德國曾經非常接近研發出「H」炸彈嗎？

德國曾經非常接近研發出「H」炸彈嗎？

威廉·佩拉斯

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跟隨

就讀美國軍事大學12月1 日更新

是的，事實上，大多數（如果不是最終）現代「H 彈」（氫彈）在某種程度上都是二戰德國研發的後代。對這一說法的大量支持以數百份解密文件和其他主要來源證據的形式存在，這些證據可以追溯到第二次世界大戰（在某些情況下，在第二次世界大戰之前）和隨後的冷戰。

儘管標準敘事在 20 世紀 40 年代末已經確立，但多年來仍出現了一些作家兼研究人員，挑戰二戰的傳統歷史和原子時代的黎明。雖然取得了顯著的發現，但這些人撰寫的大部分（如果不是全部）記錄要么無法充分獲取檔案和其他證據，要么調查範圍有限。結果，他們沒有人完全理解他們的發現的背景或後果，也沒有最終將大部分或所有的點聯繫起來。

這種情況在 2019 年發生了變化，當時麻省理工學院的前高級科學家 Todd Rider 博士在許多國家和私人檔案館和圖書館中完成了長達十年的跨國搜尋。由此產生的 4,600 頁書《被遺忘的創造者》更準確地說是對過去150 多年來德國整個科學和科學創新的調查，但文本的很大一部分涉及萊德對二戰德國核武器計劃的開創性調查。我相信這部作品最終將導致整個第二次世界大戰和核武史學的一場革命。

托德·H·萊德博士。

由於迄今為止傳統歷史的持續存在，我想以《被遺忘的創造者》中的一段作為這個答案的開始，它在許多方面都可以作為我堅信的真實而正確的敘述的論文。

從第 3566-7 頁，德國核子計畫分析：

「美國或英國有關大型戰時德國核子計畫的任何資訊都將被分類和隱藏（甚至比火箭、噴射機和化學戰計畫更嚴重），以便(i) 試圖隱藏該資訊或西方對德國戰時核子計劃的了解。來自蘇聯的資訊；(ii) 讓引進的德國科學家更容易被美國公眾和政界人士接受（避免提出類似「為什麼我們這個月要雇用上個月瀕臨核武攻擊的科學家？」之類的問題）；(iii) 淡化戰時德國的技術成就；(iv) 向國內外觀眾宣傳美國戰時和戰後的成就。

(a) 塞繆爾·古德斯密特作為阿爾索斯任務的科學負責人，其工作是詳細調查德國核計劃並報告他的發現，但有充分記錄的證據與他對德國計劃的公開描述完全矛盾。古德斯密特似乎要么在分配給他的工作中極其無能，要么故意就德國項目發表虛假的公開聲明。這裡僅舉幾個例子：

我。古德斯密特向美國參議院作證說，德國核子科學家「距離」在戰爭結束時製造出原子彈「還有一百年的時間」。這些科學家中只有一小部分完全在技術落後的蘇聯重新開始，在四年內製造出了原子彈。

二. 古德斯密特表示，“大約 100 名科學家積極參與了這個計畫”，其中許多人“只兼職參與這項重要研究，其餘時間從事日常教學或行政工作。” 已知的德國核科學家名單要大得多，參與該計劃的總人數很可能還要多得多，這些科學家對戰時核工作的緊迫性和時間投入在他們的許多戰後記錄中都有記錄。

三. 古德斯密特聲稱埃里希·舒曼是“一位二流物理學家”，“主要興趣是鋼琴弦的物理學”。有據可查的是，埃里希·舒曼 (Erich Schu mann) 是該大學的博士學位。Wernher von Braun 的論文導師，在戰爭期間花費數年時間開發、演示和優化高度複雜的內爆炸彈設計，並直接參與了許多其他突破性的軍事研究和開發項目 [Nagel 2012a]。

（舒曼於 1934 年至 45 年間擔任德國陸軍武器局 ( heereswaffenamt)研究部門的負責人，並密切參與其生物武器計劃以及核武器工作。古德斯密特對“鋼琴弦”的嘲諷評論是提及了舒曼的祖父，他是一位著名的古典音樂作曲家，同時也向年輕的舒曼戰前擔任柏林大學聲學講師的平民職位致敬- WP）。

部長級主任菲爾教授簡介 Dr.rer.nat。埃里希·舒曼

職業生涯： 00.00.1933 - 00.00.1945 教授和普通理論和實驗物理學，zugleich Systemische Musikwissenschaf...

http://menofwehrmacht.blogspot.com/2021/01/bio-of-ministerialdirigent-profdrphil.html

塞繆爾·古德斯密特

四. 古德斯密特將曼弗雷德·馮·阿登納描述為僅僅是“一位聰明的技術人員和商人”，他試圖將政府資金從“真正有能力的科學家”身上轉移走。戰後，馮·阿登納是最受蘇聯青睞的德國核子科學家（大概是基於蘇聯關於他在德國戰時核成就的情報），他最終因幫助蘇聯建造第一個核設施而被授予一等史達林獎。原子彈[Oleynikov 2000]。（這是蘇聯平民可以獲得的最高獎項，相當於美國的總統自由勳章。事實上，馮阿登納曾兩次獲得該獎項——WP）。

(b) Samuel Goudsmit 檔案中的大量與 Alsos 相關的文件仍處於機密狀態（例如，請參閱第 3454-3455 頁和第 3472 頁）。

(c) 曼哈頓計畫外國情報部門的一些非常重要的阿爾索斯相關文件也仍然處於機密狀態且不可用，如第 17 頁的範例所示。3376（見下文）。

(d) 與德國核子計畫及其科學家有關的許多其他文件已從美國國家檔案館中刪除，如黃色撤回卡所示（例如參見第 3535 頁），或在現有文件中從未引用過這些文件。

德國的大型核子計畫將對美國隨後的計畫產生直接影響，就像火箭、噴射機和化學戰計畫一樣。(a) 正如 D.2.10 節中所討論的，有證據表明繳獲的德國濃縮鈾和內爆炸彈雷管可能極大地幫助和加速了戰時美國核計劃的最後階段。美國也捕獲了大量未濃縮鈾、鈹、鋯和其他可能有助於戰後美國核子計畫的材料。德國開發的火箭、飛彈發射井、噴射轟炸機、巡航飛彈和潛艇被證明是戰後美國核武的理想運載方式，就像它們很可能成為德國一直在開發的任何核武的運載方式一樣在戰爭期間。(b) 需要進行更多檔案研究，以確定美國戰後核武工作是否受到德國核科學家、材料或戰爭結束時發現的資訊的影響，特別是對於更輕和更小的內爆系統、高-電壓聚變中子引發劑、氘化鋰聚變燃料、層餅氫彈設計、兩級和三級氫彈設計以及改良的U-235濃縮方法。諸如美國抓捕和審訊漢斯·卡姆勒（第3504-3515 頁）、愛德華·泰勒對齊格弗里德·弗魯格的邀請（第3536 頁）、有關德國核融合研究的文件（第D .2.4 節）以及來自的編輯或丟失文件等證據德國科學家（例如，第 3535 頁）提出了非常嚴肅的問題，值得徹底調查。”

這份美國國家檔案館文件至今仍不對外開放。此部分（或選項卡）所屬的較大報告指出，其中包含德國可能在 1944 年 12 月生產原子彈的情報。

塞繆爾·古德斯密特的一些文件仍處於機密狀態。古德斯密特 1947 年出版的《阿爾索斯》一書仍然被認為是對二戰德國科學及其在核武方面取得的任何進展的貶低性描述的權威。

埃里希·舒曼（左二）是二戰期間德國陸軍武器局（ heereswaffenamt ）的研究主管。他出現在看起來像是影片紀錄片中的靜態鏡頭中。根據聯合情報目標局 (JIOA) 最終報告 #5，希勒斯萊本是一家研究機構所在地，該機構正在開發用於內爆型原子彈的紅外線引信。

曼弗雷德·馮·阿登納因其在蘇聯原子彈和其他先進技術方面的工作而兩次獲得史達林獎。1945 年春天，他和他手下的幾位高級中尉科學家向紅軍投降。

弗里茨·豪特曼斯曾在馮·阿登納實驗室工作過一段時間。他是快速聚變反應技術（以高電壓引發聚變反應）和氫彈理論發展的主要人物。

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美國軍方意識到，在戰爭年代，德國正在以某種形式進行核武的先進工作。從《被遺忘的創造者》第 1503 頁開始：

「1945 年5 月31 日從艾森豪威爾發往華盛頓特區的電報報道：『美國第三集團軍位於Lofer, E 7399 附近有一個實驗室，內有與原子彈和高空火箭實驗工作相關的設備和文件」（第3527 頁）。艾森豪威爾後來告訴《紐約時報》，他非常重視德國的核子計畫：「我主要擔心的是德國人沒有獲得原子彈來對付我們」（第 3410-3411 頁）。

事實上，在戰爭結束時，盟軍調查人員親自檢查了許多與德國核武計畫相關工作的地點，包括德國境內的地點（Luneburger Heide、 Hillersleben、 IG Farben 設施、圖林根州的許多地點等），奧地利（St. Georgen an der Gusen、Ebensee、Redl-Zipf、Lofer 等）、捷克領土（Pilsen、Podmokly、St. Joachimsthal/J´achymov 等）和其他地方（第2896–2900 頁、3518） –3533）。關於他們發現和了解的德國核計劃的詳細報告從未公開發布。”

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許多第二次世界大戰的德國或奧地利參與者曾多次表示，黨衛軍在衝突期間試圖研發百萬噸級氫彈。

其中包括：

沃納·格羅斯曼

漢斯·蒂林

威廉·格羅斯

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除了這些人之外：

「1950 年，烏爾里希·傑特（ Ulrich Jetter ，德國人，1914-??）發表了一項詳細的提案，即聚變炸彈可以使用六氫化鋰作為易於儲存的固體燃料，而不是麻煩得多的低溫氘和氚（第3206 頁）。根據其他可用文件，傑特的描述似乎直接基於戰時德國的工作。根據傳統歷史，鋰-6氘化物最早於1947年由美國的愛德華·泰勒（Edward Teller）在美國、由維塔利·金茲伯格（Vitaly Ginzberg）於1949年在蘇聯首次考慮，美國於1954年首次進行測試，常用於現代氫彈」。（引用的段落來自《被遺忘的創造者》，第 1492 頁）。

Jetter 也在 1950 年發表了以下文章：

烏爾里希·傑特. 1950 年。《超級炸彈》。物理學布拉特(1950) 6:199-205。

（德文原文）Die beiden Reaktionen...「gehen」ungewěohnlich gut：das leichte Lithiumisotop hat einen sehr großen Wirkungsquerschnitt gegen¡uber der DD-Reaktion eine titere Energieschwelle und bei ¡，Sofern 也衍生出 Tritonen 或 Neutronen zuge gen sind，與 Zyklus n + 6Li −→ 4He + Tr ↑ ↓ (D.15) n + 4He ←− D + Tr die Hauptreaktion bilden。

（英文翻譯）「這兩個反應......「一起」異常順利：輕鋰同位素在DD 反應上具有非常大的橫截面，較低的能量閾值，並且在相同溫度下有一百倍的產率，所以如果當有足夠的氚核或中子時，循環中子+鋰-6−→氦-4+氚↑↓中子+氦-4←−氘+氚將成為主要反應。

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賴德博士指出：

「此反應使用6氘化鋰，是現代氫彈的主要反應。直到1950年代，美國和蘇聯才證明了這一點。由於戰後盟軍對德國和奧地利的研究進行限制，這篇論文很可能是基於戰時研究。這項研究是在何時何地進行的，由誰來進行？這篇論文可以與 Georg Stetter 小組或其他小組關於鋰基聚變反應的戰時研究聯繫起來嗎？Ulrich Jetter（德國人，1914-??）1931-1941 年在斯圖加特大學學習，1941-1945 年在威廉皇帝金屬研究所工作，1945-1951 年擔任Physikalische Blatter [Jetter 1954] 的編輯。傑特 1950 年關於氫彈科學細節的文章、1952 年書籍和 1954 年文章（圖 D.114）是否基於他在戰爭期間了解到的資訊？傑特在戰爭期間是否進行了核子研究，或者他是否與其他從事核子研究的科學家進行了互動？鋰是一種金屬；戰爭期間 KWI 金屬研究中心是否正在進行鋰聚變研究？或者，傑特的文章是否基於他在戰後以期刊編輯的身份了解到的戰時研究？或者這篇論文是否真正展示了只有傑特在 1950 年才獲得的見解？請注意，1951 年，在美國製造並測試第一顆氫彈之前，傑特就被邀請作為「文化交流研究員」來到華盛頓特區。

烏爾里希·傑特可能在二戰結束後的第一個十年對美國氫彈的發展做出了重大貢獻。

托德·萊德博士的著作《被遺忘的創造者》中的圖表顯示了描述二戰期間德國氫彈工作的已知主要來源。

解密的 1953 年美國情報報告，描述了對戰時奧地利核科學家和國家社會民主黨成員喬治·施泰特 (Georg Stetter) 的持續密切監視。斯泰特可能是黨衛軍氫彈計劃的主要人物之一。

