關於內戰如何結束的四件事”中概述了四點。

 芭芭拉·F·沃爾特 (Barbara F. Walter) 在她 2013 年 10 月 18 日的文章“關於內戰如何結束的四件事”中概述了四點。 

https://english.shannews.org/archives/20904

芭芭拉·F·沃尔特 (Barbara F. Walter) 在她 2013 年 10 月 18 日的文章“关于内战如何结束的四件事”中概述了四点。 


他们是:  


内战不会很快结束; 

派系数量越多,内战持续的时间就越长; 

大多数内战以决定性的军事胜利结束,而不是通过谈判解决;和 

以成功谈判和解告终的内战往往有两个共同点,

首先,它们倾向于根据战斗人员在战场上的地位在战斗人员之间划分政治权力,

其次,成功的和解都得到了第三方愿意的帮助以确保战斗人员复员时的安全。


以下是我们对内战如何结束的四个认识(中文版):



内战结束通常需要一方取得决定性的胜利:内战往往以一方势力取得明确的胜利而结束。这可能是由于军事优势、政治合作或外部干预的结果。内战的结束通常意味着一方的武装势力获得了足够的力量,以至于其他势力不再能够有效地与之抗衡。


外部调解和和平协商:内战的结束也可能通过外部调解和和平协商达成。这通常涉及到各方参与者之间的谈判和妥协,以达成一项持久和平解决方案。国际组织、邻国或国际调解人员的介入可以发挥重要的促进作用,帮助各方建立信任并促成和平进程。


经济、政治和社会重建:内战结束后,实现经济、政治和社会的重建是关键。这包括重建破坏的基础设施、建立有效的政府机构、推动社会和解以及提供基本服务和援助。这些努力对于稳定局势、恢复国家功能和防止新的冲突至关重要。


国际社会的支持和参与:国际社会的支持和参与对于内战的结束和后续重建至关重要。国际社会可以提供人道主义援助、经济援助、安全保障、政治支持和发展资源等方面的支持。此外,国际社会的压力和外交斡旋也可以帮助推动各方解决分歧、寻求妥协并实现和平。



这些是我们对内战如何结束的四个认识。然而,每个内战的情况都是独特的,没有一个统一适用于所有情况的解决方案。因此,在实际情况中,可能会出现其他因素和动态,影响内战的结束方式和过程。

他們是:  


內戰不會很快結束; 

派係數量越多,內戰持續的時間就越長; 

大多數內戰以決定性的軍事勝利結束,而不是通過談判解決;和 

以成功談判和解告終的內戰往往有兩個共同點,首先,它們傾向於根據戰鬥人員在戰場上的地位在戰鬥人員之間劃分政治權力,其次,成功的和解都得到了第三方願意的幫助以確保戰鬥人員復員時的安全。

在同一問題上,政府學副教授 Lise M. Howard 和博士 Alexandra Stark 兩位來自喬治城大學政府系的候選人在2018 年 2 月 9 日發表的題為“內戰如何結束”的文章中寫道:“我們確定了近代史上的三個重要轉變。在冷戰期間,大多數內戰都以失敗的一方徹底失敗而告終。冷戰結束後,大多數都以談判解決而告終。自 2001 年 9 月 11 日的恐怖襲擊以來,內戰仍傾向於以談判結束,但當涉及恐怖組織時則不然。”


讓我們利用這兩個調查結果,比較一下緬甸或緬甸的內戰情況,處於哪個階段,是否有可能很快結束。


根據經驗,我們知道內戰不會很快結束,因為自從 1948 年英國授予我們獨立以來,我們就一直身處其中,而種族衝突戰爭在獨立之後立即開始。克倫人在獨立之初叛亂並佔領了該國大部分領土,直到當時的烏努政府甚至被暱稱為仰光政府,因為仰光是政府手中唯一剩下的地方。共產黨在獨立前一年轉入地下,在 1950 年代後期,幾乎所有非緬族民族都起來反對中央政府,因為政治協議承諾建立一個聯邦聯盟,一直持續到今天,在連續自 1948 年以來的民事或緬族主導的民事和軍事政權。


