越南被遗忘的战争--主宰行动，英国对越南的占领 1945-46年

当人们谈论越南战争时，许多人可能会想到美国陆军的 "休伊 "直升机在茂密的丛林中低空飞行，伴随着克拉伦斯-清水复兴乐队的《幸运之子》的音调。

另外，也许人们会想到法国人试图从越共及其新的共产主义政权的控制下夺回他们的老殖民地。

然而，很少有人提到法属印度支那第一次战争的开始，在第二次世界大战结束后，英国军队试图将胡志明和他的政府从其权力中篡夺出来。

这场短暂对抗的结果及其后果不仅对亚洲该地区的地缘政治产生了广泛影响，而且对世界其他地区的地缘政治也产生了影响。它影响了法国和美国以及他们征服越南的企图，它影响了冷战，也影响了更广泛的殖民主义的结束。

当我们急于援助我们战时盟友的殖民需求时，英国是否也破坏了它与越南人的关系？

这不仅是英国陆军历史上一个很少被谈论的时期，而且在许多方面也是一个独特的时期。

这是印度士兵作为英国军队的一部分在国外作战的最后一次，也是战时日本帝国军队最后一次参加战斗。

也不是说这次占领几乎以盟国的成功而告终。

但是，当时这个地区的情况是怎样的，英国军队为什么要参与进来，他们的成效如何？

首先，我们必须把目光投向西方，投向欧洲和波茨坦，1945年7月，"三巨头 "盟国（英国、美国和苏联）的领导人在中国和法国的参与下举行了会议。

在这次会议上，各国领导人讨论了当他们成为胜利者后如何瓜分世界，以及如何处理日本占领东南亚大部分地区的问题¹

法属印度支那有一个由日本人建立的政权，作为日本控制下的一个傀儡国家。

在波茨坦会议上，虽然没有一个领导人认为太平洋战争会像事实证明的那样迅速结束，但由于没有考虑到原子弹的有效性，人们对战后安排进行了大量讨论。

双方商定，中国人将占领北部地区，SEAC在法国的支持下将占领南部地区。

英国在这一地区有许多殖民利益，如印度、缅甸和马来亚，因此他们希望保持这一地区的政治稳定。

此外，法国在波茨坦会议上坚持要求SEAC提供援助，这反映了法国在1945年相对较弱的军事力量。

此时，中国人是联军的一部分，在介石的领导下，他们同意占领北部地区。

接下来，我将讨论占领期间在越南的部队和领导人。

将被用于占领的英军部队是SEAC的一部分，将从Slim将军领导的第十四军中抽调。这是一支由60多万人组成的庞大部队，构成了SEAC的大部分。

第十四军中约有87%来自分治前的印度*。这些人非常适应印度支那的战斗风格和环境，因为大多数人都参加过缅甸战役。

蒙巴顿伯爵（Earl Mountbatten）副司令对他们赞不绝口，他说："我没有什么话可以充分表达这些人坚定不移的忠诚和勇气"¹。他们有信心在湿热的丛林战条件下作战，这一事实可能解释了为什么他们比后来到达的自由法国突击队要有效和成功得多。

更具体地说，在道格拉斯-格雷斯少将的指挥下，来自第20步兵师（印度）的部队被用于占领部队。这是一支高度多样化的部队，于1942年在格雷斯手下组建。其中有印度兵团，如第三马德拉斯团第四营；尼泊尔兵团，如第八廓尔喀步枪队第三营；也有来自英国的兵团，尽管他们是少数，如北安普敦郡团第一营。他们在缅甸参加过战斗，在1944年春季和初夏期间，该师在英帕尔平原的防御中表现出色，战功赫赫。第20步兵师也得到了来自殖民地第5步兵团的法国部队的支持。这些法国士兵曾在欧洲参加过战斗并在阿尔及利亚执行过内部安全任务。

然而，这些法国部队与英国部队的区别在于，他们不习惯在丛林环境中作战。就领导这些军队的人而言，

在英国方面，第20师的师长是道格拉斯-格雷西少将。格雷西出生于1894年，在桑德赫斯特大学毕业后，他被委任为英国印度军队，并在第一次世界大战期间在全球各地的不同军团服役，包括在法国和中东地区。在他职业生涯的剩余时间里，他继续在亚洲战场服役，最终在1948-51年担任巴基斯坦军队的总司令。关于其他一些领导人的简要说明，斯利姆将军被称为 "士兵的士兵"²，他也许因为在缅甸取得了对日本人的伟大胜利而受到了最好的尊敬。