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2002 年，海因里希·希姆萊(Heinrich Himmler) 去世前不久，他的戰時首席副官維爾納·格羅斯曼(Werner Grothmann) 對他的鄰居沃爾夫·克羅茨基(Wolf Krotzky ) 進行了一次內容廣泛的採訪，在採訪中，他揭開了圍繞二戰德國核武器計劃50 多年的層層秘密。 。格羅斯曼的訪談與日本（鈴木達三郎）和美國（約翰·蘭斯代爾）的二戰主要核人物所提供的額外披露類似，並且大約在同一時間進行。總而言之，這些人提供的資訊揭示了與傳統歷史相反的衝突，其特點是明顯而絕望的核元素以及所有主要交戰國為原子武器化而瘋狂的競賽。

海因里希‧希姆萊 (Heinrich Himmler) 的首席副官維爾納‧格羅斯曼 (Werner Grothmann) 談核武設計 [Krotzky 2002]。請參閱第 17 頁。第2849章

「我所知道的是鈾和鈽兩種完全建造的原子彈原型生產的實際準備。[...]我不被允許知道任何關於它的事情，所以我只能說有兩種用於對抗城市的標準類型和另外兩種不同尺寸的，它們應該是可以在前面使用的[用於戰術戰場]使用]並包含較小的費用。戰後我才得知，兩個較小的其中一個的裝藥當量（即相當的爆炸材料數量）我相信為 130 噸。它本來應該用於攻擊鐵路隧道、港口設施和軍事設施。關鍵是小型武器只需要很少的材料，這首先克服了[裂變燃料]的短缺。至於較大的那顆，我只聽到一個說法，我無法證實，它大約有三千噸，這必須仍然是一個懸而未決的問題。[頁。18] 我從來沒有聽過具體發生的事情。

然而，確實有兩種完全不同的結構。第三個，我對此一無所知，也沒聽到太多。它看起來一定像一顆膨脹的炸彈。至於另外兩個，我知道較小的一個大約是 SC 250 的大小，但重量較高。較大的武器呈球形，直徑超過一公尺。儘管炸彈本體應該是鋁製的，但它非常重。據說，如果重量減輕了，產量就不那麼高了。為此，計劃了一種變體，其中彈體本身應該是爆炸系統的一個組成部分。我現在不能說更好了，無論如何，它是為了減輕重量並仍然獲得非常大的爆炸能量。

[頁。44] 是的，現在第三個問題來了。我們已經討論過這樣一個事實：科學家們希望在一定高度的空氣中點火。它應該是大約400公尺的高度（美國在廣島和長崎投下的原子彈選擇了500公尺－WP）。但即使有許多人對其進行了研究，但甚至沒有一個可以使其可靠的點火裝置。甚至想到用時間保險絲來做到這一點，但我不知道是否這樣做了。問題是，如果使用衝擊引信，大部分效果都會失效。那麼這種武器就不值得付出努力。在44年深秋進行的降落傘降落測試中，他們嘗試了一些東西。但我不知道這是否真的是近炸引信。[頁。42]

順便說一句，物理學家在私人講座中告訴希姆萊關於氫彈的內容確實讓他震驚，因為他聽說爆炸效果比鈾彈大一百倍。”

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格羅斯曼所指的「膨脹的炸彈」很可能與弗里德沃特·溫特伯格製作的下圖相似。溫特伯格在撰寫本文時雖然已經年事已高，但仍健在，並於1955 年在德國維爾納·海森堡(Werner Heisenberg) 和庫爾特·迪布納(Kurt Diebner) 的指導下獲得了博士學位。愛德華泰勒說，他在核融合方面的工作“也許沒有得到應有的關注”，大概是在美國，他畢業後立即被帶回美國進行“回形針行動”。

Friedwardt Winterberg 繪製的氫彈概念圖。請注意，這種設計與戰後美國氫彈計劃中開發的 Teller-Ulam 配置有很大不同。

溫特伯格的一本書的封面。《熱核爆炸裝置的物理原理》於 1981 年出版。

溫特貝格在黑板前，約 1964 年。

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英國和美國審訊人員在多份報告中提到了一枚“六噸炸彈”，這些報告總結了他們對一些據信參與了該炸彈研製各個方面的德國人的審問。

埃德蒙·蒂利少校致威爾遜中校。1946 年 10 月 [TNA FO 1031/112]。

這份關於 SORG 隱藏 RECHLIN、TARNEWITZ、TRAVEMUNDE、WERNEUCHEN、UDETFELD、PEENEMUNDE、GOTENHAFEN (GYDNIA) 的 E-Stellen（測試站）文件的簡要報告的一般背景由以下簽名者在一份備忘錄中提供給中尉-上校 威爾遜總理，46 年10 月6 日。46 年夏末，奧地利收到消息稱，46 年夏末，一名SORG 上尉在45 年春季將V-2 文件隱藏在阿默湖上的Kloster ANDECHS，而SORG上尉是PETERSEN 上校的行政官員。[...] 彼得森上校從英國返回，他曾在那裡接受審訊。[...] 索格和彼得森上校都聲稱已向美國人和英國人透露了他們所有的秘密。他們兩人都沒有承認在 Kloster ANDECHS 藏匿文件；因此，我們可以放心地假設，他們兩人仍然掌握著秘密，而出於他們自己最清楚的原因，他們仍然對我們隱瞞這些秘密。[...] SORG 拒絕承認對裡面的內容有任何了解，直到他收集了這些盒子之後[...] 他還記得2 個扁彈藥箱中裝有E-7 Stellen 的記錄（關於德國空軍的炸彈和引信，可能還用在他本人測試過的6 噸炸彈上）。不幸的是，SORG 無法根據記憶為我們提供所有盒子的詳細清單以及每個盒子所包含的內容。

埃德蒙·蒂利少校致威爾遜中校。秘密導彈。EPES/FIAT，德國控制委員會，英國 Element，1946 年 7 月 13 日 [TNA FO 1031/57]。

1. 美國陸軍第 2940 工程師技術情報小組 (R) 的 FT GUTMANN 中尉剛從奧地利回來，他帶著 SCHULZ-KAMPFHENKEL 的三名助手，他們都是研究部的工作人員。

2. 古特曼中尉進入奧地利的俄羅斯區，在下奧地利州阿姆施泰滕附近的 EURATSFELD 看到了一名憲兵安東·卡斯特納 (Anton KASTNER)。卡斯特納告訴古特曼中尉，有一枚重達六噸的新型放射性炸彈。這種炸彈沒有尾翼，透過降落傘降落。卡斯特納本人聲稱只與這種新型秘密飛彈的引信部分有關。

3. 據說彼得森上校在 OKW（武裝部隊最高指揮部）負責這枚秘密導彈。卡斯特納聲稱彼得森上校的文件和文件是他留在上阿默湖的克洛斯特安德克斯( Kloster ANDECHS) 的。巴伐利亞。彼得森上校據推測在西班牙。

（彼得森出現在德國指揮結構的這個級別，顯然說明了「六噸炸彈」及其預期運載系統的重要性。另請注意，「上校」是一個名義軍銜，有時授予參與秘密武器的各種官員以及其他“黑色行動”。例如，鈴木達三郎中校，一位日本陸軍科學家，是二戰日本原子彈研究的主要人物。— WP)。

4. 據稱，一名 Hauptmann（上尉）SORG 曾擔任 PETERSEN 上校的首席行政官，並負責組織工作。SORG 仍住在阿默湖的 UTTING。

5. 古特曼中尉認為，這種新型放射性炸彈可能與舒爾茨-坎普夫亨克爾所描述的「Warmesuchgerat」不無關聯。這一定是一個非常秘密的工具，因為舒爾茨-坎普夫亨克爾沒有告訴任何美國人它的存在，也不會在對他施加高壓之前向我們奧伯魯塞爾透露它。他繼續稱其為“Warmesuchgerat”，意思是熱搜索或尋找儀器，但他將其描述為一種用於在飛機飛行過程中測量地面溫度的飛機儀器。如果僅此而已，該儀器將被稱為“Warmemessgerat”或“Temperaturmessgerat”。

6. SCHMITTHUSEN 被認為是研究人員中最了解「Warmesuchgerat」的人。我將於 7 月 15 日星期一與古特曼中尉一起審問他。他很可能很固執，因為我在菲亞特外面見過他一會兒，並要求他立即準備一份所有絕密文件藏身處的清單。他不知道我們在哈堡找到了他自己挖到地下的盒子。他被微笑地告知，如果他繼續否認這些眾所周知的事實，等待他的將是鐵絲網後面的 20 年。他很快就同意在周一之前給我一份完整的清單。

7. PILLEWIZER 是 Forschungsstaffel 的冰河專家。他應古曼中尉的要求為我們寫了兩份報告。第二份報告開頭最重要的一句話是關於1944 年拉普蘭研究工作人員的活動，內容如下：「1944 年7 月，一小群研究工作人員被派往芬蘭北部，目的是透過實際實驗來證明， ，在拉普蘭的沼澤和原始森林中快速繪製地圖的可行性，即快速繪製地圖以對難以探索的地區進行地形評估。” 報告的其餘部分更全面地解釋了這次探險的真正目的，因為這項工作是在北極圈內的 VUOTSO 和 PARKKINA 開始的，並在德國人撤離整個芬蘭南部後繼續在那裡進行。後來他們拍攝了西拉普蘭的SAARENPAEAE地區（ENONTOEKICE地區）。如此重要且秘密的科學家小組不太可能遲至 1944 年 11 月才留在北極圈。工作完成後，PILLEWIZER 與他的小組經納爾威克和奧斯陸返回德國，並在那裡抵達1944 年12 月中旬。這次探險可能與SCHULZ-KAMPF HENKEL 的其他探險具有相同的目的，即獲取新型致命武器效果的數據或提交數據以使最高指揮部能夠用此類導彈進行此類實驗。8. 古特曼中尉在過去幾天裡沒有睡太多覺，他將在周一給我一份他關於這種新型導彈的報告副本，我將在與古特曼中尉一起去達斯汀之前向您展示它。

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萊德博士：

「盟軍審訊人員相信，這枚六噸重的放射性炸彈在戰爭結束前就已達到測試階段。因此，這種武器不僅僅是紙上設計或長期項目。這項訊息與其他報導一致，即德國氫彈可能在 1945 年晚些時候或 1946 年部署…。

這枚六噸重的炸彈被明確描述為放射性，這可能意味著釋放放射性物質的常規炸藥、裂變炸彈或氫彈的骯髒炸彈。沒有明顯的理由去製造一枚六噸重的髒彈——同樣的材料可以被包裝成幾枚更小的炸彈，這樣運輸起來會容易得多。也沒有明顯的理由製造六噸重的裂變炸彈——美國的“小玩意”在沒有尾翼或炸彈外殼的情況下大約為三噸，而據報道1945 年3 月在圖林根測試的德國裂變炸彈大約為兩噸（p .3284）。相較之下，根據基本物理原理，早期的氫彈需要非常大，因為它需要包含足夠的裂變燃料、足夠的聚變燃料、足夠的常規炸藥以使裂變燃料內爆，以及爆炸所需的結構。裂變燃料來點燃聚變燃料。因此，所通報的六噸炸彈似乎最符合氫彈的描述。請注意，與參與戰時德國核計劃的奧地利科學家保持密切聯繫的漢斯·蒂林（Hans Thirring）特別提到了“六噸重的氫化鋰炸彈”（或者可能是氘化鋰？）；見第14頁。3199.聽起來好像一支德國小組正在芬蘭北部尋找測試六噸放射性炸彈的地點。尋求如此偏遠的測試地點進一步證明這枚炸彈是一枚氫彈，其爆炸威力遠高於裂變炸彈，因此其體積太大，無法在靠近人口稠密地區的地方進行安全或秘密測試。該文件中並不清楚「Warmesuchgerat」的能力和預期功能。它可能是熱尋飛彈導引系統、夜間飛行的紅外線視覺系統或半自動地形測繪系統等。或者，由於「Warmesuchgerat」似乎與六噸重的放射性炸彈以及德國團隊選擇的試驗地點密切相關，也許「Warmesuchgerat」的目的是在安全距離內測量炸彈的爆炸威力。沒有永久安置診斷儀器的偏遠地區。FT·古特曼中尉關於六噸放射性炸彈的更詳細報告能否找到檔案、解密並發布？]

沃爾特·格拉赫 (Walther Gerlach) 的筆記本草圖之一。它具有氘聚變反應和會聚衝擊波以及與其他已知的德國氫彈概念一致的橢球體。

還有來自公共來源的其他證據（例如各種報紙文章），其中描述了德國在威力極大的炸彈以及能夠將其運送到目標的超大型彈道導彈方面的非常先進的工作。請注意，所有這些記載都出現在塞繆爾·古德斯密特 (Samuel Goudsmit) 1947 年出版的著作《阿爾索斯》(Alsos)之前，該書至今仍被認為具有權威性，並且總是受到傳統歷史敘事的支持者的熱捧。第一個可以追溯到戰爭本身。

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戈登·加斯基爾。1945 年 3 月。超級火箭能擊中美國嗎？美國雜誌。第 25–108 頁。

我曾與美國戰略空軍在歐洲的 V-2 領導者進行過交談，他是一位高級別、聲譽好的軍官，了解所有盟軍對 V-2 的了解。我們知道的數量驚人。由於他的秘密工作，我不被允許透露他的名字。（大概是「A-2」中的一位高級軍官，A-2 是美國空軍情報部門的代號——WP。）但他給了我新的獨家信息，這些信息只指向一個結論：這枚偉大的火箭無疑是我們最具革命性的武器。時間。[...]這位權威根據他所掌握的事實，為我計算了大約什麼樣的火箭可能會襲擊紐約。離開德國後，它重達 63 噸，其中大部分是燃料。它的戰鬥頭將是7噸烈性炸藥。從德國到紐約的旅程大約 4,000 英里，只需 25 分鐘。這次「馬達」只能運行 8 分鐘。火箭將幾乎垂直爬升至距離地球 300 英里的高度，然後急劇平穩，其最大速度將超過每小時 9,000 英里，同時還可以節省地球自轉的時間。「我只是用紐約作為例子，」他說。“德國人可以輕鬆地向底特律、芝加哥或舊金山開火，儘管如果他們瞄準更西的地方，誤差自然會更大。” 對我來說，這聽起來仍然有點像巴克·羅傑斯，我一定已經表現出來了，因為他微笑著說：「我知道。就在幾個月前，許多英國人還拿 V-1 和 V-2 的「夢幻」傳聞開玩笑。我曾經幫忙從廢墟中挖出一些同樣的人。。。。不，恐怕這樣的火箭真的很實用。事實上，這比他們現在用來對付英國的手段還要實用。火箭的奇妙之處在於，你建造的火箭越大，它們就越高效、更令人滿意，而且成本就越低。” 我問他，如果這麼簡單，為什麼德國人還沒有使用這樣的火箭。作為回答，他拿出一份剪報，報道了納粹勞工領袖施佩爾 12 月 1 日的演講。施佩爾在向德國戰爭生產委員會發表講話時承諾，「V-3」很快就會做好向美國開火的準備。

納粹正在研發 100 噸火箭。《信使郵報》（澳洲布里斯本）。1946 年 12 月 5 日，第 12 頁 1. [納粹正在開發 100 噸火箭 - 《信使郵報》（昆士蘭州布里斯班：1933 - 1954） - 1946 年 12 月 5 日] 紐約，12 月 4 日。

戰爭結束時，納粹正在製造一枚 100 噸重的火箭，用來襲擊美國。V2 火箭的發明者、傑出的德國科學家沃納馮布勞恩 (Wernher von Braun) 揭示了這一點。馮·布勞恩目前在美國與美國專家一起進行火箭實驗。他說，當德國被超越時，超級火箭就已經在設計階段了。它可以攜帶六噸炸藥，並且能夠行駛數千英里。他聲稱 V2 火箭在德國的測試中只有約 5% 的失敗率。馮·布勞恩和他來自德國的同事們在陸軍的嚴格保密下工作，幫助培訓美國軍械人員、實業家和美國頂尖大學的科學家了解火箭炸彈的秘密。美國收益 據估計，德國和奧地利科學家僅在火箭基礎研究方面就為美國節省了超過 2.35 億英鎊，美國陸軍部在宣布將向美國增派 730 名專家時披露了這一估計。該部門表示，前敵人的智囊使美國在多個領域的研究進步了兩到十年。已有 270 名前敵方科學家在美國工作。他們包括梅塞施密特飛機廠前首席設計師和納粹佩內明德火箭試驗場的技術總監。他們自願來到美國。科學家的薪水是按合約支付的，每年最高為 975 英鎊，另加 37 英鎊/天的費用津貼。這比從事類似工作的美國公務員的薪水要低得多。外國科學家的工作涵蓋電子、超音速、飛彈、噴射推進和燃料等領域。

萊德博士：

「100 噸火箭」是佩內明德工程師有時為 A-9/A-10 使用的名稱。通常 A-9/A-10 的預期有效載重為 1 噸。可以毫不費力地擴展到 2 噸。德國的火箭設計能夠承載 6 噸的有效載荷，但在官方歷史中並不存在。這是 A-9/A-10 的不同版本，還是完全不同的火箭？由於在火箭上容納 6 噸重的有效載荷極其困難，因此只有在無法減少有效載荷的情況下才會嘗試這樣做。常規炸藥、化學武器、生物武器或放射性髒彈可以根據需要製造得盡可能小，並在必要時透過多枚火箭運載。即使是裂變炸彈也只有2-3噸重。這肯定是一種當時的物理限制要求其重量不小於6噸的武器——大概是氫彈。”

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納粹科學家正在進行美國火箭實驗。紐卡斯爾先驅晨報和礦工倡導者（澳洲新南威爾斯）。1946 年 12 月 5 日，第 12 頁 3.[納粹科學家致力於美國火箭實驗-]

紐約，12 月 4 日——戰爭結束前，納粹正在製造一枚 100 噸的火箭來襲擊美國。這是由傑出的德國科學家沃納·馮·布勞恩（Wernher von Braun）揭示的，他發明了 V2 火箭，現在人在美國。馮·布勞恩目前正在與美國專家進行火箭實驗。他說，當德國被蹂躪時，納粹的超級火箭就已經在設計階段了。它可攜帶六噸炸藥並能夠行駛數千英里。馮·布勞恩 (Von Braun) 聲稱 V2 在德國的測試中僅失敗了約 5%。馮·布勞恩和他來自德國的同事們在軍隊的嚴格保密下工作，幫助培訓美國軍械人員、美國頂尖大學的實業家和科學家了解火箭炸彈的秘密。為美國節省了數百萬美元 華盛頓陸軍部發表的一份聲明稱，據估計，德國和奧地利科學家僅在火箭基礎研究方面就為美國節省了超過 7.5 億美元（234 億澳元）。該部門宣布將向美國增派約 730 名專家。聲明稱，前敵人的智囊在兩到十年內推動了美國在多個領域的研究。自1945年9月以來，投入工作的專家人數已增加至270人，一旦交通安排完成，總數將增加到1,000人左右。這些科學家和技術人員包括梅塞施密特飛機廠前首席設計師和納粹佩內明德火箭試驗場的技術總監。他們自願來到美國。

德國人在十月定時原子彈。標準晚報（倫敦）。1945 年 8 月 7 日。

德國人擁有一顆原子彈，預計十月就可以準備就緒。據稱德國炸彈產生了巨大的爆炸效果。BUP 今天表示，據說它將摧毀六英里半徑內的一切。四個月前，當盟軍搜索隊走進漢諾威北部策勒的一家小型絲綢工廠時，德國的原子計畫被揭露。一個有兩個房間的實驗室被埋在工廠的中心。一位著名的研究科學家[Wilhelm Groth]仍在工作。他於同一天飛往英國。這個人和其他人一起研究原子彈已經有幾個月了。納粹政府為此投入巨資。顯然他們並沒有要求立即得到結果。（眾所周知，英國人與美國人、法國人和其他國家一樣，在戰爭結束時「吸走了」相當一部分德國科學家。美國基本上將英國踢出了戰後版本的曼哈頓計劃，直到英國人英國在1950 年代末開發了自己的氫彈。據說，英國對這些武器的設計方面引起了美國人的“興趣”，此後兩國恢復了核武器方面的合作，這種安排一直持續到今天。這是戰時德國工作的兩個戰後分支暫時分離然後在幾年後重新整合的案例嗎？——WP。）

納粹距離原子彈製造完成還有五個月。匹茲堡出版社。1945 年 8 月 7 日，第 17 頁 14. 第 21 集團軍總部，德國，8 月 7 日（上）

歐洲戰爭結束時，德國距離完成自己的原子彈還有不到五個月的時間。四個月前，英國特遣部隊發現，德國科學家在漢諾威北部一家小型絲綢工廠中心的兩房實驗室中幾乎完成了炸彈的研究工作。據計算，這枚炸彈將摧毀方圓六英里內的一切。負責這項實驗的德國著名研究科學家威廉·格羅斯（Wilhelm Groth）當時立即飛往英國。他估計他的工作將在十月完成。他說，德國政府給了他無限的資金和設備，並沒有要求立即得到任何結果。

納粹計畫用火箭攻擊美國《紐約時報》。1946 年 12 月 4 日。

發明致命 V-2 超音速火箭的 34 歲德國科學家沃納·馮·布勞恩 (Wernher von Braun) 今天透露，在戰爭結束之前，納粹正在製造一枚 100 噸重的火箭來襲擊美國。馮布勞恩告訴記者，當盟軍佔領歐洲時，100噸級火箭正在設計中。他說，它的「有效載荷」為六噸，將行駛數千英里襲擊美國。

沃納馮布勞恩 (Wernher von Braun)，照片攝於 1965 年左右，他位於美國國家航空暨太空總署 (NASA) 的辦公室。

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還報道於：

6英哩半徑炸彈。多倫多每日星報。1945 年 8 月 7 日。1.

6英哩半徑炸彈。馬德拉論壇報（馬德拉，加利福尼亞州）。1945 年 8 月 7 日。1.

10 公里炸彈。ABC（馬德里）。1945 年 8 月 8 日。

萊德博士：

「這些文章還提到了一枚爆炸半徑為 6 英里的炸彈。如前所述，6 英里或 10 公里的爆炸半徑相當於一枚約 1.6 兆噸的炸彈，這表明是氫彈而不是簡單的裂變炸彈。威廉·格羅斯(Wilhelm Groth) 是一位非常有才華的物理學家，自1939 年初以來，他與保羅·哈泰克(Paul Harteck) 一起在德國核計劃的許多方面發揮了重要作用，他表示，德國距離完成此類武器還有五個月的時間。如果屬實，那麼美國和蘇聯直到 20 世紀 50 年代才真正完成這一壯舉。”

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義大利消息人士也描述了德國即將出現的末日炸彈。

布魯諾·斯帕納托. 1974 年。紀念館。羅馬：國家編輯中心。第 917, 1116 頁。賴德指出：「斯潘帕納托（1902-1960 年）是一名記者和政治家，是墨索里尼的長期支持者，與義大利高級官員關係密切。戰後，他寫了一本多卷本回憶錄，其中保存了來自大量來源的信息，否則這些信息可能會丟失或被遺忘。在這裡，他引用了兩個戰時消息來源，這兩個消息來源似乎都描述了具有百萬噸級產量的核武。其中之一甚至給出了與當時其他來源完全相同的 10 公里/6 英里爆炸半徑（第 3708 頁和第 3710 頁）」。

戈弗雷多·科波拉（Goffredo Coppola）對我們說了類似的話，他代表政府在德國參加了一次科學大會，然後回來了。我們在廣場會見了他和恩里科·桑塔瑪麗亞。科波拉告訴我們一些近乎幻想的事情。但一切都可以懷疑博洛尼亞大學偉大的校長科波拉，除了他從事像泰爾這樣的贗品或其他知識分子宣傳活動。科波拉教授向我們講述了一些因研究而享譽世界的科學家秘密告訴他的事情。

這位科波拉在 1945 年 2 月 16 日告訴我們：

「德國人找到了分解原子的方法。還有一個電子發現。崩解以連續的周期發生，覆蓋了數十平方公里的廣闊區域。實驗室的工作已滿負荷運轉。” [...] 在義大利人中，與德國軍界最高層接觸最多的是[魯道夫]格拉齊亞尼元帥。格拉齊亞尼本人在羅馬特別法庭 [1948] 的自衛中作證說：「對於秘密武器問題，每個人都可以暢所欲言；但事實是，德國的秘密武器就在那裡：它們以最絕對的方式存在，而噴射機使整個航空業得到了更新，而且他們已經擁有大量的秘密武器，數千架。他們沒能投入使用，因為當時汽油開始短缺，後來英美人對工廠進行了地毯式轟炸。他們還將製造用於信號傳輸的反雷達，他們可能會再次引發潛艇戰爭。有 V-1，有 V-2，但它一直發展到 V-10，它摧毀了半徑十公里內的每一個生命元素。”

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除了「百噸火箭」之外，奧地利科學家還在為神秘的「六噸炸彈」開發另一種潛在的運載系統。這是一架火箭動力載人轟炸機，被稱為「Silbervogel ：銀鳥」。

尤金·桑格和艾琳·布雷特。1944 年。“蕨類轟炸機的最佳狀態。” UM 3538。艾因靈：德國航空研究」。英文翻譯 1952 年。遠程轟炸機的火箭驅動。CGD-32、C-84296。布阿爾海軍部技術資訊處. 第 148、152 頁。

“As an example of area attack with single propulsion and full turn, we use the attack on New York at a range of 6500 km. For c=4000 m/sec, the bomb load is 6 tons, and the detailed attack runs as follows: the motor starts to work 36 seconds after the take-off at 12 km. distance from the take-off point, and consumes the total fuel supply of 84 tons in the next 336 sec. At the end of the climb process, the aircraft reaches a velocity of 6370 m/sec, an altitude of 91 km, a distance of 736 km. from the point of take-off, and a weight of 16 tons. Using only its store of potential and kinetic energy, the bomber flies on to the point of bomb release, 5550 km. from the take-off point, and 950 km. in front of the target. At this point, which is reached 1150 sec. after take-off, the velocity has decreased to 6000 m/sec, and the stationary altitude to 50 km. After the bomb release the weight is 10 tons. Then the aircraft goes into a turn and in 330 sec. goes through a turn-spiral 1000 km. in diameter until it has reached the direction for the return flight to the home base. During turning, the altitude is greatly decreased in order to develop the aerodynamic forces necessary for the turn. At the end of the turn path, the velocity is still 3700 m/sec. and the corresponding stationary altitude is 38 km. The supersonic glide-path in the direction of the home base goes over 5450 km. in 2600 sec. and ends 100 km. before the home base at an altitude of 20 km. and velocity 300 m/sec. Subsonic glide and landing are completed in customary fashion. The whole flight lasts 4755 sec.”

Computer-Generated Concept Art Showing the Likely Appearance of the Silbervogel Suborbital Bomber.

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Dr. Rider notes:

“The Sanger-Bredt Silbervogel space plane was designed to bomb New York or other targets in the United States. Historians have dismissed the Silbervogel as merely a paper design that was never seriously considered or built. However:

• Eugen Sanger and Irene Bredt completed and submitted a 900-page proposal giving details of the Silbervogel design and development program to the German government in 1941 [Myhra 2002].

• Wind tunnel models of Silbervogel are known to have been constructed and tested (p. 3929).

• At least one photograph exists of a full-sized Silbervogel engine that had been constructed for testing no later than 1944 (p. 3930).

• In January 1946, five Canadian aerospace experts reported that while visiting a German research station, they viewed “a rocket motor 10 times larger than those used on V-2s.” That description could match either the Silbervogel motor or the A-10 booster rocket motor (p. 3855).

• Detailed orbital calculations were performed in 1944 to find the best trajectory for the SangerBredt vehicle to reach New York (pp. 3931–3933).

• 1944 年10 月30 日《每日郵報》發表的一篇文章報道稱，德國人在被佔領的法國正在建造一個“巨大的坡道”，“旨在作為飛行炸彈的發射場，這… …將摧毀紐約」。坡道的大小、飛行炸彈的參考以及聲稱的紐約目標似乎與 Silbervogel 發射彈射器一致（第 3934 頁）。

•負責監督戰爭結束時收集的所有德國火箭科學家以及相關設備和資訊的美國陸軍空軍上校唐納德·普特(Donald Putt) 於1946 年3 月報告說：「測試模型可搭載一名男子並配有起落架，儘管尚不清楚該模型是否曾經飛行過；然而，眾所周知，測試是在其發動機上進行的。” 因此，根據一個可以說是最能獲取現有資訊的權威機構的說法，Silbervogel 發動機已經建造完畢並進行了測試，帶有駕駛艙和起落架的Silbervogel 飛行器已經建造完畢，其發動機已經可以運行，而戰後的美國官員則想知道是否進行了飛行測試Silbervogel 的研究甚至可能已經進行過（第 3935 頁）。資訊是基於哪些德國證人和文件？西爾伯沃格爾原型車後來怎麼樣了——是被德國人摧毀，被美國人拆除，還是被蘇聯人拆除？

（請注意，普特擁有加州理工學院航空工程碩士學位，因此完全有資格評估西爾伯沃格爾的設計。在戰爭後期和此後的一段時間內，他也是美國回形針行動的主要人物。秘密計劃的任務是從第三帝國的廢墟中轉移盡可能多的德國科學家、工程師和其他人，並將他們帶到美國以推進美國的科學和技術。-WP)

• 1946 年 10 月，Harper's Magazine 發表了一篇冗長而詳細的文章，指出 Silbervogel 系統「僅僅因為戰爭的快速結束而從未完成」（第 3869 頁）。

• 1957 年美國空軍的一份報告指出：「助推滑翔概念…在 1940 年代初期由德國人進行了部分測試」（第 3937 頁）。在上一頁引用的 1944 年報告中，桑格和布雷特特別討論了使用 Silbervogel 向紐約投送一枚 6 噸炸彈。這與其他幾個提到特殊六噸炸彈的獨立消息來源一致（第 3199、3208-3213、3765 頁）。六噸常規炸藥所造成的損害遠遠不夠，不足以證明開發諸如Silbervogel 之類的系統來向美國目標投擲炸彈所需的大量資金、勞動力、材料、時間和精力是合理的，特別是在戰時條件下所有這些資源都急需但又供不應求。只有當六噸重的炸彈是核彈時，整個方法才有意義，而且確實有一些消息來源明確指出它是核彈——事實上，顯然是一枚成熟的氫彈。此外，有消息稱，與六噸重彈或氫彈相關的大部分工作是在奧地利進行的，而桑格是奧地利人。從他的專業關係和他的有效載荷輸送方法來看，桑格與正在研究實際炸彈的科學家有一些接觸似乎是合理的。雖然大多數關於桑格工作的戰時文件都被毀壞或被俘獲，並且在檔案中仍然無法查閱，但他在戰後寫給赫爾曼·奧伯特的一些信件證實了他對聚變反應非常感興趣[Oberth 1984，Vol.1]。1，第 199–200、213–216 頁]。

“桑格軌道轟炸機”，YouTube 影片由第三帝國歷史 YouTube 頻道提供。

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G.沃德·普萊斯。飛行炸彈是為美國準備的：發現了巨大的坡道。每日郵件。1944 年 10 月 30 日。

聖奧梅爾附近的阿圖瓦山頂上有巨大的混凝土工程，目的是作為飛行炸彈的發射場，德國人吹噓這將摧毀紐約。數千名工人在 250 英尺高的山頂上進行隧道挖掘和建造圓柱形沖天爐。在直徑上。卡車，甚至火車，都可以直接開進山的中心。德國工程師告訴當地法國民眾，當大型機械安裝完畢並準備開火時，該地區必須疏散方圓六英里的地區。英國皇家空軍的頻繁襲擊一直拖延著工作，直到盟軍從諾曼第推進，迫使所有參與其中的敵人匆忙收拾行李。註腳：一位德國潛水艇指揮官最近告訴丹麥埃斯貝格的海軍學員，德國正在準備一種新的秘密武器來對付美國。他說，U艇艇員將在該武器的使用中發揮決定性作用。

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萊德博士：

「六英里的半徑顯示炸彈具有這樣的爆炸半徑。6 英里或 10 公里的爆炸半徑對應的爆炸能量為 (10, 000/85.5)3 ≈ 1,600,000 噸 TNT 當量，或 1.6 兆噸。正如德國科學家從裂變能的基本計算中得知的那樣，這遠遠超出了裂變炸彈的千噸範圍，並表明他們正在開發更強大的氫彈或聚變炸彈。這個地點聽起來像是 Sanger-Bredt Silbervogel 太空飛機的發射雪橇軌道，或者可能是有翼 A-9 火箭的稍小的發射軌道。有關軌道發射火箭的更多討論，請參閱 E.2.3 節。另請參閱第 14 頁的文章。3364 提到挪威開發彈射式原子彈運載系統。”

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有許多因素掩蓋了納粹德國戰時氫彈的工作。

首先，雖然戰時德國的原子彈計畫或多或少是一些軍事、學術和工業實體之間的合資項目，但氫彈似乎是黨衛軍的特殊項目。組織的保密性極為嚴格，以至於格羅斯曼認為這實際上阻礙了工作（見第 2852 頁）。

同時，戰時德國氫彈的大部分研發工作是在奧地利完成的——主要是由奧地利科學家完成的，他們的名字很少出現在歷史記錄中——而且對該國核設施的調查很少。

許多研究這場衝突的學生，甚至絕大多數專業歷史學家都完全不知道另一個重要因素，那就是黨衛軍的大部分真正經濟實力來自奴隸勞動和從被征服領土大片土地上沒收的戰利品歐洲和蘇聯的西部進軍。由於這種明目張膽的盜竊和壓迫，有足夠的資金和人力來製造至少原型核武器，可能還有真正的氫彈，儘管這些是否是威力相對較小的“ sloika ”（夾心蛋糕）配置，或者今天常見的3階段（裂變-融合-裂變）版本尚不清楚。

黨衛軍主要經濟與行政辦公室 - 維基百科

德國經濟 - 維基百科

毫無疑問，正如一位作者所說，「盟軍傳奇」（即衝突的傳統歷史）確實達到了其預期目的，即轉移對戰爭實際結束的關注，特別是對任何先進的結果的關注。德國致力於核武以及任何盟軍交易以獲取核武。正如萊德博士所指出的：

格羅斯曼表示，維爾納·海森堡和奧托·哈恩不支持核武計劃，因此沒有參與其中。他們的實驗是單獨資助的，而且資助水準相對較低。美國阿爾索斯任務和大多數關於德國核計劃歷史的書籍都集中在這一副業上，而忽略了格羅斯曼和大量文件描述的主要計劃。”

解密 1947 年美國海軍海軍研究辦公室和海軍情報辦公室之間的通信，其中愛德華·泰勒請求將戰時德國核物理學家齊格弗里德·弗拉格帶到美國，以幫助泰勒製造氫彈。

證據就在最後的布丁裡。事實是，如果沒有先進的德國超級武器研發的湧入，所有隨後的核武國家可能需要幾十年的時間才能製造出氫彈。一方面是科學家、技術人員、政治家、黨衛軍人物、工業領袖和許多其他戰時人員，另一方面是勝利的盟軍（特別是西方盟軍），到底做了什麼安排，目前仍不得而知。

但這些安排確實存在。我確信這一點。

第 1444 頁，被遺忘的創造者：

「戰後，許多講德語和受過德語教育的科學家（最著名的是愛德華·泰勒和斯坦尼斯瓦夫·烏拉姆）於1952 年和1954 年繼續製造了美國第一顆聚變炸彈（氫彈或氫彈） 。戰後美國/英國核計劃也直接或直接受到來自或至少了解德國核計劃的許多德國和奧地利科學家的湧入的直接幫助，例如沃納·馮·布勞恩、魯道夫·布里爾、阿道夫·布斯曼、沃爾特·多恩伯格、魯道夫·埃德斯, 克拉夫特·埃里克、格哈德·法爾克、卡爾·菲賓格、魯道夫·弗萊施曼、齊格弗里德·弗拉格、威廉·格羅斯、戈特弗里德·古德利、保羅·哈泰克、奧托·哈克塞爾、理查德·赫爾佐格、約翰內斯·漢斯·詹森、威利博爾德·詹奇克、烏爾里希·傑特、哈特穆特·卡爾曼、漢斯·卡姆勒、傑拉德·克萊因，Stanley Kronenberg、Heinz Maier -Leibnitz、Werner Maurer、Walter Nielsch（？）、Heinz Schlicke、Kurt Starke、Ernst Stuhlinger、Hans Suess、Herbert Wagner、Friedwardt Winterberg、Karl Wirtz、Gernot Zippe 等（第3534 頁）。 ”

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被遺忘的創作者可透過以下連結免費取得：

革命性創新| 騎手研究所 | 被遺忘的創造者

《被遺忘的創造者》是一本於 2020 年 2 月發布的線上參考書。它涵蓋了 1800 年至 1945 年期間的革命性科學創新。

https://riderinstitute.org/revolutionary-innovation/

Sänger-Bredt Silbervogel：納粹太空飛機

它是什麼：一架助推滑翔洲際太空飛機。即使因為速度不足而無法進入軌道，它也會到達太空，但透過反覆跳過上層軌道，它能夠繞地球一圈…

https://falsesteps.wordpress.com/2012/07/10/sanger-bredt-silbervogel/

威廉·格羅斯 - 維基百科

德國物理化學家（1904-1977）威廉·格羅斯在巴西之旅中。威廉·格羅斯（Wilhelm Groth，1904 年 1 月 9 日於漢堡 – 1977 年 2 月 20 日於波昂）是德國物理化學家。二戰期間，他參與德國核能項目，又稱鈾俱樂部；他的主要活動是開髮用於濃縮鈾的離心機。戰後，他擔任漢堡大學物理化學教授。1950年任波昂大學物理化學研究所所長。他是 1956 年向巴西運送三台用於鈾濃縮的離心機的主要負責人。教育[編輯]從1922年到1927年，格羅斯在慕尼黑工業大學（今天的慕尼黑工業大學（Technische Universität München）、慕尼黑路德維希馬克西米利安大學（Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München）和蒂賓根大學學習( Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen ). 他於1927 年在蒂賓根Walther Gerlach 的指導下獲得了博士學位。他的論文是關於機電當量的確定。[1] [2] 1927 年，格羅斯成為漢諾威工業大學的助教，今天漢諾威萊布尼茨大學 . [1] 1932年，格羅斯成為漢堡大學物理化學研究所 Otto Stern 和 Paul Harteck 的助手。他於 1938 年底在漢堡完成了他的資格培訓，經過與德國國家社會主義大學講師聯盟（NSDDB，國家社會主義德國大學講師聯盟）漢堡地區領導層的複雜談判。[1] [3] 1938 年 12 月/1939 年 1 月發現核分裂後不久，Uranverein（即德國核能計畫）於 4 月首次啟動，隨後在 Heereswaffenamt（HWA、陸軍）下第二次組成軍械辦公室）九月。Paul Harteck 是漢堡大學物理化學系主任，也是 Heereswaffenamt（HWA，陸軍軍械辦公室）的顧問。1939 年4 月24 日，哈泰克與他的助教威廉·格羅斯(Wilhelm Groth) 一起與帝國戰爭部(RKM，帝國戰爭部) 取得聯繫，提醒他們核鍊式反應軍事應用的潛力，並指出其政治意義。兩天前，即1939 年4 月22 日，在聽取了威廉·漢勒(Wilhelm Hanle) 關於在Uranmaschine（鈾機器，即核反應器）中使用鈾裂變的座談會論文後，喬治·朱斯(Georg Joos ) 與漢勒一起通知了帝國議會的威廉·戴姆斯(Wilhelm Dames)。（REM，帝國教育部），核能的潛在軍事應用。該通訊由 REM 的 Reichsforschungsrat（RFR，帝國研究委員會）物理部門負責人 Abraham Esau 提供。4 月 29 日，由 Esau 組織的一個小組在 REM 舉行會議，討論持續核鍊式反應的潛力。集團公司

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Groth

漢斯·蒂林

漢斯·蒂林（Hans Thirring，1888年3月23日－1976年3月22日）是一位奧地利理論物理學家、教授，也是物理學家沃爾特·蒂林的父親。1920年獲得奧地利科學院海廷格獎。1918年他與數學家約瑟夫·倫斯一起預言了廣義相對論的倫斯-蒂林參考系拖曳效應而聞名。

https://dbpedia.org/page/Hans_Thirring

格奧爾格·施泰特 - 維基百科

奧地利-德國核物理學家（1895-1988）格奧爾格·卡爾·施泰特（Georg Carl Stetter，1895年12月23日-1988年7月14日）是奧地利-德國核物理學家。施泰特曾任維也納大學第二物理研究所所長。他是德國核能計畫（也稱為鈾俱樂部）的主要成員。第二次世界大戰後期，他也擔任中子研究所所長。戰後，他被大學解僱，隨後開始從事防塵研究。解職被推翻後，他成為維也納大學第一物理研究所所長，開始了氣溶膠的研究。1962年，施泰特成為奧地利科學院正式院士。同年，學院成立了清潔空氣委員會，Stetter 擔任主席直至 1985 年。教育 [編輯] 1914 年，Stetter 在維也納工業大學（現為維也納工業大學）學習。一個學期後，他自願參軍。他開始在聖珀爾滕戰鬥部隊和戰鬥單位電報團無線電支隊（Radiodetachement des Kampftruppen und Kampfverbände Telegraphenregiments St. Pölten）服役。後來他被調到一個野戰電台領導。除其他因服役而獲得的獎項外，他還獲得了 Goldenes Militär-Verdienstkreuz（金色軍事功績十字勳章）。他的服務喚醒了他對電磁波和電子學的興趣。1919 年，第一次世界大戰結束後，Stetter 在維也納大學（維納大學）學習物理和數學。他於 1922 年獲得博士學位。[1] [2] 獲得博士學位後，Stetter 成為 II 的助教。Physikalische Institut der Wiener Universität（維也納大學第二物理研究所）。[3] [4] 二的密切聯繫。位於維也納的 Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften（ÖAW，奧地利科學院）的物理學研究所和 Institut für Radiumforschung（鐳研究所）使 Stetter 與核子物理學有了密切的聯繫。Stetter 在利用電子學測量核粒子能量方面的開創性工作為他贏得了1926 年ÖAW 的Haitingerpreis（海廷格獎）。他於1928 年完成了大學的培訓。1935 年，他成為維也納化學研究所所長-Physikalischen Gesellschaft（維也納化學物理協會）。1937 年，他成為 Vertreter des Gauvereins Österreich im Vorstand der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft（德國物理學會理事會奧地利區協會代表）。1938 年，他成為哈雷的 Deutschen Akademie der Naturforscher（德國自然科學家學院）的成員。1939年，他成為ordentlicher教授（普通教授）和II的主任。物理研究所。1940年，

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Stetter

小約翰·蘭斯代爾 (John Lansdale Jr.)，91 歲，尋求納粹原子計劃的上校，去世（2003 年出版）

小約翰·蘭斯代爾 (John Lansdale Jr.) 是曼哈頓計畫的安全負責人，曾幫助領導美軍參與德國的原子彈計畫。

https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/01/obituaries/john-lansdale-jr-91-colonel-who-sought-nazi-atomic-project-dies.html

William Pellas

 · 10mo

If Germany had managed to create 4 atomic bombs in March 1945, what would have been different?

There is significant archival evidence which strongly supports the conclusion that Nazi Germany did create not just 4 atomic bombs by March, 1945, but possibly as many as 9. According to Werner Grothmann, who was Heinrich Himmler’s top adjutant in the SS throughout most of the war years in Europe, at least six (6) prototype atomic bombs or nuclear weapons in some form or configuration were produced by three different organizations operating under the umbrella of the overall German nuclear weapons program. It can be stated with a fair degree of certainty that two of the three were 1) the clandestine project at Manfred von Ardenne’s superlab which was funded in large part by the Reichspost (the German post office), and 2) the heereswaffenamt, the German Army Weapons Bureau. The brainpower that was at the disposal of both of these groups was extraordinary and included Kurt Diebner, Erich Schumann and Walter Trinks at the HWA, and Manfred von Ardenne, Siegfried Flugge, Detlof Lyons, Fritz Houtermans and Wilhelm Ohnesorge at the “Office for Special Physical Questions of the Research Division of the German Reichspost (Amt fur physikalische Sonderfragen der Forschungsanstalt der Deutschen Reichspost)” located in Berlin-Tempelhof. The third organization may have been the kriegsmarine, or perhaps one of the SS technical labs known to have existed during the war years. In an interview he gave to his neighbor, Wolf Krotzky, shortly before his death in 2002, Grothmann stated the following: “Well, it is so: It is known to me that there were four atomic tests. The first still in 1943 in the autumn in the North Sea, which failed. Then two in 1944 in the autumn and the late autumn. One of them on the ground, that is on a small stand, the later one in the atmosphere on a parachute. That one in winter 1944 in the air was highly explosive and the charge [fuel] was also larger. That could have been in November. The last test was then again with a small charge in March 1945. Where the tests were I would like to not say now, because otherwise the population would be unnecessarily upset. [p. 32] I can definitely declare that I was told of six atomic bombs that came from three different research installations. All were prototypes. In addition, there were some very small devices that were intended for laboratory experiments. For the experiment in the winter of 1944, a larger charge was indeed used, as I already told you.” Werner Grothmann, Left, With the Head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, Right, Sometime in 1943. Note that the last test mentioned by Grothmann actually consisted of two detonations; thus, according to him, there were five (5) prototype weapons that were expended in testing, one of which failed altogether. The following chart, taken from Dr. Todd H. Rider’s extraordinary resource, Forgotten Creators, lists all of the known primary sources which describe fission bomb designs that were produced in Germany in WWII. The remaining weapon said by Grothmann to be in existence following the March 1945 event may have been captured by advancing US forces. From page 3496ff in Forgotten Creators: (Grothmann speaking): “For this, however, I can vouch myself: Parts of the material had been removed from our research and development laboratories in Thuringia, but not everything. Why this happened, I do not know. The Americans are supposed to have taken at least the small amount of radioactive material for the first bomb and a part of the ignition mechanism. The prototype parts for our first real atomic bomb that were captured by the Americans were immediately taken to the “Eagle’s Nest.” I do not know any more about it, there may be someone who can confirm it.” Dr. Rider comments: Adlerhorst or Eagle’s Nest was located near Bad Nauheim, and should not be confused with the better known Eagle’s Nest or Kehlsteinhaus near Berchtesgaden. Adlerhorst was captured by the U.S. Army on 30 March 1945, and subsequently was used by the Allies as “Operation Dustbin” to imprison and interrogate high-value German intelligence targets, including Albert Speer, Wernher von Braun, and many others. If the United States captured German atomic bomb components and immediately took them to Adlerhorst, those components could have been captured no earlier than April 1945. Since the United States could have taken the components to many other sites that were equally or more secure, Grothmann’s statement that they were taken to Adlerhorst suggests that those components were shown to high-value German detainees so that they could not deny the existence of the German nuclear program. Furthermore, that would suggest that the United States had not captured a satisfactory amount of information about the nuclear program, and was desperate to learn more from the detainees. Is it possible to locate and declassify any U.S. records on what German atomic bomb components were found, or what the United States learned from German detainees? Here it may be that Grothmann was describing parts and pieces (“for our first real atomic bomb”) of the first weapon based on the Ohrdurf prototypes that was intended for actual, serial production. If this is so, that is, if what the US captured was an incomplete bomb, it would mean that as of April, 1945, there was still one more prototype that had not been expended in tests. A longstanding rumor has it that the first Soviet nuclear weapon was actually detonated in 1946 rather than in 1949 as the conventional history states. Given that most of the known atomic research, development, and industrial sites utilized by the Third Reich ultimately fell into Soviet hands, was the 1946 explosion—if it actually occurred—the final German prototype after it was captured by the Russians? So, what of the last 3 might-have-existed German nuclear weapons? These were mentioned by the following sources: Erwin Bartmann. 2013. Fur Volk und Fuhrer: The Memoir of a Veteran of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. pp. 160–161, 231. ‘As you know, I am responsible for making the telephone connections when calls are made to and from the Air Ministry. Listen to this—the other day I made a connection between Goring and the Fuhrer.’ Mama gasped. ‘Oh Horst.’ ‘Goring asked the Fuhrer for permission to use three special bombs but he refused. “If I use them in the east they will get us from the west,” said the Fuhrer.’ Papa pulled his chair closer to the table. ‘What were these special bombs?’ ‘I don’t know for sure but they must be powerful—although Goring clearly mentioned three I got the impression there might be more.’ ‘This is the Wunderwaffe,’ exclaimed my father. ‘Our scientists have done well with their rockets— who would put it past them to come up with something like this? It would really surprise the British if they put one of these special bombs in a rocket.’ After the war, I became friends with Rochus Misch, a fellow Leibstandarte veteran and communications officer in the Fuhrerbunker until the final days of the Reich. The topic of the special bombs came up in conversation. ‘Three bombs,’ he said, ‘where did you hear that? There were nine.’” A plausible explanation for this conversation is that 3 bombs were intended for an atomic attack with smaller, tactical nuclear weapons (see Grothmann’s description below) and that the other 6 were the previously mentioned prototypes. 6 prototypes plus 3 tactical nukes gives a total of 9. Geoffrey Brooks' book, Hitler's Terror Weapons: From V1 to Virmana, pg. 109: Senior Engineer August Condors who had designed the V-3 England Gun, reported in February 1945 that the new decisive weapons would not be ready for use before April 1945, and in the last days of March 1945 the Luftwaffe dropped leaflets across the Lower Rhine advising the population to evacuate the area, since from the beginning of April new decisive weapons were to be deployed there. A cordon sanitaire 50 kms wide was required. From a military point of view the period towards the end of March 1945 offered the last opportunity to shutdown the Western Front by driving back the first crossings to the western bank of the Rhine. Rumours were rife that near Munster a number of Bf109s were being converted for Kamikaze operations (SO=Selbstopfereinsatze, Self- sacrifice operations) using a special 250 kg bomb, even an Me 262 jet could not outfly the bombs pressure wave. Note the mention of the Me 262 as a potential delivery platform for the “special 250 kg bomb”. This may perhaps be the real explanation for Hitler’s seemingly bonkers insistence that at least some of the then new 262’s be completed as bombers. The Only Messershmitt Me 262A-2a “Jabo” or Jet Fighter Bomber Known to Exist Today is Part of the Australian War Memorial. This Otherwise Inexplicably Wasteful Variant of the Basic 262 Jet Fighter May Have Been Intended for Use as a Delivery Platform for WWII German Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Otto Hahn. 1968. Mein Leben (My Life). p. 200: Professor Staudinger wrote me that an officer had given him his word of honor that three German nuclear bombs had been ready for deployment in the Lüneburg Heath shortly before the end of the war. Here again we see support for the figure of 3 nuclear weapons intended for use against the Allies on the Western Front. Hahn was easily one of the most famous scientists of the 20th century and is credited by most historians as the co-creator of the first verifiable experiment that succeeded in splitting the atom. The Luneburg Heath was the same region mentioned in Brooks’ book in which a last gasp German nuclear strike mission against US and British troops was said to have been planned. Grothmann elaborated on the German battlefield weapons in the part of his interview which is transcribed below. Here he gave two specific TNT-equivalent blast yields for these devices: “[p. 9] What I know is the actual preparation for the prototype production of the two fully constructed atomic bomb types for uranium and plutonium. [...] I was not allowed to know anything about it, so I can only say that there were two standard types for use against cities and two more of a different size, which were supposed to be front-usable [for tactical battlefield use] and contain smaller charges. I learned only after the war that one of the two smaller ones would have had a charge equivalent, that is a comparable explosive material quantity, of I believe 130 tons. This was supposed to be used against railway tunnels, port facilities and military installations. The point was that the small weapons required only very little material, which overcame first of all the shortage [of fission fuel]. Of the larger one I heard only a statement, which I cannot confirm, that it was about three kilotons, that must remain [an] open [question].” For Further Reading: Revolutionary Innovation | RIDER Institute | Forgotten Creators New light on Hitler's bomb – Physics World Hans Kammler, Hitler’s Last Hope, in American Hands Dr Colm Lowery's answer to What are some of the most famous unsolved mysteries? Thierry Etienne Joseph Rotty's answer to Is it true? At the end of WW2, Germany did in fact have and tested an atomic bomb, Martin Bormann atomic bomb. William Pellas's answer to Why didn't Germany develop an atomic bomb before the United States? William Pellas's answer to How would Hitler have used an atomic bomb if he built one? William Pellas's answer to If the atom bomb had been available to Hitler, would this have changed the outcome of WW2? William Pellas's answer to Is it true? At the end of WW2, Germany did in fact have and tested an atomic bomb, Martin Bormann atomic bomb. William Pellas's answer to How close was Germany to making an atomic bomb? Informative Viewing: “Dean Reuter, Author of ‘The Hidden Nazi’”, an Interview With the Author. The Subject of the Book is the Fate of SS General-Engineer Hans Kammler, Who Ran the Nazi Secret Weapon Empire in the Final Months of the War. Video Courtesy of the Y’all Show YouTube Channel. Reuter’s Co-Author, Dr Colm Lowery, is a Contributing Writer on Quora. “Hunting Dr. Evil - Hans Kammler: Hitler's Secret Weapons Chief”, a Documentary Video by the British Historian Mark Felton. Courtesy of the Mark Felton Productions YouTube Channel.

