蘇聯能贏得蘇阿戰爭嗎？
蘇阿戰爭從1979年持續到1989年，對蘇聯和阿富汗都產生了重大影響。這是一個複雜的話題，有許多不同的因素可能會導致不同的結果。從軍事角度來看，蘇聯在武器裝備、訓練和技術方面具有明顯的優勢。然而，被稱為聖戰者的阿富汗抵抗戰士能夠有效地使用遊擊戰術來對抗蘇聯軍隊。此外，戰爭嚴重消耗了蘇聯的經濟和士氣，導致公眾普遍不滿，最終導致蘇聯崩潰1991年的蘇聯。很難確切地說蘇聯是否能夠贏得這場戰爭，但軍事、經濟和政治因素的綜合作用似乎使蘇聯不太可能獲勝。
總長DR
是的，我們本來可以贏得阿富汗戰爭。蘇聯擁有這樣做的資源和技術。
但不是決心。
更長的答案
在我們的宣傳中，我們稱之為「少量蘇聯軍隊的插入」。不是「戰爭」。這大致相當於普丁總統在烏克蘭的「特別軍事行動」。
到 1979 年進入阿富汗時，蘇聯已經掌握了：
- 1918 年至 1934 年中亞內戰的成功。那裡的叛亂實際上早在 1916 年就開始了，遠早於共產黨在聖彼得堡的奪權。
- 成功鎮壓了 1928 年至 1932 年俄羅斯的農民起義，並強制全國所有農業集體化。
- 二戰後西烏克蘭和波羅的海地區民族主義叛亂的勝利。
這一切都是在史達林的領導下實現的。從我們自己的歷史來看，這就是史達林在阿富汗的待辦事項清單：
- 在該國宣布一項全國性的安撫計劃，在整個國家張貼安撫海報，並用安撫廣播淹沒它。
- 實行嚴格的糧食獨裁，即徵用和分配糧食，使不遵守規定的群體和地理區域挨餓。
- 保持軍隊的運轉，但不要相信當地人。將阿富汗軍隊降級為警察職能。
- 讓阿甘同志將秘密警察的數量增加一倍/三倍/四倍。超過一定智商水準的久經考驗的同志和前重罪犯/罪犯的適當比例將決定成功的程度。這在我們的內戰期間非常有效。
- 忽略當地人破壞坎兒井的愚蠢想法基礎設施作為對支持叛亂分子的社區的懲罰措施。
- 不惜一切代價阻止難民流入巴基斯坦。任何難民營都是叛亂分子的避難所和招募站。
- 對叛亂分子控制的地區進行針對性、定向的種族清洗。尋找並挑選具有驅逐波羅的海人、西烏克蘭人、車臣人、伏爾加德意誌人等人的實際經驗的資深特工的大腦。
- 讓阿富汗同志共同行動，形成阿富汗兩萬五千人的奉獻力量。這些必須被派往各省各地。很少有人願意自願參加，因為他們中的許多人將被殺害或殘疾。阿富汗同志必須確保沒有人拒絕。
- 兩萬五千人的任務派往未遭受種族清洗的社區，將監督逮捕，並遣送所有神職人員、一定程度以上的牛羊主人、其他剝削分子以及所有支持他們的人。他們的財產和土地將被集體化。最貧困的村民將被選拔、培訓並負責管理這些集體。
- 流亡的剝削分子及其家人將被重新安置到阿富汗（或中亞）需要殖民化的圍欄地區。那些表現出不服從行為的人將被送往勞改營，而罪犯囚犯將負責強制他們遵守規定。
- 任命三駕馬車法庭喀布爾，由阿富汗人民民主黨兩派最值得信賴的成員組成，全部由蘇聯顧問監督。為他們所有人指定充足的起訴配額。責成他們找出許多破壞已採取的國家安撫政策的人。讓他們自行決定無罪釋放33%的嫌疑同志，起訴33%，處死33%。
- 三駕馬車的原則是Khalk三駕馬車法官Khalk成員，Parcham三駕馬車法官Parcham成員。特定部落的成員評判同一部落的人。蘇聯顧問必須嚴格執行這項政策。
- 根據他們的成就，確保最成功的同志具有高度的垂直流動性。用從人民的敵人和被處決的「前同志」那裡沒收的物品和貴重物品來慷慨地報酬他們。
- 讓全國充分了解綏靖政策不可阻擋的進展。宣傳流亡剝削分子認識錯誤走上再教育道路的工作成果。
- 定期為各級人民舉辦安撫大會和安撫節。聚集在一起看看哪些同志還在，哪些不在，將大大提高所有參與者的積極性。
下面這張 1920 年的海報展示了階級鬥爭特殊逆境時期的正確宣傳方式。
押韻的標題寫道：“烏克蘭人和俄羅斯人有一個戰斗口號——沒有人能成為工人的主人。” Pan指的是波蘭士紳，所以這個是為波蘭戰役做的準備。這張海報可以很容易地重新設計成這樣的主題：阿富汗人舉著刺刀，看起來像聖戰者組織的富有地主穿著好鞋子，戴著昂貴的瑞士手錶。
蘇聯軍隊入侵阿富汗，1979 年 12 月 24 日
許多西方人認為蘇聯入侵阿富汗是一場有計劃的戰爭和佔領。真正的現實是，入侵阿富汗根本不是事先計畫好的佔領。事實上，入侵阿富汗的決定其實是蘇聯領導人勃列日涅夫的顧問們強迫和個人的反應，因為他們說服他，如果不直接入侵，他就無法再支持阿富汗的社會主義政府；阿富汗總理努爾·穆罕默德·塔拉基 (Nur Mohammad Taraki) 9 月遇刺後
在咖啡渣上猜測巴基斯坦的命運之前，你先研究歷史，然後你就會知道歷史上並沒有蘇阿戰爭這樣的事件。事實上，阿富汗政府軍和叛亂分子之間曾發生內戰。一些阿富汗公民與其他阿富汗公民發生戰鬥。這場戰爭發生在蘇聯邊境附近，為蘇聯和中亞蘇維埃共和國帶來了許多問題。因此，蘇聯同意了阿富汗政府的請求，為打擊塔利班提供援助。此外，t
It very nearly had, during the first couple of years of the war. In 1982 or 1983, military analysts were arguing that the Afghan resistance would be reduced to a small brigandage problem in a few mountainous areas by 1984,
I think it may have been possible for the USSR to win the Soviet-Afghan war, but it would have taken decades of fighting and commitment. The USSR fell apart, so it could not make that sort of commitment.
No, because of the conditions that existed before the Soviet’s intervention. The Afghan government was overthrown in a Communist coup, and the new government instituted a set of policies that resulted in massive unrest and open rebellions across the country. The Soviet’s intervened to support the communist government, which did nothing to stop the policies that had created the problems to begin with. As long as the policies were in place, the cause for the unrest and rebellion were still in place.
