1941年，日本為何沒有加入德國與蘇聯的戰爭，而是攻擊美國？我知道他們急需石油和原料，但從俄羅斯取得不是更容易嗎？
1939 年卡爾欣戈爾戰役對抗日本和蘇聯，是對帝國在蒙古乃至符拉迪沃斯托克不斷增長的野心的現實檢驗。
卡爾欣戈爾的絕對重要性被低估了。
由於日本人認為蒙古是自己的主場（這是因為日本在滿洲和蒙古國（現在的內蒙古）的統治地位是不容置疑的）。因此，他們自然地對蒙古採取行動，蒙古當時是一個獨立國家，但本質上是蘇聯的傀儡。
想像一下，當最高指揮部發現蘇聯人願意保衛蒙古作為其在遠東的主要利益之一時，他們會感到驚訝，並向鄂木斯克的蘇聯基地派遣部隊和坦克，為蒙古的衝突提供補給和準備。
然而，日本人更多的是憤怒而不是擔心，這顯然是斯大林的權力舉動，目的是阻止日本的影響力蔓延到遠東的蒙古，但這樣做是行不通的，因此他們派遣了廣東軍的將軍和兩個師前往滿洲（估計） 1939年左右的總兵力從80,000到300,000）大約有13,000名士兵（初始），由飛機和坦克支援，以恐嚇俄羅斯人。
這分明是日本的強權宣言。我們有一整支軍隊正等待機會突襲，而你們的部隊必須從鄂木斯克一路得到補給。
蘇聯無法拒絕這項挑戰，他們在蒙古邊境部署了大量兵力以對抗日本的兵力，實際上數量遠遠超過小松原三太郎將軍指揮的微薄的1-2個師。
日本人和蘇聯人之間肯定會發生一場血腥的戰鬥。我們都知道當今現代世界中的邊界衝突，以及在小規模交火中到處都有一些人死亡的情況。但是Kalkhin Gol，天哪，這是一場大屠殺。
日軍首先發動進攻，將蘇軍擊退，但他們很快構築工事並埋下掩體，擊退了日軍，日軍損失慘重，僅一些營就死亡約 70%，關東軍被迫派遣增援部隊。
Greogory Shctern、Choibalsab 和 Georgy Zhukov 在 Kalkhin Gol 的照片。請注意照片中所有男人的輕鬆舉止。這告訴我們一個故事，蘇聯人認為日本的侵略只不過是一種煩惱，而蘇聯將軍在被派遣時更興奮地在交戰的日本人身上測試新的戰術和坦克戰。
廣東軍從滿洲派遣了越來越多的援軍，但很快就意識到自己與蒙古人的通訊和補給線搖搖欲墜且有缺陷。
在蘇聯方面，滿載人員的卡車定期繞道進出蒙古，向鄂木斯克的最高指揮部提供定期報告並發送物資。自從蘇聯高度機械化以來，俄羅斯人在供應和與他們的部隊建立通訊方面並沒有遇到太大的麻煩，自從俄羅斯內戰以來，蘇聯軍隊越來越重視機動化通訊和總部，這在卡爾欣戈爾取得了巨大的成果。日本人更接近他們在滿洲的廣東最高指揮部，但關鍵的是不具備蘇聯人所擁有的機械化優勢水準。
日本和蘇聯坦克之間的衝突表明，日本很快就發現自己的坦克只能用於步兵支援，無法損壞對方的t-32和t-30蘇聯變型。日本人在卡爾欣戈爾意識到，他們的坦克幾乎不如其他所有主要國家，而且只適用於反步兵戰術。
蘇聯也擁有主場優勢，喬巴山領導下的蒙古人對該地區及其戰略優勢有著深入的了解，這使得蘇聯在情報部門得到了喘息的機會，而日本則被迫向前偵察並探測防禦，從而給俄羅斯人更多的時間從鄂木斯克趕來更多的部隊和坦克車。
即使在空中力量方面，蘇聯人在數量上也遠遠超過日本人，儘管在激烈的混戰中損失慘重，但總體上仍處於領先地位。
日本最終不得不面對 500 多輛坦克和 60,000 名蘇聯步兵，蒙古人也在戰場上，全副武裝的蘇聯人。
由於道路糟糕，供應網絡也從未被迫經歷如此多的問題，導致廣東軍派遣增援部隊的速度緩慢，最終日軍在卡爾欣古勒的兵力最多只有 30,000 人。面臨著維持及時集結部隊以及更重要的是坦克車的緊迫期限。
另一方面，蘇聯人在蒙古境內修建了良好的道路和機場，處於戰鬥範圍之內，這給了他們整體上巨大的優勢。
不要誤會我的意思，日本人在卡爾欣戈爾地區處於巨大劣勢，他們做得很好，甚至成功地嚴重削弱並突破了在卡爾欣戈爾地區的幾條蘇聯防線，但最終，由於供應短缺、缺乏及時的通訊和關鍵的增援，被迫他們被防守的蘇聯人榨乾了血，他們知道在最終擊退了日本人的幾次猛烈的正面攻擊後，他們已經陷入了困境。他們發動反擊，徹底擊退了日軍的防線，然後日軍部署了火砲，摧毀了蘇聯擊潰他們的企圖。
