访谈本-安德森：世袭政治是封建主义的反映

 访谈本-安德森：世袭政治是封建主义的反映

Interview Ben Anderson: Hereditary Politics Are a Reflection of Feudalism

发布者 印尼媒体 // 英语角, Sejarah // 2011年2月16日

上周二，当本-安德森进入雅加达国家图书馆参加陈瑞玲的新书发布和评论时，他受到了热烈欢迎。

本-安德森

来自美国康奈尔大学的著名印尼专家安德森在发表他的观点时毫不吝啬，全部采用印尼语口语。

74岁的安德森对印尼当然不陌生，反之亦然。他于1961年首次来到该国，进行康奈尔大学的博士研究。在G30S事件之后，安德森和他的同事露丝-麦克维编写了《康奈尔文件》，这是一份有争议的报告，描述了1965年印度尼西亚军队内部冲突导致的动乱。因为那篇论文，安德森从1973年起被禁止进入印度尼西亚，直到苏哈托在1998年下台。

在印度尼西亚的那一周，安德森被邀请在许多研讨会上发言。他利用这个机会收集了关于《Tjamboek Berdoeri》作者Kwee Thiam Tjing的传记资料。在繁忙的工作中，他仍有时间做一些独特的事情。"安德森笑着说："我正在记录雅加达的'营地'主题的发展。

他在东雅加达Cipinang地区一位同事的家中与Tempo记者Nugroho Dewanto、Yandi M. Rofiyandi、Yophiandi Kurniawan和摄影师Dwianto Wibowo交谈。
他剖析了革命时期的政治和新封建主义，在他看来，
新封建主义似乎仍然扎根于今天的印尼社会。采访摘录。

是什么让你始终将1965年的事件与印尼的左派运动联系起来？

我一直被G30S事件所吸引，直到1973-1974年期间。我觉得改革启动后，几乎所有从特别军事法庭出来的文件都充满了矛盾。我们不知道哪些证词是被警察或军队逼出来的。我们将不得不等待英国和美国政府的秘密档案的出现。也许它们会包含30年前发生的那些事件的新信息和材料。

前政治犯的说法如何，他们中的许多人现在正在写书？

我曾希望这些政治犯会有回忆录，
但他们的产品大多是关于他们在监禁期间的痛苦等等。
然而，现有的对当时发生的事情的分析充满了矛盾。
 Â一个人说发生了这个，另一个人说发生了那个。我希望会有一个聪明的PKI成员能拿出一个符合逻辑的分析，但到目前为止还没有发生。
我还读了约翰-罗萨的《Dalih Pembunuhan Massal》（大屠杀的借口）一书，
其中有不少取自Supardjo文件的有趣信息。
但罗萨对这份文件过于着迷，忽略了对其他文件的研究。

因此，在我看来，他的分析过于简单化。

G30S事件和左翼运动与今天印尼的发展有什么关系？

数百万人被杀的事件之所以发生，是因为媒体和电视对将军们的谋杀案进行了宣传。我的研究表明，杀害将军的行为并不涉及残害他们的生殖器、眼球和其他可怕的描述。
所以实际上，
人们应该质疑为什么从第一天起就有这么多谎言。
这是一场冷酷计算的运动，
而不是不负责任地或因恐慌而产生的事情。
很明显，有一个团体已经准备好实施它了。

经过

你写的关于杀害这些将军的文章产生了相当大的影响。

我所写的东西可以说影响几乎为零。
"该文件的读者应该已经意识到该事件是一个大谎言。
反格瓦尼运动的基础不过是谣言，但似乎没有人在乎。
我不知道如果有人能证明苏哈托和他的集团是G30S事件的幕后黑手会发生什么。
我认为人们不愿意相信真相，因为如果他们相信了，
那就意味着有人以如此残忍的方式杀害这么多无辜的人是有罪的。
他们就像德国人一样，不愿意记住关于希特勒的事情，因为这被认为是过去的事情了。

