在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德

特別報導

2023年9月14日週四上午8:42

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/eastern-europe-caucasus/missing-escalation-ukraine

文 / 韓退之
自2022年2月俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭那一刻起，戰爭升級的陰影就一直籠罩著。

對於烏克蘭公民和士兵來說，戰爭是一場殘酷、可怕的日常現實，而且已經以顯著的方式升級；八月，基輔加大了對俄羅斯的罷工力度，莫斯科也恢復了針對烏克蘭通過黑海出口糧食的行動。然而，從另一個角度來看，

許多最令人擔心的升級情景並沒有發生，最引人注目的是北約和俄羅斯之間的大規模常規戰爭以及核武器的使用。

奧斯汀·卡森Austin Carson發表在最新一期《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs) 的

<烏克蘭消失的升級事件：為西方的緩慢做法辯護> (The Missing Escalation in Ukraine: In Defense of the West’s Go-Slow Approach)提出，在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德。

西方的漸進做法達到了重要的戰略目的
戰爭開始十八個月後，是時候評估其不同尋常的升級動態了。俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普丁多次暗示他可能會使用核武器，這增加了戰術核武器可用於摧毀軍事目標、殺害烏克蘭平民或在無人居住地區炫耀武力的可能性。但他並沒有這樣做。除了這種最明顯缺失的升級形式之外，各方都在其他領域表現出了克制——例如，在北約的偵察飛行範圍或俄羅斯在黑海行動的細節方面。儘管有充分的機會加劇敵對行動或擴大戰爭的地理範圍，但俄羅斯、烏克蘭及其盟友大多選擇不這樣做。
這種克制常常被忽視，而其一個關鍵原因——各方漸進的戰爭方式——也常常被誤解。烏克蘭的許多支持者批評零碎提供援助和其他形式的漸進主義。事實上，擴大對烏克蘭軍事援助的緩慢做法已經減緩了基輔軍隊某些作戰能力的發展。但西方的漸進做法達到了重要的戰略目的。戰爭避免了某些形式的急劇升級並非偶然。包括基輔領導人在內的戰爭參與者往往遵循學習和漸進主義的邏輯，謹慎地採用新的武器和戰術，為評估俄羅斯的反應爭取時間。甚至烏克蘭在應對俄羅斯領土內的襲擊時也採取了這種做法。西方領導人和烏克蘭已經允許現狀，
如果烏克蘭迅速獲得領土，升級的風險可能會急劇增加
然而，新的發展可能會威脅到這種動態。俄羅斯針對烏克蘭糧食基礎設施的行動以及烏克蘭在俄羅斯境內激增的襲擊有可能擴大衝突的地理範圍。瓦格納僱傭兵首領葉夫根尼·普里戈任的叛變和隨後的死亡表明，俄羅斯國內政治局勢是動態的，可能會發生轉變，從而鼓勵普丁升級。與此同時，烏克蘭的反攻取得了一些進展，但尚未取得突破。如果烏克蘭迅速獲得領土，升級的風險可能會急劇增加。隨著戰爭的不斷發展，為了控制局勢升級，西方官員和烏克蘭領導人必須抵制放棄漸進主義方針的呼聲。如果不這樣做，可能會導致來之不易的對升級的控制消失。
烏克蘭最嚴重的升級形式將涉及核武器