但援軍再次趕來，為蘇軍扭轉了戰局，蘇軍秘密部署了剛抵達卡爾欣戈爾中翼戰鬥的第9機械化師的重型火砲，等待日軍再次進攻，他們確實這麼做了。並被炮火徹底摧毀。
到那時，戰鬥實際上已經獲勝，日本人迅速撤軍，留下了大量武器和坦克，後來蘇聯人繳獲了這些武器和坦克。
蘇聯工程師正在檢查繳獲的日本 Ha-Go 型輕型坦克。
繳獲日軍大砲。
現在不要誤會我的意思，蘇聯人在卡林古爾遭受了巨大的傷亡（實際上比日本人傷亡更多），但他們相對於日本人的優勢的關鍵因素是他們從內戰時期繼承的極端機械化和經驗。除此之外，他們也以極快的速度調集增援部隊，只有高度組織和協調一致的指揮結構才能實現這項壯舉（不是普通的蘇聯士兵）。
在卡爾欣戈爾，日本人吸取了一些慘痛的教訓。
- 他們在技術上仍然落後於擁有更好武器和坦克的蘇聯。
- 他們沒有辦法有效地為來自滿洲的入侵提供補給，因為所有柔軟的防線都不足以支持一支移動的軍隊。蘇聯人絕對不會允許日本人在他們的邊境附近隨意建造道路
- 蘇聯的集結速度比日本快得多，擁有高度機械化的軍隊，而日本仍處於軍隊完全現代化的過程中。
- 軍隊需要更多的預算來對付蘇聯，正如卡林古爾所表明的那樣，他們將不得不花費更多的時間來磨練廣東軍隊的能力，而廣東軍隊已經越來越習慣於期望東方能夠戰勝使用第一次世界大戰步槍的中國人。以及過時的武器裝備。但正如預期的那樣，海軍不允許削減自己的預算（與陸軍共享），成功地論證了自己在維持日本在太平洋水域優勢方面的重要性，以恐嚇盟友。
- 俄羅斯有超過一百萬的西伯利亞軍隊分佈在符拉迪沃斯托克地區和滿洲邊境周圍，那時的戰鬥將是耗時的、破壞性的，並且會拖延他們征服中國的首要任務。
- 最後，日本空軍與蘇聯相比顯得相形見絀，即使是為了保持表面上的平等，陸軍也必須徵用屬於海軍的飛機，而海軍肯定不會接受。
因此，考慮到卡爾欣戈爾事件後的所有這些決定，日本最高指揮部放棄了這些未來可能入侵蘇聯的計劃。相反，他們更願意處於防禦狀態，以防蘇聯人發動進攻，從而獲得優勢。
從戰略上來說，這是日本最高統帥部的明智之舉，因為他們已經對吵鬧的廣東軍的能力產生了懷疑，因為廣東軍更喜歡掠奪和掠奪，而不是戰鬥。無論如何，好戰的將軍們提倡對蘇聯採取西進戰略。卡爾欣古爾的失利粉碎了最高指揮部對軍隊能力的任何信任，在戰爭的剩餘時間裡，廣東軍隊只能坐在守衛滿洲的屁股上，從未真正參與過任何重大進攻
因此判決通過了，國家不再資助廣東軍這些無藥可救的白痴發起的針對蘇聯的一些注定失敗的戰役，而是資助海軍，而海軍也大力參與對廣東軍的評判，指出其平庸和在真正的入侵中毫無用處。
嗯，這不是一個壞主意，海軍後來繼續在南方取得了重大勝利，削弱了整個英國東部艦隊，為入侵菲律賓提供了巨大幫助，運送部隊成功入侵印度支那、印度尼西亞甚至帕帕紐。幾內亞。
老實說，廣東軍在這場慘敗中吃盡了苦頭，因為他們在卡爾欣古勒的表現令人欽佩，多次以及時的進攻、有序的撤退和成功的防守證明了自己的價值。
最高指揮部可能也從他們在戰後得到的報告中知道了這一點，但他們心裡仍然有一個沉重的決定，介意你選擇支持北方一場漫長、曠日持久且代價高昂的戰爭嗎？或迅速佔領盟軍幾乎沒有防守的殖民地，在突襲中摧毀駐紮在珍珠港的美國艦隊，摧毀駐紮在印度支那的分散的英國遠東艦隊，並從征服這些土地中獲取他們的所有資源。
最後他們選擇了後者，這為他們提供了短期內急需的資源，但也最終使他們與更可怕的敵人美國人發生衝突。
- 因為與東南亞相比，俄羅斯遠東地區相對欠發達，資源貧乏
- 因為日本在1938年和1939年試圖與蘇聯發動戰爭，結果被打了屁股。
（圖：1939年被俘虜的日本士兵）
日本一直對俄羅斯遠東地區充滿興趣。早在 1900 年代，兩個帝國的願望就發生了衝突，最終導致1904 年至 1905 年的日俄戰爭。俄羅斯戰敗了，但日本也為此付出了高昂的代價：人力資源嚴重減少，經濟更是雪上加霜。因此，就 R 而言
This question, unfortunately, implies a lack of understanding of what the cause of World War II was, to begin with.
