蒋介石为什么会输给毛泽东,结果是否早已注定,如果你是蒋介石,你会采取怎样不同的行动?

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A2A. This and similar questions have been asked many times on Quora. The answers given here so far with the possible exception of part of Alan Chiu’s answer are largely unsatisfactory. An old book by Lionel Max Chassin, a French General, “The Communist Conquest of China”, translated to English and published by Harvard University in 1965, is, in my opinion, the best book ever written on the subject, and deserves much wider circulation and quotation. He had access to French intelligence from which he describes the progress of the civil war. But his real contribution is his conclusion about “the roots of Mao’s victory”. Quorans interested in this subject should read his complete book. I would just quote a small passage from the book below. It is effectively a description of not just Mao’s victory, but also the Vietnamese and Taliban victories.

“The profound lesson of the drama that was the Chinese Civil War is this: Even now in this era of materialism and mechanization, spirit is always predominant., and it is morale that wins battles. Superiority in man power and material means little if men make no use of their weapons.

Here in the Chinese Civil War, the adversaries were of the same race, of the same ancient civilization. How could the same man be a deplorably poor soldier under the Nationalists and then, after a few months of service with the Reds, became a veritable hero ? How did hares suddenly became lions? Theanswer is that the potential of man is enomous. He is as capable of heroism as of cowardice. But he would not become a lion unless he is inculcated with a faith, a belief, in a doctrine for which he will gladly give his life.

There is no such thing as a degenerate race or generation. The children of today possess much the same innate qualities as did those of generations past. The education of man - or, if one prefers, his ‘conditioning’ - is everything. The cause of Mao’s triumph lies in the fact that appealing as he did to ancient and deeply-rooted reflexes, he gave a faith, a creed, to the peasants of China. Totalitarian doctrians are always based upon simple slogans, easy to exploit. Hitler choose, as the theme for Gernany’s external relations, abolition of the Treaty of Versaillies; internally, the theme was the struggle against Jews and Communists. Mao had only to follow a beaten track. His external theme was the eternal theme of xenophobic nationalism, of the struggle against foreign imperialists, who themselves but barely emerged from barbarism, had ‘enslaved’ the higher civilization that was China. As for internal themes, he cleverly appealed to the instincts of social justice and proprietorship which are so strong in the human heart. In proclaiming agrarian reform, in despoiling the landlords and lowering taxes, in giving landless farm hands plots to hold as their very own. Mao played the best of cards -to be cynically discarded once victory was won.

But beyond the achievement of these pracyical goals, it is undeniable that Mao knew how to make of his soldiers dedicated workers for ‘a powerful China, a respected China, where justice, truth, and peace would reign.’ He obtained this result by a sustained and patient effort of daily political education. In the everyday routine of the Red soldier, Marxist political indoctrination played a more important role than the manual of arms. Taken in hand by skilled political school masters, the peasant-in-arms rapidly became a fanatic, an apostle of the new religion, ready to sacrifice his life for the better tomorrows. In this lies the essential reason for the victory of Mao Tse-Tung VIctory. In a civil war, is almost always won by the side which knows how to gain the support of the people”

I was a high school student and college freshman during the Chinese Civil War. At the time, most of the students were middle class or upper middle class. Their families generally support the Nationaists. But their support was shallow because of the inaptness and corruption of the Nationalist Government. On the other hand, there were indeed students, children of Nationalist high officials, or even Nationalists officials and military personnel who believed only the Communists could lead to ‘a powerful China, a respected China’ and worked secretely as spies for the communists, or otherwise advanced the Communist causes. During the pivotal Huaihai Campaign (see reference below), my father-in-law (who already died when I met my wife) was a General under the Nationalists. The troops under his command defected to the Communists, and asked him to go with them, although he refused. From what Chassin discussed, the eventual communist victory was just a matter of time, but the quick collapse of the Nationalists militarily was the result of the following factors:

