日本皇軍為何實力成長如此之快？
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RoughDraft95How did the Imperial Japanese Military grow in strength so quickly?
This would be around the time of the Meiji Reforms onwards in terms of the time I was looking at.
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For the navy, there were 2 broad phases: 1868 to 1895, then 1895 onward. For the army, the situation was more complicated. Both started by imitating foreign forms, then, after some successes, combined indigenous innovations with foreign doctrine.
The history of the Imperial Japanese Navy is more straightforward - its 'true founder' was Enomoto Takeaki, a samurai who had once fought the Meiji government commanding a breakaway state. For its first 3 decades, conscious that all its likely rivals, chief among them the Chinese Beiyang and Nanyang fleets, had greater financial resources, the Japanese navy innovated the French navy's asymmetric "jeune ecole" doctrine which believed swarms of small ships could overcome battleship rows. A hodgepodge of foreign advisors arrived to train the navy, but, unlike countries that did poorly with foreign advisors, real control was always in the hands of the IJN's officer cliques, who held the advisors at arms' length and standardized their SOP using bits and pieces of each foreign navy's doctrine, instead of allowing foreign advisors to clash and create contradictory recommendations
Unfortunately, like most asymmetric doctrines, the jeune ecole turned out to be nonsense. During the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Navy did not so much win the war as much as the Beiyang Navy lost it. After Empress Dowager Ci Xi's retirement in 1889, her successor as kingmaker, Grand Tutor Weng, slashed military funding to the point at which the Beiyang navy purchased no more ships after that year, and all personnel were fatally underpaid. During the war, the Japanese Navy's cruisers, torpedo boats, and gunboats failed to destroy any of the Chinese navy's battleships. Instead, the battleships were forced to surrender when it was found out that their underpaid officers replaced most of their gunpowder with sawdust in a corruption racket.
This outcome was a grave disappointment for the IJN, which had hoped its asymmetric doctrine would allow it to take on much bigger foes like France, Britain, the US, or Russia with fewer resources. The aftermath of the war saw them try to cover lost ground by lobbying for a 10-year building plan called the 6-6 plan: 6 battleships, 6 armored cruisers. They handled this transition from a French-style small ship fleet to a British-style battleship row with remarkable competence, making up for material deficits through superior gunnery training and asymmetric innovations like offensive minelaying, and the use of incendiary melinite shells to destroy superstructures. After the royal navy itself, the IJN was the first force to widely introduce wireless telegraphy (radio) on its ships. This restructuring process involved sending promising officers like Akiyama Saneyuki to the US and UK to observe the way they educated battleship officers - Akiyama brought back the concept of naval wargames, which he quickly introduced to the IJN's academies and colleges. Critically, not all of the IJN's ideas worked - their continued faith in torpedo boats was shattered by the war, and Akiyama's idea to replicate the (failed) plugging of Santiago harbor with a "sinkship" at Port Arthur went just as well as its predecessor. The "proto-Pearl Harbor" surprise attack at Port Arthur was a miserable failure, despite happening in ideal conditions. Ultimately, the IJN was willing to try new things and fail, and that was the secret to its success.
Unlike the army, the Navy fought flawlessly during the Russo-Japanese War, and changed very little "in spirit" following the war, simply adjusting its "victorious doctrine" to the times in subsequent decades. The IJN totally outclassed the various Russian fleets, and "learned" that speed and long-range battleship gunnery were the key ingredients to tactical naval success. Strategically, the war seemed a confirmation of the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who the IJN continued to read religiously.
The IJA's history is more complicated. For the decade following the Meiji Restoration, it did everything in its power to imitate the French and German armies - by 1871, "German infantry, French cavalry" became the consensus. The 1877 Satsuma rebellion, however, would totally change the game. In the dying moments of the rebellion, its leader, former ruling clique member Saigo Takamori, launched a suicide charge that greatly inspired his protege-turned-enemy, Yamagata Aritomo. While such suicide charges were commonplace in the military history of Japan, they were rare virtually anywhere else in the world. This Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit), the generals reasoned, would be the "X Factor" Japan would need to defeat richer and more populous countries (in other words: every country they would possibly fight save for Korea). Seishin Kyoikyu, or spiritual training, filtered into IJA manuals as early as 1882, the same year the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors was issued, striking a uniquely Japanese tone and rejecting many of the beliefs in vogue in Europe at the time. Still, foreign advice remained dominant in doctrinal formation well into the late 1880s, when the last empowered foreign advisors were expelled. By 1895, the IJA was still an "imitation Western force", and its performance, while respectable, was mediocre by the standards of great powers. Still, its conduct of the 1894-95 war was far less flawed than that of the Navy, so the impulse to reform was far lower.
From 1895 to 1905, the IJA made only minor doctrinal revisions, mainly around the few visible failures it did experience. In reaction to the Lushunkou massacre, when Japanese soldiers, who had no cultural or historical tradition of taking POWs, massacred thousands of surrendered Chinese, the IJA stiffened discipline and instituted "regimental wives" (prostitutes, and a precursor to comfort women) as a sort of catharsis to discourage rapes and brutality. These measures seem to have worked by 1899, as, during the Boxer Rebellion, Westerners praised Japanese soldiers for their civility and discipline (though the conduct of some of the members of the 8-Nation Alliance set a very low bar). The other area where the IJN did start to innovate was in re-introducing some traditional "Eastern" military tactics into its doctrine, namely the night attack. From 1895 to 1905, Chinese military classics started to filter back into Japanese military education and 'recreational' military reading, as the army searched for "native" advantages against materially and numerically superior Western forces.
The Russo-Japanese War, while a success, would be a serious wakeup call for the IJA as it caused widespread disenchantment with the "mainstream" European doctrines at the time. Foreshadowing World War 1, Japanese forces launched repeated human wave attacks against fortified positions, and, while they generally killed more than they lost, it rapidly became clear to the brass that they could not win wars against numerically superior enemies in this fashion. During the war, the IJA displayed more competence than their Russian enemies (who still drilled volley fire and were instructed "not to aim" by their tactical regulations, as aiming slowed down the momentum of the attack) and were widely praised by European observers (whose armies were following the same outdated doctrine), but privately its generals knew their tactics were unsustainable.