上個世紀的歷史比較經常引發有關升級風險的爭論。例如，第一次世界大戰最初是一場關於暗殺的局部爭端，但很快就升級為一場泛歐洲衝突，造成 2000 萬人死亡。朝鮮戰爭最初僅限於平壤、首爾及其外國夥伴之間的戰鬥，但五個月內，數十萬美國和中國軍隊直接交戰。美國本打算僅向南越提供軍事援助和建議，但其介入演變成一場持續十年、代價高昂的暴力軍事干預。
冷戰結束後的衝突並沒有出現同樣的升級問題。隨著兩極格局的結束，西方在伊拉克、利比亞等外圍國家的對手沒有了大國的支持者。這些都是片面的事情。因此，俄羅斯對烏克蘭的入侵讓人回想起早期戰爭期間升級和克制是重要問題的時期。
烏克蘭最嚴重的升級形式將涉及核武器。這種情況被認為是合理的，因為使用核武器可以讓普丁在某些戰場條件下獲得決定性優勢，或者對西方構成嚴厲警告。它甚至可能引發北約的報復，增加烏克蘭境外大規模交換核武器的可能性。每當一個盟友向基輔提供新的地對地導彈系統、防空系統、裝甲和履帶式車輛或戰鬥機時，西方謹慎的聲音就會警告稱，這些行為有可能導致局勢升級，包括俄羅斯在烏克蘭境外進行的報復性打擊。
核升級並未出現，並不意味著分析人士的擔心是錯誤的
迄今為止，這種情況尚未發生。沒有出現這種形式的升級並不意味著分析人士的擔心是錯誤的。恰恰相反：對升級的恐懼會促使軍事指揮官和政策制定者做出謹慎的決定，以幫助防止升級。戰爭初期，基輔及其許多支持者呼籲設立禁飛區，但西方領導人拒絕實施禁飛區，擔心北約和俄羅斯飛機之間發生空對空衝突。禁飛區提案已從公眾評論中消失，因此通過拒絕該提案來避免升級很容易被忽視。但這是一條沒有走的重要道路。教訓很明確：預測升級情景有助於降低其發生的可能性。然而，對升級的擔憂並不是烏克蘭阻止局勢升級的唯一因素。了解俄羅斯入侵沒有急劇升級的其他原因對於避免這場衝突和未來其他衝突的升級至關重要。
公開討論往往低估了許多尚未發生的升級情景。值得注意的是，俄羅斯尚未對烏克蘭以外的目標進行明顯的大規模網絡攻擊。莫斯科開發了先進的網絡能力，並利用其乾預 2016 年美國總統選舉。然而西歐和美國的民用基礎設施或政府目標似乎基本上沒有受到影響。
美國限制了美國高級軍事官員對烏克蘭的訪問
普丁還放棄使用化學武器。俄羅斯軍隊擁有大量化學彈藥，敘利亞總統巴沙爾·阿薩德的化學襲擊開創了危險的先例。但普丁尚未在烏克蘭使用它們。美國和北約表現出的某些形式的克制並未引起多大的關注。正如《紐約時報》八月份對反攻的評估所指出的那樣，美國限制了美國高級軍事官員對烏克蘭的訪問，以「避免與莫斯科的緊張關係加劇」。華盛頓以外很少有人注意到這種溫和。與間諜活動和秘密行動有關的其他形式的限制很難觀察到。北約國家經常對國際水域和本國領土進行監視，但據《紐約時報》報導，他們「小心翼翼，不要誤入戰區」。華盛頓郵報今年八月關於俄羅斯在波蘭境內的破壞行動的報告包含了一個被忽視的啟示：直到戰爭爆發一年前，俄羅斯甚至沒有試圖破壞向烏克蘭輸送軍事物資。
甚至俄羅斯在七月恢復對烏克蘭糧食出口的封鎖——以自己的方式升級——也帶有克制的成分。儘管軍事打擊的目標是與糧食相關的設施，但迄今為止，莫斯科尚未公開攻擊民用糧食運輸。北約國家對封鎖的反應也得到了衡量；目前，他們沒有按照烏克蘭的要求為糧食運輸提供武裝護送。隨著克里姆林宮擴大其敵對行動範圍，它也表現出拒絕更魯莽的升級形式的傾向。烏克蘭消失的升級事件就像不叫的狗：它們的沉默使人很容易錯過它們。
限制的原因
烏克蘭升級事件消失的謎團在一定程度上是由這場特定戰爭的更廣泛背景來解釋的。領導人有很大的動機試圖遏制戰鬥。俄羅斯和北約之間的直接常規或核衝突顯然對雙方都是毀滅性的，造成巨大的經濟、政治和軍事損失。現代大國之間的戰爭代價極其高昂。今天的烏克蘭戰爭和過去冷戰期間的衝突都存在這種結構性限制。