  1. The factors discussed in Alan Chiu’s answer.
  2. The Nationalists were out generaled by the communists, and spies in the Naionalists’ military gave its military plans to the communists.
  3. The best Nationalist troops were trained and equipped by the US in India toward the end of World War II. Their ammunitions supplies depended on the US style logistics. They were sent to recover Manchuria and gained initial success. But the cold weather was not suited to the southern troops and the Nationalists could not sustain the US style logistics without active US support. Lines of communications were cut by communist guerellas*. Once USSR turned the captured Japanese equipment to the communists the Nationalist offense there stalled and turned to defense of a few isolated city strongholds, leaving the countryside to the Communists. From that point on the Nationalists military was doomed.

*Ths is the difference between a civil war and a war of invasion. If the communists did this to the Japanese invaders, the latter would burn and destroy the nearby villages.

Huaihai campaign - Wikipedia
Battle of the Chinese Civil War (1948–49) Huaihai campaign Part of the Chinese Civil War People's Liberation Army troops, supported by captured M5 Stuart light tanks, attacking the Nationalist lines Belligerents Republic of China Chinese Communist Party Commanders and leaders Strength 800,000 [1] 6,510,000 combatants - 660,000 regulars, 400,000 irregulars, 5,450,000 armed peasants [2] Casualties and losses Total: 555,099 [ citation needed ] of which 327,000 were either captured or went over to the Communists. Total: 134,000 [ citation needed ] The Huaihai campaign ( Chinese : 淮 海 戰 役 ; pinyin : Huái hǎi Zhàn yì ), or Battle of Hsupeng ( simplified Chinese : 徐 蚌 会 战 ; traditional Chinese : 徐 蚌 會 戰 ; pinyin : Xú bèng Huì zhàn ), was one of the military conflicts in the late stage of the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party . The campaign started when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched a major offensive against the Kuomintang headquarters in Xuzhou on 6 November 1948, and ended on 10 January 1949 when the PLA reached the north of the Yangtze . Background [ edit ] After the fall of Jinan to the Communists on 24 September 1948, the PLA began planning for a larger campaign to engage the remaining Nationalist forces in the Shandong province and their main force in Xuzhou . In face of the rapidly deteriorating military situation in the Northeast , the Nationalist government decided to deploy on both sides of the Tianjin–Pukou Railway to prevent the PLA from advancing south toward the Yangtze River . [3] [ page needed ] PLA strategy [ edit ] Su Yu , the acting commander of the Eastern China Field Army proposed an operational plan to the Communist war council. The plan was to encircle the Nationalist Sixth and Seventh Army, which were still stationed in the Shandong province. The council quickly approved this plan and ordered the Central Plains Field Army under Liu Bocheng , Chen Yi (Commander of the Eastern China Field Army and liaison to the Central Plains Field Army) and Deng Xiaoping (Political Commissar of the Central Plains Field Army) to assault the Nationalist garrison in Henan and Anhui to breakthrough to Shandong. [3] [ page needed ] Campaign [ edit ] Communist forces' campaigns during November 1948 up to January 1949, the northern one being the Ping-Jin campaign , and the southern one being the Huai-Hai campaign. Map showing the Huaihai campaign as one of the three campaigns during Chinese civil war Encirclement of Xuzhou (6–22 November 1948) [ edit ] As the Nationalist Sixth and Seventh Army began retreating to Xuzhou by crossing the Grand Canal, they were behind their original schedule. Lieutenant General Huang Baitao of the Seventh Army had to wait for three days before troops from the Ninth Pacification Zone arrived, and consequently several bridgeheads were unsecured prior to the crossing. On 8 November, 23,000 Nationalist troops defected to the Communist side, exposing the retreat route of the S

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This is because the only modernized knowledge Chiang received was Japanese military education, not true Western education, and Chiang did not trust Western-educated soldiers or literati. Chiang Kai-shek was a Republican still living in the Qing Dynasty.

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