While fewer than those of the IJN, the IJA did have highlights during the war. Its night attacks were terrifying to the Russians, and would remain a fixture of its doctrine until its dissolution. Its morale was legendary, and it is still debated by historians whether this was created by seishin kyoikyu, or was simply cultural to the Japanese. Reacting against orientalism, many scholars in the 70s to 2000s tried to adjust the narrative and asserted that it was "indoctrination" that caused Japanese soldiers to be so fanatical. Some have tried to "excuse" the conduct, and indeed the atrocities of the IJA in the 30s and 40s by claiming that they were merely imitating European fascism.
However, Japanese memoirs from the Russo-Japanese War, most famously Human Bullets, prove that these "enlightened" arguments are mostly nonsense. These memoirs reveal that a great many Japanese troops during the Russo-Japanese War received virtually no seishin kyoikyu at all, and in some cases even very little training. Despite this, the accounts are full of "everyday fanaticism", including such gems as "In this particular battle to be ready for death was not enough; what was required of us was a determination not to fail to die. Indeed, we were 'sure-death' men, and this new appellation gave us a great stimulus". The accounts reveal that Japan, long before fascism, was an extreme version of an "honor culture" where one's reputation in his local community was more important, even far more important, than his life. They are also full of accounts of soldiers instinctively trying to raise each others' spirits and take each others' minds off suffering and bad news. In short, Japanese culture at the time was naturally conducive to military morale - something that was widely noticed by Western observers at the time but denied amid a torrent of revisionist history in the later Cold War.
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Outside "moral factors", the IJA did introduce some doctrinal innovations. While the British conducted indirect artillery fire on a limited scale in the Boer War, the IJA was the first army to introduce it widely. They also made innovative offensive use of machine guns, using them as overwatch from defilade to cover assaults - a skirmish line would dash from one row of cover to another when the machine gun fired, then stop and allow it to be cooled with water (as was required with the Maxims of the time) before resuming the advance under cover again. All in all, however, while the IJA revealed itself to be one of the most tactically competent armies of the time, pre-WW1 doctrine set the bar extremely low, and its generals were made painfully aware of that.
What followed was a near total rejection of the military orthodoxy of the time, and decades of innovation to create a doctrine that would allow smaller forces to defeat larger ones, and less well armed forces to defeat better armed ones. The first sacred cow to be slaughtered was traditional European drill and training, which emphasized appearances and attention to detail. The IJA replaced this with year-round "practical training" for skills they thought would be useful, including endurance marches (building up to the point where men would be marching 25 miles a day for several days), section (squad) tactics, marksmanship, bayonet work, and learning to use the rifles of their most likely adversaries. Virtually no attention was paid to bed folding, parade, or uniform standards (and uniforms would indeed get remarkably uglier in the intervening decades). Some feared the collapse of discipline amid the dissolution of European drill practices, so the IJA worked around this problem by instituting frequent beatings over even the smallest mistake, reasoning that "the lesson would remembered" and this would "encourage prompt obedience to orders".
The second sacred cow to be slaughtered was pre-war battalion tactics, which at the time involved a large unit working as a single organism, each company always having contact with the next. Japan devolved the basic tactical unit from the company to the platoon even before the First World War, and by the second it had devolved to the section. Units were instructed to forget about maintaining contact or regularity with one another, with a sole emphasis on "closing rapidly" so Japanese soldiers could leverage their advantage at close ranges.
Finally, the IJA dispensed with any semblance of 'unity of command'. Originally German-trained, it had always believed in 'mission command', but by 1931 had taken this to its logical extreme, to the point at which orders were rarely longer than a single paragraph and following them was almost optional at all levels. The most notorious example of this gone wrong was in the Imphal Offensive of 1944, where General Mutaguchi was essentially told by everyone that his offensive was a stupid idea, but ignored them all. His commander, Kawabe, allowed the plan to go ahead despite also thinking it was stupid because he believed that officers should be allowed to do what they wanted and the junior ranks always had a more accurate picture of the situation than their seniors. However, in many cases this decentralization also resulted in stunning successes. On the whole, it permeated a culture of gekokujo ("loyal insubordination") within the military where ranks in some cases became almost meaningless and a combination of force of personality and audacity determined how much say an officer had in what was to be done.
The basic trajectory of post-1905 IJA reform transitioned the force from a conventional to a "disruptive" force. Aware that military logistics and C3 were getting more complicated by the year, most countries focused on acquiring excellence in these 4 areas. Japan, in contrast, owing to its weaker industrial base, focused on building a force that could function in the absence of good logistics and C3, and which could disrupt that of the enemy, rendering him a "fish out of water".
This unconventional set of beliefs led to remarkable successes beyond what any of its authors expected in the 30s and 40s, a process which greatly buoyed the confidence and expansionism of the IJA. Its triumphs started in 1931 with the conquest of Manchuria, continued during the Second-Sino Japanese War, and finally culminated with the conquest of the European and American colonies in 1941-42. Each of these victories involved an outnumbered and outgunned force triumphing with surprising ease. Opponents of the IJA at the time noted that its soldiers were able to march far faster than they were and fight in any conditions, while its officers showed exceptional initiative and ingenuity. However, the later part of this period would also expose flaws in the IJA's system - it was excellent at doing 1 thing, and not very good at anything else. Throughout the 1941-42 offensives, the IJA relied extensively on captured equipment, and by 1944 the British had learned to keep their depots far behind their lines. Further, as a basically offensive army, the IJA knew almost nothing of defense and did not even have a concept of defense in depth. It wasn't until Iwo Jima that any Japanese position was defended competently - instead, it was "defended through attack". On paper, this wasn't an issue - even in the highly unfavorable tactical conditions of island defense, where the Japanese were subject to naval bombardment and faced an always numerically superior enemy, their loss ratios were often even and sometimes favorable. In practice, however, such an aggressive defense meant IJA garrisons were being defeated far faster than they otherwise would have been, meaning the army was essentially incapable of fighting any kind of delaying action.
