我们不知道如何憎恨

Sehepunkte 11 (2011), Nr.

Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi: 

Noi non sappiamo odiare

Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi：

我们不知道如何憎恨

这本引人入胜的著作的标题概括了第二次世界大战期间和战后意大利军官团对犯罪的否认和对军事渎职的辩解。乔瓦尼-梅塞元帅曾任 1941/42 年意大利远征军在俄罗斯的指挥官和 1943 年意大利第一军在突尼斯的指挥官，也是未来的基督教民主党参议员，他在被英国俘虏时曾对他的军官们说过这样一句话："我们是慷慨的，我们根本不知道如何仇恨[......]我们不是好战的民族"。(232)这些说法恰到好处地概括了意大利军人的自我膨胀以及战后公众对意大利多次侵略战争的妄想。

阿米迪奥-奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi）以新颖的资料来源为基础，热情而准确地瞄准了整个国家的神话。英国的战时情报部门为被选中的战俘提供了大量闲暇时间，让他们可以相互闲聊，而秘密听众则记录并转录感兴趣的评论。近年来，一个大型的德国和国际历史项目将由此产生的 50,000 页录音誊本复制并编码到数据库中，以供系统利用；奥斯蒂-格拉兹对意大利资料进行了专家评估。

成果令人惊叹。这些记录誊本提供了独特的快照，既反映了对事件的短暂反应，也反映了潜在的态度，而这些在现存的当代文献中大多不存在，在日记和回忆录中也被遗忘或压制。[奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Osti Guerrazzi）的资料主要来自 1942 年 11 月至 1943 年 7 月期间在非洲和西西里被俘的意大利军官，他将这些资料分成了一系列专题章节：资料来源和主人公；战俘生活；对法西斯运动和政权的态度；军队和君主政体；意大利的战争准备和 1940-43 年的军事行动；令人恐惧和钦佩的盟友--"阿提拉的摩托化后裔"（6, 204）；意大利的战争罪行；以及战俘对自己和意大利未来前景的猜测。

sehepunkte 11 (2011), Nr. 10

Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi: Noi non sappiamo odiare

The title of this engagingly written work summarizes the denials of criminality and the excuses for military malpractice of the Italian officer corps during and after the Second World War. Field Marshal Giovanni Messe, past commander of the Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia in 1941/42 and of 1st Italian Army in Tunisia in 1943, and future senator of the Democrazia Cristiana , uttered the phrase in British captivity, to his fellow-officers: "We are generous, we at bottom do not know how to hate [...] we are not a warrior people." (232) Those claims neatly encapsulated both the self-exculpation of Italy's military caste and the delusional character of postwar public memory of Italy's numerous wars of aggression.

Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi has taken aim with zeal and precision at an entire national mythology - on the basis of novel sources. Britain's wartime intelligence services provided selected prisoners of war with ample leisure to gossip among themselves - while secret listeners recorded and transcribed comments of interest. And in recent years a large-scale German and international historical project copied and coded the resulting 50,000 pages of transcripts into a database for systematic exploitation; Osti Guerrazzi provided the expert evaluation of the Italian materials.

The results are stunning. The transcripts offer unique snapshots both of fleeting reactions to events and of underlying attitudes that are largely absent from the surviving contemporary documents, and forgotten or suppressed in diaries and memoirs. [ 1 ] Osti Guerrazzi has grouped his material, which derives primarily from Italian officers captured in Africa and Sicily between November 1942 and July 1943, into a series of topical chapters: sources and protagonists; life as a prisoner-of-war; attitudes toward the Fascist movement and regime; the army and the monarchy; Italy's preparations for war and military operations in 1940-43; the feared and admired ally, "motorized descendants of Attila" (6, 204); Italian war crimes; and the prisoners' speculations on their own future prospects and on those of Italy.

在这些记录中，对法西斯政权的态度占据了重要位置，这些记录使后来许多人声称军队是法西斯主义无辜受害者的说法名誉扫地，无法挽回。梅塞（Messe）在 1943 年的评价很有代表性："一场再生运动，后来在道路上弄脏了自己"（70; 71, 74）。法西斯意识形态在本质上是不可或缺的："一旦法西斯思想被清除，共产主义思想就会出现"（78）。军官们甚至认为黑衫法西斯民兵--几乎所有战后军事回忆录中最受欢迎的鞭挞对象--是 "阻止群众革命 "所必需的（77、97）。虽然回想起来，这些军官对给意大利带来灾难的外交政策和军事战略提出了尖锐批评，但直到 1943 年 9 月墨索里尼作为德国傀儡重新出现，他们才完全否定了墨索里尼（69、79-82）。相反，尽管意大利皇家陆军与君主政体有着制度上的联系，但国王维克多-伊曼纽尔三世的身影在记录中只是昙花一现，直到 1943 年 7 月墨索里尼被解职--此后主要是因为停战失败和懦弱地逃离罗马，这让被俘的军官们大为困惑、沮丧和蔑视。正如奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Osti Guerrazzi）所指出的，这些爆发使得军队在 1946 年欣然接受意大利共和国比迄今为止更容易理解。

