对美国来说，缅甸的国民党军队为他们提供了机会，也带来了困难。

 结论

尽管人数相对较少，但对美国来说，缅甸的国民党军队为他们提供了机会，也带来了困难。

驻缅甸的国民党军队提供了机会，也带来了与他们的规模不相称的困难。

与他们的规模不相称的困难。起初，华盛顿认为这些非正规军是在反对共产主义的战争中是一支有用的力量。因此，美国中央情报局和因此，中情局和总统在至少大多数国务院官员不知情的情况下，向他们提供了援助。

因此，中情局和总统在至少大多数国务院官员不知情的情况下，向他们提供了援助，希望他们能够把中国共产党的部队从朝鲜吸引过来，帮助遏制中国。

中国。事实上，这些非正规军对美国的利益造成的损害远远大于对中国的损害。

比对中国的损害大得多。正如约翰-加弗（John Garver）所指出的，他们从未构成足够的

威胁，以至于北京不得不将大量军队从朝鲜转移到云南地区。

虽然他们可能带回了对美国情报机构有用的信息。

虽然他们可能带回了对美国情报机构有用的信息，但他们的活动也提高了中国共产党的

他们的活动也提高了中国共产党人的 "警惕性，使常规的间谍活动更加困难 "87。

事实上，"文件行动 "非但没有促进美国的利益，反而严重损害了美国的利益。

损害了他们的利益。首先，它动摇了美国的信誉

在其盟友眼中的信誉。美国官员告诉英国人，华盛顿没有向非正规军提供援助；而白厅很快就知道情况并非如此。

获悉并非如此。蒋介石则对白宫感到失望。

白宫起初支持国民党在缅甸的存在，但后来又改变了主意，这让他感到很沮丧。

白宫起初支持国民党在缅甸的存在，但后来又改变了主意。

美国与缅甸的关系受到了更大的伤害。蒋介石

蒋介石和英国人可能对华盛顿感到不满，但他们都不打算破坏与美国的联盟。

蒋介石和英国人可能对华盛顿不满，但他们都不打算破坏与美国的联盟关系。然而，缅甸曾试图

在东西方冲突中保持中立的立场。美国官员

美国官员希望把仰光引向非共产主义世界。他们

他们有充分的理由这样希望： 缅甸与共产主义集团的关系

由于在中缅边界线问题上存在分歧，缅甸与共产主义集团，特别是与中华人民共和国的关系在20世纪50年代一直处于紧张状态。

由于在中缅边界线问题上存在分歧，缅甸与共产主义集团，特别是中国的关系在整个50年代都很紧张。但吴努和他的

但吴努和他的顾问们有充分的理由不信任美国。不仅是

华盛顿不仅通过文件行动支持非正规军，而且白宫似乎也不愿意让台湾停止援助他们。

他们。被困于一个不愿意帮助他的美国和一个中国之间。

陷在美国和中国之间，前者不会帮助他清除国民党，后者如果他不对国民党采取行动，中国可能会入侵缅甸。

陷入困境，吴努做了白宫最不希望看到的事情：他向北京求助。

他转向北京寻求帮助。

这次转向中国是 "文件行动 "对美国利益造成的最大损害。

对美国的利益造成了最大的损害：它危及到了它本应支持的遏制政策。

它本应支持的遏制政策。美国希望有一个稳定的、统一的、亲西方的缅甸、

亲西方的缅甸。但非正规军的活动使吴努更难平息缅甸的冲突。

但非正规军的活动使吴努更难平息威胁国家稳定和统一的各种叛乱团体。

他的国家的稳定和统一。正是因为这些团体不团结

89 但非正规军仍然是一个问题。

89 但非正规军继续构成问题，导致努向共产主义集团寻求援助。

对于一项从根本上说是为了遏制共产主义的行动来说、

纸上谈兵完全是一场失败。

Conclusion

Despite their relatively small numbers, to the United States, the

Nationalist troops in Burma offered opportunities and posed difficulties

disproportionate to their size. At first, Washington saw the irregulars as

a useful force in the war against communism. Accordingly, the CIA and

the president, without the knowledge of at least a majority of state

Department officers, provided them with assistance, hoping that they

could draw Chinese communist forces from Korea and help contain the

PRC. In fact, the irregulars did far more damage to America’s interests

than to China. As John Garver has noted, they never posed enough of a

threat to require Beijing to divert large forces from Korea to the Yunnan

region. While they might have brought back information useful to U.S.

intelligence agencies, their activities also increased Chinese communist

“vigilance, which made conventional spying operations more difficult.”87

Indeed, rather than advance American interests, Operation Paper

severely damaged them. For one, it shook the United States’ credibility

in the eyes of its allies. American officials told the British that Washington was not giving assistance to the irregulars; Whitehall soon learned

otherwise. Chiang Kai-shek, for his part, felt frustration with a White

House that at first supported the Nationalist presence in Burma but then

changed its mind.88

America’s relationship with Burma suffered even more harm. Chiang

and the British might be upset with Washington, but neither was about to

break its alliance with the United States. Burma, however, had sought to

maintain a position of neutrality in the East–West conflict. American

officials hoped to draw Rangoon towards the non-communist world. They

had good reason for this hope: Burma’s relations with the communist

bloc, particularly the PRC, were strained throughout the 1950s because of

disagreements over the Sino-Burmese boundary line. But U Nu and his

advisors had good reason to distrust the United States. Not only had

Washington backed the irregulars through the Operation Paper, but the White House seemed overly unwilling to get Taiwan to stop assisting

them. Trapped between a United States which would not help him

remove the Nationalists, and a China that might invade Burma if he did

not do something about them, U Nu did what the White House least

wanted: he turned to Beijing for help.

This turn to China represented the greatest damage Operation Paper

caused for America’s interests: it endangered the very containment policy

it was supposed to buttress. The United States wanted a stable, unified,

pro-Western Burma. But the irregulars’ activities made it all the more

difficult for U Nu to quell the various insurgent groups that threatened the

stability and unity of his country. It was only because these groups were

disunited that he was able to defeat them.89 But the irregulars continued

to pose problems, leading Nu to ask the communist bloc for assistance.

For an operation that, at its base, was supposed to contain communism,

Paper was nothing short of a failure.