俄羅斯軍事資源面臨的壓力幾乎肯定會放大升級對莫斯科的負面影響。

在戰爭初期迅速奪取基輔的努力失敗以及裝備損失和傷亡率很高之後，莫斯科無法開闢新的戰線並實現其在烏克蘭的軍事目標。

普丁在衝突過程中的決定需要反映這一現實：如果衝突急劇擴大，他將處於失敗的境地。

看似優柔寡斷的行為在戰場上可能具有重要價值

國內政治也很重要。冷戰期間，對共產主義侵略的克制在政治上可能是致命的。

今天的政治環境已經改變。

不計後果地引發局勢升級的民主西方領導人可能更有可能輸掉下一次選舉。

目前還不清楚俄羅斯國內的政治動態是抑制了還是鼓勵了升級。

普丁必須避免疏遠支持他的俄羅斯精英並動員群眾持不同政見。

然而，普丁面臨的一些國內壓力激起了好戰行為，即政府外部的“戰爭鷹派”，他們不斷要求更廣泛的軍事動員，甚至使用核武器。

錯過升級的另一個原因涉及漸進主義和學習。在關鍵時刻，西方政治領導人和軍事指揮官選擇了漸進主義。在戰爭中緩慢行動常常會招致批評。烏克蘭的支持者有時抱怨美國及其盟國在提供更有效的火砲、防空系統和坦克方面猶豫不決。然而，看似優柔寡斷的行為在戰場上可能具有重要價值。

烏克蘭領導人採用漸進主義來控制事態升級

美國和西歐領導人採用緩慢漸進方法的例子並不難找到。自戰爭爆發的最初幾個月以來，北約成員國一直謹慎而緩慢地考慮提供肩扛式導彈系統、裝甲車、導彈防禦系統、坦克、遠程火砲系統以及F-16訓練機和飛機。

這種緩慢行事的好處之一是，它讓情報和軍事專家有時間仔細觀察俄羅斯的反應。

例如，華盛頓並沒有立即向烏克蘭提供M1艾布拉姆斯坦克。這個想法在公開場合爭論了數週，在內部爭論了更長時間。即使在批准了M1艾布拉姆斯之後，美國仍緩慢地將其引入戰場，讓英國和德國派出的坦克先行。

基輔常常是對緩慢提供援助方式最直言不諱的批評者。然而，烏克蘭領導人在俄羅斯境內開展跨境行動時，卻採用漸進主義來控制事態升級。自去年春天以來，烏克蘭領導人逐漸加強了對俄羅斯境內軍事補給線和城市中心的打擊，同時又避免將其歸功於自己。烏克蘭方面的這種疏遠促使克里姆林宮以溫和、相對克制的方式做出反應，避免激怒公眾。烏克蘭的西方盟友也採取了疏遠措施。例如，美國禁止將其軍事援助用於此類行動。

烏克蘭高風險管理具有漸進主義、故意模糊的特點

烏克蘭高風險事件的管理具有漸進主義、故意模糊和政治謹慎的特點。例如，2023 年 3 月，一架俄羅斯戰鬥機明顯向一架美國無人偵察機傾倒燃油並與其相撞，導致該無人機墜入黑海。雙方互相指責，美國軍方發布了一段視頻來支持其說法。然而華盛頓和莫斯科也採取了降級措施。在公開評論中，一名國家安全委員會代表暗示俄羅斯飛行員可能是自願行事，美國和俄羅斯高級軍事官員在私下電話中討論了他們對這一事件的看法。

今天有效的升級控制措施可能需要改進才能在明天繼續發揮作用。 2023 年夏季的事態發展可能會考驗已經形成的極限。首先，俄羅斯對烏克蘭糧食出口的新一輪攻擊擴大了戰爭的地理邊界。8月，一架俄羅斯無人機襲擊了多瑙河烏克蘭一側的一個港口，該河與北約成員國羅馬尼亞接壤。針對糧食基礎設施的襲擊增加了對民用運輸的意外或未經授權的攻擊或軍用飛機之間發生更致命事件的風險。

內部的異議重新調整普丁接受戰略風險的意願

其次，烏克蘭似乎正在加大對俄羅斯境內襲擊的規模和強度。7月，烏克蘭總統澤連斯基公開警告稱，戰爭將「重返俄羅斯」。這種激增的動機可能是希望在反攻期間更積極地削弱俄羅斯的後勤保障，並向烏克蘭公眾保證戰鬥將在俄羅斯境內進行。基輔還從普丁對早期跨境行動的溫和反應中吸取了教訓。風險是雙重的。俄羅斯境內更激進的行動可能會引發更嚴厲的反應。此外，隨著更強大的西方武器的出現或戰爭進一步陷入困境，俄羅斯境內擴大的戰役可能會更容易進一步擴大。

普丁國內立場的新發展表明，他的決策可能變得更加難以預測。儘管一些西方評論員和分析人士認為普里戈任的叛亂是一個積極的進展，表明這表明俄羅斯對公開異議的興趣日益濃厚，但這也可能增加了局勢升級的風險。內部的異議可能會重新調整普丁接受戰略風險的意願，使他更有可能賭上升級，就像萬福瑪利亞那樣，這將扭轉戰爭的局勢並支撐他的國內政治支持。

緩慢的進展無意中強加了一種漸進主義
漸進主義可能是戰場上痛苦的犧牲，但它也給了分析人士時間來衡量普丁的反應。也許普里戈任八月份在一次飛機失事中去世，結束了普丁核心圈子的威脅。但如果升級控制在很大程度上是通過學習來定義的，那麼日益不穩定的對手可能會讓西方和烏克蘭迄今為止學到的一些教訓變得毫無意義。當俄羅斯國內政治不斷變化時，北約盟國可能對俄羅斯對將F-16戰鬥機引入烏克蘭軍事行動的反應不太有信心。

另一個不確定因素是烏克蘭的反攻。其緩慢的進展令基輔及其合作夥伴感到沮喪，但這種步伐確實無意中強加了一種漸進主義。到目前為止，烏克蘭的領土擴張進展緩慢，這讓西方有時間評估普丁和俄羅斯軍隊如何適應。具有諷刺意味的是，如果烏克蘭取得決定性的戰場突破，這些對升級的限制可能會消失。俄羅斯軍事抵抗在衝突前線的崩潰或失去通往克里米亞的陸路通道可能會導致俄羅斯領導人採取一套新的升級策略。

漸進主義與西方提供軍事武器的方式密切相關

最後，結束戰爭的更強有力的外交進程的出現可能會重塑戰爭的升級動態，甚至矛盾地鼓勵升級。雖然加強外交溝通可以促進更好的危機管理，但和平談判也可能促使領導人升級。例如，1971 年越南戰爭期間，美國總統理查德·尼克松(Richard Nixon) 和國務卿亨利·基辛格(Henry Kissinger) 在與北越談判之前將軍事行動擴大到老撾，以增加他們在談判桌上的籌碼。

如果漸進主義迄今為止已經控制了局勢升級，那麼領導人就需要維持並調整它，以應對不斷變化的戰爭挑戰。漸進主義與西方提供軍事武器的方式密切相關。華盛頓在決定是否提供新的、更強大的系統時應繼續緩慢行動，例如陸軍戰術導彈系統（ATACMS）。在引進北約國家已經承諾的系統（例如 F-16）時，謹慎的漸進主義也很重要。戰爭的其他領域也可以從漸進主義中受益。美國和其他國家的領導人在黑海採取任何新的海上安全或監視措施時應謹慎行事，以便贏得時間來評估俄羅斯的反應並化解任何事件。至於烏克蘭在俄羅斯境內的襲擊，

在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德

支持烏克蘭的國家也應該深思熟慮，設計針對烏克蘭反攻的漸進方法。如果烏克蘭軍隊取得重大突破，基輔及其盟國應該制定計劃，例如為推進軍事部隊建立緩衝區，緩慢而謹慎地接近敏感邊境地區。西方和烏克蘭領導人還應該更好地闡明緩慢前進的戰略價值，明確表明他們的漸進主義是有意的，並且是出於在遏制戰爭損害的同時推進共同目標的利益。如果談判加速，西方和烏克蘭領導人不應採取新的升級策略。與俄羅斯的任何深化談判都應包括積極、明確的聲明，說明隨著談判的進展，雙方都需要尊重這些限制。

烏克蘭局勢並未升級，這提醒我們，在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德。緩慢的做法使北約國家能夠提供一定程度的軍事支持，這在戰爭開始時是不可想像的。升級的風險並沒有被誇大。相反，漸進主義讓西方認識到——並且在某種程度上，擴大了——戰爭的極限。

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The Missing Escalation in Ukraine

In Defense of the West’s Go-Slow Approach

By Austin Carson

September 14, 2023

Ukrainian military exercises in the Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine, August 2023

Viacheslav Ratynskyi / Reuters

Since the moment Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the specter of escalation has loomed over the war. For Ukrainian citizens and soldiers, the war is a grueling, horrific, daily reality that has already escalated in notable ways; in August, Kyiv ramped up strikes in Russia, and Moscow has resumed its campaign against Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea. Seen another way, however, many of the most feared escalation scenarios have not occurred, most notably a large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and the use of nuclear weapons.

Eighteen months after the war began, it is time to take stock of its unusual escalation dynamics. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly hinted that he might go nuclear, raising the prospect that tactical nuclear weapons could be used to destroy military targets, kill Ukrainian civilians, or make a show of force in an uninhabited area. Yet he has not done so. Beyond this most conspicuous missing form of escalation, there are other realms in which various parties have shown restraint—for instance, in the scope of NATO’s surveillance flights or in the details of Russian operations in the Black Sea. Despite ample opportunity to intensify hostilities or to expand the geographic scope of the war, Russia, Ukraine, and Ukraine’s allies have mostly chosen not to do so.

This restraint is often overlooked, and a key reason for it—a gradual approach to the war on all sides—is often misunderstood. Many supporters of Ukraine have criticized the piecemeal delivery of aid and other forms of incrementalism. Indeed, a go-slow approach to expanding military aid to Ukraine has slowed the development of some combat capabilities by Kyiv’s military forces. But the West’s gradual approach has served a vital strategic purpose. It is no accident that the war has avoided certain forms of drastic escalation. The war’s participants, including leaders in Kyiv, have often followed a logic of learning and gradualism, cautiously adopting new weapons and tactics, buying time to assess Russia’s reaction. Even Ukraine has done this in its approach to attacks within Russian territory. Western leaders and Ukraine have allowed what is still, in some important ways, a limited war to emerge organically and through trial and error.

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New developments, however, may threaten this dynamic. Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian grain infrastructure and surging Ukrainian attacks within Russia threaten to expand the geographical scope of conflict. The mutiny and subsequent death of Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin suggest that Russia’s domestic political situation is dynamic and could shift in ways that may encourage Putin to escalate. Ukraine’s counteroffensive, meanwhile, has made some progress but no breakthroughs. Should Ukraine achieve rapid territorial gains, the risks of escalation may sharply increase. To keep escalation in check as the war continues to evolve, Western officials and Ukrainian leaders must resist calls to abandon their gradualist approach. Failure to do so could cause the hard-earned control over escalation to slip away.

THE ROADS NOT TAKEN

Historical comparisons from the past century often inform debates about the risk of escalation. World War I, for instance, started as a local dispute over an assassination, but it quickly ballooned into a pan-European clash that killed 20 million people. The Korean War was initially limited to combat between Pyongyang, Seoul, and Seoul’s foreign partners, but within five months, hundreds of thousands of U.S. and Chinese troops were in direct combat. The United States intended to assist South Vietnam only with military aid and advice, but its involvement evolved into a costly, violent military intervention that lasted a decade.

