原子彈
事實上，事情遠比這複雜得多：它是以下因素的結合：
- 兩顆原子彈的震撼效果
- 害怕國內叛亂
- 天皇對軍隊失去信心
這促使裕仁天皇親自指示他忠誠的大臣投降。
在閱讀下面的深入答案之前，我建議您再次閱讀上述幾點，並將它們牢記在心，因為它們將得到答案中提出的具體證據的證實。
為了得出關於原子彈破壞或蘇聯侵略這兩個事件中哪一個導致日本投降的準確結論，有必要了解：
- 原子彈投下後的主要事件以及日本傑出領導人的思想、行動和決定。如果不考慮爭論的雙方，答案將是不完整的。
- 考慮這兩件事各自對日本領導人決策過程的影響。
您現在可能想知道那些傑出的領導人是誰？
他們是以下幾位男士：
其中六人：阿南、梅津、米內、豐田、鈴木和東鄉組成了所謂的戰爭指導最高委員會，被非正式地稱為“六大人物” 。
請記住這些人的名字和他們各自的角色，因為他們決定了日本及其人民的最終命運，正如你很快就會透過我的回答中敘述的他們的言行所看到的那樣。
裕仁天皇
這些人決定了日本的最終命運。（圖片來源：Downfall - Richard B. Frank）。
（註：木戶光一雖然出現在上圖中，但他在最終投降決定中並沒有發揮任何作用。但是，他是天皇的紅顏知己，因此他知道天皇最內心的想法。最重要的是，他記錄了日記中的那些想法，其內容將被提取並呈現在這個答案中，以揭示皇帝在做出投降決定時所起的核心作用）
我的方法是分別分析這兩起事件，而不是按時間順序（蘇聯的侵略發生在兩枚炸彈投射之間）。每項分析都會得到充分證實。
還有一件事，在我的回答中，我使用了以下兩個術語：
- 蘇聯派：指那些認為蘇聯入侵滿洲是日本投降主要原因的人
- 原爆派：指認為投降原子彈是日本投降主要原因的人。
讓我們詳細討論一下。
蘇聯軍事行動的影響
蘇聯派主張日本投降的主要原因是蘇聯的侵略，其依據是：
證據一：
當鈴木首相與蘇聯入侵滿洲後剛抵達東京的關東軍軍官池田談話時，談話內容如下
池田：關東軍已經沒有希望了。
鈴木：關東軍有那麼弱嗎？然後遊戲就開始了
這次交流被用來證明蘇聯的侵略是導致日本投降的決定性因素。
證據2
戰後審訊紀錄中，副總參謀長川部虎四郎告訴他的美國審訊者：
高級軍官們滿懷恐懼地期待俄羅斯參戰。
川部的聲明是最常被引用的證據之一，證明蘇聯的侵略是日本領導人投降的主要原因。
證據3
在 1949 年的一次訪談中，豐田章男海軍上將告訴他的美國訪談者：
原子彈爆炸是投降的一個原因，但不是唯一的原因…。俄羅斯參與對日戰爭而不是原子彈更能加速日本投降。
日本戰時傑出領導人之一的話，被蘇聯派系熱切地引用，作為其論點的基礎，即蘇聯的軍事行動對投降決定有更大的影響。
最後，我從蘇聯派別那裡聽到的一個反覆出現的論點是，蘇聯威脅入侵日本，這將導致共產主義統治的可怕幽靈成為現實。
到目前為止，一切都是合理的，對嗎？
然而，這些被有意或無意遺漏的證據還有更多的內容，會讓人們對蘇聯派的論點產生懷疑並削弱其論點。
關於證據一，被忽略的是，池田與鈴木的對話是戰後幾年池田的記憶。眾所周知，記憶會隨著時間的流逝而消失，僅此一點就足以讓人懷疑證據的有效性1。其次，池田只是一名普通軍官，無權參與決策過程，這意味著池田的陳述不太可能具有事實依據。對最終自首決定有任何影響。第三，也是最重要的一點，池田的回憶與1945年8月的證據相矛盾，這表明鈴木遠遠沒有屈服於絕境。在蘇聯入侵後的幾天裡，他實際上所做的就是在如何結束戰爭的條款和時間表上猶豫不決。
關於證據2，蘇聯派遺漏了更多內容。做出投降決定的是裕仁天皇。更重要的是？他的決定是在蘇聯入侵開始大約25小時後做出的。
為什麼這很重要？因為由於通訊故障，即使在開始25小時後，關東軍也還沒有意識到蘇聯入侵的規模。事實上，整個 8 月 9 日，即蘇聯入侵開始一天后，關東軍前線觀察員錯誤地報告說
這些攻擊的規模並不大
現在，駐紮在前線的關東軍誤判了事態的嚴重性，隨之而來的是東京的日本領導人對滿洲的情況更加一無所知。
這意味著什麼？
皇帝的投降決定不可能受到蘇聯軍事侵略的影響。這說得通。如果他和他的軍事顧問甚至在事件開始25小時後仍對蘇聯入侵的真實規模一無所知，那麼這怎麼會對裕仁天皇投降的決定產生任何影響呢？
東京方面不了解滿洲局勢的證據使蘇聯派的證據2無效。
關於證據3，與證據1一樣，是戰後4年根據記憶做出的陳述，其有效性令人懷疑。誰知道豐田章男是否忘了戰爭最後幾天發生的事？此外，您很快就會收到一項與他上述有關蘇聯侵略影響的說法相矛盾的證據。
至於日本領導人擔心蘇聯入侵日本本土的說法，其事實基礎非常薄弱。無需贅述，蘇聯只是缺乏大規模入侵日本本土的兩棲空運能力。雖然他們確實入侵了庫頁島，並對北海道進行了小規模的入侵，但他們卻遭遇了日本人出人意料的猛烈而有效的抵抗，阻止了他們入侵本土群島。
此外，蘇聯有限的兩棲能力是由美國裝備支撐的。美國向蘇聯借出了包括LSI（步兵登陸艦）和LST（坦克登陸艦）在內的兩棲裝備。他們也訓練蘇聯軍隊如何進行兩棲攻擊。但是，這些美國設備是藉來的，預計蘇聯最終會將其歸還給美國。而且，接受過兩棲攻擊訓練的蘇聯軍隊數量只有幾千人，遠遠不足以在本土群島上進行大規模的兩棲登陸。相較之下，美國在太平洋戰爭中的所有兩棲攻擊通常都涉及數萬名海軍陸戰隊員。
因此，蘇聯沒有能力成功地大規模入侵日本本土。
最重要的是，幾位著名的日本軍事領導人已經預料到了蘇聯的侵略。蘇聯已通知日本，不會續簽蘇日中立條約1941 年與日本簽署的條約於 1946 年到期。因此日本領導人知道蘇聯最終會發動攻擊。讓他們驚訝的是，蘇軍在1945年8月發動進攻，而不是他們預期的1946年春天。原因之一是他們相信蘇聯會遵守 1946 年到期的中立條約（有點諷刺，因為他們不信任蘇聯）。另外，春季的天氣有利於地面作業。儘管如此，陸軍部長阿南仍平靜地說：
不可避免的事情已經來臨
陸軍副總參謀長川部大將的行動，是反駁「蘇聯侵略導致日本投降」論最有說服力的證據之一。儘管對蘇聯入侵滿洲感到震驚，川部仍決心繼續戰爭。他起草了一份行動計劃，宣布對美國進行戰爭是首要目標。他建議在該國實施戒嚴並註銷滿洲。顯然，蘇聯的侵略並沒有迫使他考慮投降。
