诅咒这个国家 大日本帝国的起义军Curse on This Country The Rebellious Army of Imperial Japan
诅咒这个国家 大日本帝国的起义军
Curse on This Country The Rebellious Army of Imperial Japan
欧米人の多くは、大日本帝国陸軍といえば権威への盲従を連想する。 太平洋戦争中、日本兵は確実に死ぬまで上官に従うことで悪名高く、敵の心に「雄牛」「群れ」「蜂の巣」という好ましくないイメージを残した。
オーストラリアの戦場記者も書いている：
「私が見た日本兵の多くは、原始的な家畜のようにつぶらな目をしていた。 . . .彼らは、そうするように言われたからというだけで、自分の陣地にとどまって死んでいく。"彼らには、自分の頭で考える知性はない。
许多西方人将日本皇军与盲目服从权威联系在一起。 在太平洋战争中，日本士兵因追随上级而必死无疑而臭名昭著，他们在敌人心目中留下了 "牛"、"牛群 "或 "蜂窝 "等不光彩的形象。
一位澳大利亚战地记者写道：
"我见过的许多日本士兵都像原始的牛一样，目光呆滞....... . . .他们呆在自己的阵地上牺牲，仅仅是因为他们被告知要这样做，他们没有自己思考的智慧"。 1
抛开极端的言辞不谈，盲目遵守纪律的神话还是有一定道理的。 日本的军事思想确实强调无条件服从上级命令。 特别是从 20 世纪 20 年代中期开始，每个士兵都必须牢记并随时准备背诵的开创性文件--《士兵和水兵敕令》警告说，
"士兵和水兵应将忠诚视为自己的基本职责。 . . . ......一心一意履行忠诚的基本义务，牢记责任重于泰山，死亡轻于鸿毛"。 2
军官们在接到命令时也往往不假思索地冲向死亡，几乎所有日本战争中军官的伤亡率都相对较高就是一个例证。 3 1880 年代首次公布的《皇军刑法典》规定，任何士兵或军官，无论军衔高低，只要有任何不服从命令的行为，都将受到严厉惩罚。 4
然而，日本皇军可以说是现代史上最不服从命令的军队之一。 日本军官多次发动政变、暴力叛乱和政治暗杀，这种现象在 19 世纪 70 年代和 20 世纪 30 年代达到顶峰。
在这两个时期之间，其他军官不断抵制政府和最高指挥部下达的命令。
正如克雷格-卡梅伦（Craig M. Cameron）所写，"下剋上"的 "gekokujō "现象是 "塑造日本军事文化的一个重要而独特的概念。 . . . 中层参谋人员通过反抗上级改变了国家政策。 . . . .从裕仁天皇到军事最高指挥部，上级一再容忍不服从命令的行为，[并]允许他们在不重新行使权力的情况下被迫动手"。 5
这一传统在日本近代史上很早就开始了。
19 世纪 70 年代是一个混乱的时代，反叛的军官、政治家和前武士经常策划暗杀阴谋、兵变，有时甚至公开叛乱。
19 世纪末以及 1910 年代和 1920 年代，军官们在政治危机时刻暗杀外国领导人，推翻文官内阁。
20 世纪 30 年代出现了一种特别混乱的抗命形式。 1931 年，一个名为 "樱花会"（樱花协会）的军事恐怖组织试图用空袭消灭整个日本内阁。 几个月后，叛乱军官暗杀了首相犬饲毅。 随后的政变失败了，但却引发了军队内外的一系列暴力动乱。 1935 年，由于派系斗争，一名主要将领被一名下级军官砍死。 最后，1936 年 2 月，在一场大规模的军事叛乱中，国家的货币控制崩溃了。 一千多名士兵走上街头，几名日本领导人在自己的宅邸中被杀害。
英国记者休-拜亚斯（Hugh Byas）在第二次世界大战期间撰写的一本经典著作中创造了 "暗杀政府 "一词。
拜厄斯称，20 世纪 30 年代的军官们通过反复暗杀的方式恐吓文官内阁。 他们通过施加致命暴力的能力，控制了外交政策，将胆小怕事的领导人推向肆无忌惮的军事扩张道路，最终导致太平洋战争的灾难。 6
为数不多的关于日本军队不服从命令的英文研究集中于 20 世纪 30 年代的叛乱，这可能是因为叛乱的戏剧性、激烈程度以及与第二次世界大战的接近性。 正如所有这些书籍所显示的那样，
然叛乱和暗杀成为这一时期日本政治生活的重要特征。 7而，这些作者都无法解释这种彻底反常的行为在精英阶层中为何明显正常并被广泛接受。
1935 年，杀害了一名将军的下级军官试图继续执行下一个任务，就像什么都没发生过一样。樱花会的密谋者们计划杀害的那些人只在旅馆里被关了 25 天就 "惩罚 "了他们。 事实上，犯罪者得到了军官团和普通民众的广泛同情。 然而，这些支持者中的大多数人很可能并不熟悉导致某些暗杀事件的复杂的军事辩论和派系纷争。 对同情者来说，刺客的 "纯粹动机 "才是最重要的。 9
在 20 世纪 30 年代初的日本，军官的暴力行为只要是出于 "真诚的 "爱国主义，其本身就会受到钦佩。
正如一位研究日本军队的著名历史学家最近承认的那样，20 世纪 30 年代帝国武装部队叛乱的根本原因至今仍是一个谜。 10
揭开谜底的关键在于此前几十年的发展。 要想了解
日本是如何成为一个士兵叛乱、抵抗、暗杀和阴谋活动司空见惯的国家，就必须了解军队不服从命令的历史。
这样一部长期的历史从未用英文写成。 本书就是这方面的一次尝试。 我将论证，军队不服从命令事件既不是零星的，也不是偶然的，而是基于一种根深蒂固的历史模式，
即从 19 世纪 60 年代到 20 世纪 30 年代日本军队生活中不可或缺的叛乱和抵抗文化。
追溯这种文化的根源和发展，我将证明它有四大特点。
首先，它是由日本政体中的结构性缺陷促成的，类似于计算机代码中的 "错误"。
其次，它的发展是决策者为实现其他目标而做出的看似合理的决定的无意结果。
第三，它是双刃剑，既有暴力叛乱，也有对国家权力的微妙反抗。
第四，多年来，反叛与反抗交替出现，以一种互惠的方式相互滋生和再造。
这里用电脑错误来比喻政治体制中的基本结构性缺陷。 就像软件中的错误一样，它们并不能阻止国家的运行。 只有在特定情况、特定条件下，它们才会导致严重故障，最终破坏整个系统。
第一个 Bug 在日本政体中形成了叛乱和抵抗的永久龛位，并与日本君主制的本质有关。
正如许多研究近代日本的历史学家所承认的那样，天皇的权威在理论上是绝对的，但在实践中却非常有限。
由于我们将详细讨论的原因，天皇隐藏在公众视线之外，无法做出自己的政策决定。
然而，由于天皇的 "旨意 "是政治合法性的最高象征，少数领导人（被广泛称为 "明治寡头"）能够利用天皇的名义，在皇位背后进行非正式统治。
然而，这个统治集团面临着一个问题。 在官方层面，天皇是决策人，寡头只是他的顾问。
因此，为了维护帝国至高无上的形象，他们并没有将自己作为国家实际统治者的地位合法化。
这种情况为军队内外的异议人士提供了取之不尽的意识形态弹药。 这些持不同政见者总是可以声称，他们而不是那些非正式掌权的人代表着皇帝的隐秘意志。
从 1877 年的萨摩叛乱开始，到 1936 年 2 月 26 日的政变，他们曾多次这样做。 这些军事起义与其他不服从命令的行为一样，都是针对统治国家的人，但几乎从不针对天皇或国家。
即使是最暴力的形式，军队中的叛乱和抵抗也仍然是君主制和爱国主义的。