格雷西领导的法国军队由菲利普-勒克莱尔（Philippe Leclerc）领导，他是一位功勋卓著的法国将军，在第二次世界大战中从德国人手中逃脱。

在加入戴高乐和他在非洲和欧洲的战斗人员之前，他是一位在第二次世界大战中从德国人手中逃脱的功勋卓著的法国将军。他和他的手下被置于格雷西的控制之下。另一方面，胡志明是越南的领导人，从1941年起一直领导独立运动。

那么，在实际占领印度支那期间，事件是如何发生的。

日本于1945年8月15日宣布投降，根据杰拉尔德-普兰德盖斯特（Gerald Prenderghast）的说法：

"格雷西和他的手下已经准备好进入占领的第一阶段，代号为'主宰行动'。首先，至关重要的是，从日本宣布投降到在密苏里号上举行的象征性仪式上实际签署文件，历时18天。

尽管英国军队已经准备好管理印度支那的日本人的投降，但它被命令在投降正式生效之前不会开始这种行动。在这段时间里，越南人可以计划并发起一场针对印度支那存在的傀儡国家的革命。在OSS*³的支持下，越共开始接管河内，从而接管政府。正如革命力量所怀疑的那样，日本人没有进行抵抗。

最终，在1945年9月6日，英军部队的先头部队飞抵西贡，为五天后主力部队的登陆做准备。这支先头部队包括1/1廓尔喀步枪队的两个连和1/19海德拉巴团的两个连。据普兰德盖斯特说："[他们与第80旅**总部工作人员和一个战术总部一起飞来。海得拉巴团控制了机场，而廓尔喀团则在格雷斯的住所派人看守。 4 即使在主力部队于11日登陆后，印度支那的部队仍然不多，这是因为东南军区正在亚洲大部分地区执行维和任务和管理日本在其他地方的投降。这支最初只有1300多人的英国部队的任务是解除超过71000名日本士兵的武装，并维持对西贡市的控制***。实际上，英军部队的数量远远不足以完成这项任务，当格雷斯于13日抵达时，他所看到的是一个混乱的局面。

混乱的局面。事实上，他是被全副武装的日本军队从机场接走的，他们很有礼貌地把他带到他的总部。

他被全副武装的日本军队从机场接走，后者礼貌地把他带到了他的总部。最重要的是，格雷斯在蒙巴顿的命令下，选择无视出来迎接他的越共官员队伍，从而拒绝承认他们在该地区不稳定的权威。

接下来发生的事情属于格雷斯的管辖范围，但有人会认为也同样混乱。

例如，英国军队散发传单，称对欧洲人进行攻击的人将被逮捕和枪决。斯利姆将军本人于9月16日在西贡拜访了格雷斯，并对英国在当地没有足够的部队来维持对印度支那南部的控制这一事实表示赞赏。因此，他同意从第20师（印度）派出更多的部队，但这些部队要再过一个月才能到达。

尽管格雷斯认为越南人是未来法国人的问题，但他仍然需要像介石在北方那样在南方坚持控制。

这迫使格雷斯所做的事情不仅是奇怪和独特的，而且可能导致该地区在本世纪后期面临的许多问题。

格雷西首先着手释放法国战俘，引导他们到缴获的武器库武装自己。

这些战俘对他们的囚禁充满了怨恨，到处殴打越南公民。

此外，由于缺乏军队，格雷斯也被迫利用保留武器的日本军队。

于是，越共决定以 "越南独立政府 "的名义要求统治整个越南的权利。

在格雷斯的眼中，安全管理日本人的投降并组织遣返日本士兵和盟军战俘的唯一方法是对越南人民及其政府采取行动。

随后，格雷斯和蒙巴顿之间进行了对话，其中包括法国人和东南军区司令部，这也暴露了东南军区内部的分歧。

关于如何对付越南人，他们提出了许多不同的方法，但所有相关各方都很难就应该采取的行动达成一致。

交流开始于1945年9月21日，当时格雷斯给蒙巴顿写信说他负责所有的英国、法国和日本军队，然后概述了他对罪犯和破坏者（即不服从的越南人）的打算。这些命令如下。

- 不允许举行示威或游行。

- 不允许举行公众集会。

- 除授权人员外，不得携带武器。

- 西贡和乔龙将在21时30分至5时30分之间实施宵禁。

任何被发现违反这些命令或进行任何其他犯罪活动的人都将被枪决。

在这一点上，对话有些混乱，但事后可以看到，格雷斯和蒙巴顿以及东南军区在某些方面都是正确的。

英国陆军士兵不可能在西贡以外的地方保持控制，因此，格雷斯雇用日本军队作为维持秩序的警察部队，被认为是一个精明的决定，因为越南人很不可能向他们的前盟友和提供他们大部分武器的人开火。