現在，可以說，削弱蘇聯派系主張的最重要的證據就是「結號」。
Ketsu-Go的意思是決戰。帝國陸軍正確預測了美軍將入侵九州，並制定並實施了「決號」以應對預期的入侵。決號的目的是要與美國侵略者進行激烈的衝突，對美軍造成極其慘重的傷亡，而不顧日本人的傷亡。為此，日本領導人下令將關東軍老兵部隊調往本土，以加強九州和關東平原的防禦。做好戰鬥準備的日本步兵、裝甲師、空軍部隊被從滿洲撤走。除了轉移現有部隊外，還在本土群島組建了新的師，其成員均來自身體健全的男性。最終日軍的兵力部署結果如下圖所示：
日本軍隊在九州的決戰部署（圖片來源：Downfall - Richard B. Frank）
由於這次轉移，曾經強大的關東軍只剩下昔日的影子。理論上，陸軍仍有10多個師，但其戰鬥力只相當於約6-7個訓練有素、裝備齊全的師。
日軍奪走關東軍最優秀的作戰部隊這一事實本身就意味著一件事：日本領導人已經決定取消滿洲。事實上，如果他們仍然關心滿洲，特別是他們預計未來蘇聯會入侵，那麼邏輯表明他們應該在那裡保留最好的部隊來保衛滿洲。由此得出的結論是，滿洲發生的事情對日本領導人來說影響不大。這一結論在天皇宣布投降決心的一次會議上得到了證實。在這次會議上，梅津將軍堅定地表示，蘇聯的侵略並沒有使決戰失效。結號的主要策劃者之一川部將軍與梅津有著相似的觀點，即日本應該繼續對美戰爭。
總而言之，蘇聯的侵略對日本領導人投降的決定影響不大。相反，正如您即將意識到的那樣，正是兩顆原子彈加上開頭提到的其他兩個因素導致了投降。
兩顆原子彈的影響
真正迫使日本領導人投降的不是一顆，而是兩顆原子彈。
要真正理解兩顆原子彈對日本最終命運的決定性影響，至關重要的是了解原子彈對最終決定投降的人們的影響。
當廣島被新型炸彈徹底摧毀的消息傳到東京帝國總部時，最高統帥部派遣了一支由 7 名技術專家組成的小組前往廣島，以確定究竟發生了什麼並評估局勢。
經過兩天的仔細分析，由專家團隊成員確定：
毫不誇張地說，整個廣島市都被原子彈摧毀了。
1945 年 8 月 7 日，川部將軍在日記中寫道，來自廣島的報導讓他感到非常震驚。更能說明問題的是川部日記的其餘部分：美國在製造原子彈方面的成功和日本的失敗反映了日本的科學弱點。
也許沒有人比裕仁天皇更受原子彈的困擾。他完全了解廣島的悲劇。1945 年 8 月 7 日下午 1 點，在覲見天皇時，他的心腹木戶光一注意到天皇憂心忡忡的表情。在木戶的日記中，裕仁天皇深感震驚，並向他的顧問詢問了許多有關廣島的問題。最重要的是戰後四年木戶透露的天皇以下聲明：
事已至此，也沒有其他辦法了。我不在乎我個人發生了什麼，但我們應該抓緊時間結束戰爭，以免再次發生這樣的悲劇。
從上述爆料中可以清楚看到投在廣島的第一顆原子彈對天皇造成的巨大影響。這使他決心結束戰爭。
這並不是天皇唯一一次表明原子彈對他的思路產生影響的聲明。1945 年 8 月 8 日上午，他收到了多哥關於廣島災難的詳細報告。外交部長敦促接受《波茨坦宣言》，立即結束戰爭。針對多哥的緊急建議，天皇表示：
新武器使戰爭持續下去的可能性越來越小。日本必須做出盡快結束戰爭的安排。
他指示多哥盡最大努力盡快結束戰爭，並向鈴木首相傳達了結束戰爭的願望。
在繼續之前，值得注意的是，目前還不清楚天皇有多有力地表達了他結束戰爭的決心，因為木戶的日記並沒有真正表明這一點。此外，即使皇帝想要結束戰爭，他也可以：
- 仍在猶豫是否無條件接受《波茨坦宣言》。
- 他擔心或懷疑帝國軍隊是否會按照他的意願行事，因為帝國軍隊有暗殺統治的歷史，隊伍中充滿了好戰的軍官，他們拒絕相信戰爭已經失敗。
這意味著皇帝結束戰爭的願望很可能是暫時的，而不是決定性的。不僅如此，在他的軍人中，還有一些人不為第一顆原子彈嚇倒，並希望戰爭繼續下去。
第二顆原子彈讓他們重新思考並最終導致日本最終投降。
在確認廣島上有第一顆原子彈後，豐田章男海軍上將雖然感到震驚，但他認為美國可能只有一枚這樣的原子彈。這是基於他錯誤地認為美國不擁有製造許多原子彈所需的大量放射性材料：
原子彈的殺傷力極為嚴重，但美國是否能夠快速連續使用更多的原子彈卻值得懷疑。
很能說明問題的是，他以某種方式相信，即使美國人擁有不止一枚炸彈，在廣島使用這種武器也會激起世界各地的抗議，用他自己的話來說，這將阻止美國人「再犯下一次這樣的不人道暴行」。鑑於日本軍隊在戰爭期間表現得異常野蠻，這種信念顯示豐田章男是多麼的妄想。
因此，當第二顆原子彈落在長崎時，豐田章男才意識到自己犯了多大的錯誤。第二枚原子彈對豐田章男產生了更大的震撼，駁斥了他關於美國人無法快速連續投彈的錯誤假設。
陸軍大臣阿南和豐田章男一樣對炸彈感到震驚。1945年8月9日，在與內閣討論繼續戰爭的合理性的會議上，將軍說了以下的話，並由外交部記錄並轉載：
一枚原子彈可以摧毀 6 平方英里，相當於 2,000 架 B-29，每架攜帶 300 枚每枚 500 磅的常規炸彈……美國人似乎擁有一百枚原子彈……而他們每天可以投下三枚。下一個目標很可能是東京。
你看？第二顆原子彈顯然給人留下了這樣的印象（這是一個錯誤的印象）：美國有許多炸彈準備用來對付日本。這種印象引發了人們對美國會投下更多炸彈的擔憂。最糟糕的是對第三顆原子彈落在東京的恐懼，這種恐懼是由一位名叫馬庫斯·迪爾達的美國飛行員的謊言引發的，我在這裡講述了這一點）。
1945 年 8 月 9 日，會談和會議一直持續到午夜。午夜前大約 10 分鐘，天皇進入會議室，面對六大人物和其他重要官員，其中平沼男爵就是其中之一。平沼很有說服力地論證了當時的情況如何使日本不可能贏得戰爭。他提出了日本無能和脆弱的無可辯駁的證據：美國轟炸機不斷轟炸日本的城市，盟軍戰艦幾乎不受懲罰地襲擊日本本土，飛機和潛艇對日本商船的扼殺，普遍的飢餓，公眾士氣和意志的迅速侵蝕右邊是蘇聯的軍事攻擊，最重要的是原子彈。
表達完自己的想法後，男爵對著皇帝說：
遵照陛下的遺訓，陛下也有責任防止國家動亂。謹請陛下考慮到這一點而做出決定。
鈴木首相補充：
請陛下決定接受哪一項建議－外交部長提出的建議還是包含四個條件的建議。
