越共回忆录：越南战争及其后果的内幕记述 Tapa blanda – 12 Marzo 1986

 

越共回忆录：越南战争及其后果的内幕记述 Tapa blanda – 12 Marzo 1986

A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath Tapa blanda – 12 Marzo 1986

de Truong Nhu Tang (Author)

这些回忆录是我作为一个革命者的生活故事。

其中几乎没有关于越南战争中一些西方人记忆最深刻的事件：

溪山的兵戎相见、毛坦厂的突然袭击、战俘，或者当西贡落入北越军队之手时，最后一架美国直升机从使馆屋顶飞出。

我知道，人们对战争的军事方面有很大的兴趣。

但那不是我的一面。

我从来不是一个战士，也没有参加我们所谓的 "暴力斗争"，尽管在事情的发展过程中，我自己也经历了相当多的暴力，在监狱里和1969年和1970年B-52大轰炸下的丛林里。

我自己作为越共的城市组织者，然后是内阁成员，我的角色是狭义的，在我们斗争的性质中，我一直（也被保持）远离与我无关的对抗层面。

但是，战争还有另一面，一个被越南革命者认为是主要的一面--政治面。

我自己的直接参与，在近二十年的时间里，就是在这一方面。

多年来，我在西贡过着双重（有时是三重）生活，在西贡的上层社会和青年中为革命进行传教和组织。

在我被监禁和最终被交换之后，我住在丛林里，在临时革命政府的总部（我是其司法部长），然后短暂地作为外交官访问东欧和第三世界国家。

由于我对越南战争的看法是片面的，我所能描绘的革命图景需要由其他的描述来填补：

那些参与了与我不同的政治领域的人，当然还有那些回忆录和历史可能坦率地阐明冲突的军事方面的人。

不太幸运的是，鉴于当今的越南不得不让历史成为意识形态的助手，我国出现这种回忆录和报告的前景并不光明。

不过，只有通过了解在另一方作战的越南人，美国人才会对他们一直在深刻反思的战争--他们唯一输过的战争--有一个类似完整的描述。

我认为，西方对越共的了解特别少：

它的计划、它的困难，特别是它的内部冲突。

战争的环境和为掩盖其运作而采取的极大的谨慎相结合，将革命掩盖在秘密之中。

但越共并不是铁板一块；其成员的动机往往是暴力冲突的。

而我们许多组成其政治核心的人都感到，其目标最终被颠覆了。

人的动机、内部斗争、痛苦的决议--这些都是我试图在这里记录的东西。

These memoirs are the story of my life as a revolutionary. There is little in them about some of the Vietnam War’s events best remem- bered in the West: the clash of arms at Khe Sanh, the surprise offensive of Tet Mau Than, the POWs, or the last American heli- copters darting from the embassy roof as Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese army. There is, I know, a great deal of interest in the military side of the war. But that was not my side. I was never a warrior and took no part in what we called the Dau Tranh Vu Trang (“the Violence Struggle”), though in the course of things I experienced a fair share of violence myself, in prison and in the jungle under the great B-52 deluges of 1969 and 1970. My own role as a Vietcong urban organizer, then as a cabinet member, was narrowly defined, and in the nature of our struggle I kept (and was kept) away from the dimensions of confrontation that did not closely concern me. But there was another side of the war as well, one that the Viet- namese revolutionaries considered primary—the political side. My own direct involvement, over almost two decades, was on this front. For years I lived a double (occasionally a triple) life in Saigon, proselytizing and organizing for the revolution among Saigon’s upper classes and youth. After my imprisonment and eventual exchange, I lived in the jungle, at the headquarters of the Provisional Revolu- tionary Government (whose minister of justice I was), then—briefly —as a diplomat visiting Eastern Europe and Third World countries. Because my view of the Vietnam War is a partial one, the picture I can draw of the revolution needs to be filled out by other accounts: from those who were involved in areas of the political arena different from mine, and of course from those whose memoirs and histories might candidly illuminate the military side of the conflict. Un- fortunately, given the compulsion in present-day Vietnam to keep history the handmaiden of ideology, prospects for such memoirs and reports ever emerging from my country are not bright. Still, it is only through understanding the Vietnamese who fought on the other side that Americans will have anything like a complete portrait of a war upon which they have been reflecting so deeply—the only war they have ever lost. The West knows, I think, extraordinarily little about the Vietcong: its plans, its difficulties—especially its inner conflicts. The circum- stances of war and the great care taken to conceal its workings combined to mask the revolution in secrecy. But the Vietcong was no monolith; the motives of its members often clashed—violently. And many of us who composed its political core have felt that its goals were, in the end, subverted. The human motives, the internal struggle, the bitter resolution—these are the things I have attempted to record here.