然而，由于当时许多人强烈地感受到独立的热情，越南人并没有简单地遵守已经制定的严格规则。

因此，形成了一种不规则的战争，这种战争将成为该国未来几十年的特点，有一些骚乱，但大部分是以对小规模士兵的有限攻击的形式进行抵抗。

其中一个例子是，9月24/25日，一群越共暴徒绑架并残忍地杀害了大量法国人和法裔越南人，还有一名英国士兵在随后的反击中被杀。

在这次袭击后蒙巴顿对格雷斯的回应中，他事实上批评了格雷斯声称英国人对该地区的法律和秩序负责的决定，特别是由于他没有咨询过SEAC。然而，他承认格雷斯是 "在当地的人"，因此应该保留行动控制权。这种说法是蒙巴顿的象征，蒙巴顿在这一时期让格雷西几乎完全承担起了责任，因而比格雷西更有优势。

因此，我们可以把英国人在印度支那的时间分成三个部分，

即最初占领时的权力巩固，反击越南人的方式和移交给法国人。

首先是巩固，这是一个相对简单的任务，因为英国士兵展示了非常有效的战术。在英国军队在印度支那的最初阶段，有一些越南人对巡逻队的攻击。然而，由于习惯于丛林战的英国士兵能够轻松地打击没有战斗经验的越南人，特别是面对强大的敌人时，越南人的伤亡很大。

使事情更加复杂的是，10月初，勒克莱尔和他的3万名法国军队抵达印度支那，被置于格雷斯的控制之下。这是一个在该地区相对和平的时期，因为越南人认为英国人将管理日本人的投降，然后离开。

不幸的是，这一切很快就被无端袭击同山机场工程侦察队的事件所终结，这次袭击造成四名英军死亡，其他人受伤。

这次袭击是在法国到达印度支那后不久开始的，越南人将其作为煽动英国人报复的理由，因为他们声称英国人只是法国军队集结的掩护，目的是推翻他们所期望的独立越南的主权。

在他管辖的地区，这种攻击和暴民心态的增加意味着格雷斯会见了日本陆军元帅寺内，讨论提高日本军队的效率。

格雷西承诺的第20师团的增援部队仍未到达，日本军队不愿意向越南人开火或保护法国公民。

正如普伦德盖斯特所说，这次会议大大改善了情况。虽然在此期间，格雷斯向SEAC建议，在所有的日本人被遣返之前，他应留在英军部队中，但可以清楚地看到，他很快意识到，应对新出现的越南人的挑战不是一件简单的事情，他认为这是一个法国问题，一旦英军在1946年初撤出，他们可以处理。

随着数千名急于重申对印度支那控制的法国军队的到来，以及日益自信的越南人的到来，格雷斯面临着英军部队被卷入冲突的可能性。

战争是蒙巴顿最不希望发生的事情，而这看起来就是可能发生的事情。

由于英军通过积极的巡逻和战斗与日军相结合的方式，这种升级的风险得到了缓和。

他们成功地将越共赶出了西贡，并非常接近于击败美国人在20年后未能击败的部队，但其兵力只是美国人的十分之一。

英国和日本部队设法有效打击越南人的方式被称为GATEFORCE。

在西贡周围进行了一个月的猛烈攻击，值得注意的是10月13日在新山岳机场的战斗，越南工兵和部队进入了距离控制塔275米的范围内，还有一次对富林的日本基地的攻击，100名越南人被杀。

GATEFORCE在月底成立，以15/13边防部队步枪队的盖茨中校命名。这支部队由印度步兵和装甲部队以及一个营的日本步兵组成。部队中的所有人员在丛林中的战斗（在某些情况下是相互对抗）都非常有经验，因此他们与越南人的每一次交战都取得了胜利。

据报道，所有英国、日本和法国军队在 "主人翁 "行动中总共伤亡40人，这一点很清楚，与越南人遭受数百人死亡相比，伤亡人数非常少。

GATEFORCE的政策简单、粗暴而有效。这支相当庞大的部队建立了一个巡逻基地，一旦发现越南军队，他们就被告知要对他们使用最大的武力，解除所有越南人的武装，并烧毁任何反对的村庄。