The performance of the navy, due to its relative inertia during the interwar, was far less remarkable. Pearl Harbor, the Java Sea, the Indian Ocean Raid, and Savo Island were highlights, but the navy also had its share of catastrophic failures, including early in the war. Unlike the army, which had essentially discarded most of its Russo-Japanese War era practices, the navy still clung to its antiquated decisive battle doctrine, failed to develop any semblance of competent ASW tactics, and seemed to have done very little thinking about how a long war would turn out. Whereas the army had a coherent "theory of victory" against numerically superior opponents, the navy did not consider the deficiencies in, for example, their small-class pilot training program, and simply assumed that "ships took a long time to build" so a single victory would knock an opponent out of the war.
There is obviously a lot that I didn't discuss during this post, including: - The IJA's record against Korean, Manchurian, and Chinese guerrillas. - The brutal occupation of Eastern Russia from 1918-1922. - The factional intrigues within the IJA (chobatsu vs everyone else, then Baden-Baden group/toseiha vs kodoha). - The Soviet-Japanese Border War and the extensive falsification campaign that surrounded it. - Japan's 'rapid industrialization' (or rather, lack thereof) during the Meiji era. - The Sengoku roots of gekokujo, long before German arrival.
But this post is already getting way too long and I hope it at the very least gives a basic overview of the topic.
Tilting_Gambit
TienKehan
raptorgalaxy
an_actual_lawyerthe navy still clung to its antiquated decisive battle doctrine, failed to develop any semblance of competent ASW tactics, and seemed to have done very little thinking about how a long war would turn out.
I have a few minor nits to pick with these statements.
With respect to "decisive battle" I think that was the only way for Japan to win the war, other than the idea of attacking just the DEI and hoping that the US public's isolationist tilt could hold out for 12-18 months, giving the Japanese time to boost their reserves of oil, rubber, tin, aviation gasoline, etc.
Back to decisive battle. The Japanese had the best carrier task force in the world in 1940-1942. They had the best carrier pilots and they had arguably the best carrier planes. What they didn't have was staying power in any category for a long war so the only hope was to use those advantages to win a decisive battle or battles and hope the US cut a deal that would allow Japan to keep some portion of its empire.
You're not wrong, but it just goes to show how fatally flawed Japan's understanding of both the US and modern war were.
The idea that knocking out most of the US Pacific Fleet would do anything but lengthen the war showed a complete underestimation of the US's productive capacity. On Youtube, Military History Visualized has a great video that really helped me visualize how stunning the US's advantage in production was. The Japanese based their assumptions on how hard it was for them to build ships, completely ignoring how easy it was for the US to build them, even while also fighting a war in Europe.
They also underestimated the Allies' will to fight. For some reason, the Axis constantly entertained dreams of the "weak" Allies or "degenerate" communists caving and coming to the peace conference table after a defeat or two. I don't know if it was the (outlier) example of France setting their expectations or just plain old wishful thinking, but they couldn't have been more wrong in assuming that the US would have packed it in after a decisive defeat. Hell, I'd even say they were 180 degrees wrong; Pearl Harbor almost single-handedly killed off 99% of the isolationist sentiment in the US in one day. It did so so effectively that we now have conspiracy theories about how FDR must have known, since it worked out so well for his foreign policy goals.
Like you said, it might have been their only hope. But it was a vain hope, and wiser minds might have seen that and avoided war with the US altogether.
DerFeisteAbt
Hessarian99Yep, and it's one of the most pervasive myths in modern history. Japan did industrialize relatively quickly in the Meiji era, but relative is the key word. At a time when average GDP growth in Western Europe was around 1%, Japan was tied with the US at 3%. Fast, but nowhere close to speeds after 1931.
Contra popular belief, Japanese economic management before 1931 was hardly brilliant and had a lot of problems. During and after the Satsuma rebellion, there was massive hyperinflation both from printing to pay for the rebellion (Confucian governance was essentially minarchist, so taxes were very low in all of northeast Asia until after WW1) and from copying the local reserve bank system of the US, which was naturally inflationary. Finance Minister Matsukata responded to this by centralizing banknote issuing privileges in the central bank, and, after the Shimonoseki indemnity from China, buying gold to join the gold standard. What resulted was the "Matsukata deflation", which is extremely controversial among Japanese economists to this day. Some say it was brilliant, others say it was the height of economic stupidity, but the fact that this era involved great economic disruption was undeniable.
After 1900, Japan's economy was still mostly agrarian, and what industries it had were struggling. The zaibatsu started as foreign trading firms, and basically controlled the export distribution channel. They exploited small manufacturers, who had to bid low for export deals, and the traditional rayon, silk, and textile industries were suffering from American tariffs and competition from Hong Kong and China. Japan, contra popular belief, ran a trade deficit for most of the interwar years, owing to the need to import huge amounts of technology. This usually wasn't done in the smart way (hiring foreign experts, consultants, and technicians or sending interns abroad) but by directly buying huge amounts of machinery. Japan was always short of gold, and had to institute a "gold embargo" to avoid its currency being totally debased.
The turning point in Japanese economic management was 1931, when the 'reform bureaucrats', a long marginalized group in the zaibatsu-aligned establishment of the Japanese government, acquired a 'laboratory' in Manchukuo. Following the conquest of the province by mostly toseiha officers, they made an alliance with the reform bureuacrats. This concurred with a purge of reformist bureaucrats by zaibatsu-aligned officials in Japan, so most were "exiled" to Manchuria. There, they experimented with several policies to expand corporate profit rates (usually by depressing wages at all costs) and encouraging foreign investment. They secured for themselves a 'defector' among the zaibatsu in Nissan Founder Aigunkawa Gisuke, who essentially had no choice but to accept Manchukuo's overtures due to the impending bankruptcy of his company. Most of the Japanese postwar economic management techniques got their start in Manchukuo.
Boom-era monetary policy had a different genesis. By 1932, the Great Depression was hitting Japan, so Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo essentially dispensed with mainstream economics at the time, left the gold standard, ran the money printer, and used heavy deficit spending. It worked. The Finance Ministry brass had a change of heart, believing that Classical Economics was indeed the scam the reform bureaucrats were saying it was, and from then on became their main ally in Japan.