我們也知道,從理論上講,衝突派系越多,內戰往往持續的時間越長。我們現在已經經歷了 70 多年的內戰,而且還看不到結束的跡象。迄今為止,我們有大約 20 個活躍的民族武裝組織 (EAO),遍布克欽邦、撣邦、克倫尼邦、克倫邦、孟邦、若開邦和欽邦。


Barbara F. Walter 概述的兩點,“大多數內戰以決定性的軍事勝利結束,而不是通過談判解決”和“內戰以成功的談判解決結束”,到目前為止尚未適用於緬甸的情況,因為在大多數民族國家,它仍處於武裝衝突之中。


但是,對於總部設在 Panghsang(第 2 特區)的佤邦聯合軍(UWSA)和總部設在勐拉(第 4 特區)的民族民主同盟軍(NDAA),第二點“成功談判解決”可能適用,因為自 1989 年緬甸共產黨 (CPB) 解體和垮台後,緬甸共產黨一直得到北京的支持,直到 1980 年代後期。 


CPB 的兩位繼任者改組為非緬族武裝組織 (EAO)。自 1989 年以來,停火協議一直得到遵守,這些年來,雙方一直按照他們與政府之間達成的休戰協議,單獨管理和開發他們的地區。從那時起,兩國在軍事和經濟上實現了突飛猛進的發展,成為其他仍在與緬族主導的連續政權作戰的 EAO 令人羨慕的榜樣。


因此可以說在全國范圍內沒有全面的談判解決,但與 Panghsang 和 Mongla 達成了部分協議。然而,對於其他 EAO,戰爭照常進行了幾十年,沒有人決定性地贏得這場戰鬥。


緬軍或緬甸軍方甚至不想接受該國正在發生內戰,認為上一次內戰是一年後在仰光永盛鎮與克倫國防組織 (KNDO) 軍隊的戰鬥1948 年脫離英國獨立宣言。但不管軍方怎麼說,現實情況是,在過去的 7 年裡,內戰一直在持續,沒有結束的跡象。

軍方之所以拒絕承認內戰這個詞,是因為它一如既往地認為,種族衝突戰爭是解決恐怖主義叛亂問題,而不是所有種族因政治不滿而發展成內戰的種族武裝衝突。狀態。

未命名 2
緬甸主要民族地圖 – smallwarsjournal.com

芭芭拉·F·沃爾特 (Barbara F. Walter) 在她 2013 年 10 月 18 日的文章“關於內戰如何結束的四件事”中概述了四點。 

他們是:  

  • 內戰不會很快結束; 
  • 派係數量越多,內戰持續的時間就越長; 
  • 大多數內戰以決定性的軍事勝利結束,而不是通過談判解決;和 
  • 以成功談判和解告終的內戰往往有兩個共同點,首先,它們傾向於根據戰鬥人員在戰場上的地位在戰鬥人員之間劃分政治權力,其次,成功的和解都得到了第三方願意的幫助以確保戰鬥人員復員時的安全。

在同一問題上,政府學副教授 Lise M. Howard 和博士 Alexandra Stark 兩位來自喬治城大學政府系的候選人在2018 年 2 月 9 日發表的題為“內戰如何結束”的文章中寫道:“我們確定了近代史上的三個重要轉變。在冷戰期間,大多數內戰都以失敗的一方徹底失敗而告終。冷戰結束後,大多數都以談判解決而告終。自 2001 年 9 月 11 日的恐怖襲擊以來,內戰仍傾向於以談判結束,但當涉及恐怖組織時則不然。”

讓我們利用這兩個調查結果,比較一下緬甸或緬甸的內戰情況,處於哪個階段,是否有可能很快結束。

根據經驗,我們知道內戰不會很快結束,因為自從 1948 年英國授予我們獨立以來,我們就一直身處其中,而種族衝突戰爭在獨立之後立即開始。克倫人在獨立之初叛亂並佔領了該國大部分領土,直到當時的烏努政府甚至被暱稱為仰光政府,因為仰光是政府手中唯一剩下的地方。共產黨在獨立前一年轉入地下,在 1950 年代後期,幾乎所有非緬族民族都起來反對中央政府,因為政治協議承諾建立一個聯邦聯盟,一直持續到今天,在連續自 1948 年以來的民事或緬族主導的民事和軍事政權。