（附註：上述「四個條件」是頑固軍事領導人提出的，它們是：盟軍不佔領日本、自我解除武裝、自審戰犯、保全王位和帝國制度）
官方記錄指出，天皇毫不猶豫地從座位上起身向與會者發表演說。他的臉上充滿了情緒。以下引文是羅伯特·布托精心重現的，並根據日本軍事史官方年鑑中括號內的內容進行了修改：
我認真思考了國內外的局勢，得出的結論是，繼續戰爭只能意味著國家的毀滅，世界上的流血和殘酷將繼續下去。我不忍心看到無辜的人民再受苦。結束戰爭是恢復世界和平和使國家擺脫所承受的可怕苦難的唯一途徑。
那些主張繼續敵對行動的人告訴我，到六月，新的師將被部署在九十九里濱（東京以東的海灘）的防禦工事上，以便在入侵者試圖登陸時做好準備。現在已經八月了，工事還沒完工。就連要在那裡作戰的師的裝備也不足，據說要到9月中旬之後才能充足。此外，承諾的飛機產量成長並未如預期進行。
有人說，民族存亡的關鍵在於在祖國決戰。然而，過去的經驗表明，計劃與績效之間始終存在著差距。我不相信九十九里事件的差異可以被修正。事物既然如此，如何才能擊退侵略者？【此時，他也具體提到了原子彈破壞力的大幅提升】
不言而喻，看到勇敢而忠誠的日本戰士被解除武裝，我是難以忍受的。同樣令人難以忍受的是，其他曾為我提供過忠誠服務的人現在卻被當作戰爭煽動者而受到懲罰。然而，到了我們必須承受難以承受之事的時候了…
我嚥下自己的眼淚，並在外交部長概述的基礎上批准接受盟軍公告的提議。
這是多麼有說服力的啟示啊？天皇提到了兩件事你必須牢記：武裝部隊的糟糕表現和原子彈。這意味著皇帝已經對武裝部隊成功擊退預期的盟軍入侵的能力失去了信心。也顯然，他對原子彈的破壞力感到震驚。在他上述的聲明中還有一件事值得注意：明顯沒有任何明確或暗示的提及蘇聯的侵略。
皇帝離開了會議室。鈴木接著說：
陛下的決定也應該成為這次會議的決定。
於是，在凌晨3:00到4:00之間，大臣們正式採納了天皇的決定，從而使天皇不久前的言論具有了法律效力。至此，就連一直堅持戰鬥到底的好戰的陸軍大臣阿南也意識到了末日已經到來：尊主不再支持陸軍實施決戰的計劃。他沒辦法，只能遵從皇帝的旨意：
我不知道我能提供什麼藉口，但既然我們接受《波茨坦宣言》是國王陛下的決定，我們也無能為力。真正重要的考慮因素是軍隊以有組織的方式行動。你的個人感受和你手下的感受必須被忽視。
由於帝國決定的前提是盟軍將保證維護我們的國家政體，因此現在說戰爭已經結束還為時過早。因此，軍隊必須為戰爭或和平做好準備。
如果這裡有人不滿，想要違背陛下的決定，就必須對著我的屍體動手。
1945 年 8 月 14 日，發生了一件事件，加速了投降的決定。美國 B-29 飛機向日本城市投放傳單（以日文印刷）。這是一場心理戰行動，旨在讓日本人民了解困擾日本的絕望狀況。此外，它還包含伯恩斯的照會以及日本政府提出的盟軍必須接受的四個條件（上述），以換取日本接受《波茨坦公告》。
當樞密院掌門人木戶看到這些傳單時，他有充分理由感到驚愕。他擔心日本軍隊中的狂熱分子會發現與盟軍達成談判和平的秘密企圖。接下來將是一場針對和平派相關人士的迅速而無情的暗殺。
木戶意識到迫切需要採取迅速行動，會見了天皇，天皇立即下令召集官員參加上午 11:00 舉行的會議，天皇將指示內閣無條件接受《波茨坦公告》，並起草帝國敕令，將《波茨坦公告》正式化。那個決定。在上午 11:00 舉行會議的理由是避免給陸軍發動政變的時間。
據昭和天皇獨白記載，陸軍和海軍高層出席了這次會議，其中之一就是羽田俊六元帥被任命為結號總司令。當原子彈摧毀廣島時，他駐紮在廣島的總部。奇蹟般的是，他活了下來。陸軍大臣阿南希望畑以一種能夠獲得天皇批准繼續戰爭的方式進行溝通。他也希望陸軍元帥能夠盡量減少原子彈的影響。
但羽田的舉動卻出乎阿南的意料。在長野海軍上將和杉間元帥斷言日本仍然有足夠的資源和意志力繼續戰鬥後，羽田站起來講話。他的話讓所有人都愣住了。他表示，他對軍隊消滅敵人的能力以及決號取得預期勝利的潛力沒有信心。哈塔同意天皇接受《波茨坦公告》的決定。
投降的勢頭從此刻開始迅速累積起來。羽田說完後，天皇表示，敵人強大的科學能力和現在蘇聯的入侵，即使有特種攻擊部隊和日本的「戰鬥精神」也無法反擊。皇帝接著說：
我仔細聽取了反對日本應接受盟軍答复的現狀而不作進一步澄清或修改的觀點的每一個論點，但我自己的想法沒有發生任何改變。我調查了日本和全世界的情況，我相信戰爭的持續只會帶來更多的破壞。我研究了盟軍答案的條款，得出的結論是，它們實際上完全承認了我們在幾天前發出的照會中所堅持的立場。簡而言之，我認為這個答覆是可以接受的。
他為不得不命令忠誠的軍人放下武器並接受勝利者的懲罰而感到屈辱。但他判斷，如果戰爭繼續下去，日本人民將面臨的屠殺和破壞，遠遠超過他的僕人所面臨的命運。他總結了他的宣言：
為使百姓知道我的決定，請您速擬聖旨，以便向全國公佈。最後，我呼籲大家盡力，迎接接下來的艱難日子。
至此，木已成舟。
會議結束後不久，內閣召開會議，一致批准了天皇的決定，從而賦予該決定完全的法律效力。外交部開始透過中立國瑞典和瑞士向盟軍轉達投降聲明。
就這樣，最終做出了投降的決定。對天皇投降決定影響最大的是原子彈，而不是蘇聯在滿洲的軍事行動。
請注意，天皇在 1945 年 8 月 14 日的會議上簡短地提到了蘇聯的軍事行動。不要試圖以此作為蘇聯侵略對投降決定有更大影響的證據。如果你仔細重讀這一部分，你會發現皇帝只是說蘇聯的侵略不能透過自殺式攻擊和戰鬥精神來反擊，而不是蘇聯的行動迫使他投降。
進一步證實兩顆原子彈對最終投降決定的決定性影響可以在天皇的個人帳目中找到。在此，君主始終給了三個他決定投降的理由。
1/ 對國內叛亂的恐懼
事實上，當他在8月10日凌晨首次宣布這項決定時，他表示：
認真思考國內外情勢。
有大量證據表明，對國內動亂的恐懼促使木戶、米內、近衛和天皇結束戰爭。海軍大臣米內特別承認了他對國內叛亂的深切恐懼：
我認為【波茨坦宣言】這個詞不太恰當，但原子彈和蘇聯參戰，從某種意義上來說，是上帝的恩賜。這樣我們就不用說因為國內情況而退出戰爭了。我為什麼長期以來主張控制國家危機，既不是因為害怕敵人的攻擊，也不是因為原子彈和蘇聯參戰。主要原因是我對國內局勢的焦慮。所以現在我們可以在不洩漏國內情況的情況下控制事情，這是比較幸運的。