第二个问题使得这种叛乱和抵抗更难对付，这与国家官方意识形态的某些特征有关。
明治政权一直以全方位扩张的渐进运动为基础：
更富裕的国家、更强大的军队、更大的帝国。 因此，不听话的军人可以通过比政府更快、更坚决地沿着帝国扩张的道路独立前进来表达他们的反对意见。
这种行为通常表现为针对其他国家的未经授权的军事行动。
由于国家意识形态要求不断扩张领土，即使政治领导层对不服从命令的军官的 "功绩 "深恶痛绝，政府也没有理由抹杀他们的 "功绩"。
很难惩罚这些 "爱国者"，毕竟他们与政府的目标是一致的。
第三个错误进一步激化了这种形式的不服从，它源于国家意识形态的另一个特点：
其基本的模糊性。 几乎所有相关人员都清楚，日本肩负着变得更富、更强、更大的使命，但具体到什么程度却始终不清楚。
国家政策往往被解释为无止境的帝国增长意识形态。
因此，军队中不安分分子的渴求永远无法浇灭，他们的梦想也永远无法满足。
无论大日本帝国如何扩张，心怀不满的军官总能声称需要进一步扩张。
因此，上述三个弊端为日本帝国军队的叛乱和抵抗创造了空间、思想鼓励和无尽的借口。
然而，这些弊端只是铺垫。
它们增加了叛乱的可能性，但本身并没有使其不可避免。
叛乱和抵抗的实际发展是不同的人在很长一段时间内做出的众多政策决定的意外后果。
如果其中一些决定有所不同，叛乱和抵抗的发展很可能会被延缓甚至遏制。
不同的参与者，无论是官员、政治家还是执法人员，他们的初衷都是解决问题，而不是助长不服从。
然而，他们的行动却产生了他们没有预见到的后果。
这些行为者的决定无意中造成的不服从有两种形式：
暴力叛乱和抵制政府政策，每种形式在不同时期都占主导地位。
从时间上看，叛乱和反抗的交替出现将本书的时间框架定格在
从 1860 年到 1936 年（第二次中日战争前夕）的 76 年间。
19 世纪 60 年代，德川政权被革命联盟推翻，被称为 "志士"（志向远大的武士）的武士恐怖分子则助纣为虐。
这些不守规矩的武士的意识形态和组织模式被日本几代不听话的军官所采用。
最重要的是，他们影响了暴力叛乱者，这些叛乱者出于各种原因，在 19 世纪 70 年代反叛新政权。
在这一早期的成长时期，不服从命令是不足为奇的，因为政权刚刚建立，力量薄弱，其政治等级制度仍不稳定，未经考验。 具有讽刺意味的是，
正是政府对 19 世纪 70 年代动乱的反应使得这些在政权薄弱时形成的不服从模式在政权稳固后依然存在。
1877 年镇压了一场大规模叛乱后，对军队进行了改革，几十年来，这些改革有助于遏制叛乱分子的不服从行为，但却产生了意想不到的结果，
即滋生了一种反抗国家权力的倾向，其形式可以是未经授权的军事行动（1895 年和 1928 年），也可以是不流血的政变（1912 年）。
这种反抗以休眠的形式保留了过去暴力叛乱的一些基本特征。
渐渐地，它的性质变得更加激进，直到 1931 年至 1936 年爆发了新一轮的暴力反抗浪潮。 从本质上讲，
本书回答了 1877 年后得到有力遏制的暴力反抗现象为何以及如何在五十年后再次爆发，并导致日本恶化为军国主义、无节制扩张和世界大战的问题。
本书是在查阅了四个不同国家的十五个档案馆，以及信件集、证词、警方笔录、法庭文件、外交电报、历史报纸、回忆录、访谈和其他形式的日文、英文、中文、德文和俄文原始资料后的成果。
书中探讨的一些事件，如
佐贺叛乱、1874 年的暗杀阴谋和 1895 年的朝鲜王后谋杀案，
很少有人进行过详细研究，因此原始资料至关重要。 其他事件，
如大正政治危机（1912-1913 年），尤其是 1936 年 2 月 26 日的军事叛乱，
之前已有少数英语和日语学者进行过分析，因此我能够利用他们的研究以及原始资料。
我对每一章中的事件进行了重构和分析，将其视为其所处时代和地点的产物，同时也将其视为最终导致日本发动太平洋战争的过程中的各个阶段。
但是，每一种叙述方式都有其局限性，无论是所涵盖的事件还是所考虑的主题。 因此，
本书绝不是一部全面的现代日本史。
它只关注与重大叛乱和抵抗事件相关的事件。
其他事件和发展，甚至那些对日本历史具有重大意义的事件和发展，我要么一带而过，要么只字不提。 这也不是对日本帝国异议的全面描述。
大日本帝国有许多不服从命令的群体，如民权活动家、暴躁的农民、不守规矩的学生、政治流氓、组织罢工的工人、无政府主义者和共产主义者。
不过，本书的主题是军队军官团和其他密切相关群体中的不服从命令行为。
在前面的一些章节中，我们详细讨论了
心怀不满的武士发动的兵变和暗杀阴谋，即使他们并不正式属于军官团，这主要有三个原因。
首先，在明治时代的头十年，军官和武士之间的界限仍然模糊不清。
此外，明治早期的武士兵变者表现出许多后来在军官中明显可见的模式。
最后，也是最重要的一点是，政府对这些兵变者的反应导致了意想不到的后果，这些后果影响了这一时期余下时间直至太平洋战争前夕的军人不服从命令的行为。
在故事的边角部分，我们还涉及到帝国海军，它只在两个短暂的时期（1912-1913 年和 1930-1932 年）经历过叛乱和抵抗。
只有当普通士兵和民间冒险家与军官合作、结盟或勾结时，才会提到他们的叛乱和抵抗。
在下文中，我不会讲述日本独有的故事。
在许多其他国家，尤其是东亚和南亚、南欧和东欧、撒哈拉以南非洲、中东和拉丁美洲，同时也存在以叛乱和反抗为形式的军事不服从行为。 其他国家也经历了 "三虫 "中的一种或多种，尽管形式略有不同。
第一种虫子当然也存在于其他地方。
沙皇尼古拉二世和德皇威廉二世在其统治的关键时刻未能展现出领导力。 即使是阿道夫-希特勒这样理论上无所不能的独裁者，也经常不干预关键决策。
相反，他希望他的下属能够为他的旨意的 "真正 "含义而争论不休（希特勒传记作者伊恩-克肖（Ian Kershaw）的说法是 "为元首而工作"）。 11
这些统治者都不像日本天皇那样隐忍，但他们的不领导确实为派系内斗提供了一些空间，有时还助长了军队的不服从。
既模糊又无边无际的扩张主义意识形态构成了第二个和第三个错误，但这也绝非日本独有。
以臭名昭著的 1893 年夏威夷政变为例。
当年，一群美国公民和军官与美国驻夏威夷大使密谋推翻夏威夷女王，建立虚假的共和国，为夏威夷被美国吞并铺平道路。
他们不经允许，违背候任总统格罗弗-克利夫兰的意愿，独立行事。
然而，他们的 "爱国主义 "为他们赢得了巨大的支持，使政变极难逆转。
五年后，美国吞并了夏威夷。 12
因此，尽管从总体上看日本并不是独一无二的，但这三种虫子在日本的结合方式确实使日本的故事不同于俄国、德国或美国。 日本所面临的挑战也与众不同，决策者对这些挑战的反应也不尽相同。 日本过去的独特遗产，尤其是志士及其意识形态，发挥了特别重要的作用。 因此，日本军队不服从命令，尽管与其他国家的不服从命令文化有相似之处，但却是一种独立的历史现象。
它是如何产生的，是本书试图回答的问题。