这对越南人产生了简单但相当大的影响，他们从那时起就明白，在西贡周围的任何地方，他们都没有安全的地方可以开展行动。

历史学家们认为，如果英军部队没有在1946年初撤出，越南军队将被完全消灭，并不再给法国人和后来的美国人带来麻烦。

主权行动的第三部分，也是最后一部分，是将权力移交给法国人，英国军队撤出印度支那。

到1946年1月，格雷斯和他的部队已经相对控制了他们的印度支那地区，并且有足够的法国部队开始移交权力。

戴高乐认为，重新获得对其殖民地的控制权符合法国的最佳利益。

这是因为他们刚刚获得解放，希望在世界舞台上再次显得强大。

此外，日本人甚至英国军队都发现很难与法国人并肩作战，日本人说法国人 "计划少"，格雷斯说他们 "在身后留下了相当好的破坏痕迹"。

最后，在11月30日，格雷斯从寺内元帅那里获得了正式的投降书，然后勒克莱尔和他会面，计划英国军队的离开。

第一批英军在12月25日和27日之间离开，这一点得到了越南人的认可，他们开始准备在英军离开之前对其进行大规模打击。1月上旬发生的先发制人的打击行动对此进行了打击。1月25日，格雷斯正式将法军的权力移交给勒克莱尔，他本人也离开了该国。这时只剩下2/8 Punjab和4/10 Gurkha Rifles的一个连以及一个机枪连。所有日本军队都将被法国人解救，最后一批英国士兵于3月26日离开印度支那。

总之，在这个动荡地区的历史上，"主人翁行动 "的事件和原因常常被忽视，但事实上它对本世纪后期有很大的影响。

也许越共如果再有几个月的时间，就可以被英国人和日本人打败，因此越南的战争可能就不会发生。但我们必须考虑格雷斯将军在真正具有挑战性的情况下的处境。

格雷西从来没有想到要在印度支那打仗，只是要接受日本人的投降。

此外，控制勒克莱尔和他的部队是一个巨大的压力，与自由法国的英雄菲利普-勒克莱尔相比，格雷斯缺乏公众和军事形象。

此外，尽管在占领期间SEAC对他的决策提出了批评，而且法国部队的行为也让格雷斯有能力指挥来自三个军事传统截然不同的国家的部队，但这并不是什么了不起的事。这表明格雷斯在充满挑战的情况下表现出了一些高超的领导能力。

书目。

T.O. Smith, Vietnam and the Unravelling of Empire (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

G. Prenderghast，《英国和越南的战争》。The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)

R.Lewin，《Slim》（伦敦，Leo Cooper Ltd.，1976）。

D.钱德勒和I.贝克特，《牛津插图英国陆军史》（牛津，牛津大学出版社，1994年）

A.霍尔科姆，"越南革命，1945年8月至1946年3月"。在《越南民主共和国的大规模动员，1945-1960》中，17-37。HONOLULU。夏威夷大学出版社，2020年。

R.Indurthy, and M. Haque."the kashmir conflict:为什么它无法解决。"International Journal on World Peace 27, no. 1 (2010):9-44.

J.Springhall, "'Kicking out the Vietminh':英国如何允许法国重新占领南印度支那，1945-46。"Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 1 (2005):115-30.

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https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacques-Philippe-Leclerc, 12/02/21

https://www.forces.net/heritage/history/britain-vietnam-war, 13/02/21

https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/asia.htm, 11/02/21

https://www.britishlegion.org.uk/get-involved/remembrance/remembrance-events/vj- day/ww2-comwealth-contribution/south-eastasia-command, 12/02/21

https://burmastarmemorial.org/archive/stories/1405858-20th-indian-infantry-division, 13/02/21

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/5e_r%C3%A9giment_d%27infanterie_coloniale#Apr%C3%A8s

_guerre, 10/02/21

https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/william-slim, 13/02/21

最终字数。3454 (不包括书目和脚注)Bibliography:

T.O. Smith, Vietnam and the Unravelling of Empire (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

G. Prenderghast, Britain and the wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)

R. Lewin, Slim (London, Leo Cooper Ltd., 1976)

D. Chandler and I. Beckett, The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994)

A. Holcombe, "The Vietnamese Revolution, August 1945 to March 1946." In Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960, 17-37. HONOLULU: University of Hawai'i Press, 2020.

R. Indurthy, and M. Haque. "THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: WHY IT DEFIES SOLUTION." International Journal on World Peace 27, no. 1 (2010): 9-44.

