在美国和深蓝海洋之间。巴西的冷战政策和政治崩溃 Guilherme Casarões 发表于Frank Jacob（编辑）。冷战的周边地区。Wurzburg:Königshausen & Neumann, 2015, v. 1, p. 283-317.
Between the U.S. and the deep blue sea: Cold War policies and political breakdown in Brazil Guilherme Casarões Published in Frank Jacob (ed.). Peripheries of the Cold War. Wurzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2015, v. 1, p. 283-317.
冷战对国家和人民造成的结构性影响是众所周知的，在过去的几十年里，人们对其进行了广泛的辩论和记录。从第二次世界大战的废墟中出现的两极环境缩小了世界上大多数国家的国际选择范围，迫使它们站在美国或苏联一边。无论在战争结束后的几年中形成的关系的性质如何--意识形态的或务实的，服从的或自主的--冷战一方面使国际政治更加稳定，另一方面也更加危险。这种推理最好的描述就是雷蒙德-阿伦所称的热核时代的恐怖平衡1。由于威慑，核武器确实提供了很大程度的稳定，但它实际上只发生在宏观层面，或全球大国之间。世界的其他地方，由于一些不同的原因，则处于震荡之中。虽然欧洲中心的政治和社会斗争由于杜鲁门和斯大林需要确保他们在该大陆的地位而迅速得到解决，但由于非殖民化，不稳定和冲突逐渐转移到地球的边缘。作为欧洲中心主义秩序衰落的结果之一，非洲和亚洲独立国家的崛起为苏联/共产主义和美国/资本主义势力范围的扩大提供了机会。在这几十年里，对权力和影响力的长期争夺逐渐转移到了边缘地区，导致政治动荡、经济倒退，甚至导致后殖民世界的流血战争。矛盾的是，国际体系的稳定在这些新独立的国家有了安全阀。拉丁美洲遭受了冷战的混合影响。与美国相邻，至少在理论上可以提供某种程度的繁荣和稳定。区域巨头，如墨西哥、巴西或阿根廷，能够与超级大国讨价还价，利用其规模、战略资产或经济能力来吸引投资或获得贷款，以促进国家发展。而较小的国家则更容易受到影响，它们往往把美国作为唯一的选择而与之结盟。在这两种情况下，拉美国家的命运还是取决于美国是否愿意合作，或者至少愿意维护它们在该地区的利益。在二战结束后的几年里，情况并非如此。尽管拉丁美洲被推入杜鲁门政府建立的半球机构框架--如《美洲互惠条约》（1947年）或美洲国家组织（1948年）--但这个超级大国与其后院之间的关系最初是冷漠的。放弃了前十年的睦邻政策，"美国认为与该半球的友谊是理所当然的，并忽视了来自一个不是被战争，而是被贫穷和落后蹂躏的大陆的经济援助呼吁。
The structural effects caused by the Cold War on states and their peoples are well known, having been extensively debated and documented in the past decades. The bipolar setting that emerged from the debris of the Second World War narrowed down the array of international choices of most countries in the world, forcing them to take sides with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Irrespective of the nature of the relationships that were forged in the years that followed the wars end – ideological or pragmatic, subservient or autonomous – the Cold War made international politics more stable, on the one hand, and yet more dangerous, on the other. This reasoning is best described by what Raymond Aron has labeled balance of terror in the thermonuclear age 1 . Nuclear weapons indeed provided a great degree of stability thanks to deterrence, but it only actually occurred at the macro level, or between the global powers. The rest of the world, for several different reasons, was in convulsion. While political and social struggles at the heart of Europe were swiftly settled by Truman and Stalin s need to secure their positions in that continent, instability and conflicts progressively moved to the fringes of the planet due to decolonization. As one of the results of the downfall of the Eurocentric order, the rise of independent states in Africa and Asia opened up opportunities for the enlargement of both Soviet/communist and American/capitalist spheres of influence. In those decades, the permanent struggle for power and influence was progressively transferred to the periphery, leading to political turmoil, economic setbacks and even to bloody wars in the post-colonial world. Paradoxically, stability of the international system had in those newly-independent countries its safety valve. Latin America suffered the mixed effects of the Cold War. Proximity with the United States could provide, at least in theory, some degree of prosperity and stability. Regional giants, such as Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, were able to bargain with the superpower by using their size, strategic assets, or economic capabilities to attract investments or take loans with an eye on promoting national development. Smaller states, on their part, were more vulnerable and often bandwagoned with the U.S. as their only alternative. In both cases, the fate of Latin American nations nonetheless depended on the willingness of the United States to cooperate or at least to safeguard their interests in the region. That was not the case in the years that immediately followed the end of WWII. Although Latin America was pushed into the hemispheric institutional frameworks created by the Truman administration – such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) or the Organization of American States (1948) – relations between the superpower and its backyard were initially marked by indifference. Giving up the Good Neighbor policy of the previous decade, “merica took friendship with the hemisphere for granted and ignored the calls for economic assistance that came from a continent torn not by war, but by poverty and backwardness.
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