我們也知道,從理論上講,衝突派系越多,內戰往往持續的時間越長。我們現在已經經歷了 70 多年的內戰,而且還看不到結束的跡象。迄今為止,我們有大約 20 個活躍的民族武裝組織 (EAO),遍布克欽邦、撣邦、克倫尼邦、克倫邦、孟邦、若開邦和欽邦。

Barbara F. Walter 概述的兩點,“大多數內戰以決定性的軍事勝利結束,而不是通過談判解決”和“內戰以成功的談判解決結束”,到目前為止尚未適用於緬甸的情況,因為在大多數民族國家,它仍處於武裝衝突之中。

但是,對於總部設在 Panghsang(第 2 特區)的佤邦聯合軍(UWSA)和總部設在勐拉(第 4 特區)的民族民主同盟軍(NDAA),第二點“成功談判解決”可能適用,因為自 1989 年緬甸共產黨 (CPB) 解體和垮台後,緬甸共產黨一直得到北京的支持,直到 1980 年代後期。 

CPB 的兩位繼任者改組為非緬族武裝組織 (EAO)。自 1989 年以來,停火協議一直得到遵守,這些年來,雙方一直按照他們與政府之間達成的休戰協議,單獨管理和開發他們的地區。從那時起,兩國在軍事和經濟上實現了突飛猛進的發展,成為其他仍在與緬族主導的連續政權作戰的 EAO 令人羨慕的榜樣。

因此可以說在全國范圍內沒有全面的談判解決,但與 Panghsang 和 Mongla 達成了部分協議。然而,對於其他 EAO,戰爭照常進行了幾十年,沒有人決定性地贏得這場戰鬥。

未命名 1
EAO 團體 – mmpeacemonitor.org

現在讓我們來看看 Lise M. Howard 和 Alexandra Stark 對不同時期給出的主格趨勢的理論發現,即: 

  • 內戰以失敗的一方徹底失敗而告終(冷戰時期 1947-1991); 
  • 談判解決(冷戰後時期 1991-2001);和 
  • 內戰仍然傾向於在談判中結束,但當涉及恐怖組織時,談判就結束了(2001 年 9 月 11 日的後果)。

2001 年 9 月 1 日,伊斯蘭恐怖組織基地組織對美國發動了一系列四次協調一致的恐怖襲擊,這也被稱為 9/11,並向恐怖主義宣戰。

Lise M. Howard 和 Alexandra Stark 寫道:“自 9/11 以來,儘管談判的規範仍然很強大,但與恐怖分子不談判的反補貼規範意味著軍事勝利的適當性再次佔上風。美國和其他國家不是在尋求民主,而是在推動一種新的“穩定”規範。

他們還在調查結果中指出:“(N)談判(negotiations,談判,談判者)的減少與恐怖主義(terror,terrorist)相關詞彙的使用增加一致。 

也就是說,協商解決的趨勢減少,打壓的趨勢增加。

緬甸經歷了冷戰、後冷戰,現在正處於後 2001 年 9 月 11 日時代的中期。換句話說,緬甸最近正處於“談判解決,以非談判姿態拒絕恐怖組織”的時代。 

政府主要採用談判解決的方式來結束內戰。但在實踐中不太清楚,因為一方面它表示所有 EAO 都參與,根據全國停火協議 (NCA) 為基礎的和平談判進程,另一方面將 AA 指定為恐怖組織3月23日積極嘗試運用反恐法殲滅該組織,對其進行大規模軍事攻勢。

而由於政府時不時地在三兄弟聯盟上使用恐怖主義叛亂分子的說法,我們不確定其成員是否也被視為恐怖組織。但迄今為止,尚未正式宣布將後兩個組織 MNDAA 和德昂民族解放軍 (TNLA) 列為恐怖分子。