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已故的萨沃-埃迪将军不是承认了这些杀戮吗？

他怎么会知道300万人被屠杀的事情？

关于这一时期的许多问题仍然不清楚，比如斯亚姆-卡马鲁扎曼的命运。

有些人仍然怀疑Sjam被关押在海外。他是谁，他与苏哈托是什么关系，仍然是一个大谜团。

阿赫玛德-维拉纳塔库苏马将军的家人有一个独特的故事。他回忆说，

10月1日，也就是G30S事件发生后的第二天，他在与苏哈托的会面中感到困惑，

苏哈托一直在询问斯亚姆的情况。

会上的每个人都很困惑，似乎没有人知道斯亚姆的命运。事实上，有一些资料表明，苏哈托在革命时期就认识斯雅姆。

因此，今天的意义在于表明整个事情是一个大谎言，而且还犯下了反人类罪。

恩约托、艾迪特和其他人对G30S事件的一切负有责任，这并不符合逻辑。
这意味着苏哈托故意粉碎了这场运动，以成为英雄。
如果这只是苏哈托的一出戏，当然印尼历史的结果会大不相同。

你的意思是说，PKI有可能夺取政权吗？

我不确定。看看选举的结果吧。没有政党能够赢得超过23%的席位。
PKI的局限性很明显：他们无法渗透到伊斯兰教控制的地区。
1955年全国大选后，PKI在DPRD层面排名第二，但只在爪哇，任何增加的选民都来自PNI而非伊斯兰政党。事实上，在恩约托被排挤并被奥卢安-胡塔佩亚取代后，我并不相信PKI能控制印尼。

为什么印尼政治中没有左派运动如此重要？

非常重要。
组建一个像以前那样的左派政党并不像人们想象的那么容易。
它需要多年的斗争，特别是如果它想吸引贫穷的工人、农民和渔民，
这些人长期以来一直受到官僚主义等的打击。
我认为这样的努力需要一个有原则的领导人，他显然有一个战略和战术。

你如何解释过去选举的效率，但当选议员的质量却有待提高。

鉴于在上一次选举中，许多穷人在金钱的基础上投票，左派意识形态是否仍然具有吸引力？

嗯，那是因为没有其他选择。
这也发生在泰国的一个地区，
那里的共产主义曾经非常强大。
在1970年代，那个地区的共产党人被消灭了。
他们无法被容纳，因为只有两个政治角色，
一个是由当地的黑手党支持，
另一个是由军队支持。

在这种情况下，
人们会把票投给能够给予最大贿赂的政党，
不是因为他们喜欢这个政党，
而是因为他们认为，
"如果我不玩这个游戏，就不会得到什么"。

最近，人们开始意识到，投票应该是基于提供的政策，而不是钱。
这个群体威胁到了曼谷和泰国君主制。
多年来，政治意识发生了很大变化。
如果你到外省去，你会看到描述国王的侮辱性词语，使用非常粗俗的语言。
宫里的宣传一直说国王受到尊重等等，就像日惹不能释放苏丹国一样。

反资本主义的情绪通常为左派运动带来机会。
但这种情况在印尼没有发生。
事实上，在这里，
反资本主义的人也可能是反共产主义的。这是为什么呢？

在很多情况下，
印尼的企业集团远离渔民、农民、女佣和普通人的视野范围。
他们的日常敌人不是外国人，而是警察和黑手党等当地人。
精英们把问题归咎于犹太人和美国，以确保他们不被厌恶。
因此，这就是把人们的愤怒转移到外部目标上的政治，以掩盖国内经济的失败。

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您如何看待年轻一代在改变印度尼西亚政治中的作用？

当我看到一个顽皮的孩子时，我总是开玩笑地说："这是动物的希望"（这是对bangsat或动物一词的发挥，而不是经常提到的bangsa或民族-Ed.）。但是年轻人还是有希望的，他们可以做一些有意义的事情。年轻人通常有勇气，但没有抵抗力，所以他们中的许多人最终加入了团体或黑手党帮派。如果有一个好的领导者，运动就能活跃起来。

你认为今天的政治文化与新秩序时期一样吗？

有帮助的是这一代年轻人，他们从未经历过也不能很好地记住苏哈托时代。当然，他们也有不足之处，但他们不会是经历过苏哈托时代的印尼人，他们的新封建主义、腐败和残酷都是在成长过程中形成的。这样的改变需要时间。目前众议院（DPR）的立法者基本上都是新秩序的产物。他们的政治心态是完全一样的。