J. Springhall, "'Kicking out the Vietminh': How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy South Indochina, 1945-46." Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 1 (2005): 115-30.

https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/potsdam-conference, 12/02/21

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-the-potsdam-conference-shaped-the-future-of-post-war- europe, 13/02/21

https://parallelnarratives.com/vietnam-vignette-the-oss-and-ho-chi-minh-1945/, 12/02/21

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacques-Philippe-Leclerc, 12/02/21

https://www.forces.net/heritage/history/britain-vietnam-war, 13/02/21

https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/asia.htm, 11/02/21

https://www.britishlegion.org.uk/get-involved/remembrance/remembrance-events/vj- day/ww2-commonwealth-contribution/south-east-asia-command, 12/02/21

https://burmastarmemorial.org/archive/stories/1405858-20th-indian-infantry-division, 13/02/21

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/5e_r%C3%A9giment_d%27infanterie_coloniale#Apr%C3%A8s

_guerre, 10/02/21

https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/william-slim, 13/02/21

Final Word Count: 3454 (Excluding Bibliography and Footnotes)

####$$

Vietnam’s forgotten war–Operation Masterdom, British occupation of Vietnam 1945-46

When there is talk of a war in Vietnam, many people might picture US Army "Huey" helicopters flying low over dense jungle, accompanied by the tones of Fortunate Son by Clarence Clearwater Revival. Alternatively, perhaps one may think of the French trying to grasp their old colony from the grip of the Viet Minh and their new communist regime. However, little is mentioned about the very beginning of the first war in French Indochina where British Army units attempted to usurp Ho Chi Minh and his government from their power right after the end of the Second World War. The outcome of this short confrontation and its consequences have had broad effects on not only the geopolitics of that region of Asia, but also on the geopolitics of the rest of the world. It affected France and the USA and their attempts to subdue Vietnam, it affected the Cold War and also the end of colonialism more widely. As we rushed to aid our wartime ally’s colonial needs did Britain also ruin its relations with the Vietnamese? This is not only a rarely talked about period in British Army history but also a unique one in many ways. It was one of the last times that the Indian soldiers fought as part of a British Army abroad and it was the last time that the wartime Imperial Japanese army saw combat. Nor that this occupation almost ended in success for the allies. But what was the situation in this region at the time, why did the British Army get involved and how effective were they?

Initially we must look west, to Europe and Potsdam where in July 1945 the leaders of the ‘Big Three’ allied countries (Britain, USA and USSR) met with attendance from China and France. In this conference the leaders discussed how they were going to carve up the world when they were victors and also how to deal with the problem of the Japanese occupation of much of South East Asia.¹ French Indochina had a regime established by the Japanese which acted as a puppet state under Japan’s control. At Potsdam, whilst none of the leaders considered that the war in the Pacific would be over as quickly as it proved to be, given the effectiveness of the atomic bomb was not considered, there was much discussion about post war arrangements.² A plan was devised for Chinese and SEAC* forces to administer the Japanese surrender in Indochina, having been split into north and south sectors along the 16th Parallel. It was agreed that the Chinese would occupy the northern part and SEAC supported by the French would occupy the southern part. Britain had many colonial interests in this area such as India, Burma and Malaya³ and therefore they wanted to maintain political stability in the region. In addition, France had insisted on SEAC assistance at Potsdam, reflecting its comparative military weakness in 1945.

*SEAC = South East Asia Command; A command based in South East Asia comprised solely of British Empire troops and commanders

1. T.O. Smith, Vietnam and the Unravelling of Empire. (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp32-56

2. T.O. Smith, Vietnam and the Unravelling of Empire. (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)pp32-56

3. https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/asia.htm, 11/02/21

At this time the Chinese were part of the allied forces and under Kai Shek they had agreed to occupy the northern sector.

Next, I will discuss the forces and the leaders that were present in Vietnam during the occupation. The British Army units that were to be utilised for the occupation were part of SEAC and were to be drawn from the Fourteenth Army headed by General Slim. This was a large force of over 600,000 men that made up most of the SEAC. Approximately 87% of the Fourteenth Army were from pre-partition India*. These men were very well suited to the fighting style and environment in Indochina as most had been present in the Burma campaign. They were fondly spoken of by Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten who said, “No words of mine could adequately express the unfaltering loyalty and courage of these men”¹. The fact that they were confident fighting in the hot and humid conditions of jungle warfare may explain why they were so much more effective and successful than the Free-French commandos that arrived later. More specifically to the occupation force units from the 20th Infantry Division (India) were used under the command of Major-General Douglas Gracey. This was a highly diverse formation that had been formed under Gracey in 1942. It had within it Indian regiments such as the 4th Battalion 3rd Madras Regiment; Nepalese regiments such as the 3rd Battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles; also, it had regiments from Britain, though they were in the minority, such as the 1st Battalion Northamptonshire regiment. They were highly decorated in battle having seen action in Burma and the division distinguished itself on the defence of the Imphal plain during the spring and early summer of 1944. The 20th Infantry Division was also supported by French troops from the 5e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale. These were French soldiers that had seen combat in Europe and internal security duty in Algeria. The difference, however, from these French troops to the British ones was that they were unused to fighting in a jungle environment. In terms of the men who led these armies, on the British side the head of the 20th Division was Major-General Douglas Gracey. Gracey was born in 1894 and after having passed out at Sandhurst he was commissioned into the British Indian army and served with a variety of different regiments all around the globe during the First World War including in France and the Middle East. He continued to serve in Asian theatres for the rest of his career which culminated in him being the commander in chief of the Pakistan army from 1948-51. A brief note on some of the other leaders, General Slim was known as the ‘soldiers’ soldier’² and is perhaps best revered as having achieved a great victory over the Japanese in Burma. The French, under Gracey, were led by Philippe Leclerc who was a highly decorated French general that had escaped from German capture in