And yet, the imperial Japanese army was arguably one of the most disobedient armed forces in modern history. Japanese officers repeatedly staged coup d’états, violent insurrections, and political assassinations, phenomena that peaked in the 1870s and in the 1930s. Between these two periods, other officers incessantly resisted orders given by both government and high command. As Craig M. Cameron has written, the phenomenon of gekokujō , “the low overthrowing the high,” was “a crucial and unique concept shaping Japanese military culture. . . . Mid-level staff officers, by defying their superiors, transformed national policy. . . . Repeatedly, from Emperor Hirohito through the military high command, superiors tolerated insubordination [and] allowed their hands to be forced without reasserting their authority.” 5 This tradition began very early in modern Japanese history. The 1870s were an age of chaos, when rebellious officers, statesmen, and former samurai regularly hatched assassination plots, mutinies, and at times even open rebellions. In the late nineteenth century, and again during the 1910s and 1920s, officers assassinated foreign leaders and overthrew civilian cabinets in moments of political crisis. The 1930s gave rise to a particularly chaotic form of disobedience. In 1931, a military terror organization named the Sakura-kai (Cherry Blossom Society) attempted to annihilate the entire Japanese cabinet with an air strike. A few months later, rebellious officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. The ensuing coup d’état failed but led to a series of further violent upheavals, both inside and outside the army. In 1935, a leading general was slashed to death by a junior officer because of a factional rivalry. And finally, in February 1936, state control monetarily collapsed during a massive military insurgency. More than a thousand troops took to the streets, and several Japanese leaders were murdered in their mansions. In a classic book written during the Second World War, the British correspondent Hugh Byas coined the term “government by assassination.” Officers of the 1930s, according to Byas, terrorized the civilian cabinet by way of repeated assassinations. Through their ability to inflict lethal violence, they took control of foreign policy, pushing timid and terrified leaders toward a course of unbridled military expansion, and finally, into the disaster of the Pacific War. 6 The few English-languages studies about Japanese military disobedience have focused on rebellions in the 1930s, probably because of their drama, intensity, and proximity to the Second World War. As all of these books have shown, rebellions and assassinations became an essential feature of Japanese political life during this period. 