滇缅公路：二战中缅印战区的史诗故事

为被遗忘的战场伸张正义

2021年9月28日在美國評論

起初，我以为这本书介绍的是缅甸公路以及美国工程师在修建这条公路时遇到的困难。后来仔细一看，我才发现这是一本全面记述CBI（中国、缅甸、印度）战区作战情况的书。

书中主要介绍了美国将军斯蒂尔维尔领导的中国 X 部队在缅甸战争初期攻占腊戍时，打通了日军切断的通往中国的补给线。然而，在此之前，缅甸北部必须从日军控制下解放出来。

尽管作者写得很好，但他忽略了几件事，而这些事本可以为他的叙述提供更多的实质内容。首先，关于日本入侵缅甸，作者没有提供这场战役的战略背景。战役开始时，日本在中国的战争变得无休无止。

日本军队征服了大片中国领土。但却未能造成致命一击。东京认为，这是因为中国国民党军队继续通过法属印度支那和缅甸腊戍获得补给。如果这些补给线被切断，中国的抵抗就会停止。这种想法支撑了日本占领法属印度支那和缅甸的决定。

英国人哈罗德-亚历山大被认为是一位幸运的将军。为什么会这样呢？亚历山大抵达缅甸，接替托马斯-赫顿（Thomas J.Hutton）成为英军新任总司令。他一到缅甸就意识到缅甸战役已经失败。因此，他决定无视上司的命令撤退。在交战期间，他险些被日本巡逻队俘虏。到底发生了什么？

在这里，日军因战地情报失误而误判英军正向仰光撤退；结果在锡唐河桥附近遭到惨败，第 17 师被击溃。实际上，英军正在向北移动。日军指挥官樱井决定诱捕英军，在英军假定的撤退路线上进行大范围包抄。前者险些与英军部队发生接触，而英军部队却在日军走后横穿马路。道路被切断，英军逃脱。重要的是，随着时间的推移，英军向北推进，日军向南压迫，双方的差距越来越大。

缅甸战役对盟军来说是一场灾难。一些战争史学家声称，这不是一次撤退，而是一次溃败。尽管如此，盟军还是逃脱了被消灭的命运。如果日军有效地使用了空中力量，就不会发生这种情况。

值得回顾的是，1941 年 3 月 27 日，日军在空中占据了绝对优势。然而，他们的空军却未能在必要的程度上骚扰、阻碍盟军的撤退，从而确保盟军被其地面部队摧毁。

这是由两个因素造成的。首先，空军部队由缺乏经验的皇军高级军官指挥。其次，飞机不是攻击敌军集结地和军队，而是轰炸缅甸中部和北部的城市，造成大量平民伤亡。

就在史迪威领导的中国军队忙于在缅甸北部与日军作战时，日军入侵印度。他过于关注科希马战役，却忽视了南部英帕尔附近发生的同样重要的战役。

日军的侵略沿着多条轴线展开：城市南部、东南部和东北部。在这三条轴线中，沿着东北轴线的进攻可能是最危险的。英国人从未料到日军会从这个方向进攻。因此，这一地区的防御很薄弱。

村口将军的作战计划非常出色。他正确地判断出，从南面和东南面轴线发起的进攻将分散英军的注意力，使英帕尔的防御力量荡然无存。不幸的是，日军精锐的第 15 师团在桑沙克与印度伞兵旅遭遇。伞兵无法阻止日军的推进，但却成功地拖延了日军的进攻，这给日军敲响了警钟。这一延迟为英国人提供了足够的时间来巩固英帕尔的防御。为此，英军从阿拉干地区空运了部队。印度第 5 师的部队从英帕尔附近的机场下机后立即投入战斗。该城得以保全。

尽管存在上述遗漏，我仍不介意给这本书打 4 星。该书填补了我对加比战区了解的一大空白。一般来说，这是一个被忽视的战区。所有关于第二次世界大战的主要历史都提到了它，尽管只是敷衍了事。这种态度近来有所改变。本书正是这种观念转变的体现。缅甸北部发生了一些史诗般的战役：沙祖普（Shadzup）、卡马宁（Kamaing）、恩普姆嘎（Nhpum Ga）、密支那（Myitkina）。其中最令人难忘的是为期 13 天的围攻 Nhpum Ga 战役。

最后，作者还分享了他在印度东北部、缅甸、中国云南等地旅行的亲身经历，为本书的写作增添了活力。这一点也值得赞赏。

Doing justice to a forgotten theater of war

2021年9月28日在美國評論

First I thought this book was on Burma road and the difficulties associated with its building by the American engineers. Then taking a closer look I realized this was a full-blown operational account of CBI ( China,Burma,India) theater of war.