Long story short, by 1937 both the military establishment and political establishment were outmaneuvered by the "Manchurian clique" of reform bureaucrats and toseiha officers with the help of the Hitler-cosplaying (not a joke, he actually dressed as Hitler to costume parties) Prince Konoe. Konoe had a good run, lasting four years on and off (about 10 times longer than the average Japanese PM at the time), but eventually Tojo (the leader of Toseiha), Kishi (the leader of the reform bureaucrats), and Matsukata (the foreign minister and their longtime friend) threw him under the bus. Then, Tojo and Kishi threw Matsukata under the bus (I forget exactly why) and bombed Pearl Harbor. By then, it was too late for economic reform, but the reformists used the war to clear all the conservatives out of the bureaucracy. Finally, by 1945, the reform bureaucrats threw Tojo and Toseiha under the bus, convincing the Americans that the military and zaibatsu were responsible for the war and they had no part in it (something easy for the Americans to believe, as the American bureaucracy had virtually no power) and ended up ruling the country for 40 years.
In this time, they implemented, refined, and perfected the techniques they were already using in Manchukuo and, on the monetary front, in Japan. Critically, however, these techniques were unknown before 1931, and the Meiji era, despite being a military success, was an economic failure as Japan remained a relatively poor 'great power' up to the 40s.
DrHENCHMANHitler-cosplaying (not a joke, he actually dressed as Hitler to costume parties) Prince Konoe
wikipedia_text_botPrince Fumimaro Konoe (Japanese: 近衞 文麿, Hepburn: Konoe Fumimaro, often Konoye, 12 October 1891 – 16 December 1945) was a Japanese politician and prime minister. During his tenure, he presided over the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the breakdown in diplomatic relations resulting in Japan’s entry into World War II. He also played a central role in transforming his country into a totalitarian state by passing the National Mobilization Law and founding the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Despite Konoe's attempts to resolve tensions with the United States, the rigid timetable imposed on negotiations by the military and his government's inflexibility regarding a resolution set Japan on the path to war.
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Critically, however, these techniques were unknown before 1931, and the Meiji era, despite being a military success, was an economic failure as Japan remained a relatively poor 'great power' up to the 40s.
Hmm, it seems to me that economically, the Japanese Meji period parallels other non-European powers that had reforms in the nineteenth century (Ottoman Tanzimat period, Qing Dynasty self-strengthening, Egypt under Muhammad Ali).
Mistaking the Industrial revolution as a technological revolution instead of a financial revolution, like their counterparts in China, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, the Meiji reformers focused on military technology.
Except their military reforms were far more successful, giving Japan enough time to devise their own economic system.
sirboozebum
Ye_Olde_Mudder
Garand
theskipper363
dalenacio
LostWithStuff
HoboWithAGlock FlashbackHistoryDeputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Mandatory Fun |
Command, Control, and Communications. In other words, how leaders talk to their subordinate units and tell them what to do.
VRichardsenUnfortunately, like most asymmetric doctrines, the jeune ecole turned out to be nonsense. During the First Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Navy did not so much win the war as much as the Beiyang Navy lost it. After Empress Dowager Ci Xi's retirement in 1889, her successor as kingmaker, Grand Tutor Weng, slashed military funding to the point at which the Beiyang navy purchased no more ships after that year, and all personnel were fatally underpaid. During the war, the Japanese Navy's cruisers, torpedo boats, and gunboats failed to destroy any of the Chinese navy's battleships. Instead, the battleships were forced to surrender when it was found out that their underpaid officers replaced most of their gunpowder with sawdust in a corruption racket.
This paragraph alone is fascinating; so much packed into it. This comment is not only informative, but a joy to read.
Thank you: * Japanese Infantryman 1937-45 - The best overview of IJA training and doctrine in English. * Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 * Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall - Not a very objective book, but goes over the major facts well. * The Way of the Heavenly Sword - very good and goes deep into the factional politics. * The Russo-Japanese War: Lessons Not Learned
During the war, the Japanese Navy's cruisers, torpedo boats, and gunboats failed to destroy any of the Chinese navy's battleships. Instead, the battleships were forced to surrender when it was found out that their underpaid officers replaced most of their gunpowder with sawdust in a corruption racket.