在這裡，需要詳細闡述以了解這種對國內叛亂的恐懼的根本原因。日本平民在整個戰爭期間遭受了巨大的苦難。1940年，政府強制實施食品配給，首先是米、糖、鹽。隨著戰爭的進展，配給的商品清單變得越來越長。作為一個島國，日本嚴重依賴進口來維持工業生產和生存。但美國潛水艇阻止了大部分食品和原料到達本土。結果，人民（富人除外）普遍遭受飢餓。
但儘管民眾挨餓，軍隊的飲食卻相對較好。正是在這個時候，人們對軍隊的不滿情緒出現了，隨著戰爭的進展，糧食狀況日益惡化，這種不滿情緒也愈演愈烈。
除了飢餓之外，還有對政府和軍隊廣泛而根深蒂固的不滿。從 1945 年 3 月 9 日至 10 日造成約 10 萬日本平民喪生的燃燒彈襲擊開始，美國轟炸機繼續轟炸日本，幾乎不受懲罰。事實證明，日本空軍無力阻止美國的空襲（美國 B-29 損失的很大一部分是由於非戰鬥原因造成的）。這導致公眾認為軍隊無能（事實確實如此），未能保護人民。
因此，怨恨和飢餓的結合可能會引發叛亂，從而推翻帝國機構和政府。這種恐懼影響了日本領導人和天皇做出投降的決定。
2/ 對軍隊失去信心
這在他上面引用的聲明中顯而易見。與人們普遍認為天皇沒有實權並且不了解軍隊在戰爭期間所做的事情的誤解相反，他完全了解戰爭的進程。如果談判失敗，他知道並批准了襲擊珍珠港的計劃。他密切關注日本對歐洲殖民地的迅速征服。他知道在中途島慘重損失 4 艘艦隊航空母艦，在瓜達爾卡納爾島、塞班島以及最後沖繩島的失敗。陸軍和海軍的一次次失敗削弱了他對武裝部隊在面對壓倒性盟軍時取得勝利的信心。
3/原子彈
上述引用和解釋毫無疑問地顯示了原子彈對天皇的深遠影響。在他的投降宣言中，他提到：
一種新的、最殘酷的炸彈，其造成的破壞力確實無法估量，奪走了許多無辜者的生命。
他堅信這些炸彈是美國科學實力的證明。他堅信，科學能力較弱的日本不可能獲勝。
最能說明問題的是，皇帝在他的個人記憶中從未提到蘇聯的侵略。
更重要的是？投降儀式後僅一週（1945 年 9 月 2 日），天皇以書面形式向長子傳達了他對日本戰敗原因的看法。原因之一是日本人低估了他們的英美敵人。尤其是日本人錯誤地認為美國人好色、自私、個人主義、意志薄弱，因而缺乏戰鬥意志。另一個原因是日本人盲目相信“戰鬥精神”，而忽視了科學技術。美國人獲勝是因為他們在科學上投入了大量資金，這使得他們能夠製造出原子彈。皇帝在他的著作中沒有提及蘇聯的侵略。
鈴木首相在1945年12月提供的解釋證實了原子彈對最終投降決定的影響最大：
直到原子彈投下之前，最高軍事會議都不相信僅靠空襲就能打敗日本。他們也相信美國會登陸而不是試圖轟炸日本退出戰爭。另一方面，有許多知名人士確實相信美國僅靠轟炸就能贏得戰爭。然而最高戰爭委員會並不相信這一點，而是繼續執行在登陸點進行決戰的唯一計劃，並正在為迎接登陸做好一切準備。他們繼續執行這個計劃，直到原子彈被投下，此後他們相信美國擁有這種武器就不需要登陸；所以那時他們決定最好求和。
同樣，鈴木的聲明中沒有暗示或明確提及蘇聯的侵略。
我將以木戶光一的一個非常有趣的評論來結束本節，它表明原子彈不僅是一個重要的原因，而且也是投降的一個有效藉口：
如果軍事領導人能夠讓自己相信，他們是被科學的力量打敗的，而不是因為缺乏精神力量或戰略失誤，他們可以在某種程度上挽回面子。
（這讓我想知道，保全面子的願望在多大程度上促成了日本軍國主義者繼續戰爭的決心。）
總而言之，原子彈派獲勝。我提供了充分的證據證明，真正迫使日本領導人投降的是原子彈，而不是蘇聯的侵略。雖然並沒有完全否認蘇聯的軍事行動是微不足道的，但它充其量只是投降決定的強化因素，而不是決定性因素。正如我上面所解釋的，日本人已經註銷了滿洲。他們的首要目標是結圍。他們期待並準備美國入侵日本本土，他們將給美國侵略者造成可怕的傷亡，迫使美國領導人締結一項和平條約，使日本能夠維護國家獨立和國家榮譽。他們並不關心滿洲的命運。
最終，原子彈在日本最終投降中發揮了決定性作用，正是因為它糾正了日本軍國主義者的錯誤假設，即美國人必須入侵日本本土才能擊敗日本人。在快速連續投下兩顆原子彈後，他們（錯誤地）認為美國人擁有更多的原子武器，他們可以繼續向日本投擲原子彈，殺死更多的日本平民和士兵，摧毀更多的城市，而無需入侵日本。懷著這種錯誤的信念，日本領導人得出結論：決戰毫無用處，延長戰爭也是徒勞無功的。他們沒有辦法阻止失敗。是時候屈服盟軍無條件投降的要求了。
參考）
1/《垮台 - 日本帝國的終結》 - 理查德·B·弗蘭克（Richard B. Frank）（一部出色的作品，打破了對太平洋戰爭最後幾天事件的許多誤解，特別是日本準備投降的神話）
2/地獄付出代價：日本的垮台和入侵1945-1947 - DM Giangreco（一本有用的書，提供了大量有關日本和美國軍事實力的統計數據，並詳細描述了日本軍隊的決心和計劃在本土島嶼上進行決戰）。
3/ 與敵人賽跑：史達林、杜魯門和日本投降 - 長谷川剛
3/ Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan - Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
出色的分析。
The atomic bombs
In truth, it was far more complex and complicated than that: it was a combination of the following factors:
- shock effect of TWO atomic bombs
- fear of domestic rebellion
- the Emperor’s loss of faith in the armed forces
that prompted Emperor Hirohito himself to instruct his loyal councilors to surrender.