Conflicts after the end of the Cold War did not feature the same escalation problems. With the end of bipolarity, the West’s adversaries in peripheral countries such as Iraq and Libya did not have great-power backers. These were one-sided affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine therefore harks back to an earlier period when escalation and restraint were potent issues during war.

The gravest form of escalation in Ukraine would involve nuclear weapons. This scenario has been depicted as plausible because employing nuclear weapons could give Putin a decisive edge under certain battlefield conditions or serve as a stark warning to the West. It could even prompt retaliation by NATO, increasing the possibility of a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons beyond Ukraine’s borders. Every time an ally has provided Kyiv with new surface-to-surface missile systems, air defense systems, armored and tracked vehicles, or fighter jets, cautious voices in the West have warned that these acts risk prompting escalation—including Russian retaliatory strikes outside Ukraine.

To date, this has not happened. The absence of this form of escalation does not mean that analysts have been wrong to fear it. Quite the contrary: a fear of escalation can motivate military commanders and policymakers to make cautious decisions that help prevent it. Early in the war, Kyiv and many of its supporters called for a no-fly zone, but Western leaders refused to impose one, fearing an air-to-air clash between NATO and Russian aircraft. The no-fly zone proposal has faded from public commentary, making the escalation avoided by rejecting it easy to overlook. But this was an important road not taken.

The lesson is clear: anticipating escalation scenarios helps make them less likely to happen. Yet the fear of escalation is not the only factor that has prevented it in Ukraine. Understanding the other reasons why Russia’s invasion has not drastically escalated is essential to avoid escalation, both in this conflict and in others to come.

The absence of nuclear escalation does not mean that analysts have been wrong to fear it.

Public discussions often underrepresent many of the escalation scenarios that have not come to pass. Conspicuously, Russia has not engaged in observable large-scale cyberattacks on targets beyond Ukraine. Moscow has developed a sophisticated cyber-capability and used it to meddle in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Yet civilian infrastructure or government targets in Western Europe and the United States appear to have been largely spared.

Putin has also abstained from using chemical weapons. The Russian military has a considerable stock of chemical munitions, and chemical attacks by President Bashar al-Assad in Syria have set a dangerous precedent. But Putin has not yet used them in Ukraine.

Some forms of restraint demonstrated by the United States and NATO have received minimal fanfare. The United States has limited visits by senior U.S. military officials to Ukraine to “avoid increasing tensions with Moscow,” as an August assessment of the counteroffensive in The New York Times noted. Few outside Washington notice such moderation. Other forms of restraint related to espionage and covert action are hard to observe. NATO countries routinely conduct surveillance over international waters and their own territories, but according to The New York Times, they “are careful not to stray into the war zone.” A Washington Post report this August on Russian sabotage operations within Poland contained an overlooked revelation: Russia had not even attempted to sabotage the flow of military supplies into Ukraine until a year into the war.

Even Russia’s resumption of its blockade on Ukrainian grain exports in July—a form of escalation in its own way—features elements of restraint. Although its military strikes have targeted grain-related installations, so far Moscow has not overtly attacked civilian grain shipments. NATO countries’ responses to the blockade have also been measured; for now, they have refrained from providing the armed escorts for grain shipments that Ukraine has requested. As the Kremlin expands the scope of its hostilities, it has shown a tendency to also reject more reckless forms of escalation. The missing escalations in Ukraine are analogous to dogs that do not bark: their silence makes them easy to miss.

REASON FOR RESTRAINT

The puzzle of the missing escalations in Ukraine is, in part, explained by the broader context of this particular war. There are significant incentives for leaders to try to contain the fighting. A direct conventional or nuclear clash between Russia and NATO would clearly be ruinous for both sides, inflicting tremendous economic, political, and military damage. War between major powers in the modern era is incredibly costly. Today’s war in Ukraine and past conflicts during the Cold War share this structural constraint.

