逃离边缘地区--解开东亚的 "谜团

Robert H. Wade* 2018年9月 

 

WIDER工作文件2018/101

 

摘要。

 

在过去两个世纪里，很少有非西方国家达到西欧和北美的普遍繁荣。
事实证明，工业革命早期几十年形成的世界经济的核心-外围结构是稳健的，即使在第二次世界大战后70年的自觉 "发展 "之后。
几乎所有在1960年处于边缘地带的国家今天仍然处于边缘地带。
最明显的例外是东北亚的资本主义国家，即日本、台湾和韩国；此外还有新加坡和香港这两个岛国。
它们是如何逃脱的呢？

 

关键词。

中心，外围，国家能力，美国帝国 鸣谢。
Deepak Nayyar, Ana Celia Castro, Fanny Alcocer, Jakob Vestergaard 

 

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* 伦敦经济学院，英国伦敦，电子邮件：r.wade@lse.ac.uk 。

 

本研究报告是在联合国大学发展经济学所的 "亚洲转型 "项目中编写的。
对国家发展的调查"。

 

Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2018 Information and requests: publications@wider.unu.edu ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-543-5 https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2018/543-5 Typescript prepared by Lesley Ellen .

 

联合国大学世界发展经济学研究所提供经济分析和政策建议，目的是促进可持续和公平的发展。
该研究所于1985年在芬兰赫尔辛基开始运作，是联合国大学的第一个研究和培训中心。
今天，它是一个独特的智囊团、研究机构和联合国机构的混合体--提供一系列服务，包括向政府提供政策建议，以及免费提供原创研究。

 

研究所的资金来自一个捐赠基金的收入，以及来自芬兰、瑞典和英国对其工作计划的额外捐款，还有来自各种捐助者对具体项目的专用捐款。

 

Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland

 

本文所表达的观点是作者的观点，不一定反映研究所或联合国大学的观点，也不代表方案/项目捐助者的观点。

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  使用大量进口保护和其他形式的國家指導主義dirigisme的发展中国家的快速增长'对我[和我们所有的人]主张放手市场的人来说有很多神秘之处。
(William Easterly (2002), emphasis added)

一个开放其经济并将政府的作用保持在最低限度的国家，必然会经历更快速的经济增长和收入的增加。
(Louis Uchitelle (2002), 报道了2002年世界经济论坛会议上企业高管和政府领导人的共识)

生活中最重要的是有一个目标，并有决心去实现它。

@@指導主義（dirigisme或dirigism，源自法語diriger），或譯統制主義，是一種經濟學說，國家扮演著強有力的指導角色，而不僅僅是對資本主義市場經濟的監管幹預角色。
作為一種經濟學說，指導主義與自由放任相反，強調國家干預在遏制所謂的生產效率低下和市場失靈方面的積極作用。
指導政策通常包括經濟規劃、國家指導的投資以及使用市場工具（稅收和補貼）來激勵市場實體實現國家經濟目標。

 

1 引言

 

当历史学家回顾二十世纪下半叶时，他们可能会把东亚的经济复兴视为开创性的事件之一。
从1950年代的日本开始，到1960和1970年代的台湾、韩国、香港和新加坡，再到后来的东南亚（但较少），以及1990年代的中国。
它代表了自第二次世界大战以来，对大英帝国及其欧洲同行在十八和十九世纪创造的、当时由美国领导的全球军事、经济和文化权力等级制度的第一次重大挑战。
它已经开始将该地区恢复到世界发展的最前沿，而该地区在被以西方为中心的世界新秩序掩盖之前已经占据了一千多年（Arrighi 2007）。

 

我们的重点是东北亚的世界秩序，它由日本在19世纪末和20世纪初创造，
然后在第二次世界大战后被纳入新兴的美帝国。
米达尔（1968）的《亚洲戏剧》对东北亚说得很少，因为它关注的是南亚，其次是东南亚。

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asian drama_ inquiry into the poverty of nations - Myrdal, Gunnar, 1898-1987.pdf

缪达尔在斯德哥尔摩大学接受教育，并于 1923 年获得法学学位，并于 1927 年获得经济学博士学位。他于 1924 年与阿尔瓦·雷默 ( Alva Reimer ) 结婚。在美国获得洛克菲勒旅行奖学金(1929-30) 后，缪达尔成为一名助理日内瓦国际研究所教授（1930-31 年）。他还是斯德哥尔摩大学政治经济学教授（1933-50 年）和国际经济学教授（1960-67 年）；1967年他成为名誉教授。