*The partition of British India in 1947 split the country into 2 independent states, India and Pakistan

1. https://www.britishlegion.org.uk/get-involved/remembrance/remembrance-events/vj-day/ww2-commonwealth-contribution/south-east- asia-command, 11/02/21

2. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/william-slim, 11/02/21

the Second World War before joining De Gaulle and his fighting men in both Africa and Europe¹. He and his men were placed under the control of Gracey. On the other side Ho Chi Min was the leader of the Viet Minh having been leading the independence movement from 1941 onwards.

So, how did the events occur during the actual occupation of Indochina. Japan had announced its surrender on the 15th of August 1945 and at this time according to Gerald Prenderghast: ‘Gracey and his men were ready to move in the first stage of the occupation, codenamed Operation Masterdom.’² However, unfortunately there were several events that then occurred that were crucial not only on Operation Masterdom but also arguably set the ball rolling for many more of the events that were to occur later in the century. Firstly, and crucially was the 18-day period that it took from the Japanese announcement of surrender to the actual signing of the document in a symbolic ceremony on the USS Missouri. Although the British forces were ready to administer the surrender of the Japanese in Indochina, it was ordered that no such operation would begin until the surrender was official. The time that this took to occur allowed the Viet Minh to plan and initiate a revolution against the puppet state that existed in Indochina. Supported by OSS*³ the Viet Minh proceeded to takeover Hanoi and therefore the government. As suspected by the revolutionary forces the Japanese offered no resistance.

Eventually, on the 6th September 1945 the advanced party of the British Army forces flew into Saigon to make ready for the main force's landing five days later. This preliminary force consisted of two companies of 1/1 Gurkha Rifles and two companies of 1/19 Hyderabad Regiment. According to Pranderghast: '[They flew in] together with 80th Brigade** headquarters staff and a tactical headquarters. The Hyderabads took control of the airfield and the Gurkhas posted guards on what was to be Gracey's residence.’4 Even after the landing of the main force on the 11th there still were not very many troops in Indochina, this being because the SEAC was spread thin across much of Asia performing peacekeeping and administering the Japanese surrender elsewhere. This initial British force of just over 1300 men was tasked with disarming in excess of 71000 Japanese soldiers and maintaining control over the city of Saigon***. In actuality the number of British army troops were vastly inadequate for this task and when Gracey arrived on the 13th the situation that he arrived into was one of

chaos. He was in fact picked up from the airfield by fully armed Japanese forces who politely

*The OSS was the wartime agency of the U.S. Federal government (1942-45) used to gather intelligence, many of its roles were later assumed by the CIA.

**80th Indian Infantry Brigade was a brigade of the WW2 Indian army assigned to the 20th Infantry division.

***The city formally known as Saigon is now called Ho Chi Minh city and is the most populous city in Vietnam 1.https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jacques-Philippe-Leclerc, 11/02/21

2.G. Prenderghast, Britain and the wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)p.14

3. https://parallelnarratives.com/vietnam-vignette-the-oss-and-ho-chi-minh-1945/, 12/02/21

4. G. Prenderghast, Britain and the wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)p.15

led him to his headquarters. Crucially, Gracey elected, on orders from Mountbatten, to ignore the greeting party of Viet Minh officials who had come out to greet him, thereby refusing to recognise their albeit precarious authority in the region.