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r/戰爭學院
日本皇軍為何實力成長如此之快？
就我所看到的時間而言，這大約是明治維新時期。
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對於海軍來說，有兩個主要階段：1868 年至 1895 年，然後是 1895 年以後。對軍隊來說，情況更加複雜。兩者都是從模仿外國形式開始的，然後在取得一些成功後，將本土創新與外國學說結合起來。
日本帝國海軍的歷史更為簡單──它的「真正創始人」是榎本武昭，一位曾與指揮分裂國家的明治政府作戰的武士。在最初的30年裡，日本海軍意識到所有可能的競爭對手（主要是中國的北洋艦隊和南洋艦隊）都擁有更強大的財力，因此創新了法國海軍的不對稱「青年學院」學說，該學說相信成群結隊的小型艦艇可以戰勝戰艦行。一大堆外國顧問來到這裡訓練海軍，但是，與那些在外國顧問方面表現不佳的國家不同，真正的控制權始終掌握在日本海軍的軍官集團手中，他們與顧問保持一定的距離，並使用比特和數字來標準化他們的標準作業程序。每個外國海軍的條令，而不是讓外國顧問發生衝突並提出相互矛盾的建議
不幸的是，像大多數不對稱學說一樣，「青年學院」最終被證明是無稽之談。甲午戰爭期間，與其說日本海軍贏了戰爭，不如說是北洋海軍輸了。1889年慈禧太后退休後，她的繼任者太傅翁太師大幅削減軍費，導致北洋水師自此之後不再購買船隻，所有人員的工資都嚴重過低。戰爭期間，日本海軍的巡洋艦、魚雷艇、砲艇未能摧毀中國海軍的任何一艘戰艦。相反，當發現戰艦上的軍官工資過低，在腐敗行為中用木屑代替了大部分火藥時，戰艦被迫投降。
這項結果令日本海軍深感失望，它原本希望其不對稱學說能夠使其能夠以更少的資源對抗法國、英國、美國或俄羅斯等更大的敵人。戰爭結束後，他們試圖透過遊說一項名為「6-6計畫」的10年建設計畫來彌補失地：6艘戰艦，6艘裝甲巡洋艦。他們以卓越的能力完成了從法國式小型艦隊到英國式戰艦的轉變，透過卓越的砲術訓練和進攻性布雷等非對稱創新以及使用燃燒性雷尼特砲彈摧毀上層建築來彌補物質上的不足。繼英國皇家海軍之後，日本海軍是第一支在其艦艇上廣泛採用無線電報的部隊。這個重組過程包括派遣像秋山實之這樣有前途的軍官到美國和英國觀察他們教育戰艦軍官的方式——秋山帶回了海軍兵棋的概念，並很快將其引入了日本海軍的學院和學院。關鍵的是，日本海軍的想法並非全部都奏效——戰爭摧毀了他們對魚雷艇的持續信心，而秋山在亞瑟港用一艘“沉船”複製聖地亞哥港堵塞（失敗的）的想法和它的前身一樣順利。儘管發生在理想的條件下，但對旅順港的「原始珍珠港」襲擊卻是一次悲慘的失敗。最終，日本海軍願意嘗試新事物並接受失敗，這就是其成功的秘訣。
與陸軍不同，海軍在日俄戰爭期間表現完美，戰後「精神」幾乎沒有改變，只是在隨後的幾十年裡根據時代調整了「勝利主義」。日本海軍完全超越了各種俄羅斯艦隊，並「了解」速度和遠程戰艦火力是海軍戰術成功的關鍵因素。從戰略上講，這場戰爭似乎證實了阿爾弗雷德·塞耶·馬漢的著作，日本海軍繼續虔誠地閱讀他的著作。
IJA 的歷史更為複雜。明治維新後的十年裡，它竭盡全力模仿法國和德國軍隊——到1871年，「德國步兵，法國騎兵」成為共識。然而，1877 年的薩摩叛亂徹底改變了遊戲規則。在叛亂的最後時刻，其領導人、前統治集團成員西鄉隆森發起了自殺指控，極大地鼓舞了他的門徒變成敵人的山形有友。雖然此類自殺指控在日本軍事史上很常見，但在世界其他地方幾乎很少見。將軍們認為，這種大和魂（日本精神）將是日本擊敗更富裕、人口更多的國家（換句話說：除了朝鮮以外他們可能與之戰鬥的每個國家）所需的「X因素」。Seishin Kyoikyu（精神訓練）早在 1882 年就滲透到 IJA 手冊中，同年《士兵和水手的帝國敕令》發布，呈現出獨特的日本風格，並拒絕了當時歐洲流行的許多信仰。儘管如此，直到 1880 年代末，當最後一批獲得授權的外國顧問被驅逐時，外國建議仍然在理論形成中佔據主導地位。到1895年，IJA仍然是一支“模仿西方力量”，其表現雖然值得尊敬，但以大國的標準來看卻很平庸。儘管如此，它在 1894-95 年戰爭中的表現遠不如海軍的缺陷，因此改革的動力要低得多。
從 1895 年到 1905 年，IJA 僅對理論進行了較小的修改，主要是圍繞它所經歷的少數明顯的失敗。針對旅順口大屠殺，沒有俘虜戰俘的文化和歷史傳統的日本士兵屠殺了數千名投降的中國人，日軍加強了紀律，並設立了“團妻”（妓女，慰安婦的前身）作為一種阻止強姦和暴行的宣洩方式。這些措施似乎在 1899 年發揮了作用，因為在義和團運動期間，西方人稱讚日本士兵的文明和紀律（儘管八國聯盟的一些成員的行為門檻很低）。日本海軍確實開始創新的另一個領域是將一些傳統的「東方」軍事戰術重新引入其理論中，即夜間攻擊。從 1895 年到 1905 年，中國軍事經典開始滲透到日本軍事教育和「娛樂」軍事讀物中，因為日本軍隊正在尋找「本土」優勢來對抗物質和數量上佔優勢的西方軍隊。
日俄戰爭雖然取得了成功，但對日本帝國主義來說是一個嚴重的警鐘，因為它引起了人們對當時歐洲「主流」理論的廣泛失望。預示著第一次世界大戰，日本軍隊對防禦工事反覆發動人海攻擊，雖然他們通常造成的傷亡多於損失，但高層很快就意識到，他們無法以這種方式贏得對數量上佔優勢的敵人的戰爭。戰爭期間，IJA 表現出了比俄羅斯敵人更強的能力（他們仍然練習齊射，並根據戰術規則指示“不要瞄準”，因為瞄準會減慢攻擊的勢頭），並受到歐洲觀察家的廣泛讚揚。他們的軍隊遵循同樣過時的學說），但私下里，其將軍們知道他們的戰術是不可持續的。