 

直到 20 世纪 30 年代初期，缪达尔一直强调纯理论，这与他后来对应用经济学和社会问题的关注形成鲜明对比。在他的博士论文中，他研究了预期在价格形成中的作用，这种方法源于弗兰克·H·奈特。1931 年，他将这一理论方法应用于宏观经济学，当时，作为斯德哥尔摩经济学院，他发表的演讲导致货币均衡（1939）。这些讲座说明了事前（或计划）和事后（或已实现）储蓄和投资之间的区别。

 

应卡内基公司的邀请，缪达尔探讨了美国的社会和经济问题1938-40 年的非裔美国人并写道美国的困境：黑人问题与现代民主（1944 年）。在这部著作中，缪达尔提出了他的累积因果理论——即贫穷创造贫穷。缪达尔还指出，富兰克林·D·罗斯福总统政府实施的两项经济政策无意中摧毁了数十万非裔美国人的工作岗位。第一项此类政策涉及限制棉花生产，旨在提高农场主的收入。缪达尔写道：“因此，农业政策，尤其是 1933 年 5 月制定的农业调整计划 (AAA)，似乎是导致黑人和白人佃农和黑人农户数量急剧减少的直接原因。现金和股份租户。” （原文斜体。）第二个政策是最低工资，缪达尔指出，这使得雇主不太愿意雇用相对不熟练的人，其中许多人是非裔美国人。

 

1947 年至 1957 年，缪达尔担任联合国欧洲经济委员会执行秘书。缪达尔在他的发展经济学著作中警告说，富国和穷国的经济发展可能永远不会趋同。相反，这两者可能会出现分歧，穷国只能生产利润较低的初级商品，而富国则获得与规模经济相关的利润。然而，这种悲观的看法并没有被事件所证实。

 

在其他书中，缪达尔将他的经济研究与社会学研究相结合。其中包括经济理论发展中的政治因素（1930 年）和超越福利国家：经济计划及其国际影响（1960 年）。这本书亚洲戏剧：对国家贫困的调查（1968 年）代表了一项为期 10 年的亚洲贫困研究。缪德拉是马尔萨斯主义者，认为亚洲的人口增长会阻碍经济增长，但 21 世纪初的情况表明，许多亚洲国家都经历了人口增长和经济高速增长。###@

 

本文第2节阐述了东北亚经济表现优异的证据。
第3節总结了主流或新自由主义对这种特殊表现的原因的理解。
第4节概述了一个部分的替代性解释，重点是东北亚的政治领导人有能力建立 "发展型国家 "并维持数十年的位置、禀赋和时间条件。
第5节阐述了这些国家的特点，与新自由主义范式所青睐的监管国家形成对比。
第6节是关于新加坡和香港。
第7节是结论。

 

2 东北亚的特殊经济表现

 

今天我们看到，东北亚国家仍然是少数非西方经济体中的一员，它们摆脱了发展中国家典型的结构性限制。
但在世界经济的核心-外围结构中，我们不应该说 "发展中国家 "或 "新兴经济体"，而应该说 "外围"。
核心区发出冲动；外围区接受冲动并向核心区提供投入，以维持核心区的技术、经济、金融和军事主导地位--包括技术人才的供应（Fischer 2015）。

 

此外，东北亚国家仍然是为数不多的非西方国家之一，它们在广泛的全球主要行业中发展了大部分本土企业，能够成为（西方或日本）跨国公司的第一级供应商，甚至与它们正面竞争。
这个范围包括化学品、石化产品、电子、钢铁、造船、汽车和汽车零部件，以及最近的生物技术、先进的半导体、纳米技术和太空探索。
这一成就反映了他们在世界前沿的技术革新方面的本土能力的发展。
然而，他们与世界上最大和最具创新性的市场隔着大约9000公里的太平洋，而隔壁的墨西哥却一蹶不振。

 

东北亚的经济表现到底有多出色，从这个问题的答案中可以看出：在过去两个世纪中，有多少非西方国家达到了西欧和北美的一般繁荣水平？
不到十个。
少数的追赶者使得世界经济的主要长期增长模式是："分歧，大时代"（Pritchett 1997）。

 

世界银行（2013）的一项研究证实了这一结论。
它在1960年确定了101个国家为 "中等收入"，并发现其中只有13个国家在近50年后，即2008年达到 "高收入"。

 