What happened next was under the jurisdiction of Gracey, but some would argue was also just as chaotic. The British troops had for example circulated leaflets that stated that those who performed attacks on Europeans would be arrested and shot. General Slim himself paid a visit to Gracey in Saigon on the 16th September and appreciated the fact that there were not enough troops on the ground for the British to maintain control in southern Indochina. Therefore, he agreed to send more troops from the 20th Division (India), which would not arrive for another month and even though Gracey regarded the Viet Minh as a problem that would be for the French in the future, he still needed to assert control in the south as Kai Shek had done in the north. What this forced Gracey to do was not only strange and unique but also may have led to many of the problems that the region faced later in the century. Gracey first set about freeing French prisoners of war and directing them to captured weapons dumps to arm themselves. These POWs, full of resentment as to their captivity went about beating the Vietnamese citizens. Furthermore, due to the lack of troops Gracey was also forced to utilise Japanese troops that had retained their arms. The Viet Minh then decided to claim the right to govern the entire of Vietnam under the name of 'The Independent Government of Vietnam'. In Gracey's eyes, the only way to safely administer the surrender of the Japanese and organise the repatriation of the Japanese soldiers and the allied POWs was to take action against the Viet Minh and their government. There was subsequently a dialogue between Gracey and Mountbatten that included the French and SEAC command also which exposed divisions within SEAC. Many different approaches as to how to deal with the Viet Minh were suggested but it was difficult for all the parties involved to agree on the action that should be taken.

The exchange started on the 21st of September 1945 when Gracey wrote to Mountbatten stating that he was in charge of all the British, French and Japanese troops and then outlined what he intended for criminals and saboteurs (i.e., non-compliant Viet Minh). These orders were as follows:

• No demonstrations or processions would be permitted.

• No public meetings would take place.

• No arms were to be carried, except by authorized personnel.

• A curfew would be enforced in Saigon and Cholon between 21.30 and 5.30 hours.¹

It was clear what Gracey intended with these orders - to quash any sense of revolution among the Viet Minh and their followers whilst also maintaining authority and control in the region's main population centres. Any person found breaking these orders or performing any other criminal activity would be shot. The dialogue is somewhat confusing at this point but with hindsight it is possible to see that both Gracey and Mountbatten and the SEAC were right in some respects. It was not possible for the British Army soldiers to maintain control outside of Saigon, so it is recognised as a shrewd decision by Gracey to employ the Japanese troops as a policing force to maintain order as the Viet Minh were very unlikely to fire upon their former allies and the people who were supplying most of their arms. However, the Viet Minh did not simply comply with the strict rules that had been put in place as the fervour for independence was strongly felt by many at that time. Therefore, what developed was a type of irregular warfare that would become characteristic in the country in the coming decades with some rioting but mostly resistance in the form of limited attacks on smaller parties of soldiers. One such example was when on the 24/25th of September a mob of Viet Minh abducted and brutally killed a large number of French and French Vietnamese, also one British soldier was killed in the subsequent counter attack. In Mountbatten's response to Gracey after this attack, he in fact criticised Gracey's decision to claim that the British were responsible for law and order in the region, particularly since he had not consulted SEAC. However, he recognised that Gracey was the 'man on the ground.' and should therefore retain operational control. This rhetoric was emblematic of Mountbatten who came away from this period better off than Gracey by letting him take responsibility almost in full.

So, we can split the time that the British were in Indochina into three parts, the consolidation of power in the initial occupation, the way that the Viet Minh were countered and the handover to the French. Firstly, the consolidation, this was a relatively simple task due to the fact that the British soldiers displayed highly effective tactics. In the initial period that the British troops were in Indochina there were some attacks by Viet Minh on patrols. However, the Viet Minh suffered high casualties as the British soldiers, used to jungle warfare, were easily able to combat the Viet Minh who had no combat experience, particularly against a strong enemy.

To further complicate matters, in early October, Leclerc and his 30,000 French troops arrived in Indochina and were placed under Gracey's control. This was a time of relative peace in the region due to the fact that the Viet Minh though that the British would administer the surrender

G. Prenderghast, Britain and the wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)p.17

of the Japanese and then leave. Unfortunately, this was quickly brought to an end by an unprovoked attack on an engineering reconnaissance party at Ton Son Nhut airfield which killed four British troops and injured others. This attack among others, having started soon after the French arrival in Indochina, were justified by the Viet Minh as to inciting retaliation from the British since they claimed the British were simply a cover for a build-up of French troops designed to quash the sovreignty of the independent Vietnam that they desired. This increase in attacks and mob mentality in the areas under his jurisdiction meant that Gracey met with the Japanese Field-Marshal Terauchi to discuss increasing efficiency of his Japanese troops. Gracey’s promised reinforcements from the 20th Division had still not arrived and Japanese troops were reluctant to fire upon the Viet Minh or protect French citizens. This meeting improved things greatly as Prenderghast states: 'Terauchi was genuinely angry at his men's behaviour and passed on stringent orders that improved the situation dramatically, ensuring the safety of French citizens and the security of vital installations from that time on.'¹ Although during this period Gracey suggested to SEAC that he remain with the British Army troops until all the Japanese were repatriated, it is clear to see that he was quickly realising that dealing with the emerging Viet Minh challenge was no simple matter and that he considered it a French problem that they could deal with once the British force had pulled out in early 1946.