儘管比日本海軍少，但日本陸軍在戰爭期間確實有亮點。它的夜間襲擊令俄羅斯人感到恐懼，並且在其解體之前一直是其學說的固定內容。它的士氣是傳奇性的，歷史學家仍然在爭論這是否是由Seishin Kyoikyu創造的，或者只是日本人的文化。為了反對東方主義，20世紀70年代至2000年代的許多學者試圖調整敘述，並斷言是「灌輸」導致日本士兵如此狂熱。有些人試圖為 IJA 的行為以及 1930 年代和 1940 年代的暴行辯解，聲稱他們只是在模仿歐洲法西斯主義。
然而，日本的日俄戰爭回憶錄，最著名的是《人肉子彈》，證明這些「開明」的論點大多是無稽之談。這些回憶錄表明，在日俄戰爭期間，許多日本軍隊實際上根本沒有接受過任何訓練，在某些情況下甚至很少接受過訓練。儘管如此，這些記載仍然充滿了“日常狂熱”，其中包括諸如“在這場特殊的戰鬥中，做好死亡準備是不夠的；我們需要的是不死不休的決心。事實上，我們是‘ “必死之人”，這個新的稱謂給了我們很大的刺激」。這些記載表明，早在法西斯主義出現之前，日本就是「榮譽文化」的極端版本，一個人在當地社區的聲譽比他的生命更重要，甚至更重要。他們也充滿了士兵本能地試圖鼓舞彼此的士氣，讓彼此忘記痛苦和壞消息的描述。簡而言之，當時的日本文化自然有利於軍事士氣——這一點當時被西方觀察家廣泛注意到，但在後來的冷戰修正主義歷史洪流中被否認。
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除了「道德因素」之外，IJA 確實引入了一些理論創新。雖然英國在布爾戰爭中進行了有限規模的間接火砲射擊，但 IJA 是第一支廣泛採用這種技術的軍隊。他們還創新地使用機槍進行進攻，將機槍用作從掩護到掩護攻擊的監視——當機槍開火時，一條小衝突線會從一排掩體衝到另一排掩體，然後停下來用水冷卻（如是當時的格言所必需的），然後再在掩護下繼續前進。然而，總而言之，雖然日本陸軍證明自己是當時戰術能力最強的軍隊之一，但第一次世界大戰前的條令將標準設定得極低，其將軍們痛苦地意識到了這一點。
隨之而來的是幾乎完全拒絕當時的軍事正統觀念，並經過數十年的創新創造了一種學說，允許較小的軍隊擊敗較大的軍隊，允許武裝力量較差的軍隊擊敗武裝較好的軍隊。第一個宰殺的聖牛是歐洲傳統的操練和訓練，強調外表和注重細節。IJA 取而代之的是全年的“實踐訓練”，以培養他們認為有用的技能，包括耐力行軍（直至男子每天行軍 25 英里，持續幾天）、分隊（小隊）戰術、槍法，刺刀工作，並學習使用最有可能的對手的步槍。事實上，沒有人注意到折疊床、遊行或統一標準（在接下來的幾十年裡，制服確實變得非常難看）。有些人擔心歐洲演習活動的解體會導致紀律崩潰，因此 IJA 解決了這個問題，即使是最小的錯誤也會經常受到毆打，理由是“教訓會被記住”，這將“鼓勵迅速服從命令”。
第二個被宰殺的聖牛是戰前的營戰術，當時該戰術涉及一個作為單一有機體運作的大型部隊，每個連總是與下一個連保持聯繫。早在第一次世界大戰之前，日本就將基本戰術單位從連移交給了排，到了第二次世界大戰之前又移交給了步兵班。各部隊被指示忘記彼此保持聯繫或規律性，只強調“迅速接近”，以便日本士兵可以在近距離利用他們的優勢。
最後，IJA 放棄了任何「統一指揮」的說法。最初是在德國接受訓練的，它一直相信“執行式指揮”，但到了1931 年，它已將其推向了邏輯的極端，以至於命令很少長於單個段落，並且在所有級別上執行指令幾乎都是可選的。這種錯誤最臭名昭著的例子是 1944 年的因帕爾攻勢，當時幾乎每個人都告訴穆塔口將軍他的攻勢是一個愚蠢的想法，但他卻忽略了他們。他的指揮官川部允許該計劃繼續進行，儘管他也認為這很愚蠢，因為他認為應該允許軍官做他們想做的事，而且下級總是比上級更準確地了解情況。然而，在許多情況下，這種權力下放也取得了驚人的成功。總體而言，它滲透到軍隊內部的一種「忠誠不服從」文化中，在某些情況下，軍階幾乎變得毫無意義，而人格力量和大膽的結合決定了軍官對要做的事情有多少發言權。
1905年後IJA改革的基本軌跡是將軍隊從傳統力量轉變為「破壞性」力量。意識到軍事後勤和 C3 逐年變得更加複雜，大多數國家都專注於在這 4 個領域取得卓越成就。相較之下，日本由於其工業基礎較弱，專注於建立一支能夠在缺乏良好後勤和指揮控制能力的情況下發揮作用的部隊，並且能夠擾亂敵人的行動，使敵人成為「離水之魚」。
這種非傳統的信念帶來了超越其作者在 20 世紀 30 年代和 40 年代所預期的顯著成功，這一過程極大地增強了 IJA 的信心和擴張主義。它的勝利始於 1931 年征服滿洲，在抗日戰爭期間繼續取得勝利，最終在 1941-42 年征服歐洲和美洲殖民地時達到頂峰。這些勝利中的每一次勝利都以寡不敵眾、火力不足的部隊以令人驚訝的輕鬆方式取得勝利。當時 IJA 的反對者指出，其士兵能夠比實際情況更快地行軍並在任何條件下作戰，而其軍官則表現出非凡的主動性和聰明才智。然而，這段時期的後期也暴露了 IJA 系統的缺陷——它只擅長做一件事，而不擅長做其他事情。在整個 1941-42 年的攻勢中，IJA 廣泛依賴繳獲的裝備，到 1944 年，英國人已經學會將其倉庫保持在遠離戰線的地方。此外，作為一支以進攻為主的軍隊，日本陸軍幾乎對防禦一無所知，甚至沒有縱深防禦的概念。直到硫磺島戰役之前，日本的任何陣地都沒有得到有效的防禦——相反，它是「透過進攻來防禦」的。從紙面上看，這不是問題——即使在島嶼防禦的非常不利的戰術條件下，日本人受到海軍轟炸，並且面對數量上始終佔優勢的敵人，他們的損失比率通常是均勻的，有時甚至是有利的。然而，實際上，這種侵略性的防禦意味著 IJA 駐軍被擊敗的速度比原本應有的速度要快得多，這意味著軍隊基本上無法對抗任何形式的拖延行動。