William Pellas

 · 9mo

Is it true that Japan developed an atom bomb at the end of WWII?

Although there are many deniers—including a prominent person on this site—there is no question that Japan was trying to build its own atomic bombs in WWII. This is not, however, the same thing as saying that “Japan (successfully) developed an atom bomb at the end of WWII”. In order to answer the question of whether Japan in fact succeeded in its own Second World War nuclear quest or not, we must consider the evidence and also the history of how that evidence appeared in public sources in the West. The story of the WWII Japanese atomic bomb project—or actually, “projects”, since there were at least four (4) of them—was first told in Western mass media in a 3 October 1946 story by the late newspaper writer and journalist, David Snell. A quick search on the internet did not yield any proper biographies of Snell, only a since-deleted Wikipedia entry (which was predictably and quickly dismissive of his Japanese a-bomb piece) and a useful if not particularly detailed “infogalactic dot com” article. David Snell (journalist) Atlanta Constitution Headline From 3 October 1946 Story by David Snell Alleging Successful Test of a Japanese Atomic Bomb at the Tail End of WWII So rather than depend on hostile or incomplete sources, here it would be best to quote Snell directly. The following excerpt consists of roughly half of the full text of his article in the Atlanta Constitution newspaper. The complete text is available by following the link below the excerpt: When told this story, I was an agent with the Twenty-Fourth Criminal Investigation Department, operating in Korea. I was able to interview Capt. Wakabayashi (a pseudonym given to protect his identity), not as an investigator or as a member of the armed forces, but as a newspaperman. He was advised and understood thoroughly, that he was speaking for publication. He was in Seoul, en route to Japan as a repatriate. The interview took place in a former Shinto temple on a mount overlooking Korea's capital city. The shrine had been converted into an hotel for transient Japanese en route to their homeland. Since V-J Day wisps of information have drifted into the hands of U.S. Army Intelligence of the existence of a gigantic and mystery-shrouded industrial project operated during the closing months of the war in a mountain vastness near the Northern Korean coastal city of Konan. It was near here that Japan's uranium supply was said to exist. This, the most complete account of activities at Konan to reach American ears, is believed to be the first time Japanese silence has been broken on the subject. In a cave in a mountain near Konan, men worked against time, in final assembly of genzai bakuden, Japan's name for the atomic bomb. It was August 10, 1945 (Japanese time), only four days after an atomic bomb flashed in the sky over Hiroshima, and five days before Japan surrendered. To the north, Russian hordes were spilling into Manchuria. Shortly after midnight of that day a convoy of Japanese trucks moved from the mouth of the cave, past watchful sentries. The trucks wound through valleys, past sleeping farm villages. It was August, and frogs in the mud of terraced rice paddies sang in a still night. In the cool predawn Japanese scientists and engineers loaded genzai bakudan aboard a ship in Konan. Off the coast near an inlet in the Sea of Japan more frantic preparations were under way. All that day and night ancient ships, junks and fishing vessels moved into the anchorage. Before dawn on Aug. 12 a robot launch chugged through the ships at anchor and beached itself on the inlet. Its passenger was genzai bakudan. A clock ticked. The observers were 20 miles away. This waiting was difficult and strange to men who had worked relentlessly so long who knew their job had been completed too late. OBSERVORS BLINDED BY FLASH The light in the east where Japan lay grew brighter. The moment the sun peeped over the sea there was a burst of light at the anchorage blinding the observers who wore welders' glasses. The ball of fire was estimated to be 1,000 yards in diameter. A multicolored cloud of vapors boiled toward the heavens then mushroomed in the stratosphere. The churn of water and vapor obscured the vessels directly under the burst. Ships and junks on the fringe burned fiercely at anchor. When the atmosphere cleared slightly the observers could detect several vessels had vanished. Genzai bakudun in that moment had matched the brilliance of the rising sun in the east. Japan had perfected and successfully tested an atomic bomb as cataclysmic as those that withered Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The time was short. The war was roaring to its climax. The advancing Russians would arrive at Konan before the weapon could be mounted in the ready Kamikaze planes to be thrown against any attempted landing by American troops on Japan's shores. It was a difficult decision. But it had to be made. The observers sped across the water, back to Konan. With the advance units of the Russian Army only hours away, the final scene of this gotterdammerung began. The scientists and engineers smashed machines, and destroyed partially completed genzai bakudans. Before Russian columns reached Konan, dynamite sealed the secrets of the cave. But the Russians had come so quickly that the scientists could not escape. This is the story told me by Capt. Wakabayashi. 1946 Atlanta Constitution Atom Bomb Articles Link to a transcription of Snell’s complete original newspaper story and related articles Note that the Japanese term “Genzai bakudan” in Snell’s article is probably more correctly rendered “genshi hakai dan”and is literally translated into English as “element bomb”. Subsequent denials, harrumph-harrumphs and how-dare-you-sirs quickly appeared in various newspapers, including (shockingly—not) a New York Times piece in which “an MIT scientist scoffed” at the idea that Japan had been doing its own advanced nuclear weapons work during WWII and might even have successfully tested an atomic bomb. US Occupation entities conducted fairly extensive investigations into whatever Japan was doing with its nuclear weapons R&D, but there was considerable political pressure to brush everything under the rug because the United States had already determined that Japan would be brought into the Western orbit as a Cold War proxy state to thwart Soviet expansion into the Pacific. What digging there was, was done by 1) the Atomic Bomb Mission, attached to the Manhattan Engineer District and thus an Asian version of the highly successful “Alsos” European atomic intelligence gathering effort, and 2) the Scientific Intelligence Survey, headed by the prominent American scientist Dr. Karl T. Compton. Compton had been a member of the “Interim Committee”, the advisory think tank formed by President Truman soon after he took office whose mission was to recommend the best use of the newly perfected American a-bomb. Of the two, the Atomic Bomb Mission was much more persistent and raised many more questions until it was finally ordered to cease and desist in the late 1940s. The Scientific Intelligence Survey quickly reached its own “conclusions” and was plainly acting as an arm of the US State Department, which had already decided as a fait accompli that there was nothing to see here, so move along, move along. There was, however, one notable result of US investigations that was immediately obvious. US Occupation Forces Dismantling One of the Massive Cyclotrons at the Riken Institute North of Tokyo, Japan, on 4 December 1945. https://books.google.com/books?id=BkkEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA26&lpg=PA26&dq=tokyo+bay+cyclotrons+sunk&source=bl&ots=9JXLOtdJ2X&sig=bcCyvZB0mJBjyS4iGuT9AHS0GQ8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=JAxAVJLRK82NyAT_y4KQAQ#v=onepage&q=tokyo%20bay%20cyclotrons%20sunk&f=false — link goes to a Life magazine story about the destruction of the Japanese cyclotrons, including photos of Professor Yoshio Nishina, head of theoretical research for the Japanese Army’s WWII nuclear weapons program. Tokyo, Japan 1917-1950: Rare Images Of Love, Loathing And Life - Flashbak — additional Life magazine photos, including the two immediately above. A total of five (5) cyclotrons had been located in Japan, with two of them at the Riken Institute—the headquarters of Japanese “big science” and the location of the offices of Dr. Yoshio Nishina, head scientist of the Japanese Army’s atomic bomb enterprise, known as “Project Ni”. Cyclotrons are particle accelerators capable of measuring the neutron fission cross section of uranium and other fissionable elements, and they can also be used to create fissile materials themselves, although the output of all but the largest cyclotrons is very small. American Occupation forces arrived at the Riken and other Japanese science institutes in November of 1945. Using axes and dynamite, they quickly disassembled all 5 machines and dumped the wreckage into Tokyo Bay—obviously a rather extreme measure if there was no danger of Japanese science being anywhere close to a nuclear weapon. US Occupation Forces Destroying Professor Bunsaku Arakatsu’s Cockroft-Walton Particle Accelerator on 24 November 1945. This Device, Along With Arakatsu’s Own Massive Cyclotron, Was Located at Kyoto Imperial University, the Primary R&D Center for the Japanese Navy’s Nuclear Weapons and Propulsion Effort, Project F-Go, During WWII. Photo Courtesy of the Website Atomic Heritage Dot Org. Cockcroft–Walton generator - Wikipedia Snell’s account then receded into the background until the Korean War. This time the NYT ran an article that actually supported Snell’s story, “North Korean Plant Held Uranium Works”, in the 26 October 1950 edition, on page 3. This particular article was, naturally, based on testimony of US soldiers fighting on the Korean Peninsula, most notably in the region of Konan (Hamhung), North Korea and at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. M-26 Pershing Tank and US Marines During the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, November - December 1950. American troops were operating in precisely the area in which Snell and his pseudonymous source located the WWII Japanese atomic bomb project (or one of them—more detail on this point later). Tucked away in the Wikipedia entry about the Chosin Reservoir clash is this note: “(The) Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula. The name Chosin is the Japanese pronunciation of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces. The battle's main focus was around the 78 miles (126 km) long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir.” Battle of the Chosin Reservoir | Korean War Battle of Chosin Reservoir - Wikipedia US MARINES at Chosin Reservoir Hungnam was the North Korean coastal city near the site at which the alleged-to-exist Japanese atomic bomb was said to have been tested. Snell’s article states that the bomb was assembled in a cave above Hungnam, then trucked down a road to the coast, where it was detonated at “an inlet in the Sea of Japan”. The Chosin Reservoir was, in fact, part of a colossal hydroelectric plant—built by Japanese zaibatsu colonial industrialists—whose output was two and a half times greater than the Tennessee Valley Authority hydroelectric installations that had powered the Clinton Engineer Works at Oak Ridge, TN, where the US built its Little Boy U-235 atomic bomb in WWII. Retreating US forces, which had previously advanced past Hungnam on their way north, were taken off by amphibious transports in the aftermath of the fighting withdrawal by the “Frozen Chosen”. Whatever proof they might have seen of Japan’s WWII nuclear activities in that port city was probably destroyed when the Americans dynamited most of the buildings to prevent their capture by the advancing Chinese. US Navy Attack Personnel Destroyer USS Begor (APD-127) Off the Coast of Hungnam (Konan), Korea, During American Demolition of Port Facilities, December 1950. However, a few photos of the massive, if by that point badly damaged, facilities at Hungnam did surface in the public realm. Most of these were taken by various US personnel, either during their advance to the north or their subsequent retreat to the south. One of them is immediately below: Some of the Ruins of Hungnam, North Korea, Seen Here on 18 November, 1950. The American Journalist David Snell Called The Electrical Power Infrastructure Clearly Visible in This Photo, “The Greatest Concentration of High Voltage Electrical Wiring I Have Ever Seen”. Photograph Courtesy of Dwight Rider and is From His Personal Research Into the Wartime Japanese Nuclear Projects. As it happened, a halfhearted retraction of the 26 October NY Times story was subsequently printed on the back page on 3 November, quoting “Tenth Corps Headquarters” in Korea. Thus US officialdom once again told the world that there was nothing to see here. (Both of these articles and others are cited in Robert Wilcox’s book, Japan’s Secret War, pgs. 212-3). Yet again Snell’s account faded from history. And yet again, it would be resurrected, this time from a Japanese source. Science and Society in Modern Japan, a Book Edited in Part by Eri Yagi. Yagi Studied Under the Yale University Professor of the History of Science, Derek de Solla Price. Amazon.com: Science and Society in Modern Japan (The M.I.T. East Asian science series ; 5) (9780262140225): Shigeru Nakayama, David L. Swain, Eric Yagi: Books Eri Yagi is one of the more prominent names in Japanese science over the past half century. In the early 1960s, she was a student at Yale University under the direction of the eminent physicist, historian of science, and information scientist Derek de Solla Price. Yagi would make a name for herself in the latter years of the 20th century, as her list of subsequent published papers demonstrates. Price was already justifiably famous for his work regarding the discovery and purpose of the ancient Greek Antikythera Mechanism. Publication List — Eri Yagi’s professional scientific publications Derek John de Solla Price (Official Site) Official Website of the late Yale University professor, Derek de Solla Price Gears from the Greeks. The Antikythera Mechanism: A Calendar Computer from ca. 80 B. C. Modern Replica of the Original Ancient Greek Analog Computer, the Antikythera Mechanism In the November 1962 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Price and his then-graduate student Yagi published an open letter detailing the few scraps of information that had come to him (probably at least in part from Yagi herself) about Japan’s attempts to build atomic bombs during WWII. There wasn’t much other than the names of a couple of Japanese scientists, an apparently early code name, Project AEROPOWER, and a few financial records describing certain sums of yen earmarked for nuclear R&D. After telling the world what he had learned to that point in time, Price asked the world scientific community at large to come forward with any additional information. I have never read that anyone did so. Note that the choice of the word “Aeropower” was probably a reflection of the personal interest of General Takeo Yasuda in nuclear physics, Yasuda being the head of the Army Aeronautical Technical Research Institute when the Army first began serious investigation into nuclear weapons in April of 1940 (see the section on Project Ni below). Takeo Yasuda - Wikipedia Cover of the November 1962 Issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in Which Yale University Professor Derek de Solla Price and His Japanese Graduate Student Eri Yagi Asked the World Scientific Community for More Information About the WWII Japanese Atomic Bomb Projects Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists — Link to Price and Yagi’s November 1962 Open Letter in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. It is on page 29. Shortly before his death in 1985, Price passed the story to the American journalist Robert Wilcox, whose subsequent archival research and personal interviews formed the basis of his book, Japan’s Secret War. Book Review: Japan's Secret War: Japan's Race Against Time to Build Its Own Atomic Bomb (Robert K. Wilcox): WWII Cover of the 1995 2nd Edition of Japan’s Secret War by Robert K. Wilcox. Wilcox’s book was of course instantly controversial and it continues to be in the present day. In my experience this is almost never because of any disagreement with the factual content, but rather simply because the idea of a WWII Japanese atomic bomb flies in the face of the postwar leftist pseudomorality that unfortunately soon grew up around the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. William Pellas's answer to Why is Nazi Germany stereotyped as villainous while Japan’s militarism is presented in American pop culture as repository of ancient chivalrous martial art? It should be noted, too, that most critics of Wilcox accuse him of “claiming that Japan tested its own atomic bomb” or that “Japan had The Bomb, too”. Wrong. It was Snell and his anonymous Japanese source who said that Japan had test-fired its own atomic bomb just after the second American nuclear attack. What Wilcox did was take the earlier information from Snell, Yagi, and Price, and then couple it with the results of his own personal interviews and archival research to see if Snell’s story could be corroborated. Japan’s Secret War is still the best and most complete overview of Japan’s attempted atomic bomb development in WWII. In the first two editions of his book, Wilcox was able to document three of the four known wartime Japanese nuclear projects. These were: 1. Project Ni, the Japanese Army’s nuclear weapons program, led initially by Professor Yoshio Nishina and later by the Army scientist, Lt. Col. Tatsusaburo Suzuki. Nishina and his immediate staff were headquartered at the Riken Institute, just north of Tokyo, the birthplace of Japanese “big science”. Suzuki is the man who personally conducted the 1940 industrial and mineralogical survey that convinced the Japanese Army that building an atomic bomb was feasible. It is likely that he worked on specialized metallurgy for use in thermal diffusion and possibly gaseous diffusion separators from the start of the project until 1943. So far as I have been able to determine to this point, while thermal diffusion, gaseous diffusion, and electromagnetic separation were all studied and considered, only the thermal diffusion separators were actually built. Project Ni was significantly disrupted by severe damage to the Riken Institute as a result of the “Great Tokyo Fire Raid” of 9–10 March, 1945. Note that this mission, and not either of the two atomic bombings, was far and away the deadliest air raid of the entire war. 73 Years Ago Today: The Deadliest Air Raid in History, Operation Meetinghouse. 