Before reading the in-depth answer below, I advise you to read the aforementioned points again, bear them in mind because they will be corroborated by concrete evidence presented in the answer.
To draw an accurate conclusion regarding which of the two events, destruction by atomic bombs or Soviet aggression, led to Japan’s surrender, it is essential to know:
- the main events AND the thoughts, actions and decisions of Japan’s preeminent leaders after the dropping of the atomic bombs. The answer will not be complete without considering both sides of the dispute.
- consider the respective influence of both events on the decision-making process of Japan’s leaders.
You may now wonder who were those preeminent leaders?
They were the following men:
- Emperor Hirohito
- Mitsumasa Yonai: Navy Minister
- Soemu Toyoda: Chief of the Naval General Staff
- Korechika Anami: Army Minister
- Yoshijirō Umezu: Chief of the Army General Staff
- Kantarō Suzuki: Prime Minister (PM)
- Shigenori Tōgō: Foreign Minister (FM)
Six of these men: Anami, Umezu, Yonai, Toyoda, Suzuki and Togo composed the so-called Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and were informally referred to as the Big Six.
Bear in mind the name of these men and their respective roles because they were the one who determined the ultimate fate of Japan and her people, as you will soon see through their words and actions recounted in my answer.
Emperor Hirohito
These were the people who determined the ultimate fate of Japan. (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank).
(Note: although Koichi Kido appeared in the picture above, he did not play any role in making the final decision to surrender. But, he was a confidante of the Emperor and hence he knew the Emperor’s most inner thoughts. Most importantly, he recorded those thoughts in a diary the content of which will be extracted and presented in this answer to reveal the central role the Emperor had in making the decision to surrender)
My approach will be to analyze each of the 2 events separately rather than in chronological order (Soviet aggression took place between the dropping of the 2 bombs). Each analysis will be amply corroborated.
One more thing, in my answer, I use the following 2 terms:
- Soviet faction: refers to those who argue that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was the primary reason underlying Japan’s surrender
- Atomic-bomb faction: refers to those who argue that the dropping of the atomic bombs was the primary reason underlying Japan’s surrender.
Let’s go into details.
The influence of Soviet military action
In making the assertion that Soviet aggression was the primary reason why Japan surrendered, the Soviet faction have relied on the following pieces of evidence:
Evidence 1:
When PM Suzuki spoke to Ikeda, an officer of the Kwantung Army who just arrived in Tokyo after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the conversation went as follows
Ikeda: The Kwantung Army is hopeless.
Suzuki: Is the Kwantung Army that weak? Then the game is up
This exchange has been invoked as proof that Soviet aggression was the decisive factor in bringing about Japan’s surrender.
Evidence 2
In a post-war interrogation record, Vice chief of the General Staff Torashirō Kawabe told his American interrogators that:
It was with a heart filled with fear that senior army officers expected Russia to entered the war.
Kawabe’s statement is one of the most oft-cited evidence for the assertion that Soviet aggression was the primary reason for Japan’s leaders to surrender.
Evidence 3
In a 1949 interview, admiral Toyoda told his American interviewers that
the atomic bombing was a cause for the surrender but it was not the only cause…. The Russian participation in the war against Japan rather than the atom bombs did more to hasten the surrender.
Those words of one of the preeminent wartime leaders of Japan have been eagerly invoked by the Soviet faction as the basis for the argument that Soviet military action had the greater influence on the decision to surrender.
And lastly, one recurring argument I have heard from the Soviet faction is the threat of Soviet invasion of Japan which would cause the dreaded specter of Communist domination to materialize.
So far, all plausible, yes?
However, there is more to those pieces of evidence that has been omitted, intentionally or not, that will cast doubt on and weaken the arguments of the Soviet faction.
Regarding evidence 1, what has been neglected is the fact that the conversation between Ikeda and Suzuki was from Ikeda’s memory several years after the war. As we all know, memory fades with time and this alone casts doubt on the validity of evidence 1. Secondly, Ikeda was just a regular officer with no authority to partake in the decision-making process, meaning that Ikeda’s statement was unlikely to have had any influence on the final decision to surrender. Thirdly and most importantly, Ikeda’s recollection conflicts with the evidence in August 1945 which shows that Suzuki was far from resigning himself to the hopeless situation. What he actually did in the days after the Soviet invasion was dithering over the terms and timetable of how to end the war.
Regarding evidence 2, there is more to it that the Soviet faction has omitted. It was Emperor Hirohito who made the decision to surrender. What’s more? His decision was made only about 25 hours after the start of Soviet invasion.
Why did this matter? Because due to faulty communication, even after 25 hours since the start, the Kwantung Army had not yet realized the scale of Soviet invasion. Indeed, throughout 9th August, one day after the start of Soviet invasion, frontline observers of the Kwantung Army mistakenly reported that
the scale of these attacks is not large
Now, given that the Kwantung army stationed at the front line misjudged the gravity of the situation, it followed that Japan’s leaders in Tokyo were even more ignorant of what was unfolding in Manchuria.
What was the implication of this?
The Emperor’s decision to surrender could not have been influenced by Soviet military aggression. It makes sense. If he and his military counsels were in the dark about the real magnitude of the Soviet invasion even 25 hours after the start of the event, then how could it have had any influence in Hirohito’s decision to surrender?
The evidence of Tokyo’s ignorance of the situation in Manchuria invalidates evidence 2 of the Soviet faction.
Regarding evidence 3, as evidence 1, it was a statement made based on memory 4 years after the war, which casts doubt on its validity. Who knows if admiral Toyoda had forgotten what happened during the last days of the war? In addition, you will soon be presented with one piece of evidence that conflicts with his claim above about the influence of Soviet aggression.
As for the argument regarding Japanese leaders’s fear of Soviet invasion of the home island, that is based on a very weak factual foundation. Without going into much details, the Soviets simply lacked the amphibious as well as airlift capability to mount a large-scale invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. While it was true that they did invade the Sakhalin islands and made a small-scale incursion on Hokkaido, they faced surprisingly fierce and effective Japanese resistance that deterred them from invading the Home Islands.