綜上所述,該國已處於內戰模式 70 多年;有大量的衝突方;採用混合談判解決和拒絕恐怖組織,阻止其進入和平談判進程模式;根據和平研究理論家的說法,不要很好地結束衝突。 

雖然長達數十年的內戰和擁有眾多武裝衝突方是結束衝突的兩個關鍵障礙,但採用混合策略、將 AA 作為恐怖組織驅逐出去,同時與其他 EAO 談和平將無法達成協商解決。

原因很簡單。若開軍(AA)屬於三兄弟聯盟,也屬於北方聯盟-緬甸(NA-B),這是軍事聯盟,意思是:他們都作為一個單位與共同的敵人、政府作戰,並且已經在很多場合。NA-B 是七人政治聯盟聯邦政治談判和協商委員會 (FPNCC) 的一部分,該委員會仍未簽署 NCA,因此處於基於 NCA 的和平談判進程之外。

三兄弟聯盟由 AA、MNDAA 和 TNLA 組成。NA-B 由三兄弟聯盟和克欽獨立軍 (KIA) 組成。FPNCC 由 NA-B 加上 UWSA、NDAA 或勐拉和撣邦進步軍 (SSPP) 組成。

鑑於這種情況,政府對所有 EAO 的全面參與將不會實現,就像 NA-B 不簽署 NCA 一樣,FPNCC 也不會簽署。這意味著基於 NCA 的和平進程將只是已經簽署的 10 個 EAO 的部分參與,這隨後表明它不會富有成果或無法取得積極成果,有 8 個 EAO 被排除在和平談判進程之外。 

FPNCC 之外的另一個 NCA 非簽署方 EAO 是克倫尼民族進步黨 (KNPP)。

就目前的情況來看,在不久的將來結束內戰是沒有希望的,因為政府甚至懶得理會聯合國秘書長安東尼奧·古特雷斯在所有受衝突影響地區全世界停火的呼籲在 Covid-19 大流行期間,說它沒有用,而是選擇在若開邦對機管局發動更多攻勢。

現在要問的問題是,政府是否真的要堅持單獨談判的解決模式,準備無視機管局被定性為恐怖組織,接受其作為談判夥伴。

同樣重要的是,政府要考慮承認 EAO 在其控制區的合法性,以便在和平談判進程中處於平等地位,而不是利用家長式的主奴關係,這種關係現在是案件。

根據 Lise M. Howard 和 Alexandra Stark 的說法:“內戰往往以外部力量認為應該結束的方式結束。換句話說,規範——適當行為的觀念——在內戰結果中起著直接的作用。”

在緬甸的案例中,包括聯合國在內的大多數國際參與者都支持通過談判解決問題,儘管尚未積極尋求第三方調解或乾預。值得注意的是,即使是在冷戰時期積極支持CPB的中國,現在也轉向和平談判解決。

但到目前為止,西方希望緬甸自主的和平進程並鼓勵衝突各方自行解決政治問題,2015 年 10 月與 8 個 EAO 簽署 NCA 後正式啟動。和平談判進程幾乎停滯不前兩年來,甚至由於混合戰略方法的失敗,似乎正在加速惡化,更多地傾向於戰爭道路。 

最後但同樣重要的是,給定的理論結果表明,緬甸將無法輕易實現和平與和諧或結束內戰。然而,如果像理論家所建議的那樣,嚴格採用談判解決辦法,並有能幹的第三方調解,包括政府對 EAO 的合法性給予一定程度的承認,悲觀的前景可能會轉為樂觀的局面,為搖搖欲墜的和平注入活力過程。否則,該國將像往常一樣繼續激烈的內戰,直到成為一個完全成熟的失敗國家。 

Barbara F. Walter, in her article “The Four Things We Know About How Civil Wars End,” of 18 October 2013 outlined four points. 