2. Project F-Go, the Japanese Navy’s nuclear weapons and propulsion effort. The lead scientists here were Professor Bunsaku Arakatsu—formerly the personal student of Einstein himself—and future Nobel laureate, Hideki Yukawa. Arakatsu decided to go with the ultracentrifuge for uranium separation, and at least one large machine was built; according to Wilcox it was destroyed by B-29s at a railroad siding in mainland Japan while en route to Korea. Whether any additional units were built is unknown. F-Go was headquartered at Kyoto Imperial University. The city of Kyoto, in one of history’s supreme ironies, was spared from inclusion on the emerging American nuclear attack list by the US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. Stimson never knew that his decision was enabling the Japanese to proceed with their own atomic weapons development. The city saved from the atomic bomb 3. The Joint Imperial Japanese Army-Navy Atomic Bomb Research Program, called in some sources “Project F-NZ”. This was the result of the late-war amalgamation of the previously competing Army and Navy efforts, and was probably organized in the immediate aftermath of the B-29 Great Tokyo Fire Raid (Operation Meetinghouse) in early March, 1945, which destroyed most of the buildings at the Riken Institute, along with Nishina’s thermal diffusion UF-6 uranium separation pilot plant. Japan’s last ditch nuclear weapons effort was located in what is today North Korea and utilized the considerable industrial muscle—particularly the enormously powerful hydroelectric power plants—that had been built up after Korea came under Japanese control following the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War. As far as I have been able to determine, none of the Japanese industrial belt in Korea was ever attacked by Allied forces throughout the entire war until the Red Army overran the region in August - September, 1945. According to the Russian scientist Pavel V. Oleynikov in his paper, “German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project”, SMERSH operatives (Soviet technical intelligence agents) accompanied the ground troops on their advance into Korea, a significant footnote which probably means they were looking for Japanese personnel and equipment that were associated with F-NZ. Similar SMERSH units had already gone through the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, where they captured a number of German physicists as well as stocks of uranium oxide from the wreckage of the Auergesselschaft plant near Berlin. Japanese Nuclear Scientist Yoshio Nishina, Far Left, With Other Prominent Physicists at the Riken Institute, Probably in 1929. Werner Heisenberg is Fourth From Left. The RIKEN Story | RIKEN From the Riken’s present-day website. The fourth epicenter of wartime Japanese atomic bomb development was somewhere in mainland Asia, probably in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, under the auspices of the shadowy Unit 516 of the Kwantung Army. Unit 516 is described in most sources as a chemical weapons specialty group operating under the supervision of the notorious bioweapons lab, Unit 731. However, certain OSS documents from “Project Ramona” indicate that it was also working on atomic bombs. The OSS papers—cited extensively by Wilcox in the recently issued Third Edition of his book—point to a decision by the Kwantung Army to attempt development of nuclear weapons following the decisive defeat of Japanese ground forces by the Soviet Union at Khalkin Gol in the undeclared, 1939 border war in Mongolia. I believe, but have not yet seen documentary proof, that the Kwantung project was likely folded into the crash program in Korea in 1945. The Forgotten Soviet-Japanese War of 1939 It is claimed in the same OSS files that the Kwantung project also attempted a test detonation or perhaps a “cold test”, somewhere in the Gobi Desert. Very few details of what was going on in this end of the Japanese effort have surfaced to date; Wilcox is again the best and most complete source available in the public realm, as the third edition of Secret War, first published in 2019, contains a section derived from the Ramona documents. I was able to find one corroborating paper at the US National Archives, when I visited in 2012. This was a very brief mention by Nishina of a wartime Japanese scientist of his acquaintance who, according to him, was doing atomic bomb R&D in Japanese-controlled Chinese territory and had gone over to the Chinese communists after the war and was now working on The Bomb for them. If this is so, it means that Japan was anything but a nuclear victim. Rather, she has made her own, sizable contribution to world nuclear weapons proliferation. Both China and Russia (through its capture of Hungnam and the surrounding industrial infrastructure), as well as North Korea, very likely benefited from the fruits of wartime Japanese nuclear weapons research and development. It is clear that Japan’s initial approach to producing a nuclear detonation was broadly similar to what the United States was doing with what ultimately became the U-235 “Little Boy” atomic fission bomb. It is likely that Nishina was the primary impetus in this direction, as the Kuroda Papers (see the notes in the Sources section below this Answer) contain considerable discussion of the use of U-235 as an explosive along with extensive mathematical calculations to that effect. The use and benefits of a polonium neutron initiator or “spark plug”, as well as a neutron reflector or “tamper”, are also mentioned. All three of these were integral parts of the American Little Boy gun-type U-235 atomic fission bomb. Based on what I have seen to this point in time, however, it appears to me that Japan probably did not separate - enrich enough U-235 to enable the production of a bomb along the same lines as the gun-type “Little Boy” device, that is, not within the time frame of the war as it actually played out. Therefore, if one or perhaps two Japanese nuclear devices of some kind really were test-fired, it stands to reason that some other source or sources of fissile material must have been utilized—and also that the Japanese bomb, if in fact it did exist in prototype form, probably at least attempted to employ a more efficient detonation mechanism than the easier to build but also grossly inefficient gun-type. There are two candidates if Japan was able to manufacture or acquire additional “bomb fuel” besides the small (and insufficient) amount of enriched uranium she is believed to have produced during the war. One, Nazi Germany, whose own nuclear weapons projects were along significantly different lines but whose R&D may still have helped the Japanese, and two, a “pile” or production reactor. William Pellas's answer to Were any nuclear bombs tested before Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Regarding nuclear cooperation between Imperial Japan and the Hitler regime, a recent opinion piece by the Japanese journalist Yoichi Shimatsu makes a couple of startling claims. The first is that the real beginning of Japanese interest in nuclear weapons goes all the way back to Heisenberg’s visit to the Riken in 1929. From there, a joint Nazi-Japanese consortium known as “Bund-Eine” (Alliance One) operated a uranium mine located on Mount Uzumine on the outskirts of Sukagawa, southeast Fukushima Prefecture. Possible corroboration is found in the article below, which mentions extensive monazite deposits among the other “rare earth minerals” found in and around Uzumine. Uranium ores are often found in monazite. RARE-ELEMENT MINERALOGY OF THE UZUMINE GRANITIC PEGMATITE, ABUKUMA MOUNTAINS, NORTHEASTERN JAPAN Shimatsu also draws a direct line through history which connects the recently retired Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi. Kishi was the head of Japan’s WWII Munitions Ministry and, according to Shimatsu, was directly involved in financing the Korean nuclear effort. Although I have yet to research Shimatsu’s sources for his article, his information is compelling and, I think, probably true. (NOTE: the link immediately below seems to be vacillating between active and dead, and I have gotten both results when I clicked on it in recent weeks. The article title is as it appears below so it may be reachable with certain web browsers but not others.) Opinion: Hiroshima memories compel us to save the last child It is known that there were dozens of submarine cargo voyages between Germany and Japan during the war, with missions carried out by German, Japanese, and Italian submarines. There were also surface ship blockade runners until mid-1943, as well as ultra-long distance flights by specialized aircraft throughout the war. At least one of these aircraft, and probably more than one, was a repurposed prototype from the cancelled Amerikabomber project that was subsequently operated by one of Germany’s sonderkommando (“Special Command”, ie, special forces) formations. German WW2 Amerika Bombers - Concepts and Projects A Messerschmitt Me-264 Long Range Bomber in Flight. Although Cancelled After a Handful of Prototypes Were Constructed, it is Likely That at Least One of These Aircraft Flew Multiple Sonderkommando Missions Between Finland and Japan During WWII. Whether These Flights Were Connected in Any Way With Axis Nuclear Weapons Projects is Unknown at This Time. Only the submarines are known to have attempted the transport of nuclear weapons material and technology. A number of U-boats and I-boats involved in this “Nuclear Axis” (as the author Philip Henshall termed it) were hunted down and sunk by determined Allied antisubmarine countermeasures. Perhaps it is a coincidence that a fairly large number of the “boats” involved in the underwater cargo missions were destroyed. Or maybe Allied intelligence specifically targeted them because it knew, or had some inkling, that the Axis submarines had something to do with attempts at building nuclear weapons. I will say that enough of these attempted uranium supply missions were killed or compromised for me to suspect strongly that there was, in fact, an Allied atomic bomb interdiction effort—but I cannot say for certain at this time. Regarding a Japanese “pile” or reactor, Japanese science was certainly equal to the task of building one, as demonstrated by the rapid emergence of nuclear power in Japan less than 20 years after the end of WWII despite the enormous destruction in nearly every one of Japan’s major industrial centers during the war. Whether one or more were built during the actual conflict, I don’t know without a deeper and broader examination of declassified documents than I have been able to do to this point. (Note: fellow researcher Dwight Rider has documents in his possession which indicate considerable wartime Japanese interest in “Magnox” reactors. Several nuclear power stations that utilized this approach were built in the UK shortly following the end of the war. Magnox is a dual-use technology—that is, reactors of this type are used for both power generation and plutonium production—and have the considerable advantage of being able to run using natural uranium as fuel. Magnox - Wikipedia) As for the targets of an actual Japanese atomic bomb, it has been known since the 1970s that Japan’s military was developing its own nuclear attack list and that it included the US B-29 bases on Tinian Island which were used for the American missions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. William Pellas's answer to What if the Japanese were the first to drop a nuclear bomb? And according to a German Catholic priest who claimed to have heard it personally from a Japanese university official in the ruins of Hiroshima, the American west coast city of San Francisco could also have been hit by an atomic bomb had Japan been able to complete them in time. William Pellas's answer to Did the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki wipe out a significant portion of Japanese Christians? None of this is definitive proof that the Japanese actually succeeded, during WWII itself, in producing a practical, functioning atomic bomb or nuclear weapon in some form. But they certainly made a considerable effort to do so. And at minimum, they came much closer to turning the end of the Second World War into an exchange of weapons of mass destruction than most people know or care to admit in the present day. —————————————————————————————————- PARTIAL LIST OF SOURCES Link goes to the late Quoran Dwight Rider’s book, Tsetusuo Wakabayashi Revealed. In addition to surveying the evidence he has gathered pointing to what he believes is “Wakabayashi’s” real identity, Rider provides considerable background information about Japanese atomic bomb research and development during WWII. http://www.mansell.com/Resources/Rider_Burn_Before_Reading_28May2016.pdf — Rider’s paper on the Japanese nuclear weapons program in WWII and the efforts by some, including US State Department personnel, to sabotage further investigation in the present day. http://www.mansell.com/Resources/Rider_Chongjin_22-Mar-2020.pdf — Link goes to what is probably Rider’s most thorough work on the subject, “The Japanese Wartime Atomic Energy and Weapons Research Program – Seishin (Chongjin), northern Korea. 1938 - 1984″. Japanese Atomic Bomb Project From the website atomicheritage dot org. Factually correct as far as it goes, but dismisses Robert Wilcox’s work (without having the courtesy to mention him by name) as “a conspiracy theory”. New evidence of Japan's effort to build atom bomb at the end of WWII This is a Los Angeles Times piece by Jake Adelstein about the discovery of WWII Japanese Navy Project F-Go ultracentrifuge design blueprints at Kyoto University. Adelstein states incorrectly that two Japanese on board the German submarine U-234 killed themselves “upon being captured”, when in fact they committed suicide after learning that the crew intended to surrender to the United States. The article is otherwise factually correct. What If, in World War II, Japan Got the Atomic Bomb First? Follow-up article by Adelstein dated 6 August 2019, the day that the Third Edition of Japan’s Secret War was released—in Japan, and translated in Japanese. New Details Emerge About Japan's Wartime A-Bomb Program Was Japan building a nuclear bomb? Notebooks uncovered in Kyoto show how far wartime scientists had got — South China Morning Post article about the Project F-Go notebooks. New film pushes Japan to confront a wartime taboo Japan ‘came close’ to wartime A-bomb Article contains personal testimony from Japanese Army scientist Lt. Col. Tatsusaburo Suzuki about Project Ni, the Army’s WWII atomic bomb effort. Suzuki disclosed that Japan’s nuclear program considered electromagnetic isotope separation in the form of a proposed gargantuan cyclotron. Thermal diffusion separators were designed for the Army program, and at least a handful were actually built. These were apparently based on Nishina’s original pilot plant apparatus at the Riken Institute. Ultracentrifuges were designed for the Navy—Wilcox states that at least one was completed—and may possibly have been influenced by German machinery that was built under the direction of Dr. Paul Harteck. The German Physical Chemist Dr. Paul Harteck Was a Pioneer in the Development of Highly Efficient Centrifuge Machinery. Paul Harteck - Wikipedia Atomic plans returned to Japan BBC News website article by Jane Warr about the return of the “Kuroda Papers” (so called after the name of a WWII Japanese nuclear scientist who had them in his possession) to the Riken Institute north of Tokyo. The Papers are a series of notes transcribed directly from three lectures given by Nishina at the Riken on the state of Japanese nuclear weapons research. An English translation of the Papers, along with a detailed commentary on what they contain by Dwight Rider and Eric Hehl, is found here: http://www.mansell.com/Resources/Rider_The_Kuroda_Papers_25-March-2020.pdf The Kuroda Papers Regarding the progress of wartime Japanese nuclear weapons science, a Japanese Asahi Shimbun newspaper article dated 25 August 2005 and titled “Lost A-Bomb Research Resurfaces in Hiroshima”, states the following: Of the 60 kilograms of uranium 235 used in the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, according to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum,about 1 kilogram was used for the atomic detonation. The reports (of the Japanese who investigated the Hiroshima atomic attack) thus suggest that the Japanese military had grasped the essential characteristics of the bomb with relative accuracy soon after it was dropped. "In Japan, too, during the war, the army and navy were separately undertaking atomic research," explained Masakatsu Yamazaki, a professor at the Tokyo Institute of Technology and an expert on the history of atomic development. "After the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, those who were involved in the research speedily began to investigate the bombing. The investigative team determined four days after the bombing that it had been an atomic bomb, because they had a high level of scientific analytical capability as a result of their own atomic research." http://www.energy-net.org/N-LET/... Item #13 in this link goes to a transcription of the full text of the piece in the Asahi Shimbun. Yoshio Nishina Bunsaku Arakatsu Yukawa Hideki | Japanese physicist — comprehensive overview of Yukawa’s sterling career in science, but with no mention whatsoever of his work on Project F-Go as Arakatsu’s head theoretical mathematician. Logs of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Yukawa show clues on wartime nuke research - The Mainichi Japanese Nuclear Scientist and Nobel Laureate Hideki Yukawa Japanese Scientist and College Professor Kazuo “Paul” Kuroda, 1917–2001. During WWII, Kuroda Was One of the Scientists Working on the Atomic Bomb at the Riken Institute for the Japanese Army’s Project Ni. http://physicstoday.scitation.or... Link to a Physics Today news page that includes a brief story about the return of the WWII Project Ni papers that were in Kuroda’s possession to the Riken Institute in 2002. Paul Kazuo Kuroda (1917–2001)Summary of Kuroda’s outstanding career in science both in Japan and in the United States. Note that prior to WWII he was a professor at Tokyo Imperial University. This was one of the centers of Japanese atomic bomb R&D during the war. Questions About Hiroshima Persist – Reconsidering Obama’s “Apology” and Truman's Claim that Hiroshima was a Military Target - A blog written by Dr. Stephen Bryen https://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0801/01041.html — “Japan Eyed Bomb, Favored Using It”. This is a brief article in the Christian Science Monitor newspaper from 1995. Most notable is its confirmation of the likely target of a WWII Japanese atomic bomb—the US B-29 base in the Marianas Islands. The Japanese nuclear weapons program • Axis History Forum I found a copy of this extensive discussion thread at the US National Archives when I went to NARA’s College Park, MD location in 2012. William Pellas's answer to People debate the morality of using atomic weapons on WWII Japan. I don't but I do wonder about two bombs. Did we have to drop two?