表1显示了1970年和2010年几个东亚国家的平均收入占美国平均收入的百分比，还有印度和巴西。
台湾和韩国，以及中国，因其追赶的幅度而脱颖而出。
世界上大多数国家看起来更像印度尼西亚、印度和巴西。

 

表1：1970年和2010年国家平均收入占美国实际平均收入的百分比

注：Penn World tables 9.0，基于2011年购买力平价（PPP）数字，四舍五入到最近的分位数。

资料来源。作者根据Cherif和Hasanov (2015)更新。

 

在2010年之前，台湾保持着连续6%或更多增长年限的世界纪录，为32年（从1962年到1994年）。
韩国排名第二，为29年（1962年至1991年）。
中国在2010年打破了台湾的记录；如果其增长统计数据可以信赖的话，当时中国已经连续33年以6%以上的速度增长（Pritchett and Summers 2014）。

 

表2显示了支持这些增长表现的投资率，包括国家集团和中国。
作为比较，英国1990年的数字是19%，美国的数字是17%。

 

表2：资本形成总额/GDP，选定实体（%）

注：LICs=低收入国家，MICs=中等收入国家。
资料来源：《世界发展指标》，12/22。
世界发展指标，12/22/2015 .

 

 我们必须记住，大多数 "成功 "进入发达国家地位的非西方国家的人口都很少（未来的中国除外）。

 

东北亚规模的收入和生产赶超很罕见，所涉及的 "人口数量 "也相对较少，这表明世界经济存在着类似于 "玻璃天花板 "或 "中等收入陷阱 "的分割。
这一观点与新古典主义发展理论不一致，后者认为世界经济是一个开放的系统，没有核心-外围的整体结构，类似于马拉松比赛，每个选手的位置都是内部健身的函数。

 

下一节将讨论主流经济学范式（通常称为新自由主义）中的分析家提出的原因。
他们的解释--强调东北亚的市场自由化--在关于经济发展的更广泛的辩论中，包括在世界银行，是最有影响力的。
我认为，它的影响与其说是来自于证实证据的力量，不如说是纯粹的简单性（奥卡姆剃刀）和符合由其他原因驱动的亲西方资本的意识形态故事。
##@

奧坎剃刀（英語：Ockham's Razor、拉丁語：Lex Parsimoniae，意為「簡約法則」）是由14世紀方濟會修士奧坎的威廉（William of Occam，約1287年至1347年，英格蘭薩里郡奧坎 (Ockham)人氏）提出的邏輯學法則。如果關於同一個問題有許多種理論，每一種都能作出同樣準確的預言，那麼應該挑選其中使用假定最少的。儘管越複雜的方法通常能做出越好的預言，但是在不考慮預言能力（即結果大致相同）的情況下，假設越少越好。##@

 

3 东北亚在新自由主义范式下的崛起

 

20世纪80年代，当东北亚的崛起开始引起西方政策分析家的持续关注时，大多数经济学家和西方控制的多边发展组织（包括世界银行、国际货币基金组织、经合组织及其发展中心）通过新自由主义的视角来看待他们的主题--西方新近复苏的经济信仰，包括发展经济学方面。

 

新自由主义哲学说，"市场 "是经济增长和自由的最佳机构。
即使发现了明确的 "市场失灵"，通常也最好不要处理，因为通过 "国家干预 "来纠正它们的社会成本可能会高于社会收益。
对国际经济开放的最佳程度是接近最大限度的开放，因为全球一体化提高了对所有国内生产者的竞争压力，从而使国家经济更加灵活，并将资源导向最有效的用途。
政府应该为了帮助一些公司和行业获得规模经济而抑制竞争，为了国家社会凝聚力和国家就业而抑制全球一体化，这种观点在这种看法中没有什么价值（Wade 1992a, 2017a, 2017b）。

 

世界银行（1993）的《东亚奇迹》一书是一个相对成熟的案例。
它研究了八个 "表现出色的亚洲经济体 "的成功原因。
日本，韩国、台湾和新加坡这三个第一代新兴工业化经济体，以及泰国、马来西亚和印度尼西亚这三个第二代东南亚经济体，还有香港。

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The East Asian miracle : economic growth and public policy : Main report (English)##@

 

该书认为，这些国家通过确保 "基本要素 "对这些国家的快速增长做出了重要贡献：低通货膨胀和有竞争力的汇率；人力资本；有效和安全的金融体系；低价格扭曲；容易获得外国技术；以及对农业的低偏见。

 

换句话说，这些国家实施了有效的 "横向 "政策，适用于所有部门。

 

但 "战略 "干预--促进特定行业甚至特定公司的特定政策--"通常是不起作用的"（世界银行1993年：354，强调是后加的；Wade 1996）。

 

 带来的信息是。
对国际贸易的开放，在很大程度上基于中立的激励措施，是东亚快速增长的关键因素"（世界银行1993：292）。

 

这个论点使东北亚有力地证实了新自由主义对亚当-斯密问题的回答：

市场资本主义如何产生人类福利？
答案是市场自由化--在全球范围内，全球一体化，或者说走向 "世界是一个经济国家"，对经济流动或所有权要求的限制不比美国各州对它们的限制多。
这不仅是自由贸易的论点，也是资本自由流动的论点；反之，它淡化了国家主权和民主的价值。

 

简而言之，世界银行的结论是，与序言一中的威廉-伊斯特利相反，东亚的崛起并不神秘。
主要原因在书信二中被确认，即世界经济论坛的亲西方资本论点。

 

4 发展型国家的崛起

 

我们可以通过以下问题给出一个更有趣的答案：

是什么条件使梅尔达勒在国家能力提高、内部和平程度提高和收入提高之间产生了累积因果关系。
换句话说，

是什么条件使日本、台湾和韩国能够避免外围国家的共同命运--"弱国"，
一个根深蒂固的统治集团与内部敌人作战，
提供狭隘的公共产品以支持自己的支持者，并松散地执行法治？
是什么条件使他们能够从 "特殊利益国家"
（一个根深蒂固的统治集团能够保持内部稳定，倾向于偏袒自己的支持者，以加强对权力的控制，但也长期关注长期的国家目标）开始，
然后过渡到 "共同利益国家"，提供基础广泛的公共产品，从而帮助提高收入和减少不满（Besley和Persson 2011）。

 

我们需要牢记弗朗西斯-福山的观点：
"对穷国的领导人来说，坚持某种政治权力结构往往是一个生死攸关的问题"（福山 2004: 49）。
这种对权力的把持往往导致国家能力的低下和对国家发展目标的低承诺，甚至到了统治者在政府各部委之间制造对立关系的地步，以防敌对集团从国家发展项目创造的新经济机会中获益，并利用他们的新财富试图取代现任者，也许是通过投资暴力。

 

事实证明，
东北亚如何维持国家能力上升、收入上升和内部和平程度上升之间的累积因果关系，
答案与东北亚和美国的地缘政治，以及由此产生的区域经济结构密切相关。
东北亚的崛起远不是一小群马拉松选手在一场公开赛中奋勇向前的故事。

 

4.1 位置、禀赋和时机的 "运气

 

历史学家布鲁斯-库明斯提醒我们。
如果说东亚出现了经济奇迹，那也不是自1960年以来才出现的；如果认为是这样，那就太不符合历史了"（Cumings 1984: 3）。
在一个较长的论述中，我们将从17世纪以前东亚经济的卓越地位的原因开始。
缩短这个漫长的时间，我从19世纪末和当时东亚的三个 "秩序 "开始（Woo 2016）。

 

第一个是国家资本主义的东北亚世界，由日本在19世纪末对朝鲜和台湾进行殖民统治，随后在1930年代和1940年代前半段对满洲和中国东海岸进行殖民统治。
日本殖民政府将朝鲜和台湾视为离岸农场、矿山和工业，与核心地区紧密结合。

 

它复制了日本早期类似的经济和政治体制和政策--民族主义的、孤立的、军国主义的、国家渗透的，专注于提高农业、矿业和早期制造业的生产力，并致力于提供大规模的小学教育。

 

到1940年，大约50%到70%的韩国和台湾儿童都上了小学。
所有这三个国家在种族和宗教方面都比其他大多数国家更加同质化。

 

由西方殖民主义者建立的第二个世界秩序包括香港和东南亚。
殖民主义者将经济（除香港外的转口港）转变为面向西方市场的商品生产，主要以种植园的形式，赋予大地主权力。
但在采掘业之外，殖民者的治理比日本帝国更被动，更接受在位的土地精英。
到1940年，在法国的殖民地越南，只有大约2%的儿童在上小学。
此外，东道主社会在种族和宗教方面比东北亚地区更加多样化。

 

第三世界是中国，后来，在第二次世界大战后的几十年里，中国被视为资本主义东北亚地区的美国式新秩序的敌人。

 