Plus, the limited Soviet amphibious capability was underpinned by American equipment. The Americans loaned amphibious equipment which included LSI (landing ship infantry) and LST (landing ship tank) to the Soviets. They also trained Soviet troops on how to carry out amphibious attack. But, these American equipment were on loan and the Soviets were expected to return them to the US eventually. Moreover, the number of Soviet troops trained in amphibious attack was only a few thousands, far too small to mount a large scale amphibious landing on the Home Islands. By comparison, all American amphibious attacks in the Pacific War typically involved tens of thousands of marines.
So no, the Soviets did not have the ability to mount a successful large-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Most importantly, several eminent Japanese military leaders had anticipated Soviet aggression. The Soviets had informed the Japanese that they would not renew the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact signed with Japan in 1941 which expired in 1946. So Japan’s leaders knew that eventually, the Soviets would attack. What surprised them was that the Soviets attacked in August 1945 rather than in the spring of 1946 as they expected. One reason was that they believed the Soviets would honor the Neutrality Pact which expired in 1946 (a bit ironic because they mistrusted the Soviets). Plus, in spring the weather was favorable for ground operations. Despite this, Army Minister Anami was noted to have said calmly:
The inevitable has come
The action of Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff General Kawabe is one of the most convincing evidence that refutes the argument that Soviet aggression led to Japan’s surrender. Although stunned by Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Kawabe was determined to carry on with the war. He drafted a plan of action which declared that carrying on the war against the United States to be the primary objective. He recommended implementing martial law in the country AND writing off Manchuria. Clearly, Soviet aggression did not compel him to consider surrendering.
Now, arguably, the most significant piece of evidence that weakens the assertion of Soviet faction was Ketsu-go.
Ketsu-Go means Decisive Battle. Correctly predicted that US forces would invade Kyushu, the Imperial Army formulated and implemented Ketsu-Go in response to the anticipated invasion. The purpose of Ketsu-Go was to engage the American invaders in a violent clash to inflict extremely heavy casualties on US forces without any regard to Japanese casualties. To this end, Japan’s leaders ordered the transfer of veterans units from the Kwantung Army to the Home Islands to strengthen defense in Kyushu and the Kantō Plain. Combat-ready Japanese infantry and armor divisions, air units were taken away from Manchuria. Apart from transferring existing units, new divisions were raised on the Home Islands whose members were drawn from able-bodied males. The end result was the disposition of Japanese army force shown in the map below:
Disposition of Japanese army forces on Kyushu for Ketsu-Go (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)
As a result of this transfer, the once mighty Kwantung Army was then only a shadow of its former self. On paper, the Army still had over 10 divisions but their combat power was only equivalent to about 6–7 fully trained and equipped divisions.
The very fact that the Japanese army took away the best combat units of the Kwantung army implied one thing: Japan’s leaders had decided to write off Manchuria. Indeed, if they still cared about Manchuria and especially that they expected a Soviet invasion in the future, then logic dictated that they should have kept the best units there to defend Manchuria. It follows from this the conclusion that what happened to Manchuria would be of little consequence for Japanese leaders. This conclusion was confirmed in a meeting where the Emperor announced his determination to surrender. In this meeting, General Umezu stated firmly that Soviet aggression did not invalidate Ketsu-Go. General Kawabe, one of the chief planners of Ketsu-Go, shared similar opinion with Umezu that japan should continue the war against the US.
So all in all, Soviet aggression did little to influence the decision of Japan’s leaders to surrender. Instead, as you are about to appreciate, it was the TWO atomic bombs coupled with the other 2 factors mentioned at the start that led to the surrender.
The influence of the two atomic bombs
It took not one, but two atomic bombs to really compel Japan’s leaders to surrender.
To really appreciate the decisive influence the two atomic bombs had on Japan’s ultimate fate, it is vital to see the effect the bombs had on the people who made the final decision to surrender.
When news of Hiroshima’s total destruction by a new type of bomb reached the Imperial HQ in Tokyo, the high command sent a team of 7 technical experts to Hiroshima to determine exactly what had happened and assess the situation.
After 2 days of careful analysis, members of the specialist team were certain that:
It was no exaggeration that the whole city of Hiroshima had been destroyed by an atomic bomb.
General Kawabe wrote in his diary on 7th August 1945 that he was shocked tremendously by the reports from Hiroshima. Even more telling was the rest of Kawabe’s diary note: the US’s success and Japan’s failure in creating the atomic bombs reflected Japan’s scientific weakness.
Probably no one was more disturbed by the atomic bomb than Emperor Hirohito. He was fully aware of the tragedy at Hiroshima. On 7th August 1945 at 1:00 PM, in an audience with the Emperor, his confidant, Koichi Kido observed the worried countenance of the Emperor. In Kido’s diary, Hirohito was noted to be deeply alarmed and ask his counsels many questions about Hiroshima. Most significantly was the following statement of the Emperor that was revealed by Kido 4 years after the war:
Now that things have come to this impasse, there is no other way. I don’t care what happened to me personally, but we should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another tragedy like this.
You can clearly see from the above revelation the huge impact the 1st atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had on the Emperor. It made him disposed toward ending the war.
And that was not the only statement made by the Emperor that showed the effect of the bomb on his train of thoughts. On the morning of 8th August 1945, he received a meticulous report on Hiroshima’s devastation from Togo. The Foreign Minister urged immediate termination of the war by accepting the Potsdam Declaration. In response to Togo’s urgent recommendation, the Emperor stated:
The new weapon made it less and less possible to continue the war. Japan must make such arrangements as will end the war ASAP.
He instructed Togo to do his best to end the war quickly and informed PM Suzuki of his desire to end the war.
Before moving on, it is worth noting here that it is unclear as to how forcefully the Emperor expressed his determination to end the war because Kido’s diary did not really show that. Furthermore, even if the Emperor wanted to the war to end, he either:
- still dithered over unconditionally accepting the Potsdam Declaration.
- feared or doubted if the Imperial Army, with its history of government by assassination and whose ranks were filled with bellicose officers who refused to believe that the war was lost, would act in accordance with his wish.
The implication of this was that the Emperor’s desire to end the war was probably tentative rather than decisive. Not only that, among his military servants, there were those who remained undeterred by the 1st atomic bomb and wanted the war to continue.
It took the second atomic bomb to shock them into rethinking and ultimate lead to Japan’s ultimate surrender.
After confirmation of the 1st atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Admiral Toyoda, though stunned, argued that the US probably had only one such bomb. This was based on his mistaken belief that the US did not possess a large amount of radioactive materials needed to create many atomic bombs:
The damage of the atomic bomb was extremely heavy, but it is questionable whether the US will be able to use more bombs in quick succession.
And tellingly, he somehow believed even if the Americans had more than one bomb, the use of such weapon on Hiroshima would provoke protest from around the world which would discourage the Americans from, in his own words, “perpetrating another such inhuman atrocity”. It was a belief that shows how delusional Toyoda was, given the fact that the Japanese military had conducted itself with exceptional barbarity during the war.
So when the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, it dawned on Toyoda how mistaken he was. The second bomb had a greater shock effect on Toyoda and refuted his erroneous assumption that the Americans could not drop bomb in quick succession.