The book is mostly on operations executed by the American general Stilwell-led Chinese X Force that opened supply line to China cut by the Japanese forces when they captured Lashio during the opening phase of war in Burma. However before that could happen northern Burma had to be liberated from Japanese control.

Though well-written the author, however, has glossed over a few things which could have given more substance to his narrative. Firstly, on the Japanese invasion of Burma the author failed to provide strategic background to the campaign. It began with Japan’s war in China becoming interminable.

Japanese forces conquered large chunks of Chinese territory . But failed in inflicting a knock-out blow. Tokyo felt this was because the Chinese Nationalist forces were continuing to get supplies via French Indo China and Lashio in Burma . If these supply routes were cut the Chinese resistance would cease. This thinking underpinned Japan’s decision to occupy French Indo china and Burma

The Briton Harold Alexander was considered a lucky general. Why was this so?There are no reference to it in the book. Alexander arrived in Burma to replace Thomas J.Hutton as the new GOC of the British forces. Immediately upon his arrival he realized the campain in Burma was lost. Therfore decided to ignore his superior’s orders and withdraw. While engaged he narrowly escaped capture by Japanese patrols. So what happened?

Here the Japanese misjudged on account of failure by their battle field intelligence the British were withdrawing towards Rangoon; outcome of defeat inflicted near Sittang river bridge where 17th division was routed. Actually, the British were moving north. The Japanese commander Sakurai decided to trap the British forces by bringing his forces astride latter’s presumed path of retreat in a wide outflanking maneuver. The former narrowly missed coming in contact with British units that now crossed the path after Japanese had gone. The road was unbarred and the British escaped. What was significant the gap widened as the days went by with the British moving northwards and Japanese pressing towards the south.

The Burma campaign was a disaster for the Allies. Some war historians have claimed that it was not a retreat but a rout. Nevertheless, the Allied forces escaped annhilation. This would not have happened had the Japanese employed their airpower effectively.

It’s worth recalling by 1941, March 27 the Japanese enjoyed absolute air supremacy. Yet their airforces failed to harass,impede the withdrawal of Allied forces to an extent necessary which would have ensured its destruction by their ground troops.

This was on account of two factors. Firstly, the air units were commanded by the senior officers of the Imperial Army who lacked experience. Secondly, instead of attacking enemy troop concentrations and military the planes bombed cities in central and northern Burma causing heavy civilian casualties.

While Stilwell-led Chinese forces were busy fighting the Japanese in northern Burma came came the latter’s invasion of india.Here again author’s narrative is incomplete. He focusses too much attention on Kohima battle while ignoring equally important fought in the south near Imphal.

The Japanese invasion came along multiple axes: south,southeast,northeast of the city. Among the three the thrust that came along the northeastern axis was perhaps the most dangerous. The British never expected a move from this direction. Consequently this sector was lightly defended.

General Mutaguchi’s battle plan was brilliant. He correctly judged that the assault from the south and the southeastern axes would distract,divert British attention leaving Imphal’s defenses denuded. Unfortunately for the Japanese their crack 15th division ran smack on to an Indian parachute brigade at Sangshak. The paratroopers could not check the Japanese advance but managed to delay it sending the alarm bells ringing. The delay imposed gave sufficent time for the British to shore up Imphal’s defenses. This was done by bringing troops which were airlifted from the Arakan sector. The units of the 5th Indian division immediately went into action after deplaning from airfields near Imphal. The city was saved.

Despite the above omissions I don’t mind giving 4 stars for the book. The book has filled a big void in my understanding of CBI Theater of war. Generally, this is an ignored,neglected theater of war. All major histories on World War II do mention it albeit perfunctorily. This attitude has changed of late. The book is a manifestation such a changed mindset. Northern Burma saw some epic battles: Shadzup,Kamaing,Nhpum Ga,Myitkina. Of these most memorable was 13-day siege Nhpum Ga

Finally, the author has enlivened his narrative by sharing personal experiences traveling northeast India, Burma,Yunnan prov China while researching for the book. This too is appreciated.