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我们知道的关于内战如何结束的四件事(以及这对叙利亚的启示)

 我们知道的关于内战如何结束的四件事(以及这对叙利亚的启示)
作者:芭芭拉-F-沃尔特,加州大学圣地亚哥分校

* 本备忘录是为2013年11月8日的 "叙利亚战争的政治学 "会议准备的。本文的浓缩版最初于2013年10月18日作为博文发表在《政治暴力@一瞥》上。

奥巴马政府继续坚持认为,它希望看到叙利亚内战的外交解决方案。这一点在美国总统奥巴马9月在联合国大会的讲话中得到了明确。据奥巴马说"我不相信军事行动--由叙利亚内部的人或外部势力采取的行动--能够实现持久和平。我也不认为美国或任何国家应该决定谁将领导叙利亚--这应该由叙利亚人民来决定。"相反,欧巴马坚持认为,应对暴力的最佳方式是 "坚定的外交,解决冲突的根本原因"。

表面上看,这一战略似乎是合理的。推动温和派之间的权力分享协议,可以避免美国卷入另一场中东战争,有助于确保反美伊斯兰教徒不会上台,而且还有一个好处是在国内受到政治上的欢迎。但是,如果把我们在过去70多年里对内战如何结束的认识与叙利亚目前存在的情况相比较,就会发现外交手段几乎肯定会失败。

在奥巴马考虑推动叙利亚问题谈判解决的可行性时,他应该牢记以下三点,以及一个重大结论:

内战不会很快结束。自1945年以来,内战的平均长度约为10年。自冷战结束后,平均持续时间有所下降,但这仍然表明叙利亚处于冲突的早期阶段,而不是处于倾向于鼓励认真谈判的后期阶段(Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fearon 2004)。
派别的数量越多,内战的时间往往越长。叙利亚的内战是在巴沙尔-阿萨德总统的政府和至少13个主要的反叛团体之间进行的,这些团体的联盟是相对不稳定的。这表明叙利亚的内战可能会比一般的内战持续更久(坎宁安,2006)。
大多数内战都是以决定性的军事胜利而不是谈判解决而结束的。政府约有40%的时间获胜,叛军约有30%的时间获胜,这取决于你使用的数据集。其余的战争往往是以谈判解决的方式结束。这表明,叙利亚的内战不会以谈判解决的方式结束,而是在战场上结束(Walter 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2007)。
因此,以成功的谈判解决方式结束的内战往往有两个共同点。首先,它们往往根据战斗人员在战场上的地位来划分政治权力。这意味着叙利亚的任何谈判解决方案都需要包括阿萨德政权和伊斯兰教徒,而这两个团体在这个时候并没有真正的谈判动机。从阿萨德的角度来看,任何真正的分享权力的提议都等同于决定性的失败。同意向逊尼派(占人口的70%)开放政治进程,就等于接受政府中的少数地位。而政府中的少数派地位将使他容易受到报复,即在复仇的民众手中遭到监禁或死亡。

即使阿萨德同意达成妥协协议,反对派也有自己的理由拒绝解决方案。假设反对派能够团结起来(这种结果不太可能),他们几乎没有理由相信,一旦他们复员和解除武装,阿萨德会遵守协议。因此,反叛派别将尽一切可能巩固自己的权力,果断地击败阿萨德。这将使他们能够强加自己喜欢的政策,避免达成难以长期执行的协议。

最后,成功的解决方案几乎都有第三方的帮助,愿意在这个脆弱的复员期确保战斗人员的安全。这意味着,即使所有各方都同意谈判(由于战争或军事僵局的代价越来越大),也不可能有任何国家或联合国愿意派遣必要的维和人员来帮助实施和平。因此,虽然奥巴马和其他国家领导人声称,他们希望看到叙利亚战争通过谈判得到解决,但他们都不愿意做出必要的承诺,以帮助长期执行协议。

这一切意味着什么?它意味着,尽管奥巴马政府努力说服我们,但通过谈判成功解决叙利亚问题的可能性几乎为零。

芭芭拉-F-沃尔特(Barbara F. Walter)是加州大学圣地亚哥分校的国际关系和太平洋研究教授以及政治学附属教员。她的研究重点是政治可及性和内战。她在博客 "政治暴力一瞥 "上发表文章,是《致力于和平》的作者:成功解决内战》(2002年)和《国际组织》中的 "解决内战的关键障碍"。


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The Four Things We Know About How Civil Wars End (And What this Tells Us About Syria)

By Barbara F. Walter, University of California, San Diego

* This memo was prepared for “The Political Science of Syria’s War” conference, November 8, 2013. A condensed version of this article was originally published as a blog post on Political Violence @ a Glance on October 18, 2013.