Army Minister Anami was just as stunned by the bombs as Toyoda was. On 9th August 1945, during a conference with the cabinet discussing the rationality of carrying on with the war, the General uttered the following words that were recorded and reprinted by the Foreign Ministry:
One atomic bomb could destroy 6 square miles, which was equivalent to 2,000 B-29s each with 300 conventional bombs of 500 pounds each… The Americans appeared to have one hundred atomic bombs… while they could drop three per day. The next target might well be Tokyo.
You see? The second atomic bomb clearly gave rise to the impression (a mistaken one at that) that the US had many bombs ready to be employed against Japan. From this impression stemmed the fear that the US would drop more bombs. Worst of all was the fear of the 3rd atomic bomb being dropped on Tokyo, a fear inspired by a lie of an American pilot named Marcus Dilda which I recounted here).
Throughout 9th August 1945, talks and meetings continued until midnight. About 10 minutes before midnight, the Emperor entered the meeting room to face the Big Six and other prominent officials, among whom was Baron Hiranuma. Hiranuma persuasively argued how the prevailing conditions made it impossible for Japan to win the war. He presented irrefutable evidence of Japan’s impotence and vulnerabilities: American bombers ceaselessly bombed Japan’s cities, Allied warships attacked the home islands with near impunity, the strangulation of Japan’s merchant shipping by aircraft and submarines, the widespread hunger, the rapid erosion of public morale and will to right, Soviet military attack, and most important, the atomic bombs.
Having articulated his thoughts, the Baron faced the Emperor and stated:
In accordance with the legacy of Your Imperial Forefathers, Your Imperial Majesty is also responsible for preventing unrest in the nation. I should like to ask Your Majesty to make your decision with this point in mind.
PM Suzuki added:
Your Imperial Majesty’s decision is requested as to which proposal should be accepted - the one stated by the Foreign Minister or the one containing the 4 conditions.
(as a side note: the “4 conditions” mentioned above were those put forth by diehard military leaders. They were: no Allied occupation of Japan, self-disarmament, self-trial of war criminals, preservation of the Throne and the Imperial Institution)
The official record noted that the Emperor rose without hesitation from his seat to address the attendees. His face was full of emotions. The following quote is a meticulous recreation by Robert Butow, modified by the items in brackets from the official annals of Japanese military history:
I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress with which it is burdened.
I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be placed in fortified positions at Kujukuri-hama [the beaches east of Tokyo] so that they would be ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. Even the equipment for the divisions which are to fight there is insufficient, and reportedly will not be adequate until after the middle of September. Furthermore, the promised increase in the production of aircraft has not progressed in accordance with expectations.
There are those who say that the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [At about this point, he also made specific reference to the greatly increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]
It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come when we must bear the unbearable…
I swallow my own tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.
What a telling revelation huh? The Emperor mentioned two things that you have to bear in mind: the record of poor performance by the armed forces AND the atomic bombs. The implication is that the Emperor had lost faith in the ability of the armed forces to successfully repel the anticipated Allied invasion. It is also clear that he was shocked by the destructiveness of the atomic bombs. One more thing noteworthy in his declaration above: a conspicuous absence of any mention, explicit or implicit, to Soviet aggression.
The Emperor left the conference room. Suzuki then spoke:
His Majesty’s decision should be made the decision of this conference as well.
And so, between 3:00 AM and 4:00 AM, the ministers officially adopted the Emperor’s decision, thereby giving legal force to the Emperor’s words enunciated not long ago. At this point, even the bellicose Army Minister Anami who had insisted on fighting to the bitter end realized that the end had come: the revered Sovereign no longer supported the Army’s plan to carry out Ketsu-Go. He had no choice but to comply with the wish of the Emperor:
I do not know what excuse I can offer but since it is the decision of His Majesty that we accept the Potsdam Declaration there is nothing that can be done. The really important consideration is that the army act in an organized manner. Your individual feelings and those of the men under you must be disregarded.
Since the Imperial Decision is predicated upon the assumption that the Allies will guarantee the preservation of our national polity, it is too soon to say that the war has already ended. The army must therefore be prepared either for war or for peace.
If there is anyone here who is dissatisfied and who wishes to act contrary to his Majesty’s decision, he will have to do so over my dead body.
Then on 14th August 1945, an event occurred that quickened the making of the decision to surrender. American B-29s dropped leaflets (printed in Japanese) on Japanese cities. It was a psychological warfare operation intended to inform Japanese people of the desperate conditions plaguing Japan. In addition, it contained the Byrnes’s note as well as the Japanese government’s four conditions (mentioned above) the Allied must accept in exchange for Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.
When Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido saw the leaflets, he was stricken with consternation for good reason. He feared that fanatical elements in the Japanese army would discover the surreptitious attempt to reach negotiated peace with the Allies. What followed would be a swift and ruthless assassination aimed at those associated with the pro-peace faction.
Recognizing that swift action was urgently demanded, Kido met the Emperor who promptly ordered officials to be summoned for a meeting held at 11:00 AM in which the Emperor would instruct his cabinet to accept the Potsdam Declaration unconditionally and to draft the Imperial Rescript to formalize that decision. The rationale for holding the meeting at 11:00 AM was to avoid giving the Army the time to mount a coup d’etat.
According to Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku (Emperor Showa's Monologue), the meeting was attended by high-ranking figures in the army and navy, one of whom was Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, the appointed overall commander of Ketsu-go. He was stationed in his HQ at Hiroshima when the atomic bomb destroyed the city. Miraculously, he survived. Army Minister Anami expected Hata to communicate in a way that would elicit the Emperor’s approval for continuing with the war. He also expected the Field Marshall to minimize the effect of the atomic bomb.
But Hata acted to the contrary of Anami’s expectation. After Admiral Nagano and Field Marshal Sugiyma asserted that Japan still had enough resources and willpower to keep fighting, Hata rose to speak. His words stunned everyone. He stated that he no confidence in the military’s ability to destroy the enemy and in Ketsu-go’s potential to achieve the desired victory. Hata concurred with the Emperor’s decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration.
The momentum for surrendering was being built up rapidly starting at this very moment. After Hata finished speaking, the Emperor stated that the enemy’s immense scientific capability and now Soviet invasion could not be countered even with special attack forces and Japan’s seishin (seishin = fighting spirit). The Emperor went on to state:
I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. I have surveyed the conditions prevailing in Japan and in the world at large, and it is my belief that a continuation of the war promises nothing but additional destruction. I have studied the terms of the Allied reply and have concluded that they constituted a virtually complete acknowledgement of the position we maintained in the note dispatched several days ago. In short, I consider the reply to be acceptable.
He bemoaned the humiliation of having to order his loyal military servants to lay down their arms and be punished by the victors. But he judged that the fate that would befall his servants were far outweighed by the carnage and destruction Japanese people would face if war was allowed to persist. He concluded his declaration:
In order that the people may know of my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead.
Thus, the die was now cast.