由於兩次世界大戰期間相對惰性，海軍的表現遠沒有那麼引人注目。珍珠港、爪哇海、印度洋突襲和薩沃島都是亮點，但海軍也有災難性的失敗，包括在戰爭初期。與陸軍不同，陸軍基本上放棄了日俄戰爭時期的大部分做法，而海軍仍然堅持其過時的決戰學說，未能發展出任何有效的反潛戰術，而且似乎很少考慮如何結果是長期戰爭。陸軍對數量上佔優勢的對手有一套連貫的“勝利理論”，而海軍卻沒有考慮到其小班飛行員訓練計劃等方面的缺陷，只是簡單地假設“艦艇建造時間很長”，因此一次勝利就能將對手淘汰出戰爭。
顯然，我在這篇文章中沒有討論很多內容，包括： - IJA 對抗朝鮮、滿洲和中國遊擊隊的記錄。- 1918 年至 1922 年間對俄羅斯東部的殘酷佔領。- IJA 內部的派系陰謀（chobatsu 與其他所有人，然後是巴登巴登集團/toseiha 與 kodoha）。- 蘇日邊境戰爭以及圍繞它的廣泛的偽造運動。- 日本在明治時代的「快速工業化」（或更確切地說，缺乏工業化）。- 月國城的戰國根源，早在德國人到來之前。
但這篇文章已經太長了，我希望它至少能給出這個主題的基本概述。
這是一篇很棒的文章，寫得非常好！謝謝你的詳細資料。
謝謝你
您能更深入地討論這個主題嗎？你是說日本的明治工業化更像是奧斯曼坦齊馬特改革時期或19世紀埃及帝國的“工業化”，而不是真正的工業化？
時機很好，我剛剛在這裡發了一篇文章。簡而言之——按照當時的標準來看，它是快的，但按照現代標準來看，它是慢的，而且與1931 年之後的繁榮相去甚遠。到1931 年，日本仍然是最貧窮、工業化程度最低的大國。
你可以真正看到德國在以攻為守的理念上對日本學說的影響。看起來他們似乎把德國的理論推向了合乎邏輯的結論。
100%。他們結合了德國的學說，消除了所有細微差別，並將其與中國古代的軍事經典相結合，創造了有史以來最具侵略性的理論。
對於這些陳述，我有一些小問題需要指出。
至於“決戰”，我認為這是日本贏得戰爭的唯一途徑，而不是僅僅攻擊DEI並希望美國公眾的孤立主義傾向能夠持續12-18個月，讓日本人是時候增加石油、橡膠、錫、航空汽油等的儲備了。
回到決戰。1940 年至 1942 年間，日本擁有世界上最好的航空母艦特遣部隊。他們擁有最好的艦載機飛行員，可以說他們擁有最好的艦載機。他們沒有在任何方面進行長期戰爭的持久力，因此唯一的希望是利用這些優勢贏得一場或多場決定性的戰鬥，並希望美國達成協議，允許日本保留其帝國的一部分。
你沒有錯，但這只是顯示日本對美國和現代戰爭的理解有多麼致命的缺陷。
認為消滅美國太平洋艦隊的大部分力量只會延長戰爭時間的想法表明完全低估了美國的生產能力。在 YouTube 上，Military History Visualized 有一個很棒的視頻，它確實幫助我直觀地了解了美國在生產方面的優勢是多麼驚人。日本人的假設是他們建造船隻有多困難，完全忽略了美國建造船隻 有多容易，即使還在歐洲打仗。
他們也低估了盟軍的戰鬥意志。由於某種原因，軸心國不斷地夢想著「軟弱」的盟友或「墮落」的共產主義者在一兩次失敗後屈服並來到和平會議桌前。我不知道這是法國設定他們的期望的（異常）例子，還是只是簡單的一廂情願，但他們認為美國會在一場決定性的失敗後將其收歸國有，這是大錯特錯的。天哪，我甚至會說他們錯了 180 度；珍珠港事件幾乎在一天之內消滅了美國99%的孤立主義情緒。它的作用如此有效，以至於我們現在有關於羅斯福一定是如何知道的陰謀論，因為它對他的外交政策目標非常有效。
就像你說的，這可能是他們唯一的希望。但這是一個徒勞的希望，明智的人可能已經看到了這一點並完全避免與美國發生戰爭。
這真是一本精彩的讀物！非常感謝您花時間寫下如此詳細且非常易讀的文字！
如果有機會，我肯定還會閱讀您第二篇文章末尾列出的方面。
非常不願意閱讀/努力閱讀明治時代日本工業化的失敗。
《傳統觀點》認為，日本的現代化進程異常迅速，從 17 世紀進入 20 世紀大約花了 50 年。
是的，這是現代歷史上最普遍的神話之一。日本在明治時代的工業化速度確實相對較快，但關鍵字是「相對」。當時西歐的平均 GDP 成長率約為 1%，而日本的成長率則與美國持平，均為 3%。速度很快，但與 1931 年後的速度相去甚遠。
與一般看法相反，1931 年之前的日本經濟管理並不出色，而且存在許多問題。薩摩藩叛亂期間和之後，由於為叛亂支付印刷費用（儒家治理本質上是小政府主義，因此直到第一次世界大戰之後，整個東北亞的稅收都非常低）和復制日本的地方儲備銀行體系，出現了大規模的惡性通貨膨脹。美國，自然是通貨膨脹的。財務大臣松方對此的回應是將紙幣發行特權集中在中央銀行，並在中國作出馬關賠償後購買黃金以加入金本位制。結果就是至今在日本經濟學家中爭議極大的「松方通貨緊縮」。有人說這是輝煌的，也有人說這是經濟愚蠢的頂峰，但不可否認的是，這個時代帶來了巨大的經濟混亂。
1900年以後，日本經濟仍以農業為主，其產業也舉步維艱。財閥以外貿公司起家，基本上控制了出口通路。他們剝削小型製造商，這些製造商必須低價出價才能獲得出口交易，而傳統的人造絲、絲綢和紡織工業則受到美國關稅以及來自香港和中國大陸的競爭的影響。與普遍看法相反，由於需要進口大量技術，日本在兩次世界大戰之間的大部分時間都存在貿易逆差。這通常不是以聰明的方式完成的（聘請外國專家、顧問和技術人員或派實習生到國外），而是直接購買大量機械。日本一直缺乏黃金，不得不實行「黃金禁運」以避免本國貨幣全面貶值。