The Obama administration continues to insist that it would like to see a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Syria. This was made clear in U.S. President Barack Obama’s September speech to the U.N. General Assembly. According to Obama: “I do not believe that military action — by those within Syria, or by external powers — can achieve a lasting peace. Nor do I believe that the United States or any nation should determine who will lead Syria — that is for the Syrian people to decide.” Instead, Obama insisted that the best way to respond to the violence was with “dogged diplomacy that resolves the root causes of conflict.”

On the surface this strategy seems reasonable. Pushing for a power-sharing agreement between moderate elements avoids embroiling the United States in another Middle Eastern war, helps ensure that anti-American Islamists will not come to power, and has the added benefit of being politically popular at home. But when one compares what we have learned about how civil wars have ended over the last 70 plus years to the conditions that currently exist in Syria, it becomes clear that diplomacy will almost certainly fail.

Here are three things Obama should keep in mind as he considers the feasibility of pushing for a negotiated settlement in Syria, and one big conclusion:

  1. Civil wars don’t end quickly. The average length of civil wars since 1945 has been about 10 years. The average duration has declined somewhat since the end of the Cold War, but this still suggests that Syria is in the early stages of its conflict and not in the later ones that tend to encourage serious negotiations (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fearon 2004).
  2. The greater the number of factions, the longer a civil war tends to last. Syria’s civil war is being fought between the government of President Bashar al-Assad and at least 13 major rebel groups whose alliances are relatively fluid. This suggests that Syria’s civil war is likely to last longer than the average civil war (Cunningham 2006).
  3. Most civil wars end in decisive military victories not negotiated settlements. Governments have won about 40 percent of the time, rebels about 30 percent of the time depending on which dataset you use. The remaining wars tend to end in negotiated settlements. This suggests that the civil war in Syria will not end in a negotiated settlement but will rather end on the battlefield (Walter 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2007).

The civil wars that end in successful negotiated settlements therefore tend to have two things in common. First, they tend to divide political power amongst the combatants based on their position on the battlefield. This means that any negotiated settlement in Syria will need to include both the Assad regime and the Islamists, two groups that have no real incentive to negotiate at this point in time. From Assad’s perspective, any real offer to share power would be tantamount to a decisive defeat. Agreeing to open up the political process to Sunnis (who represent 70 percent of the population) would be tantamount to accepting a minority position in government. And a minority position in government would make him vulnerable to reprisals in the form of imprisonment or death at the hands of a vengeful population.

Even if Assad were to agree to a compromise deal, the opposition has its own reasons to reject a settlement. Assuming that opposition factions could unite (an outcome that is unlikely), they have little reason to believe that Assad will honor an agreement once they demobilize and disarm. As a result, rebel factions will do everything possible to consolidate their own power and decisively defeat Assad. This will allow them to impose their own preferred policies and avoid an agreement that will be difficult to enforce over time.

Finally, successful settlements almost all enjoy the help of a third party willing to ensure the safety of combatants during this vulnerable demobilization period. This means that even if all sides agree to negotiate (due to the increasingly heavy costs of war or a military stalemate), it is unlikely that any country or the United Nations will be willing to send the peacekeepers necessary to help implement the peace. Thus, while Obama and other state leaders claim that they would like to see a negotiated settlement to the war in Syria, none of them are willing to make the commitment needed to help enforce the agreement over time.

What does this all mean? It means that the likelihood of a successful negotiated settlement in Syria is close to zero despite the efforts of the Obama administration to convince us otherwise.

Barbara F. Walter is a professor of international relations and Pacific studies and affiliated faculty of political science at the University of California, San Diego. Her research focuses on political accessibility and civil war. She writes at the blog Political Violence @ a Glance and is the author of Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (2002) and “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement” in International Organization.

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