今天的政治文化与新秩序时期的政治文化有什么相似之处？

这个系统由独裁者统治，实行寡头制度，分赃，没有反对意见。他们知道，只要分赃，要求每个人都参与，寡头政治就安全了。寡头制度的成员都没有勇气脱离，做一些不同的事情。也许当再次发生经济危机时，这种情况会有所改变。

今天的印尼政治家们也在培养他们的家庭成员和他们的孩子，以继续他们的领导角色和地位。

除了他们父母或丈夫的名字，他们什么都没有。这些政治上的王子和公主是封建主义的反映。

反映了封建主义和像朝鲜那样的领导人的狂热野心。那个国家是共产主义国家，但是它的领导人三代都是世袭的。与其与他人分享权力，不如把权力交给继承人，即使他或她的脑子像鸡一样。

自殖民时代以来，封建主义有多大变化？

从革命时期到20世纪50年代，贵族或小国王感到威胁，因为有来自下面的压力--人民。人们认为他们是压迫者的亲信，是坏统治者。PNI、PKI和Masyumi等政党被认为是原则性很强的政党，所以他们比贵族和精英更有吸引力。然后，小国王们试图通过进入官僚机构而不通过选举程序回来。

那么在新秩序时代呢？

苏哈托阉割了所有的政党，使贵族或上层阶级无法卷土重来。苏哈托支持地方上的小国王，他们在国家层面上是无足轻重的。他们最大的敌人是那些对印尼全国人民有吸引力的政党。如果他们的影响力只在地方范围内延伸，那就没有问题了。这些小国王被培养起来，并得到金钱，这样他们就可以像以前一样统治。他们被弄得像僵尸一样。

日惹苏丹国认为它与其他君主国有着不同的历史根源。

我不相信这一点。支持苏丹会给其他地区的小国王带来希望。通过观察一些国家的君主制，我的印象是，当君主被消灭后，人们会在三周后忘记他们。所以，当统治结束后，他们就不会再回来了。

君主制能像在这个改革时代一样被消灭吗？

今天的条件实际上反映了政党在吸引群众方面的失败。所以，在这种情况下，王牌就在那些还很弱的牌中，而国王在苏哈托时代就已经聚集了他的力量。

本尼迪克特-理查德-奥戈尔曼-安德森

本-安德森

出生地点和日期。中国昆明，1936年8月26日

学历：英国剑桥大学学士

英国剑桥大学学士

康奈尔大学国际研究荣誉教授。

美国职业生涯。

康奈尔大学讲师和研究员

著有《革命时期的爪哇》。占领与抵抗1944-1946》（1972）。

想象中的社区。对民族主义的起源和传播的思考（1983年）（Tempo杂志/IM）。

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Interview Ben Anderson: Hereditary Politics Are a Reflection of Feudalism

Posted by: Indonesia Media // English Corner, Sejarah // February 16, 2011

He has been absent from the world of research on Indonesia, but Benedict Anderson’s reputation among academics remains intact.  Anderson received a warm welcome when he entered the Jakarta National Library last Tuesday to attend the launch and a review of a book by Tan Swie Ling.

Ben Anderson

Anderson, the famed Indonesia expert from Cornell University in the United States did not mince words when he gave his views, all in a colloquial Bahasa Indonesia.

Anderson, 74, is certainly no stranger to Indonesia and vice versa. He first came to the country in 1961 to do his Cornell University doctoral research. Following the G30S incident, Anderson and his colleague Ruth McVey produced the Cornell Papers, a controversial report describing the 1965 upheaval as a result of an internal conflict within the Indonesian military. Because of that paper, Anderson was banned from entering Indonesia from 1973 and until Suharto stepped down in 1998.

In the week that he was in Indonesia, Anderson was invited to speak at many seminars. He took the opportunity to collect information on the biography of the author of Tjamboek Berdoeri, Kwee Thiam Tjing. In the midst of his busy schedule, he still had the time to do something unique. “I am documenting the development of ‘campy’ subjects in Jakarta,” said Anderson, laughingly.

He spoke with Tempo reporters Nugroho Dewanto, Yandi M. Rofiyandi, Yophiandi Kurniawan and photographer Dwianto Wibowo at the home of a colleague in the Cipinang area of East Jakarta. He dissected the politics during the revolutionary period and neo-feudalism, which in his opinion seems to be still rooted in Indonesian society today. Excerpts of the interview:

What makes you consistently link the 1965 incident with the leftist movement in Indonesia?

I have been attracted to the G30S events until the 1973-1974 period. I felt that after reforms were launched, almost all documentation coming out of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal was full of contradictions. We don’t know which testimonies were forced out by the police or the army. We will have to wait for the secret files of the UK and US governments to become available. Perhaps they will contain new information and material from those events which happened 30 years ago.

What about the claims of former political prisoners, many of whom are now writing books?

I had hoped there would be memoirs from those political prisoners, but most of their products are about their suffering during their imprisonment and so forth. Yet the available analysis of what happened at the time is full of contradictions.  One person says this occurred, others say that happened. I am hoping there will be a smart PKI member who can produce a logical analysis, but so far it hasn’t happened. I also read the book Dalih Pembunuhan Massal (Pretext for Mass Murder) by John Roosa, which contains quite a bit of interesting information taken from the Supardjo documents. But Roosa was too enthralled by this document, neglecting to look at other documents. So, in my view, his analysis was too simplistic.

What is the relevance of the G30S events and the left-wing movement with developments in Indonesia today?

The killing of millions of people happened because of a media and television campaign on the murders of the generals. My research indicates that the killing of the generals did not involve mutilation of their genitals, their eyeballs and other grisly description. So actually, people should be questioning why there were so many lies right from the first day. This was a campaign planned with cold calculation, not something that came out irresponsibly or as a result of panic. Clearly, there was a certain group that was ready to carry it out.

Your writings about the killing of those generals have had quite an impact.

What I have written can be said to have had almost zero effect.  Readers of the document should have realized the event was a big lie. The anti-Gerwani campaign was based on nothing more than rumors, but no one seemed to care. I don’t know what will happen if someone can prove that Suharto and his group were behind the G30S incident. I think people don’t want to believe in the truth, because if they did, that means someone is guilty of killing so many innocent people in such a sadistic way. They are like the Germans who don’t want to remember about Hitler because it’s considered to be something from the past.

Wasn’t there an admission by the late General Sarwo Edhie on these killings?

How would he know about the massacre of 3 million people? Many issues about this period remain unclear, like the fate of Sjam Kamaruzaman. Some people still suspect that Sjam is being detained overseas. Who he is and what his relation is to Suharto is still a big mystery. There is a unique story from the family of General Achmad Wiranatakusumah. He recalled being puzzled during a meeting with Suharto on October 1, the day after the G30S incident, who kept asking about Sjam. Everyone at the meeting was confused and no one seemed to know about Sjam’s fate. In fact, there is some information indicating that Suharto had known Sjam since the revolutionary days.

So the relevance today is to show the whole thing was a big lie and a crime against humanity had been carried out.

That Njoto, Aidit and the others were responsible for everything about the G30S incident doesn’t make sense. Which means Suharto intentionally crushed this movement to become a hero. If this was merely a drama by Suharto, certainly Indonesian history would have turned out quite different.

Do you mean that the PKI could have taken over power?

I’m not sure. Look at the results of the elections. No parties were able to win over 23 percent. The limitations of the PKI were clear: they were unable to penetrate Islamic-controlled areas. After the 1955 national elections, the PKI came second at the DPRD level but only in Java, and any increase in the voters came from the PNI not the Islamic parties. In fact, after Njoto was sidelined and replaced by Oloan Hutapea, I wasn’t convinced the PKI could control Indonesia.

Why is the absence of a leftist movement in Indonesian politics so important?

Very important. Forming a leftist political party like in the old days is not as easy as one thinks. It needs years of struggle, particularly if it wants to attract poor workers, farmers and fishermen which have for long been hit by bureaucracy and so forth. I think such an effort needs a principled leader, who clearly has a strategy and tactics. How do you explain the efficiency with which the past elections proceeded, yet the quality of elected legislators is something to be desired.

Is leftist ideology still attractive given that in the last elections many poor people voted on the basis of money?

Well, that’s because there is no alternative. This also happened in an area in Thailand where communism was once very strong. During the 1970s, the communists in that area were destroyed. They could not be accommodated because there were only two political players, one backed either by the local mafia and the other by the army. In such a situation, people will vote for the party which can give the biggest bribe, not because they like the party, but because they think, “I wouldn’t be getting anything if I didn’t play the game.” Recently, people became aware that casting their ballots should be based on policies offered, not about money. This group threatened Bangkok and the Thai monarchy. Political awareness had changed much over the years. If you go out into the provinces, you would see insulting words describing the king, using very coarse language. The propaganda from the palace keeps saying that the king is respected and so forth, just like the way Yogyakarta cannot bring itself to release the sultanate.

Anti-capitalism sentiments usually open up opportunities for the leftist movement. But that’s not happening in Indonesia. In fact, here people who are anti-capitalist can also be anti-communist. Why is that?

In many cases, Indonesian conglomerates are far from the range of vision of fishermen, farmers, maids and common people. Their daily enemy is not foreigners, but locals like the police and the mafia. The elites blame problems on the Jews and America, to ensure they are not detested. So this is the politics of transferring people’s anger at external targets to cover up for the failed economy inside the country.

How do you see the role of the younger generation in changing politics in Indonesia?

When I see a naughty child, I always say, jokingly, “this is the hope of animals” (a play on the use of the word bangsat or animal, as opposed to the oft-mentioned phrase bangsa or nation–Ed.). But there is hope for the young and they can do something meaningful. Young people usually have the courage but not the resistance so many of them end up joining groups or mafia gangs. The movement can be active if there is a good leader.

Do you see political culture today the same as it was during the New Order?

What will help is the generation of young people who never experienced and cannot remember well the Suharto era. Of course there is a shortcoming, but they will not be Indonesians with formative years experiencing the Suharto era, with its neo-feudalism, corruption and cruelty. Such a change needs time.  The current legislators at the House of Representatives (DPR) are basically the result of the New Order. Their political mentality is exactly the same.

What similarities are there in today’s political culture with those of the New Order?

The system is ruled by a dictator with an oligarchic system, sharing the spoils, no opposition. They know that as long as the spoils are divided and everyone is asked to participate, the oligarchy is safe. No member of the oligarchy has had the courage to break away and do something different. Perhaps this will change when there is another economic crisis.

Indonesian politicians today also are grooming their family members and their children to continue their leadership role and status.

They have nothing except their parents’ or their husbands’ names. These political crown princes and princesses is a

reflection of feudalism and the maniacal ambition of leaders like the one in North Korea. That country is communist, but its leaders have been hereditary for three generations. Rather than share power with others, better give it to the heirs, even though he or she has the brains of a chicken.

How much has feudalism changed since the colonial days?

From the time of the revolution to the 1950s, the nobility or small kings felt threatened because of pressure from below–the people. People saw them as cronies of the oppressors, bad rulers. Political parties like the PNI, PKI and Masyumi were seen to be strong-principled so they had bigger appeal than the nobility and the elites. The small kings then tried to come back by entering the bureaucracy without the electoral process.

What about during the New Order era?

Suharto castrated all political parties so that the nobles or the upper class could not make a comeback. Suharto supported the small kings at the local level, who were insignificant at the national level. Their biggest foes were the parties which appealed to people all over Indonesia. If their influence only extended within local boundaries, there was no problem. These small kings were groomed and given money so they could rule like in the old days. They were rendered zombie-like.

The Yogyakarta sultanate believes it has different historical roots than other monarchies.

I don’t believe that. Supporting the sultan would give hope to small kings in the other regions. My impression from observing monarchies in a number of countries is that when the monarch is eliminated, people will forget them in three weeks’ time. So, when the reign is ended, they will not come back.

Can a monarchy be eliminated just like in this era of reforms?

Conditions today actually mirror the failure of political parties in attracting the masses. So, in this case, the ace is among the cards which are still weak and the king has already gathered his forces since the time of Suharto.

Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson

Ben Anderson

Place & Date of Birth: Kunming, China, 26 August 1936

Education:

BA, Cambridge University, UK

Professor Emeritus in International Studies, Cornell University,

USA Career:

Lecturer and Researcher, Cornell University

Author of Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946 (1972);

Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) (tempo magazine/IM)