7 None of these authors, however, has been able to explain the apparent normality and widespread acceptance amongst the elite of such thoroughly abnormal behavior. In 1935, the junior officer who had murdered a general attempted to go on to his next assignment, as if nothing had happened. The people the conspirators of the Sakura-kai had planned to kill “punished” them with only twenty-five days’ confinement to an inn. Indeed, the perpetrators enjoyed widespread sympathy both in the officer corps and from the general public. And yet, it is highly probable that most of these supporters were unfamiliar with the complicated military debates and factional strife that had led to some of the assassinations. It was the “pure motives” of the assassins which mattered to sympathizers. 9 In Japan of the early 1930s, violent acts of officers, as far as they were motivated by “sincere” patriotism, were admired in and of themselves. As a leading historian of the Japanese army admitted recently, the reasons underlying the rebelliousness of the imperial armed forces in the 1930s are still a mystery. 10 The key to unlocking it lies in the developments of prior decades. In order to understand how Japan became a country in which it was normal for soldiers to rebel, resist, assassinate, and conspire, a history of military insubordination is necessary. Such a long-term history has never been written in English. The present book is an attempt to do so. Incidents of military insubordination were neither sporadic nor random, I will argue, but rather based on a deep-rooted historical pattern, a culture of rebellion and resistance that was an integral part of Japanese military life from the 1860s to the 1930s. Tracing the roots and the development of this culture, I will demonstrate that it had four major features. First, it was made possible by structural faults in the Japanese polity, comparable to “bugs” in a computer code. Second, its development was an unintentional result of seemingly reasonable decisions made by policymakers trying to achieve other goals. Third, it was doubled-edged, combining violent rebellions with more subtle resistance to state authority. Fourth, rebellion and resistance alternated over the years, nurturing and re-creating each other in a reciprocal way. Computer bugs are used here as a metaphor denoting basic structural flaws in the political system. Just like bugs in software, they did not prevent the state from running. Only in certain situations, under specific conditions, did they cause severe failures that eventually undermined the entire system. The first bug formed a perpetual niche for rebellion and resistance in the Japanese polity and related to the essence of the Japanese monarchy. As recognized by many historians of modern Japan, the authority of the emperor, absolute in theory, was very limited in practice. For reasons we shall discuss in detail, the emperor, hidden from public view, could not make policy decisions of his own. Yet, as his “will” was the supreme emblem of political legitimacy, a handful of leaders (widely known as the “Meiji oligarchs”) were able to use his name to govern unofficially from behind the throne. However, this ruling group faced a problem. Officially, the emperor was the one who made decisions, and the oligarchs were merely his advisors. So, in order to maintain the image of imperial supremacy, they did not legitimize their own position as the de facto rulers of the country. This situation gave an inexhaustible source of ideological ammunition for dissenters in the military and beyond. Such dissenters could always claim that they, rather than the people who unofficially held power, represented the hidden will of the emperor. As we shall see later, they did so on several occasions, starting with the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 and ending with the coup d’état of February 26, 1936. These military uprisings, like other acts of insubordination, were directed against the people who ruled the country, but almost never against the emperor or the state. Even in their most violent forms, rebellion and resistance in the army remained monarchic and patriotic. The second bug, which made such rebellion and resistance harder to contend with, related to a certain feature of official state ideology. The Meiji regime had always been based on a progressive movement of expansion on all fronts: richer country, stronger army, bigger empire. Therefore, disobedient military elements could express their opposition by independently moving along the road of imperial expansion faster and more resolutely than the government. Often, such behavior took the form of unauthorized military operations against other countries. Because state ideology dictated constant territorial expansion, it did not make sense for the government to undo the “achievements” of disobedient officers, even if the political leadership abhorred the way in which they had been obtained. It was difficult to punish such “patriots,” who after all were striving for the same goals as the government.
The third bug, which further radicalized this form of insubordination, derived from another feature of the state ideology: its basic ambiguity. It was clear to almost all actors involved that Japan harbored a mission to become richer, stronger, and larger, but it was never clear to what extent. National policy was often interpreted as an ideology of endless imperial growth. Therefore, the thirst of restive elements in the army could never be quenched, and their dreams could never be satisfied. No matter how much the Japanese empire expanded, disgruntled officers could always claim that further expansion was needed. Hence, the three bugs mentioned above created room, ideological encouragement, and endless pretexts for rebellion and resistance in the imperial Japanese army. However, these bugs only set the stage. They increased the probability of insubordination but did not make it inevitable in itself. The actual development of rebellion and resistance was an unintended consequence of numerous policy decisions taken by different people over a long period of time. Had some of these decisions been different, the developments could well have been slowed or even curbed. The different actors, whether officers, politicians, or law enforcement personnel, always intended to solve problems, not foster insubordination. Yet their actions had consequences they did not foresee.
The insubordination unintentionally created by these actors’ decisions took two forms: violent rebellion and resistance to government policy, each dominant at different times. The alternation between rebellion and resistance chronologically frames this book in a period of seventy-six years, from 1860 to 1936, the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In the 1860s, the Tokugawa regime was overthrown by a revolutionary coalition, abetted by samurai terrorists known as shishi (warriors of high aspirations). The ideology and organizational patterns of these unruly samurai were adopted by generations of disobedient officers in Japan. Most of all, they influenced violent rebels who, for various reasons, turned against the new regime in the 1870s. Insubordination in this early, formative period was unsurprising, as the regime was new and weak, and its political hierarchy was still fluid and untested. Ironically, it was the response of the government to the upheavals of the 1870s that made it possible for these patterns of insubordination, established when the regime was weak, to endure even after its solidification. Reforms in the army, implemented after the suppression of a major rebellion in 1877, helped to curb rebellious insubordination for decades, but had an unexpected outcome, nurturing a tendency of resistance to state authority, either in the form of unauthorized military operations (1895, 1928) or as bloodless coups d’état (1912). This resistance preserved, in a dormant form, some of the basic features of the past’s violent rebellions. Gradually, it became more radical in nature, until it exploded in a new wave of violent rebellions from 1931 to 1936. In essence, this book answers the questions of why and how the phenomenon of violent insubordination, powerfully curbed after 1877, exploded again fifty years later, contributing to the deterioration of Japan into militarism, unbridled expansion, and world war. This book is the result of encounters with fifteen archives in four different countries, as well as letter collections, testimonies, police transcripts, court documents, diplomatic cables, historical newspapers, memoirs, interviews, and other forms of primary material in Japanese, English, Chinese, German, and Russian. Some of the incidents explored in the book, such as the Saga Rebellion, the assassination plots of 1874, and the murder of the Korean queen in 1895, have rarely been studied in detail, so the primary materials are of paramount importance. Other incidents, such as the Taishō political crisis (1912–1913) and, especially, the military revolt of February 26, 1936, have been analyzed before by a handful of scholars in English and Japanese, so I have been able to make use of their studies as well as the primary sources.