我们感兴趣的是以日本为中心的东北亚世界，从19世纪中期日本被迫开放开始。
在十九世纪中叶之前的大约250年里，日本统治者将这个国家孤立起来。
1853年，美国海军准将佩里率领一支军舰舰队驶入江户（现在的东京）港，要求日本对美国的商业开放。
他的访问给日本的领导人带来了震动，他们担心美国可能会把日本作为殖民地，因为它在太平洋上争夺统治地位。
欧洲国家通过1839年至1849年的不平等条约吞并中国的消息已经传到了日本，根据这些条约，欧洲国家对在中国的外国人实施欧洲法律，并对通过条约港口进口的货物设置关税。
日本会是下一个吗？
日本政府的反应是进行全面改革，建立一个中央集权的国家和民族认同，作为强大军队的基础。
在佩里访问之后，一位日本领导人表达了指导精神。
'如果我们采取主动，我们就能主宰；如果我们不这样做，我们就会被主宰'。

 

1868年的明治维新掀起了一场持续数十年的工业化和军事化的狂潮，
其指导思想是在 "不沉不浮 "的残酷的集体选择中产生的发展思维。
政府在国家能力方面进行了一次大的推动，包括财政、法律和公共产品。
它派遣官员团队到西方世界调查组织现代社会的方法，如税收制度、邮局、铁路、军队、国家宪法、议会、司法机构等，然后在国内实施最佳模式。

 

日本的军事化速度之快，效果之好，在1894-95年，它的海军打败了中国的海军，十年后又打败了俄国的海军。
后者给西方政府带来了冲击波，因为这是近代以来亚洲国家首次击败欧洲国家。
日本后来成为第一个在生产结构、军事力量和大众生活条件等方面追赶西方的非西方国家。

 

与此同时，一群强大的沙文主义思想家开始鼓吹
由日本领导的泛亚新秩序，以抵御西方帝国。
这个团体为日本在19世纪末和20世纪初将韩国和台湾作为殖民地，以及后来将中国大陆的大部分地区作为殖民地铺平了道路。
1 日本在第二次世界大战中战败后，韩国恢复了它在成为日本殖民地之前的一千年的统一王国--现在有了一个总统而不是国王或皇帝。
台湾又回到了中国政体中一个被忽视的省份，就像它在1895年成为日本殖民地之前一样。

 

战后，日本继续被明治维新时期的发展思维所统治，并在1930年代的战争准备中得到加强。
类似的心态开始在独立的韩国和台湾的国家精英中被制度化，建立在日本殖民主义的发展遗产之上。
这种心态在日本出现是为了应对美国的外部威胁，而在韩国和台湾重新出现是为了应对另一种外部威胁，即来自中国大陆、朝鲜和俄罗斯等近邻的共产主义国家。
更广泛地说，发展型心态的出现是由于以下因素的结合。

 

l   缺乏自然资源，首先是土地和能源，这使得这些国家能够摆脱 "自然资源的诅咒"（高估的汇率阻碍了制成品的出口，政府基于对自然资源飞地的控制，忽视了其他人口），另一方面，人口丰富，有着悠久的大规模扫盲和初级教育的历史，这使得他们成为其收入水平的国家的异类；2

l   战后重建（而不是重新创建）物质和组织基础设施的巨大挑战。

l   必须建立工业，以摆脱低附加值的活动，增加出口，以支付工业化和军事进口；以及

l   感受到来自附近共产主义国家的迫在眉睫的生存威胁，这就需要强大的军事力量、美国的保护和高速的工业化，同时允许大众消费和生活条件的改善，足以限制国内的动荡--敌人的邻国可以利用这一点。

 

战后早期的台湾有600万人口，1949年，由于国民党军队和政府在与红军和中国共产党的长期内战中失利，其领导人、官员、军队和同情者逃到离大陆150公里的台湾，因此涌入了100万至200万的动荡人口。
在蒋介石的领导下，入境者声称仍然是中国的合法统治政权；因此他们只计划在台湾重新集结，以便以后在大陆重新开始内战。
土生土长的台湾人，他们的祖先大多在两个或更多世纪前就来自大陆，并在日本统治下经历了与大陆完全分离的50年，他们把外来者视为外国人，反之亦然。
由于不需要当地精英的支持，国民党在台湾实施了一个纪律严明的一党制国家，从大陆的解体中吸取教训，并在经济和政治上实行有利于自己的歧视。
他们不断援引共产党入侵或颠覆的威胁来为专制统治辩护。
这种威胁是真实的。
例如，1954年和1958年，红军轰炸了国民党控制的靠近大陆的小岛。

 

 