The cabinet convened shortly after the end of the conference and unanimously ratified the Emperor’s decision, thereby endowing it with full legal force. The Foreign Ministry began transmitting the declaration of surrender to the Allies through neutral Sweden and Switzerland.
And that’s how the decision to surrender was finally made. It was the atomic bombs, not Soviet military action in Manchuria, that had the greatest effect on the Emperor’s decision to surrender.
Note that the Emperor briefly mentioned Soviet military action in the meeting on 14th August 1945. Don’t be tempted to take that as a proof that Soviet aggression had greater influence on the decision to surrender. If you reread that part carefully, you will see that the Emperor merely stated that Soviet aggression could not be countered by suicide attacks and fighting spirit, not that Soviet action impelled him to surrender.
Further confirmation of the decisive influence the two atomic bombs had on the final decision to surrender could be found in the Emperor’s personal account. Herein, the Sovereign consistently gave three reasons underlying his decision to surrender.
1/ Fear of domestic revolt
Indeed, when he first announced his decision in the early morning of August 10th, he stated that he had:
given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad.
There is considerable evidence that fear of domestic unrest motivated Kido, Yonai, Konoe and the Emperor to end the war. Navy minister Yonai in particular confessed his deep fear of domestic rebellion:
I think the term [Potsdam Declaration] is inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu = heaven-sent blessings]. This way we don’t have to say that we have quit the war because of domestic circumstances. Why I have long been advocating control of the crisis of the country is neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So it is rather fortunate that now we can control matters without revealing the domestic situation.
Here, an elaboration is needed to understand the root cause of such fear of domestic revolt. Japanese commoners had endured immense hardship throughout the war. In 1940, the government enforced rationing of foods, starting with rice, sugar, salt. As the war progressed, the list of rationed commodities got longer. Being an island nations, Japan depended heavily on imports to sustain industrial production and survival. But American submarines prevented most of the foods and raw materials from reaching the Home Islands. Consequently, the population (except the rich) suffered from widespread hunger.
But while the population starved, the military continued to eat relatively well. This was when resentment toward the military arose and only intensified as the food situation worsened with the progress of war.
Added to hunger was widespread and deep-seated disaffection with the government and the military. Starting with the incendiary raid on the 9th-10th March 1945 which the lives of about 100,000 Japanese civilians, American bombers continued to bomb Japan with near impunity. Japanese air force proved incapable of stopping American air raids (a significant percentage of American B-29 losses were due to non-combat causes). This led to public sentiment that the military was incompetent (which it was) that it failed to protect the people.
So a combination of resentment and hunger could give rise to a rebellion that might topple the Imperial Institution and the government. This was a fear that influenced Japan’s leaders AND the emperor to make the decision to surrender.
2/ Loss of faith in the military
This was evident in his declaration quoted above. Contrary to popular misconception that the Emperor had no real power and was oblivious to what the military ddid during the war, he was fully aware of the course of the war. He knew and approved the plan to attack Pearl Harbor if negotiations failed. He followed closely Japan’s rapid conquest of European’s colonial possessions. He knew about the disastrous loss of 4 fleet carriers at Midway, the defeat at Guadalcanal, Saipan, and finally Okinawa. Defeat after defeat suffered by the army and navy eroded his faith in the armed forces to secure victory in the face of overwhelming Allied powers.
3/ The atomic bombs
The aforementioned quotes and explanation leave no doubt as to the profound effect the atomic bombs had on the Emperor. In the Imperial Rescript which contained his declaration to surrender, he mentioned:
a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.
He was convinced that the bombs were proof of American scientific prowess. He was convinced that Japan, with her weaker scientific capability, could not prevail.
Most tellingly, the Emperor NEVER mentioned Soviet aggression in his personal recollection.
What’s more? Just one week following the surrender ceremony (2nd September 1945), the Emperor conveyed in writing to his eldest son his thoughts concerning the causes of Japan’s defeat. One cause was that the Japanese underestimated their Anglo-American enemies. In particular, the Japanese had mistakenly thought that the Americans were pleasure-loving, selfish, individualistic, weak-willed and consequently lacking the will to fight. The other cause was that the Japanese had placed blind faith in seishin (fighting spirit) at the expense of science and technology. The Americans won because they invested heavily in science which enabled them to build the atomic bombs. In his writing, the Emperor made no mention of Soviet aggression.
The explanation provided by PM Suzuki in December 1945 confirmed that the atomic bombs had the greatest influence on the final decision to surrender:
The Supreme War Council, up to the time that the atomic bomb was dropped, did not believe that Japan could be beaten by air attack alone. They also believed that the United States would land and not attempt to bomb Japan out of the war. On the other hand, there were many prominent people who did believe that the United States could win the war by just bombing alone. However the Supreme War Council, not believing that, had proceeded with the one plan of fighting a decisive battle at the landing point and was making every possible preparation to meet such a landing. They proceeded with that plan until the Atomic bomb was dropped, after which they believed the United States need not land when it had such a weapon; so at that point they decided that it would be best to sue for peace.
Again, no implicit nor explicit reference to Soviet aggression could be seen in Suzuki’s statement.
I shall conclude this section with a very interesting comment made by Koichi Kido which showed that the atomic bombs not only served as an important cause but also as a valid excuse for surrendering:
If military leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of science but not by lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, they could save face to some extent.
(It makes me wonder the extent to which the desire for face-saving contributed to Japanese militarists’ determination to carry on with the war.)
So all in all, the atomic-bomb faction wins. I have provided ample evidence demonstrating that it was the atomic bombs rather than Soviet aggression that really drove Japanese leaders to surrender. While not completely dismissing Soviet military action as insignificant, it was at best a reinforcing but not decisive factor underlying the decision to surrender. As I explained above, the Japanese had written off Manchuria. Their foremost goal was Ketsu-Go. They were expecting and prepared for an American invasion of the Home Islands where they would inflict horrific casualties on the American invaders to force US leaders to conclude a peace treaty that would allow the Japanese to preserve national independence and national honor. The fate of Manchuria was of little concern to them.
At the end of the day, the atomic bombs played the decisive role in Japan’s ultimate surrender precisely because it disabused Japanese militarists of their mistaken assumption that the Americans would have to invade the Home Island to defeat the Japanese. After two atomic bombs were dropped in quick succession, they believed (mistakenly) that the Americans had more atomic weapons that they could simply keep dropping on Japan to kill more Japanese civilians and soldiers and destroy more cities without the need to invade Japan. With that erroneous belief, Japanese leaders concluded that Ketsu-Go was useless and prolonging the war was futile. There was nothing they could do to preclude defeat. It was time to yield Allied demands for unconditional surrender.
Reference(s)
1/ Downfall - The End of the Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank (an excellent work that shatters a lot of misconceptions about the events in the last days of the war in the Pacific, particularly the myth that Japan was prepared to surrender)
2/ Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945–1947 - D. M. Giangreco (a useful books that provides a lot of statistical data concerning military strengths of Japan and the US as well as meticulously describes the Japanese military’s determination and plan to fight the decisive battle on the Home Islands).
3/ Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan - Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
Excellent analysis.
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