They are:  

  • civil wars don’t end quickly; 
  • the greater the number of factions, the longer a civil war tends to last; 
  • most civil wars end in decisive military victories, not negotiated settlements; and 
  • the civil wars that end in successfully negotiated settlements tend to have two things in common, first, they tend to divide political power among the combatants based on their position on the battlefield, and second, successful settlements all enjoy the help of a third party willing to ensure the safety of combatants as they demobilize.

On the same issue, Lise M. Howard, Associate Professor of Government and Alexandra Stark, Ph.D. Candidate, both from the Department of Government at Georgetown University, in their piece “How Civil Wars End” published on 9 February 2018 writes: “We identify three important shifts in recent history. During the Cold War, most civil wars ended with complete defeat for the losing side. After the Cold war, most ended in negotiated settlement. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, civil wars still tend to end in negotiation, but not when a terrorist group is involved.”

Let us make use of the these two findings and compare the Myanmar or Burma’s civil war situation, in which stage it is in and if there is a chance that it would end anytime soon.

By experience, we know that civil wars don’t end quickly, as we have been in it since the British granted us independence in 1948 and the ethnic conflict war started immediately on the heels of the independence. The Karen rebelled at the beginning of independence and occupied most territories of the country, until the then U Nu government was even nick-named as Rangoon government, as Rangoon was the only place left in the hands of the government. The communist party went underground one year before independence and in late 1950s almost all non-Bamar ethnic nationalities were up in arms against the central government, due to the unfulfilled political agreement promises to establish a federal union, which goes on until today, under successive civil or Bamar-dominated civil and military regimes since 1948.

We also know that theoretically it is true, the greater the number of conflict factions, the longer a civil war tends to last. We have been now in it for more than 70 years of civil war and end is nowhere in sight. To date, we have some 20 active ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) spread out in all over in Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon, Arakan and Chin ethnic states.

The two points, “most civil wars end in decisive military victories, not negotiated settlements” and “civil wars end in successfully negotiated settlements,” outlined by Barbara F. Walter haven’t been yet applicable in the case of Burma so far, as it is still in the middle of the armed conflict, in most ethnic states.

However, in the case of United Wa State Army (UWSA) headquartered in Panghsang (Special Region 2) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) based in Mongla (Special Region 4), the second point “successful negotiated settlement” may apply, as since 1989 after the dismemberment and downfall of the Communist Party Burma (CPB), which was then backed by Beijing until late 1980s. 

The CPB two successors revamped themselves into non-Bamar ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).   And since 1989 the ceasefire agreement has been observed and all these years both have been left alone to administer and develop their areas as agreed by the truce made between them and the government. And ever since then the two have grown with leaps and bounds, militarily and economically, becoming an enviable role model for the rest of the EAOs still fighting the Bamar-dominated successive regimes.

Thus it could be said there is no comprehensive negotiated settlement countrywide but partial agreement with Panghsang and Mongla have taken place. However, with the rest of EAOs the war goes on as usual for decades, with no one decisively winning the fight.

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EAOs groups – mmpeacemonitor.org

Now let us go to Lise M. Howard and Alexandra Stark theoretical findings of nominative trends given by different period of time, namely: 

  • civil wars ending with complete defeat for the losing side (Cold War period 1947-1991); 
  • negotiated settlement (post-Cold War period 1991-2001); and 
  • civil war still tend to end in negotiation but when terrorist group is involved negotiation ended (aftermath of  11 September 2001 period).

A series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States took place in 1 September 2001, which is also referred to as 9/11 and declared war on terrorism.

Lise M. Howard and Alexandra Stark writes: “Since 9/11, although the norm of negotiation remains strong, a countervailing norm of non-negotiation with terrorists means that the appropriateness of military victory is once again ascendant. Instead of seeking democracy, the United States and others are promoting a new norm of “stabilization.””

They also pointed out in their findings: “(N)egotiation (negotiations, negotiating, negotiator) decrease in line with an increase in the use of words associated with terrorism (terror, terrorist). 

In other words, the trend of negotiated settlement decrease and tendency to suppression increase.

Burma has passed the Cold War, post-Cold War and now in the middle of post-11 September 2001 era. In other words, Burma recently is in the era of “negotiated settlement and rejection of a terrorist group with non-negotiation posture.” 