I have reconstructed and analyzed the incidents in each chapter as products of their time and place, and also as phases in the process that ultimately led Japan to the Pacific War. But every narrative has its limitations, both in the events it covers and the themes it considers. So this book is by no means a comprehensive history of modern Japan. It focuses only on events which are of relevance to major incidents of rebellion and resistance. Other events and developments, even those of great significance to Japanese history, I either mention in passing or not at all. Nor is this a comprehensive account of dissent in the Japanese empire. There were many disobedient groups in Imperial Japan, such as popular rights activists, restive peasants, unruly students, political ruffians, workers who organized strikes, anarchists, and communists. This book’s subject, however, is insubordination in the army’s officer corps and other closely related groups. In some of the earlier chapters, we deal at length with mutinies and assassination plots staged by disgruntled samurai, even when they did not officially belong to the officer corps, for three main reasons. First of all, in the first decade of the Meiji era, the borderline between officers and samurai was still blurry. In addition, early Meiji samurai mutineers displayed many patterns later evident among officers. Finally, and most important, the government’s reaction to these mutineers led to unintended consequences that shaped military insubordination for the rest of the period, up to the eve of the Pacific War. In the margins of the story, we deal also with the Imperial Navy, which experienced rebellion and resistance only in two short periods (1912–1913 and 1930–1932). Rebellion and resistance among rank-and-file soldiers and civilian adventurers are mentioned only when these people worked with, were allied with, or colluded with officers. In the following pages I do not tell a story that is unique to Japan. Military disobedience, both in the form of rebellion and defiance, existed at the same time in numerous other countries, particularly in East and South Asia, southern and eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Other countries also experienced one or more of the “three bugs,” albeit in somewhat different forms. The first bug certainly existed elsewhere. Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser William II failed to demonstrate leadership at crucial junctures in their reigns. Even such a theoretically omnipotent dictator as Adolf Hitler often did not interfere in key decisions. He expected instead that his subordinates would fight and debate with each other over the “true” meaning of his will (“working toward the Führer,” as Hitler biographer Ian Kershaw phrased it). 11 None of these rulers was as hidden as the Japanese emperor, but their failure to lead did allow some room for factional infighting and at times encouraged military insubordination.
An expansionist ideology that was both vague and boundless, which constitutes the second and third bugs, was also far from unique to Japan. Take the infamous Hawaii coup d’état of 1893 as an example. In that year a group of American citizens and officers conspired with the US ambassador to Hawaii to overthrow the queen and establish a phony republic, so as to pave the way for the island to be annexed by the United States. They acted independently, without asking for permission and against the will of President Elect Grover Cleveland. Yet their “patriotism” won them enormous support and made the coup extremely difficult to reverse. Five years later, the United States annexed Hawaii. 12 So while Japan was not unique in general terms, the way the three bugs combined in the country did make its story different from that of Russia, Germany, or the United States. The challenges Japan faced were also different, as were the responses of policymakers to those challenges. The distinct legacy of the Japanese past, especially the shishi and their ideology, played a particularly important role. Japanese military insubordination, notwithstanding its similarity to cultures of disobedience in other countries, is therefore an independent historical phenomenon. How it came about is the question that this book tries to answer.
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