Hitler wanted to accomplish the following:
- Eliminate every clause of the Pact of Versailles, which he considered a dishonor to the German people. This implied in simple terms getting territories lost in WWI, stop paying reparations, and eliminate all restrictions to develop its military industry. He accomplished most of all three things without war.
- Recover the standing of Germany as a world power, in industrial and economic terms, and in uniting all Germanic people in a single coun
Answer: I would put the Invasion of Russia by Hitler at the top of the poorest decision of WW2.
Attacking the US was monumentally a stupid idea, but it had less effect than Hitler's decision.
While you can blame Hitler, the fact is the Pearl Harbor decision was a group effort. It took a few Army mid level officers on staff in the Kwantung Army to set the eventual path to disaster. Then along comes Hideki Tojo, who decides it is a better idea to stay inside China, and SE Asia rather than withdraw as the US wanted. His “Ace” in the hole? He is sure, the US is morally weak, and the “Wonderful Japan
Multiple reasons.
- Japan wasn’t going to get the raw materials they needed from attacking Siberia in the Soviet Union.
- They’d fought the Soviet Union and got their tails whipped—badly. They didn’t want to fight the Soviet Union.
- They were already at war with the West. Wait, you think Japan’s war with the West started on Dec. 8th? Wrong. For starters, Pearl Harbor according to Japan was Dec. 8th. As was a series of attacks on Hong Kong, Wake Island and a host of other Western bases. But Japan actually felt they were at war much earlier. When Japan invaded China (in 1937 I think?), the West institut
“Why didn't Japan join Germany in war with Soviet Union in 1941, instead of attacking Americans? I understand they badly needed oil and raw materials, but wasn't it easier to get them from Russia?”
Actually, more than anything else, that was because the war in the “East” started a LONG time before the war in Europe.
The Japanese invaded China in 1931, two years before Hitler gained real power in Germany. They were focused on gaining control of the resources immediately near them, which did not include the Russian far East, and in establishing a defensive perimeter thousands of nautical miles aro
Looking back, if Japan attacked the Soviet Union during the fall 1941, when Hitler was closing on Moscow, and America didn’t enter the war yet, it had a very high chance of success. The Soviet troops (about 1 million) would of course put up a fight, or even counterattack, as was the dominant strategy at the time, but this huge diversion in the Far East would inevitably lead to a collapse in the Soviet defense around Moscow, and lead to a defeat from Germans by the spring ‘42, at the latest.
But the Japanese didn’t know what we know now. And available reasons spoke strongly against attacking the
Siberia is god awfully massive and most of its greatest resources weren't even discovered yet. Take a look:
That is not Siberia, which is twice as big and extends west to the Ural Mountains. That is just the Russian Far East, which is already about 2/3 the size of the US. Imagine the Imperial Japanese Army deciding that it is a good idea to try to occupy and exploit an area twice the size of the Chinese territory they already occupied. Let's also not forget that their are few railroads in the area so an attack would probably prompt the Soviets to destroy these lines if defeat became pr
No, it wasn’t easier to get them from Russia NOT BY A LONG SHOT. Japanese industry needed all kinds of raw materials (like iron) in order to keep going and to supply Japanese society and the Japanese armed forces with all the consumer goods and military hardware they needed but above all Japan needed OIL which it could only get from overseas because Japan has no oil deposits.
Until late 1941 Japan actually got a lot of its oil from the US and it was PRECISELY the fact that the US instituted a severe oil embargo on Japan in November 1941 that forced Japan’s hand, in the minds of the Japanese lea
Allow me to preface this answer by saying that it was NOT a mistake to do so from Hitler’s perspective.
Strategically it made sense to attack the Soviet Union while they were weak and unprepared for war. Hitler knew that as he made progress on the Western front, Stalin grew increasingly nervous about the growing power of Germany. The poor performance of the USSR in the Winter War also motivated Hitler.
If Hitler's commanders had done what Hitler had wanted, which was to rush as fast as possible to Moscow, then it is possible that the USSR would have fallen. You have to consider that the USSR was
Any war can be won if you kill enough of the enemy and that was what Germany tried to do in Barbarossa. It’s called attrition. However, unless you have a considerable technical edge (machine guns and railroads vs. spears in the 19th century), you need to have a significantly larger population with a lot more soldiers than your enemy in order to accomplish this. In World War II, Germany fielded a few wonder weapons, but she did not have a significant enough edge in technology to make up for her smaller population and poor economic management compared to the Soviet Union, to say nothing of the U
Studying war ever since I was little, I have grown up believing all these stories of “Germany could have won if they had streamlined production” or “If Hitler never focused on Stalingrad, the Germans might have won” or even the ridiculous claim that “If they had taken Moscow, the Russians would have surrendered.” Spoiler alert: They would not have surrendered. The only way Germany could ever win World War 2 was by defeating the Soviet Union or by securing peace with Britain.
Now I’m sure everyone has heard the common myths of World War 2. I will tackle some of the biggest. But to do that, I nee
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