With the arrival of thousands of French troops anxious to reassert control over Indochina and an increasingly assertive Viet Minh, Gracey faced the possibility of British Army units becoming embroiled in conflict. A war was the last thing that Mountbatten wanted and it looked like that was what was might happen. The risk of such escalation was mitigated due to the way in which the British Army combined with Japanese troops through aggressive patrolling and combat. They managed to push the Viet Minh away from Saigon and became very close to defeating the force that the Americans failed to beat 20 years later but with a tenth of the troops. The way in which the British and Japanese force managed to effectively combat the Viet Minh was called GATEFORCE. After a violent month of attacks around Saigon with notable battles being at the Tan Son Nhut airfield on the 13th October where Viet Minh sappers and troops came within 275m of the control tower and an attack on a Japanese base at Phu Lam where 100 Vietnamese were killed. GATEFORCE was formed at the end of the month, named after Lt. Col. Gates of the 15/13th Frontier Force Rifles. This force consisted of Indian infantry and armoured units combined with a battalion of Japanese infantry. All of the men in the force were very experienced at fighting in the jungle (against each other in some cases) and therefore with every engagement that they had with the Viet Minh they always emerged victorious. This is

G. Prenderghast, Britain and the wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson, NC, McFarland Publishing. 2015)p.21

clear by the reported 40 casualties in total for Operation Masterdom of all the British, Japanese and French troops, very slight compared to the Viet Minh who suffered hundreds of men killed.

The policy of GATEFORCE was simple and brutal yet effective. The considerably large force set up a patrol base and upon finding Viet Minh troops they were told to use maximum force against them, disarm all Vietnamese and burn down any village that stood as opposition. This had the simple yet considerable effect on the Viet Minh who from then on understood that there was no safe place for them to conduct their operations from anywhere surrounding Saigon. It is considered by historians that if the British Army units had not pulled out in early 1946 the Viet Minh forces would have been completely wiped out and ceased to cause problems for the French and later the Americans.

The third and final section of Operation Masterdom was the handover of power to the French and the exit of British troops from Indochina. By January 1946 Gracey and his force had relative control over their sector of Indochina and there were enough French troops present to begin the handover of power. De Gaulle believed it was in France’s best interests to regain control over their colony. This was because having just been liberated themselves they wanted to look strong again on the world stage. To add to this the Japanese and even the British troops were finding it hard to fight alongside the French who the Japanese described as 'scheme less’ and who Gracey spoke of as 'Leaving a pretty good trail of destruction behind them.' At last, on the 30th November Gracey obtained the official surrender from Field Marshal Terauchi and then Leclerc and he met to plan the departure of British troops. The first British troops left between the 25th and 27th December and this was recognised by the Viet Minh who began preparing for large strikes on the British before they left. This was combatted by pre-emptive strikes which occurred in the early part of January. On the 25th January Gracey officially handed over power of the French forces to Leclerc and he himself left the country. That left only one company of 2/8 Punjab and 4/10 Gurkha Rifles along with a single machine gun company. All Japanese troops were due to be relieved by the French and the last British soldiers left Indochina on the 26th of March.

In conclusion, the events and causes of Operation Masterdom often get overlooked in the history of this turbulent region but it in fact had great effect on the later part of the century. Perhaps the Viet Minh could have been defeated by the British and Japanese had they had a few more months and therefore the wars in Vietnam might never have happened. But we have to consider the situation of General Gracey in really challenging circumstances.

Gracey was never expecting to fight a war in Indochina, only to accept the surrender of the Japanese. Moreover, being in control of Leclerc and his forces was a great pressure, Gracey lacked the public and military profile as compared to the hero of the Free-French that was Philippe Leclerc. Furthermore, despite the criticism of his decision making by SEAC during the occupation and the behaviour of the French troops Gracey’s ability to command troops from three different nations with very different military traditions was no mean feat. This indicates that Gracey’s demonstrated some superb leadership in challenging circumstances.

Bibliography: