理想化的结果。 林德教授自己 "对抗 "自己的结论，即国际关系需要一种介于忏悔和粉饰历史之间的冲突后反应。 她自己勤奋的研究无法支持她所希望的理想主义结论。

1970 年，德国的威利-勃兰特下跪的画面令人心碎，这也让许多学者开始追寻公开道歉的好处。 二战纳粹的暴行是如此清晰可见，数百万手无寸铁的人被屠杀，这一点无法否认。 为什么只有在最严重的情况下才需要和解？ 忏悔不仅是为了人类战争的后果，也是为了整个人类。 我们不需要灭绝来证明谦卑应该成为预防冲突的日常实践。

政治道歉的障碍和优点是一项必要的研究。 一个政府受民族主义、个人和集体自豪感、谨慎和诚意的影响，也许不亚于其地理和文化特性。 共同的边界是否会鼓励和解，而权力的隔绝和海洋的距离是否会阻碍和解的努力？

我们不可能总是知道或控制公开甚至私下道歉的结果。 受害者神话 "可能会为军国主义辩护，也可能会培养出一颗顽固不化的心。 但是，无论是在国家、国际还是后殖民背景下，即使是最严重的冒犯，也必须通过真诚的忏悔来寻求出路。 没有永远的痛苦是合理的。 如果道歉是一种政治风险，那么宽恕也可能是一种政治风险。

2017年2月26日在美國評論

Books on public apologies in international relations (IR) are in the same company as books on the art of negotiation, inter-cultural dialogue, creative diplomacy, the virtues of patience, the political importance of linguistic analysis, religious analysis and transitional justice. War-making and IR theory books are usually a few library aisles down. The academic distance too often translates to a disconnect in practice. None of these virtues or practices is the sole domain of warrior or diplomat. The apology neighborhood is not the soft side of IR. In its proper place it is courageous and necessary IR.

The "Uses and Abuses" begins by highlighting the increased preponderance of apologies in the domestic, international and post-colonial environments (the book's three categories). The application is timely in the midst of America's competing opinions between "apology presidents" (Obama), "no apologies" (Romney) or "we're not innocent either" (Trump) debates. Apologies are a very interesting battle ground through which to confirm a necessary virtue while at the same time dissect and correct our own expectations of political morality. Why is it that our own personal pride will demoralize humility in a political opponent and at the same time praise the destructive pride in another?

Jennifer Lind's "Sorry States" is a good balance to the "Uses and Abuses" case studies. The latter provides a general discussion of apology theory across multiple case studies with an obvious desire to normalize the practice of public apologies in IR. "Sorry States" on the other hand, digs through important public opinion archives, national textbook evidence, memorial monuments and leadership statements of post-WWII Germany and Japan to qualify the "when" and "why" of successful state contrition.

Apologies carry with them a host of considerations. What makes a sincere apology? What damage might be done to the self-image, the national image? When is compensation for misdeeds simply unneeded, maybe impractical or tactically ignored? For whom and to whom can a national leader make an apology? Any prudent foreign relations agent should ponder the recipient's response to the public apology. It is an instructive irony when author Daniel Goldhagen debunks the "myth" of German public innocence to the harsh criticism of outsider commentators but to the willing embrace of Germany's own population (Lind, 148-9)? Whose opinion matters?

There is no perfect apology but the best include remorse, admission of deeds and perhaps restitution if practical ("Uses and Abuses"). Apologies should make an actor vulnerable to public opinion. But prudence, sincerity and national pride are an odd combination that seeks to control for the public response, shrink the scope of fault and limit the extent of amnesty. Japan's 1998 public apology came only after it confirmed South Korea's intended response (Lind). Canada's recent apology for treatment of indigenous peoples was limited to education system abuses ("Uses").

Theory on apology is difficult for many reasons, most due to availability of records. Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan are valuable examples but certainly not culturally and socially representative to a more comprehensive theory. Second, some apologies allow for mutual contrition as in the case of de Gaulle, admitting to Adenauer the 100 year animosity between France and Germany. On the other hand, Timor Leste's President Horta defended his 2008 common apology with Indonesia, for the sake of "truth" and not contrition, despite the latter's obvious aggression (Strassner in "Apology and Reconciliation").

Truth and Reconciliation is sometimes the only way out of a circle of bitterness and pride that results from extensive atrocities or long-term occupation. For perpetrators of harsh colonial methods, an apology is a calculation of at least elapsed time, national prestige and control of reparations... not to mention the forgiveness by victims whose economic and social conditions are still directly influenced by recent history. Is it even possible to compensate for the "loss of language and culture" ("Uses", 144)? How former French and British colonies in Africa have responded to that question, along with their own forgiving responses, in some cases gives as much credit to healing humility as it has raised more questions of unhealthy post-colonial entrapment.

As Professor Colleen Murphy notes in her prescription of transitional justice: forgiveness is not enough. Humans should desire reconciliation which can begin with apology and forgiveness. But "Uses" and Lind both describe successful reconciliation without initial apology or forgiveness. It was not Japan's apology that held back reconciliation, but its refusal to respond truthfully to its history. Nationalism is not always patriotism and neither are they necessarily the enemy of good international relations. Apology sometimes requires a vulnerability that national pride cannot stomach, but for which good patriotism can make up.

In IR, the individual and the international realms are seen on different moral and political planes.

The practice of individual apologies does and should have an influence on political contrition. Should a nation wait for a top down example of reconciliation when communities, where spiritual fervor is most active and least controversial, can influence the same from the bottom up? Individual apologies have a vulnerability that public apologies simply cannot muster in the political arena ("Uses", Chap 10).

We speak of apology like it's a science; forgiveness like it's a feeling. The process of repentance, redemption and reconciliation is powerful! It cannot be confined to political prose but it can be a fire that refines. Apologies, like so many other ideas in its "library shelf neighborhood" cut across the moral planes in very fascinating, even spiritually informative ways ("Uses" Chap 5). Many might avoid discussing religion and apology but the truth is that religion has influenced greatly the concept of sincere repentance and forgiveness. It should not be an irony that Christians are as much in need of the forgiveness they teach as anyone else; nor that temptation to power can corrupt the purity of religious piety, in answer to John Dower's, "Cultures of War" (My review, 17 books ago).

Jesus once asked his audience, which son was to be lauded: the son who verbally acknowledged his obedience but sat on his hands or the son who verbally refused the task but completed it anyway. The answer was, and still is, the latter (Matthew 21:28-31). Japan issued in words what it did not follow with deeds. Germany's remorse was witnessed first in reparations, silent contrition and popular humility which only later translated to multiple, heartfelt public apologies. The public ceremonies and carefully worded apologies, like forgiveness, requires actions that follow suit. The strongest proof of international reconciliation need not be from the top, but globalization, immigration, language competence and even care for refugees allow citizens to cultivate from the bottom up what politics too often cannot express from the top down.

Both books mention how the reception and connotations of apology are not the same in every culture. Having lived and worked in dozens of countries, cooperating closely with Europeans, Arabs, Africans and East Asians I have had the privilege of making mistakes in each one. A number of the personal engagements required that I apologize, not just for cultural misunderstandings but simply a result of my own, or my teams', honest faults. Culturally, however, the contrition was not always received in the same manner that my cultural background might expect. In some cases my apology was welcomed with astonishment and grace and at other times quickly abused as fodder through which to berate my entire character. Does that make apology any less important?

In politics, apologies are made zero sum games. The contrite surrenders the moral "high ground" to a competitor who in reality is no more deserving of the podium; the pitfalls of "plank-eye politics". IR theory is quick to refuse the apology in one school knowing the human pride nature. Another IR school hopes for an idealistic result. Professor Lind herself "fought" her own conclusion that IR requires a post-conflict response somewhere between contrition and the whitewashing of history. Her own diligent research could not support the idealistic conclusion she so desired.

The heart-wrenching image of Germany's Willy Brandt on his knees in 1970 brings many scholars to pursue the merits of public apology. The WWII Nazi atrocities were so clearly evident and the millions of defenseless slaughtered impossible to deny. Why is the need for reconciliation only "obvious" in the gravest of circumstances? Contrition is not just for the aftermath of human war but the whole of humanity. We don't need extermination to prove that humility should be a daily practice in conflict preventative maintenance.

The barriers to and merits of political apologies is a necessary study. A government is perhaps influenced as much by nationalism, individual and collective pride, prudence and sincerity as much as its geographic and cultural identity. Do shared borders encourage reconciliation whereas the insulation of power and ocean distance forestall the effort?

We cannot always know or control the outcome of a public or even private apology. The "mythology of victimhood" may justify militarism or cultivate a stubborn unforgiving heart. But even the worst of offenses must have a way out by honest contrition whether in a national, international or post-colonial context. No bitterness is eternally justified. If apology is a political risk, forgiveness can be too.