The strain on Russia’s military resources almost certainly amplifies the downsides of escalation for Moscow. After its failed bid to swiftly seize Kyiv at the beginning of the war and high rates of equipment loss and casualties, Moscow cannot open new war fronts and achieve anything close to its military objectives in Ukraine. Putin’s decisions over the course of the conflict will need to reflect this reality: if the conflict dramatically widened, he would be playing with a losing hand.

Domestic politics also matter. During the Cold War, restraint toward Communist aggression could be politically fatal. Today’s political environment has changed. Leaders in the democratic West that recklessly invite escalation are probably more likely to lose the next election. It is less clear whether Russia’s domestic political dynamics have blunted or encouraged escalation. Putin must avoid alienating the Russian elites that support him and mobilizing mass dissent. Yet some domestic pressures on Putin incentivize belligerence, namely the war hawks outside government who continually demand more expansive military mobilization or even the use of nuclear weapons.

GOING SLOW IS GOOD

Another reason for missing escalation involves incrementalism and learning. At critical moments, political leaders and military commanders in the West have chosen gradualism. Going slowly in war often invites criticism. Ukraine’s supporters have at times complained that the United States and its allies have dithered in providing more effective artillery, air defense, and tanks. What looks like indecisiveness, however, can have significant value on the battlefield.

Examples of U.S. and Western European leaders using a slow, incremental approach are not hard to find. Since the early months of the war, NATO members have cautiously and slowly deliberated about providing shoulder-fired missile systems, armored vehicles, missile defense systems, tanks, longer-distance artillery systems, and F-16 training and aircraft. One benefit of this go-slow approach is that it has given intelligence and military experts time to scrutinize how Russia reacts. For example, Washington did not flip a switch and provide M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The idea was debated in public for weeks and internally for longer. Even after approving the M1 Abrams tanks, the United States has slow-rolled their introduction to the battlefield, allowing tanks sent by the British and Germans to go first. Each of these steps can be a painful sacrifice on the battlefield, but they also give analysts time to gauge Putin’s reaction to a potentially explosive U.S. decision.

Kyiv has often been the most vocal critic of the go-slow approach to delivering aid. Yet Ukrainian leaders themselves use gradualism to control escalation when conducting cross-border operations within Russian territory. Since last spring, Ukrainian leaders have incrementally intensified strikes on military supply lines and urban centers within Russia while avoiding taking credit for them. This distancing on Ukraine’s part encourages the Kremlin to respond in a mild, relatively restrained way and avoid the wrath of the public. Ukraine’s Western allies have used distancing as well; for instance, the United States has forbidden its military aid from being used in such operations.

The management of high-risk incidents in Ukraine has been characterized by gradualism, deliberate ambiguity, and political caution. In March 2023, for example, a Russian fighter jet apparently dumped fuel on and collided with a U.S. surveillance drone, sending the drone crashing into the Black Sea. Both sides exchanged blame, with the U.S. military releasing a video to support its account. Yet Washington and Moscow also engaged in deescalatory measures; in public comments, a National Security Council representative suggested that the Russian pilot may have acted on his own accord, and senior U.S. and Russian military officials discussed their views of the incident in a private call.

WARNING SIGNS

Escalation control measures that have worked today may need to evolve to keep working tomorrow. Developments over the summer of 2023 may test the limits that have developed. First, Russia’s renewed attacks against Ukrainian grain exports have expanded the geographic boundaries of the war. In August, a Russian drone attacked a port on the Ukrainian side of the Danube River, which forms the border with Romania, a NATO member. Strikes targeting grain infrastructure increase the risk of accidental or unauthorized attacks on civilian shipping or more deadly incidents between military aircraft.

Second, Ukraine appears to be ramping up the scale and intensity of its attacks inside Russia. In July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly warned that the war would be “returning to Russia.” This surge may be motivated by a desire to more aggressively degrade Russian logistics during the counteroffensive and to reassure the Ukrainian public that the fight is being taken to Russian territory. Kyiv has also learned from Putin’s mild reaction to earlier cross-border operations. The risk is twofold. A more aggressive campaign within Russia may prompt a harsher reaction. In addition, a widening campaign within Russia may make it easier to expand even farther as more potent Western weaponry becomes available or the war bogs down more.