然而，这些记录最能说明军官团对意大利备战、战略和行动以及与德国盟友关系的看法。在两个相互矛盾的方面：一方面，将军们在战后为战败找借口，首先是墨索里尼表面上没有听取军事专家的建议（64, 141），这些借口都是公开的；与希特勒元帅们的战后幻想明显相似。另一方面，这些文字记录揭示了一种不安的意识，即意大利军事机构和军事文化固有的令人遗憾的不足之处，这种意识后来通常受到压抑。在这方面，德国盟友发挥了双重作用：既是灾难的替罪羊，又是反面教材，不具备所谓的意大利美德，如 "人道 "和政治智慧；既是军事效率的黄金标准，又远远超出了皇家军队的能力范围。在战后世界，正如奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Osti Guerrazzi）所指出的，第一种模式占了上风--意大利（而非德国）在俄国和巴尔干犯下的战争罪行从人们的记忆中消失了。尽管俘虏中包括塔迪奥-奥兰多将军（Taddeo Orlando），他下令射杀巴尔干战俘和平民时的克制程度丝毫不亚于他的德国盟友，但这些罪行在笔录中也丝毫没有出现。奥兰多和梅塞等人很快被英国人释放，并在 1943 年后的意大利获得了辉煌的职业生涯--还免于被引渡到南斯拉夫。尽管这些将军们出于特有的狭隘观念，未能预见到美国的霸权角色，但他们的谈话记录也显示了意大利作为反苏西方联盟中一个非常次要的合作伙伴的未来角色的非凡预见性。

对作者的唯一轻微指责是他的解释框架。奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Osti Guerrazzi）追随伦佐-德-费利切（Renzo De Felice）（105-106, 110），认为军官团的态度仅仅反映了其作为 1922 年前接受并服务于政权的 "统治阶级"（classe dirigente）一部分的地位；因此，一种内敛的反共 "共同文化"（54, 63, 82）将武装部队和法西斯主义联系在一起。但这种态度和目标上的部分认同并不能解释意大利在第二次世界大战中扮演的角色的最显著和最特殊的特征，即军事体制上的无能、战术和行动上的非同寻常的不足，以及武装部队内部普遍存在的腐败现象，这些都是被俘军官在谈话中坦然承认的，即使是痛苦地承认，部队也普遍认为是这样（143, 208-209, 211-212, 223-225）。奥斯蒂-格拉兹（Osti Guerrazzi）显然认为这些现象是 "整个意大利统治阶级[......]在经历了二十年的法西斯主义之后道德解体 "的结果（156, 158-167）。但这一判断与将军们将自己的不足归咎于政权的做法有着令人遗憾的相似之处。仔细分析 1922 年王室军队带给法西斯主义的意大利军事文化的持久特征--法西斯主义本身的许多内容也来源于此--可能会有所启发。1940-43 年间，普通德国军官与意大利军官在训练、战术和作战技能、主动性、专业性以及以身作则激励部队的能力等方面的差距，真的完全是墨索里尼及其政权的责任吗？[无论如何，《我不可能逃跑》对意大利人民和军队在第二次世界大战中是 "好人"--"勇敢的意大利人"--这一根深蒂固的神话进行了精彩而持久的驳斥。

Attitudes toward the regime figure prominently in the transcripts, which discredit beyond redemption the many later protestations that the army was an innocent victim of Fascism. Messe's 1943 verdict was representative: a "regenerative movement that soiled itself later along the road" (70; 71, 74). Fascist ideology was existentially indispensable: "Once the Fascist idea is removed, the Communist one appears" (78). The officers even regarded the black-shirted Fascist Militia, a favorite whipping-boy in virtually all post-war military memoirs, as vitally necessary to "hold back the masses from revolution" (77, 97). And while in retrospect savagely critical of the foreign policy and military strategy that had brought disaster upon Italy, the officers did not wholly repudiate Mussolini until his reemergence in September 1943 as a German puppet (69, 79-82). Conversely, and despite the Royal Italian Army's institutional link to the monarchy, King Victor Emanuel III figures only fleetingly in the transcripts until Mussolini's July 1943 dismissal - and thereafter primarily for the botched armistice and cowardly flight from Rome that moved the captive officers to vociferous perplexity, dismay, and contempt. As Osti Guerrazzi points out, those outbursts make the army's ready acceptance of the Italian republic in 1946 far more understandable than hitherto.