简而言之，此时的台湾是一个 "特殊利益 "的国家，但根深蒂固的（和半外国的）统治集团在外部威胁和美国政府的约束下，提供更广泛的（而不是更狭窄的）公共产品。

 ###@

1 在1894-95年的中日战争中取得胜利后，日本于1895年正式将台湾并入日本帝国，作为实施南扩主义的第一步（正式）。
这种吞并一直持续到1945年日本在第二次世界大战中战败。
日本在19世纪70年代开始对朝鲜进行匍匐式殖民统治，并于1905年将朝鲜列为 "保护国"，1910年成为正式的殖民地。
日本的统治打破了殖民时代前的杨班（土地精英）对国家的控制。
国家的高级职位由日本官僚担任，他们将明治维新（1868-1912）时期的经济发展经验应用于韩国。
他们鼓励以韩国为基地的日本商业团体，类似于国内的财阀，提供国家资助的信贷、廉价电力和其他福利。
在韩国，人们普遍认为日本殖民主义严重损害了经济的增长潜力。
我们应该用这样一个事实来修饰这种看法：
战争结束后留下的工厂很快就恢复了战前的生产水平，这要归功于那些曾在日资企业担任中层管理人员的韩国人头脑中的技术。
另外，战前日本财阀的经验使朴正熙总统和他的政府更容易在与国家的类似关系中培育韩国的同类企业--财阀。
其他有利的长期原因包括种族同质性、将组织目标作为自己个人目标的文化倾向，以及更多。
关于韩国和印度官僚机构的组织激励机制，见Wade（1982a，1982b，1985，1992b）。

2 Irma Adelman和Cynthia Morris汇编了74个发展中国家1961年的数据。
台湾的人均收入排名第44位，"社会政治 "发展排名第12位，"发展潜力 "排名第4位（Wade 1990/2004: 109）。 ###@

 

 

1950年至1953年的朝鲜战争，由中国和苏联支持的共产主义北朝鲜对美国和美国盟友联盟支持的南朝鲜。
死亡和失踪的人数为 韩国人--21万军人和100万平民；北朝鲜人--40.6万军人和60万平民；中国人--60万军人；美国战区死亡人数为3.7万。
战争以停战而告终，但没有和平条约，半岛分为南北两部分。
双方在技术上仍处于 "战争状态"。
从战争结束到今天，北朝鲜政权在南方进行持续的挑衅和恐怖活动。
1979年我在韩国进行实地调查时，该国漫长的海岸线上的每一米海滩都在日落时分被扒开，黎明时分被检查，以寻找朝鲜破坏者的脚印。

 

和台湾一样，南朝鲜的统治者在1961年朴正熙领导的军事政变之后，实施了纪律严明的军事独裁统治，以外部威胁为理由。

 

朴正熙曾在日本军事学院接受教育，并在满洲里的日本军队中服役，当时他研究了明治维新的历史以及国家在日本工业化中的作用。
从1961年到1979年被暗杀，他是韩国发展型国家的首席设计师和推动者。
秉承日本战前军队的精神，他的核心信念是 "只要我们努力，我们就能做任何事情"，仿佛所有问题都可以通过纯粹的意志力来克服。
上台后不久，
他就逮捕了主要的商人，并威胁他们要坐牢（因为 "腐败"），除非他们去美国并带着出口订单回来；
他征用了高级军人的房子（集中在首尔的一个地方），理由是他们的工资不可能买得起这样的房子，并将该地区交给了外交殖民地；
他还关闭了位于首尔市中心的高尔夫球场，该球场是为美国军队和韩国精英人士建造的设施。

 

韩国和台湾迟至1980年代后半期才过渡到民主政权，这时他们已经度过了人口结构的转型期。
甚至日本也几乎是一党制国家；从1955年至今，自由民主党几乎是每届政府的多数党。
这些国家的主流政治哲学强调 "秩序 "和 "民族主义"，
而不是 "自由 "和 "自由企业"，
与新自由主义哲学形成鲜明对比，
尽管西方媒体把他们说成是自由和自由企业以及美国生活方式的热爱者，以便更好地证明对共产主义的援助。

 

 4.2 美国在东北亚和东南亚的作用

 

第二次世界大战前，美国在东北亚的存在很少。
它是作为其更大的统治或霸权战略的一部分而进入的。
在东亚和西欧，它看到了严重而持久的共产主义国家的敌人。
因此，"遏制共产主义 "成为美国在东亚和西欧外交政策的首要任务（Lee 2017）。

 