New developments concerning Putin’s domestic position suggest his decision-making could become more unpredictable. Although some Western commentators and analysts viewed Prigozhin’s rebellion as a positive development, suggesting it indicated a growing appetite for open dissent in Russia, it may also have increased the risk of escalation. Internal dissent could recalibrate Putin’s willingness to accept strategic risk, making him more likely to gamble with escalation as the Hail Mary that would turn the tide of the war and shore up his domestic political support.

Incrementalism can be a painful sacrifice on the battlefield, but it also gives analysts time to gauge Putin’s reactions.

Perhaps Prigozhin’s August death in a plane crash ended the threat to Putin from his inner circle. But if escalation control is largely defined by learning, an increasingly unstable adversary may make moot some of the lessons the West and Ukraine have learned thus far. NATO allies may be less confident about Russia’s reaction to the introduction of F-16 fighter jets into Ukraine’s military operations when the domestic politics in Russia are in flux.

Another wildcard is Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Its sluggish progress is frustrating to Kyiv and its partners, but that pace does inadvertently impose a kind of gradualism. So far, Ukrainian territorial gains have been slow, giving the West time to assess how Putin and the Russian military adapt. Ironically, these limits on escalation could dissolve if Ukraine achieves a decisive battlefield breakthrough. The collapse of the Russian military resistance on one of the conflict’s fronts or the loss of its overland access to Crimea could lead Russian leaders to embrace a new set of escalatory tactics.

Finally, the emergence of a stronger diplomatic process to end the war could reshape the war’s escalation dynamics or even paradoxically encourage escalation. While strengthening diplomatic communication can facilitate better crisis management, peace negotiations can also tempt leaders to escalate. In 1971 during the Vietnam War, for example, U.S. President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, expanded military operations into Laos ahead of talks with North Vietnam to increase their leverage at the negotiating table.

WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

If gradualism has so far controlled escalation, then leaders need to maintain it and adapt it to meet the evolving challenges of the war. Gradualism is most associated with how the West has provided military weaponry. Washington should continue to move slowly as it decides whether to provide new and more potent systems, such as the Army Tactical Missile System. A cautious incrementalism will also be important when it comes to introducing systems NATO countries have already promised, such as F-16s. Other arenas of the war can also benefit from gradualism. Leaders in the United States and elsewhere should use caution in adopting any new maritime security or surveillance measures in the Black Sea so they can buy time to gauge Russia’s reaction and defuse any incidents. As for Ukraine’s attacks within Russia, Kyiv should go slowly with any expansion in the volume of strikes, targets, or use of new weapons systems.

Countries backing Ukraine also ought to think ahead, designing incremental approaches to Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Should the Ukrainian military achieve a significant breakthrough, Kyiv and its allies should have plans, such as buffer zones for advancing military units, to approach sensitive border areas slowly and cautiously. Western and Ukrainian leaders should also better articulate the strategic value of going slowly, clearly signaling that their gradualism is intentional and motivated by an interest in advancing shared goals while containing the war’s damage. And if negotiations accelerate, leaders in the West and Ukraine should not reach for new escalatory tactics. Any deepening talks with Russia should include proactive and explicit statements about limits that both sides need to respect as the bargaining progresses.

The lack of escalation in Ukraine serves as a reminder that in limited wars, patience is a virtue. A go-slow approach has allowed NATO countries to provide a level of military support that was unthinkable at the war’s start. The risks of escalation have not been overblown. Instead, gradualism has allowed the West to learn—and, in some ways, stretch—the limits of the war.

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AUSTIN CARSON is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and the author of Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics.

MORE BY AUSTIN CARSON

Eastern Europe & Caucasus Ukraine Russian Federation International Institutions NATO Security Defense & Military Nuclear Weapons & Proliferation Strategy & Conflict War & Military Strategy U.S. Foreign Policy War in Ukraine

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在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德

在有限的戰爭中，耐心是一種美德

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