The transcripts are however most eloquent on the officer corps view of Italy's preparations for war, strategy and operations, and relations with the German ally. In two mutually contradictory ways: on the one hand the generals' post-war excuses for defeat, first of all Mussolini's ostensible failure to listen to expert military advice (64, 141), are all on parade; parallels to the postwar fantasies of Hitler's field marshals are obvious. On the other, the transcripts reveal an uneasy consciousness, later usually repressed, of the intrinsic lamentable inadequacies of Italian military institutions and military culture. In this connection, the German ally performed a dual function, as scapegoat for catastrophe and negative example devoid of purported Italian virtues such as " umanità " and political astuteness, and as a gold standard of military effectiveness far beyond the Royal Army's reach. In the postwar world, as Osti Guerrazzi points out, the first model prevailed - and Italian (but not German) war crimes in Russia and the Balkans simply vanished from memory. Nor do they appear to any extent in the transcripts, although the captives included General Taddeo Orlando, who had ordered the shooting of Balkan prisoners of war and civilians with scarcely less restraint than his German allies. Along with Messe, Orlando and others were soon released by the British, and enjoyed brilliant careers in post-1943 Italy - as well as immunity from extradition to Yugoslavia. The transcribed remarks also show remarkable prescience about Italy's future role as a very junior partner in an anti-Soviet Western alliance, even if the generals failed - from a characteristic parochialism of outlook - to anticipate the hegemonic role of the United States.

The only mild reproach one might direct at the author regards his explanatory framework. Osti Guerrazzi follows Renzo De Felice (105-106, 110) in arguing that the attitudes of the officer corps merely reflected its position as part of the pre-1922 classe dirigente that had accepted and served the regime; a viscerally anti-Communist "shared culture [ cultura condivisa ]" (54, 63, 82) thus united the armed forces and Fascism. But that partial identity of attitudes and aims does not explain the most salient and peculiar feature of Italy's role in the Second World War, the specifically military-institutional ineptitude, extraordinary tactical and operational inadequacies, and widespread corruption within the armed forces themselves that the captive officers freely if bitterly admitted in conversation, and which the troops widely perceived (143, 208-209, 211-212, 223-225). Osti Guerrazzi apparently considers these phenomena a result of "moral disintegration of the entire Italian ruling class [...] after twenty years of fascism" (156, 158-167). But that judgment bears unfortunate resemblance to the generals' efforts to blame their own inadequacies on the regime. Closer analysis of the abiding features of the Italian military culture that the royal army brought to Fascism in 1922 - and from which much of Fascism itself derived - might be suggestive. Were the gaps in training, tactical and operational skill, initiative, professionalism, and ability to motivate the troops by example between the average German officer and his Italian counterparts in 1940-43 really the sole responsibility of Mussolini and his regime? [ 3 ] Regardless, Noi non possiamo odiare offers a splendid sustained refutation of the deeply rooted myth that the Italian people and armed forces numbered among the good guys - " italiani brava gente " - of the Second World War.

备注 ：

[ 1 ] 参见项目组织者的示范性专著：Sönke Neitzel: Abgehört.Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942-1945, Berlin / München 2005, and Sönke Neitzel / Harald Welzer: Soldaten.Protokolle von Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben, Frankfurt/M. 2011。

[ 2 ] 有关理论和应用，请参阅伊莎贝尔-赫尔（Isabel V. Hull）的基本著作：《绝对毁灭：帝国德国的军事文化与战争实践》（Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany），伊萨卡/纽约，2004 年。

[ 3 ] 特别参见 MacGregor Knox：希特勒的意大利盟友》，剑桥，2000 年，第 29-30 页、第 51-58 页，以及同上：《世界大战与 "军事文化"》。Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse, edited by Sven Oliver Müller / Cornelius Torp, Göttingen 2008, 290-307.

主题词：军事、意大利、世界大战 <1939-1945>、历史 1943 年

Notes :

[ 1 ] See the exemplary monographs of the project organizers: Sönke Neitzel: Abgehört. Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942-1945, Berlin / München 2005, and Sönke Neitzel / Harald Welzer: Soldaten. Protokolle von Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben, Frankfurt/M. 2011.

[ 2 ] For both theory and application, see the fundamental work of Isabel V. Hull: Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, Ithaca/NY 2004.

[ 3 ] See especially MacGregor Knox: Hitler's Italian Allies, Cambridge 2000, 29-30, 51-58, and idem: Erster Weltkrieg und "Military Culture". Kontinuität und Wandel im deutsch-italienischen Vergleich, in: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse, edited by Sven Oliver Müller / Cornelius Torp, Göttingen 2008, 290-307.

Subject headings: Militär, Italien, Weltkrieg <1939-1945>, Geschichte 1943