日本經濟管理的轉捩點是1931年，當時「維新官僚」——日本政府中與財閥結盟的機構中長期被邊緣化的群體——在偽滿洲國獲得了一個「實驗室」。在大多數東正教軍官征服該省後，他們與改革官僚結盟。這與日本與財閥結盟的官員對改革派官僚的清洗相一致，因此大多數人被「流放」到滿洲。在那裡，他們嘗試了多項政策來提高企業利潤率（通常是不惜一切代價壓低工資）並鼓勵外國投資。他們在財閥中為自己找到了一名「叛逃者」——日產創始人愛群川義介，由於公司即將破產，他別無選擇，只能接受滿洲國的提議。日本戰後的經濟管理技術多起源於偽滿洲國。
繁榮時期的貨幣政策有著不同的起源。1932 年，大蕭條襲擊了日本，財務大臣高橋是清基本上放棄了當時的主流經濟學，放棄了金本位制，經營印鈔機，並使用巨額赤字支出。有效。大藏省的高層改變了主意，認為古典經濟學確實是改革官僚所說的騙局，從此成為他們在日本的主要盟友。
長話短說，到了 1937 年，軍事機構和政治機構都被改革官僚和東正教軍官組成的“滿洲集團”在希特勒扮演王子的幫助下擊敗了（不是開玩笑，他實際上在化裝舞會上打扮成希特勒）近衛。近衛的表現不錯，斷斷續續地持續了四年（大約是當時日本首相平均時間的10倍），但最終還是東條（東正教領袖）、岸信介（改革官僚領袖）和松方（改革官僚領袖） 。外交部長和他們的老朋友）把他扔到了公共汽車下。然後，東條和岸信介把松方扔到公共汽車下（我忘了具體原因）並轟炸了珍珠港。到那時，經濟改革已經太晚了，但改革派利用戰爭將所有保守派清除出了官僚體系。最後，到了1945 年，改革官僚們將東條和東正波拋在了公共汽車下，讓美國人相信軍隊和財閥應對戰爭負責，而他們沒有參與戰爭（美國人很容易相信這一點，因為美國官僚機構已經幾乎沒有權力）並最終統治了這個國家 40 年。
在這段時間裡，他們實施、改進和完善了他們已經在滿洲國以及在日本的貨幣方面使用的技術。然而，重要的是，這些技術在1931 年之前並不為人所知，而明治時代儘管在軍事上取得了成功，但在經濟上卻失敗了，因為日本直到20 世紀40 年代仍然是一個相對貧窮的「大國」。
有照片，確實發生過。
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fumimaro_Konoe
近衛文麻呂
近衛文麿親王（日文：近衛文麿，赫本：近衛文麿，常稱近衛，1891年10月12日－1945年12月16日）是日本政治家和首相。在他任職期間，他主持了1937年日本侵華戰爭，導致兩國外交關係破裂，導致日本加入第二次世界大戰。他也透過《國家總動員法》和成立帝國統治援助協會，在將國家轉變為極權國家的過程中發揮了核心作用。儘管近衛試圖解決與美國的緊張關係，但軍方對談判強加的嚴格時間表以及他的政府對決議的不靈活態度使日本走上了戰爭之路。
關於我-選擇退出- OP 可以回复！刪除即可刪除 -每日文章
該機器人將很快過渡到選擇加入系統。按此處了解更多並選擇加入。
夥計，你是一位了不起的海報，我總是很高興看到你對帖子做出回應。
嗯，在我看來，在經濟上，日本明治時期與十九世紀進行改革的其他非歐洲列強（奧斯曼坦齊馬特時期，清朝自強，穆罕默德·阿里統治下的埃及）相似。
與中國、埃及和奧斯曼帝國的同行一樣，明治維新派將工業革命誤認為是技術革命，而不是金融革命，因此將重點放在了軍事技術上。
但他們的軍事改革要成功得多，給了日本足夠的時間來設計自己的經濟體系。
迷人。
是的，我知道日本不是一個富裕的國家，就像同一時期的義大利一樣。
非常有趣的是了解他們如何以昂貴的方式進口技術......透過購買機械和工具。
這是一篇很棒的文章。您有關於您所報道的經濟史的一些資料嗎？
我想進一步閱讀。
乾杯!
您可能會喜歡讓敵人破產
寫得很好，謝謝！
多謝，夥計！我沒有意識到 reddit 上有文字限制！
多普讀了，謝謝你寫這篇文章。
您能為想要了解更多資訊的人推薦一些歷史資料嗎？你對這個主題的介紹讓我想了解更多！
紮實的帖子先生
很棒的帖子。
我正在寫一些與軍事派別主義有關的研究。您是否有任何關於 20 年代和 30 年代 IJA 的書籍推薦？為您的貼文提供一份一般性的書籍清單會非常有幫助。謝謝。
對於這個主題，《倚天劍之道》是一本很棒的書。
感謝您的推薦。我會考慮得到它。
這太令人著迷了！您對進一步閱讀該主題有什麼建議嗎？特別是明治維新後直至投降，因為它涉及政治、經濟或軍事改革/領域。
您能解釋一下「物流和C3」中的C3是什麼意思嗎？泰
命令、控制和通信。換句話說，領導者如何與下屬單位交談並告訴他們該做什麼。
光是這一段就很有趣；裡面裝了這麼多東西。這篇評論不僅內容豐富，而且讀起來很有趣。
多麼美麗，多麼美麗的閱讀，謝謝！！如果您不介意我問，您會推薦哪些參考書？顯然，您已經讀過幾本。
謝謝： * Japanese Infantryman 1937-45 - IJA 訓練和條令的最佳英文概述。* Kaigun：日本帝國海軍的戰略、戰術和技術，1887-1941 * 日本帝國陸軍：其興衰 - 不是一本非常客觀的書，但很好地介紹了主要事實。* 天劍之道-非常好，深入派係政治。* 日俄戰爭：未吸取的教訓
非常感謝！我會確保將這些書添加到我想在某個時候閱讀的未讀書堆中。
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MITI 和日本的繁榮是有關該主題的最好的書。
有趣的一點