日本「差點」獲得戰時原子彈

一位日本核物理學家表示，他和他的許多同事相信他們可以在第二次世界大戰期間製造核武。甚至還計劃向西太平洋島嶼塞班島的美國基地投擲原子彈。唯一阻礙他們的是…

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg14719880-200-japan-came-close-to-wartime-a-bomb/

（郵政信箱 1142），神秘的二戰絕密軍事情報設施

亨特堡在第二次世界大戰的戰俘和英特爾國防部公園管理局介紹二戰中亨特堡國家公園管理局的圖片在第二次世界大戰期間，亨特堡是一個絕密的所在地…

https://sofmag.com/po-box-1142-the-mysterious-wwii-top-secret-military-intelligence-installation/

唐納德·利安德·普特中將

Donald Leander Putt 1905 年出生於俄亥俄州 Sugarcreek。1928 年畢業於卡內基理工學院，獲得電機工程理學士學位。

https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/105883/lieutenant-general-donald-leander-putt/

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羅伯特沃克

 · 2年

嗨威廉。一些觀察：

1 你的報紙文章引用是「他拿出一份剪報，報道了納粹勞工領袖施佩爾 12 月 1 日的演講。施佩爾在向德國戰爭生產委員會發表講話時承諾，「V-3」很快就會做好向美國開火的準備。

V3 是一把瞄準倫敦的大砲。V級是一種同盟裝置。德國人使用了其他描述符。你是說報紙或斯佩爾的訊息被誤導了？

2 Sanger Amerika 轟炸機的設計承載重量高達 3,629 公斤。（約 8,000 磅）獨立式炸彈。製作了一台風洞原型。

Sänger Amerika Bomber Luft '46 條目

1935 年 6 月和 1936 年 2 月，Eugen Sänger 博士在奧地利航空刊物 Flug 上發表了有關火箭動力飛機的文章。這導致他被德國最高統帥部要求在特勞恩建立一個秘密航空航天研究所，以研究和建造他的“銀鳥”，這是一種可以進入軌道的有人駕駛、有翼飛行器。桑格博士多年來一直致力於這個概念，事實上他已經開始開發液體燃料火箭引擎。從 1930 年到 1935 年，他（通過無數的靜態測試）完善了一種「再生冷卻」液體燃料火箭發動機，該發動機通過其自身的燃料冷卻，燃料在燃燒室周圍循環。該引擎產生的排氣速度高達 3048 公尺/秒（10000 英尺/秒），而後來的 V-2 火箭的排氣速度為 2000 公尺/秒（6560 英尺/秒）。桑格博士和他的工作人員繼續在特勞恩從事美國轟炸機計劃下的「銀鳥」計畫。Sänger Amerika 轟炸機（或稱軌道轟炸機、反足轟炸機或大氣機長）專為超音速、平流層飛行而設計（請參見下圖）。機身是扁平的，這有助於產生升力，機翼較短，呈楔形。機身最尾端有一個水平尾翼面，兩端各有一個小尾翼。燃料裝在兩個大油箱中，機身兩側各一個，從機翼後部延伸。氧氣罐位於機身兩側各一個，位於機翼前方。機身後部安裝有一台100噸推力的巨大火箭發動機，兩側還有兩台輔助火箭發動機。飛行員坐在機身前方的加壓駕駛艙內，並安裝了三輪起落架用於滑翔降落。中央炸彈艙裝有一枚 3629 公斤（8000 磅）重的自由落體炸彈，沒有安裝防禦武器。空重約 9979 公斤（22000 磅）。為「銀鳥」設想了一個有趣的飛行剖面。它由火箭驅動的雪橇沿著 3 公里（1.9 英里）長的單軌軌道推進，該雪橇在 11 秒內產生 600 噸的推力（請參見下圖）。以 30 度角起飛並到達 1.5 公里（5100 英尺）高度後，速度將達到 1850 公里/小時（1149 英里/小時）。此時，主火箭引擎將點火8分鐘並燃燒90噸燃料，將「銀鳥」推進到最高速度22100公里/小時（13724英里/小時）和超過145公里（90英里）的高度，儘管一些來源列出的最大高度為280 公里（174 英里）。當飛機在重力作用下加速和下降時，它會撞擊約 40 公里（25 英里）處較稠密的空氣，然後像石頭在水中跳躍時一樣「跳躍」回來（請參見下圖）。這還有一個額外的好處，就是在達到較稠密的空氣時遇到強烈的摩擦加熱後冷卻飛機。跳過我

http://www.luft46.com/misc/sanger.html

還不夠大，無法攜帶 6 噸炸彈嗎？

3 聚合體 (A9-10) 設計用於攜帶 2200 磅的彈頭。

骨材（火箭家族）

Aggregat 系列是納粹德國軍隊的研究項目於 1933-45 年開發的一套火箭設計。它最成功的是 A4，通常被稱為 V-2。德語單字 Aggrega 指的是一組一起工作的機器。A1 是 Aggregate 系列中的第一個火箭設計。它是由沃納·馮·布勞恩(Wernher von Braun) 於1933 年在庫默斯多夫(Kummersdorf) 的國防軍(德國武裝部隊) 研究項目中設計的，該項目由沃爾特·多恩伯格(Walter Dornberger) 領導。A-1 是最現代 R 的始祖

https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Aggregate_(rocket_family)

還是不足以運送 6 噸的有效載重？

4 呂訥堡荒原上到底有什麼如此秘密的事？

我的興趣部分源於我的父親，他在戰後駐紮在呂訥堡，其中一個團故事稱該團（HLI，1945年）曾協助集中營（我現在認為是貝爾根貝爾森集中營），當他們到達了這個古色古香的小鎮（呂訥堡），他們命令居民離開並將其夷為平地。此後，英國陸軍保留了呂訥堡荒原的部分地區作為坦克訓練場長達 20 年。

荒野中是否隱藏著更奇特的東西，而這個故事是為了掩蓋？

威廉·佩拉斯

 · 2年

羅伯特，感謝您敏銳的觀察和評論。

據我了解，“V”名稱實際上起源於德國人，並在特定武器系統投入使用後廣泛使用。例如，作為原型機，後來被稱為“V-1”的產品被稱為“Fieseler Fi-103”。有很多候選人本來可以被授予“V-3”稱號，但如果我沒記錯的話，他們中沒有一個人真正獲得了這一榮譽。

回覆：桑格軌道轟炸機，有許多數字出現在各種來源。在桑格自己的提案第 110 頁的英文翻譯中，給出了 11.5 噸的炸彈裝載量（圖 71）：

saenger.pdf (astronautix.com)

我認為預計炸彈裝載量的一些差異是由於設計本身的波動造成的。據美國空軍上校 Donald Putt（在上面的回答中引用）稱，至少一架 Silbervogel 原型機是在戰爭年代建造的。他表示，「（A）測試模型是載有一名男子並配有起落架的，儘管尚不清楚該模型是否曾經飛行過；然而，眾所周知，測試是在其發動機上進行的。” 這聽起來不僅僅是一個風洞模型，儘管它是否功能齊全尚不清楚。普特本人不確定原型機是否經過了飛行測試，但似乎相信它可能經過了飛行測試，這似乎表明它是一個功能性原型機，而不是一個不太複雜的概念驗證版本。

100噸火箭或彈道飛彈可能是A-9/A-10「堆疊」的一個版本或衍生品，或者（在我看來更有可能）完全不同的機器。維爾納·馮·布勞恩（Werner von Braun）提到它，並表示其有效載荷為六噸。到目前為止，我在公共資源中讀到的唯一資訊表明，A-9/A-10 下級的主火箭發動機在戰爭期間在試驗台上發射，但沒有進一步的進展據說已經做出來了。因此，這款 100 噸飛彈要么正在比其他機器更遠離電網的開發，要么仍處於繪圖板上。

關於：呂訥堡荒地，奧托·哈恩在他的書中表示，他被告知該地區有三 (3) 枚完成的德國原子彈，「在戰爭結束前不久」就可以使用。這可能意味著 1945 年 3 月底或 4 月初。也許它們存放在呂內貝格本身或附近的德國陸軍倉庫或集結區？當然，這是假設它們存在。有一些消息來源聲稱他們做到了。

威廉·佩拉斯 (William Pellas) 對「如果德國在 1945 年 3 月成功製造出 4 顆原子彈，情況會有何不同？」的回答 - 知乎

PS：我剛剛重讀了《被遺忘的創造者》（第 3112-3119 頁）中的相關頁面，有報導表明 Luneberg Heide 地區存在某種隱藏的地下核設施。你的父親或你認識的其他士兵有沒有對你說過這件事？

羅伯特沃克

不是對我威廉來說，但我會問我媽媽這個問題（她已經 91 歲了，但還在這裡）