经过几十年与蒋介石和国民党的密切联系，包括第二次世界大战的联盟，美国在1949年后陷入了与共产主义中国的冷战，然后在朝鲜陷入热战。
美国认为共产主义中国和共产主义朝鲜--以及邻近的共产主义俄国--是对其新兴的 "太平洋势力范围 "的严重威胁。
但是，尽管华盛顿有强大的声音希望美国帮助蒋介石重启大陆的内战，美国国务卿迪安-艾奇逊（Dean Acheson）在呼吁 "战略克制 "和在中国周围建立 "大新月形 "围堵的不太激进的政策方面取得了胜利。

 

美国向它的三个东北亚盟国提供了大量的援助--部队、经济顾问、政治顾问和教师，同时还有大量的资金转移。
美国顾问借鉴了新经销商在战前试图在拉丁美洲扶植有利于发展的政府的经验，帮助建立集中的、最高级别的机构来规划非常稀缺的资本的使用，并帮助建立一个有效的公务员制度、警察、司法和教育系统。
在美国占领日本期间（从1945年到1952年），日本政府在美国的支持下建立了 "一个主要自由国家所设计的最严格的外贸和外汇管制系统"（Hollerman 1979）。
1950年至1953年的朝鲜战争对日本的复兴有很大帮助，因为它使日本成为美国采购的主要来源。

 

当时的首相吉田茂后来宣布，这场战争是 "神的礼物"。

 

美国政府对这三个国家的征用性土地重新分配给予了强有力的支持。

 

土地改革通过遏制地主阶级和加强农民对国家的支持，帮助建立政治秩序和对工业化的支持，使农村人口成为共产主义颠覆的较少的场所。
他们创造了一个小农的农业结构，可以接受国家为提高农业生产力所做的大量努力，作为快速工业化的条件（Dore 1965；Wade 1982a）。

 

美国政府明确表示，援助不会无限期地持续下去。
它提供援助的精神是提高国家资助和管理自己的官僚机构和军队的能力，
这样美国的资源和人员就可以缩减，而不会对冷战的遏制产生危险。
美国大力参与帮助建立发展型国家和抵御军事进攻的时期是：。
日本1948年至1964年；台湾1950年至1965年；以及南朝鲜1945年至1965年。

 

请注意，美国密集参与的结束是在美国和盟国为南越加强军事努力的时候，
因为他们担心 "共产主义 "在朝鲜半失败后可能在印度支那取得胜利。
韩国派出32万军队与南越和美国军队并肩作战，并从约翰逊和尼克松政府那里获得了数百亿美元的赠款、贷款、技术转让和优惠市场的回报。

 

简而言之，由于共产主义国家在美国试图成为其势力范围的地区扩张的威胁（在珍珠港被从西太平洋攻击），
美国向东亚三国转移了大量资源。
它提高了它们的外汇储备（允许它们持续的经常账户赤字），
将它们的投资比率提高到异常高的水平，
并通过加强国家精英对生产结构向制造业转型而非农业和商品的承诺，
以及建立适当的规划和执行组织，帮助约束可投资资金的使用。
另外，它提供的援助和贷款的形式不会削弱国家对工业部门的所有权，
这与拉丁美洲依靠美国公司建立子公司的做法形成鲜明对比。
它还给予东北亚国家进入其巨大的高收入制成品市场的特权。

 

就台湾而言，从1951年到1965年，美国的财政转移平均每年约为6亿美元（2016年美元），是该时期世界上最大的人均美国援助转移。

 

美国的民事和军事援助官员特别注意确保他们转移给国民党政府的资源得到适当的使用，
他们深知国民党在1949年撤退到台湾之前在中国大陆几十年的错误统治中肆意腐败的历史。
美国的资源直接流向了化肥、航运、水泥、铝、造纸、玻璃、制糖、化工、合成纤维和制药行业的公司。

 

美国官员帮助制定了产权、投资、出口加工区等方面的法规。
他们一贯反对国民党政府中的许多高层人士致力于将新企业建立为公共企业而不是私人企业。
他们支持那些希望国家对主要是私营部门的经济进行强有力领导的人。

 

1959年，美国援台团主任提出了一个八点经济改革方案，
其中包括统一汇率，放开外汇管制，以及国有企业私有化。
根据这一建议，政府在1960年初推出了十九点改革方案，
这相当于一个谨慎的、有控制的顺序，即促进出口、开放经济、根据工业战略取代一些进口、将一些国有企业私有化
（与美国人的愿望相反，将指挥中心--上游的投入供应公司留在公有制中），
以及建立或加强几个机构来试点该方案。
美国提供了一大笔贷款，条件是实现该计划的某些目标。