Principally the government is employing negotiated settlement to end the civil war. But in practice it is less clear, as on one hand it said that it is for all EAOs participation, under the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA)-based peace negotiation process, and on the other hand designating the AA to be a terrorist group on March 23 and actively trying to apply counter-terrorism law to annihilate the organization, with massive military offensives against it.

And as the government also now and then used the term of terrorist insurgents on the Three Brotherhood Alliance, we are not sure if all its members are also considered terrorist organizations. But to date, official announcement designating the latter two organizations, MNDAA and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), as terrorists has not yet been done.

To sum up, the country has been in civil war mode for more than 70 years; having a multitude number of conflict parties; employing a mixed negotiated settlement and rejection of a terrorist organization, blocking its entrance to peace negotiation process mode; don’t cater well to end the conflict, according to the peace study theoreticians. 

While the decades-long civil war and having numerous armed conflict parties are two crucial handicapped points to end the conflict, the employing of a mixed strategy, pushing AA out as terrorist organization and talking peace at the same time with the rest of the EAOs will not be feasible to achieve negotiated settlement.

The reason is simple. Arakan Army (AA) belongs to the Three Brotherhood Alliance and also to the Northern Alliance – Burma (NA-B), which are military alliance, meaning: they all fight as a unit against common enemy, the government and have already done so in many occasions. The NA-B is part of the seven-member political alliance Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which still has not signed the NCA and thus outside of the NCA-based peace negotiation process.

The Three Brotherhood Alliance is made up of AA, MNDAA and TNLA. The NA-B is made up of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, plus Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The FPNCC is made up of NA-B, plus UWSA, NDAA or Mongla and Shan State Progressive Army (SSPP).

Given such scenarios the government’s all-inclusiveness participation of all EAOs will not materialize, as if the NA-B doesn’t sign the NCA, the FPNCC won’t sign either. This means the NCA-based peace process will only be a partial participation of the already signed 10 EAOs, which subsequently denotes it will not be fruitful or able to achieve positive result, with 8 EAOs being left out of the peace negotiation process. 

Another NCA-non-signatory EAO outside FPNCC is Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).

As the situation now stands, there is no hope in the near future to end the civil war, as the government don’t even bother to heed the call of ceasefire the world over in all conflict affected areas by the UN General-Secretary  António Guterres during the Covid-19 pandemic, saying that it is of no use and instead opted for more offensives in Arakan State against the AA.

The question to ask now is if the government really wants to stick to the solely negotiated settlement mode and ready to disregard the designation of the AA as a terrorist group and accept it as negotiation partner.

It is also important that the government ponder the idea of acknowledging the EAOs’ legitimacy in their controlled areas so as to be on the equal-footing in peace negotiation process and not sort of making use the paternalistic master-slaves relationship, which is now the case.

According to Lise M. Howard and Alexandra Stark: “Civil wars tend to end the way that external forces think they ought to end. In other words, norms—ideas of appropriate behavior—play a direct role in civil war outcomes.”

In Burma’s case most international actors, including the UN, are for negotiated settlement although third party mediation or intervention has not been actively solicited. It is noteworthy that even China which actively backed the CPB during Cold War era is now for peaceful negotiation settlement.

But so far, the West desired Burma’s self-owned peace process and encouraged conflict parties to resolve political problems on their own, which has been officially activated after the signing of NCA with 8 EAOs in October 2015. The peace negotiation process has stagnated for almost two years now and even seems to be deteriorating at an accelerating speed because of the failed mixed strategy approach, leaning more on war path. 

Last but not the least, the given theoretical findings indicated that Burma won’t be able to achieve peace and harmony or end civil war easily. However, if only negotiated settlement is strictly employed with an able third party mediation as suggested by the theoreticians, including a degree of legitimacy acknowledgment given to the EAOs by the government, the pessimistic outlook may perhaps turn into an optimistic situation and energize the flagging peace process. Otherwise, the country will continue with the civil war raging as usual until it becomes a fully fledged failed state. 


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