第 28 页赫尔最后通牒和珍珠港外交续珍珠港战役前奏

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第 28 页
赫尔最后通牒和珍珠港外交
续珍珠港战役前奏

此前,国务卿曾解释说,他和罗斯福总统及内阁都知道有一个最后期限,如果在 11 月 29 日之前不能达成和平协议,日本政府认为不得不承认战争状态,于是国务卿向日本大使野村递交了一份有时被称为《赫尔最后通牒》的文件。 该通牒有十项建议,其中一些与日本之前的建议一致,而赫尔知道其中一些建议意味着他实质上是在向日本宣战。

赫尔最后通牒,即 11 月 26 日的赫尔照会,提出了 "多边互不侵犯条约"(引自赫尔的回忆录,而非照会本身)。 在法属印度支那殖民地实行门户开放政策。 摧毁战争领主(蒋介石)以外的中国政府。

从积极的一面来看,美国提出 "放弃在中国的治外法权",但这应该早在几十年前就向中国人提出,而不是日本人。

美国将结束禁运。 作为回报,日本只需从中国全境撤出所有武装力量。 美国在菲律宾的殖民地以及在亚洲的其他白人至上殖民地都没有被提及,因此它们将保持原有的地位。 [1083]

赫尔说:"后来,日本的宣传......试图歪曲我们 11 月 26 日的备忘录,称其为最后通牒。 [1084]

赫尔的借口是 "日本舰队已经驶向珍珠港" [但科德尔-赫尔并不知道 但科德尔-赫尔在1941年11月26日并不知道这一点。 另外,除了珍珠港的美国战列舰队外,美国海军舰队正驶向菲律宾或中国或福摩萨或法属印度支那,我们永远不会知道它会被指挥去攻击哪里,但我们知道[见麦克阿瑟笔记#4],11月27日,在菲律宾的麦克阿瑟将军得到了自行决定攻击日本人的许可。]

赫尔和日本大使黑须和野村一直在交谈,直到珍珠港战役开始的消息传来,但双方都知道战争即将开始。 [1083-1094]

"马歇尔将军和斯塔克上将在同一天[11月27日]向总统递交了一份备忘录,并抄送了我一份,他们在备忘录中恳求给予更多的时间,特别是因为增援部队正在途中或将前往菲律宾"。 [1087]

1941年11月27日,赫尔告诉战争委员会,日本不会接受他1941年11月26日的备忘录,他们 "应该在计算中考虑到日本可能同时在不同地点发动突然袭击的假设"。 [1087]

赫尔在11月27日阅读了一份截获的日本外交电文,其中指出谈判已经结束,但各国大使应继续伪装。 [1087. WPM: 所以赫尔只是维持和平的假象,他知道这一切都是假的]

11月29日,澳大利亚提出充当日美之间的调停人,但赫尔回复说 "外交状态已经结束"。 [1089]

1941年12月6日,美国得到报告称,一支庞大的日本战斗舰队正驶向泰国的克拉半岛。 [1093]

罗斯福总统早些时候准备了一份和平电文,准备直接发送给大日本帝国。 赫尔对此表示反对,但该电文最终于11月6日晚9:00发送给了驻东京的格鲁大使。 "在日本偷袭珍珠港之前......这份电文没有送到格鲁大使手中"。 [1091-1094]

1941年12月7日上午,赫尔收到了日本拒绝他11月26日提议的答复的解密部分。 下午 2:05 左右,日本大使在他的办公室等候,罗斯福总统打电话告诉他:"有报告说日本人袭击了珍珠港。 [1095]

赫尔于下午 2:20 接见了野村和栗寿。 他们为没有按照指示在下午 1:00 之前递交日本的回信表示歉意,并将延误归咎于将回信翻译成英文有困难。 赫尔假装第一次看纸条,不让日本人知道他们的密码被破解了。 赫尔随后对大使们进行了口头攻击,但没有告诉他们夏威夷珍珠港遭到袭击的报道。 赫尔写道:"诺姆拉与我的最后一次会面与他从一开始就处理讨论的无能是一致的"。 [1096]

赫尔于下午六点向新闻界发表声明,称 "日本背信弃义,无端攻击美国"。 [1098]

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Notes on The Memoirs of Cordell Hull
by William P. Meyers

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Page 28
Hull Ultimatum and Pearl Harbor Diplomacy

Continued from Prelude to the Battle of Pearl Harbor

Having previously explained that he and President Roosevelt and the Cabinet understood there was a deadline and the Japanese government felt compelled to recognize a state of war if a peace agreement was not reached by November 29, Secretary of State handed Japanese Ambassador Nomura what is sometimes called the Hull Ultimatum. This had ten proposals, some of which matched earlier Japanese proposals and some of which Hull knew meant he was essentially declaring war on Japan.

The Hull Ultimatum, or November 26 Hull Note, offered "A multilateral nonaggression pact" [quoting Hull's memoirs, not the note itself.]. An Open Door policy in the French colony of Indochina. The destruction of Chinese governments other than that of the war lords (Chiang Kai-shek).

On the positive side, the U.S. offered "relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China," but that should have been offered to the Chinese decades early, not to the Japanese.

The U.S. would end the embargo. In return all Japan had to do was withdraw all her armed forces from all of China. The U.S. colony in the Philippines, in addition to the other white supremacist colonies in Asia, were not mentioned, and so would maintain their prior status. [1083]

Hull says "Later on, Japanese propaganda ... tried to distort our memorandum of November 26 by calling it an ultimatum." [1084]

Hull's excuse was "the Japanese fleet was already steaming toward Pearl Harbor." [1084] [WPM: But Cordell Hull did not know that on November 26, 1941. Also, in addition to the U.S. war fleet at Pearl Harbor, a U.S. Navy fleet was steaming towards the Philippines or China or Formosa or French Indochina, we will never know where it would have been directed to attack, but we know [See MacArthur notes #4] that on the November 27 General MacArthur, in the Philippines, received permission to attack the Japanese at his discretion.]

Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors Kurusu and Nomura continued talking right up until the word arrived that the Battle of Pearl Harbor began, but each side knew the war was about to begin. [1083-1094]

"General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent a memorandum to the President that same day [November 27], with a copy to me, in which they pleaded for more time, particularly because of the reinforcements en route or destined for the Philippines." [1087]

On November 27, 1941 Hull told the War Council that his November 26, 1941 memorandum would not be accepted by Japan, and they "should include in their calculations the assumption that the Japanese might make surprise attacks at various points simultaneously." [1087]

Hull read an intercepted Japanese diplomatic message on November 27 indicating that negotiations were over, but the ambassadors were to keep up pretenses. [1087. WPM: So Hull was just keeping up peaceful pretenses, and knew it was all a sham]

Australia offered to act as a mediator between Japan and the U.S. on November 29, but Hull replied "that the diplomatic state was over." [1089]

On December 6, 1941 the U.S. had reports of a large Japanese battle fleet heading towards the Kra Peninsula in Thailand. [1093]

President Roosevelt had earlier prepared a peace message to be sent directly to the Empire of Japan. Hull was against it, but it was finally sent to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo at 9:00 PM on November 6. "This message did not get to Ambassador Grew ... before the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor." [1091-1094]

On the morning of December 7, 1941 Hull was getting decrypted sections of the Japanese response rejecting his November 26 proposal. With the Japanese Ambassadors waiting in his office around 2:05 PM, President Roosevelt called and informed him "There's a report that the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor." [1095]

Hull admitted Nomura and Kurusu at 2:20 PM. They apologized for not delivering the Japanese reply by 1:00 PM, as per their instructions, and attributed the delay to difficulties translating it into English. Hull pretended to look at the note for the first time, to keep the Japanese from knowing their code had been broken. Hull then verbally attacked the Ambassadors, but did not tell them of the reported attack on Pearl HarborHawaii. Hull writes "Normura's last meeting with me was in keeping with the ineptitude that had marked his handling of the discussions from the beginning." [1096]

Hull issued a statement to the press at 6:00 PM stating "Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United States." [1098]

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