What if the Soviet Union "won" the Soviet-Afghan war?
We’d still have these
The socialist government would have been restored, along with women’s rights, the Taliban wouldn’t have taken over, 9/11 wouldn’t have happened, and America wouldn’t have had a pretext for waging interminable wars across the Middle East and killing millions of people. But, hey, it was all worth it to bring down the Soviets, right?
Afghan College Girls, 1970s
Thank you for the question.
I guess it’s about time an Afghan elaborates on this matter, because most of the comments by these non-Afghan middle-aged people are ridiculous and demeaning beyond belief.
Soviets
Soviets followed inside Afghanistan after the Afghan government already set up a Communist regime, at the request of the then Afghan president. The Communists were split into two subgroups: Khalq (meaning ‘for the people’) and Parcham (meaning ‘for the nation’). Khalq were the initial rulers of the government, their tactics were simply ‘work with us or die’. Parcham, on the other hand, were
I remember a talk with a Soviet officer who served in the Baltics and Afghanistan in the 1980s. He told me:
“Could never figure out these Afghans. With the Balts, you see they hate you right away, but they never try to harm you. An Afghan will be all smiles, pour you tea, tell you the names of his kids—just to shoot you in the back when you’ll be leaving his village”.
Not taking sides
I had a few conversations with people who saw it all first-hand some 12 years ago and some 30 years ago. From which I made some observations to myself—without pretending to be an expert.
The Soviet-Afghan war destroy
The Soviets ultimately failed in Afghanistan, because they could not stop the flow of arms from Pakistan into the country. Early in the war, Soviet troops made a number of major mistakes related to the treatment of the population that turned the Afghan people against them. Counterinsurgency is in many respects a popularity contest. The occupying army must convince the population that they have their interests at heart. The Soviets’ heavy-handed tactics early in the war earned the scorn of population, causing them to rise up.
The Soviets would likely have been able to contain this outrage if the
The reason for our defeat in Afghanistan was the same as the defeat of the US in Vietnam: we didn’t commit ourselves to winning.
The resources allocated weren’t enough. The objective wasn’t defined adequately. But above all, the will to win was sadly lacking.
史達林或託洛茨基可能會成功（有關他們反叛亂方法的更多信息，請閱讀迪馬·沃羅比耶夫對蘇聯能否贏得蘇維埃戰爭？的回答）。但赫魯雪夫或他之後的任何人都不會。
關鍵因素是二戰。戰後的一代蘇聯統治者——就像我們國家的其他人一樣——受到了深深的創傷。
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