 

James Lee（2017）总结道。
'到1965年官方援助计划结束时，
台湾已经获得了一个发展型国家，
其中国家指导的工具仍然存在，
但发展的基础是私营工业'。
美国赞助了日本和韩国的类似改革。

 

比较美国在其前殖民地菲律宾的战略，美国认为那里没有生存威胁。
3 为了应对部分农村地区由共产党领导的叛乱，政府和美国依靠的是反叛乱战略，而没有尝试土地改革，因为这将破坏现有的地主-政府复合体。
美国没有为菲律宾的本土工业化尝试提供任何接近其东北亚水平的援助，也没有鼓励有效的国家规划。
在援助资源进入现有的地主主导的赞助网络时，美国仍然很放松，因为它在更北的地方也没有放松。

 

美国支持菲律宾政府强调农产品和原材料的集约化，而不是工业品（Lee 2017; Rock 2017）。
为什么呢？
美国认为菲律宾是专注于受到威胁的东北亚的区域经济的外围。
美国的首要任务是使日本、台湾和韩国工业化，以便使它们有能力抵御敌人，为美国提供前线防御。
向这些国家出口的菲律宾商品将为人民和工业提供廉价的投入，帮助他们实现工业化，同时也消除他们从共产主义国家进口商品的诱惑。

 

 ###@

3 在美国于1898年将菲律宾作为殖民地之前，菲律宾在西班牙的统治下已有几个世纪。
美国的统治一直持续到1941年。
美国的殖民管理比日本在朝鲜和台湾的管理密度要小得多，而且是通过土地精英进行统治的。###@ 

 

因此，菲律宾的 "痛苦 "在于没有一个能够威胁到其亲美国家生存的共产主义敌人。
它自己的精英和美国政府都没有推动'生产转型'联盟的建立。
菲律宾至今仍是更广泛的东亚经济中的一个边缘国家。

 

关于地缘政治和时机，应该提出三个更广泛的观点。

首先，

在美国和日本的设想中，日本将通过经济、政治和意识形态的手段与美国联系在一起，并且本身将成为东北亚地区经济的恢复性核心。
台湾和韩国将成为成本较低的半周边国家（尽管没有使用这个术语）。

 

所有这三个国家都将获得进入美国市场的便利，并在公共采购中获得优惠，因为它们对美国的安全非常重要。
在政府对这些经济体活力的承诺的鼓励下，美国和日本公司迈出了第一步，从国内生产商或他们自己在那里的业务（而不是从隔壁的墨西哥）进口廉价劳动力的产品。

 

第二，时机很重要。
大力推动东北亚发展的努力恰逢美国通过关税与贸易总协定（GATT）领导一个大型的多边贸易和投资自由化项目，对发达国家开放其市场的压力比对发展中国家开放其市场的压力更大。
东北亚公司和西方跨国公司的分支机构是利用新的出口机会的 "先行者"，利用西方的需求来弥补低收入和小规模人口带来的相对低的国内需求。
特别是，他们乘着战后第四次大技术革命的石油-汽车-大规模生产产品的大规模消费浪潮，然后从1970年代开始，乘着第五次革命的信息和电信产品的新兴需求浪潮。
在其他发展中国家的生产者进入游戏时，他们已经站稳脚跟，并向价值链上游和成本曲线下游移动。

 

区域经济发展出一种被称为 "雁行 "模式的一体化模式。
当日本的产业变得没有竞争力时，它们就转移到台湾或韩国（或将供应转给当地的生产商）；
当台湾和韩国的成本上升时，这个过程就会重复到东南亚和印度支那的更便宜的地方--在20世纪90年代，还有中国。
但是，雁行模式的一个经常被忽视的特点是，整个产业通常没有转移；高附加值的部分留在国内，低附加值的活动被离岸。

 

相反，东北亚见证了后来被称为 "全球价值链 "的早期发展，更准确地说，应该称为 "区域价值链"。

 

这里有一个例子。
在20世纪70年代，像卡西欧、佳能和夏普这样的日本电子公司开始以 "原始设备制造商 "的身份将低端计算器的组装工作外包给台湾企业。
生产设备和关键部件（如液晶显示器）来自日本，而计算器被打上了日本品牌。
其中一家主要的台湾公司是金宝电子。
1990年，经过与夏普的广泛磋商，金宝决定在泰国开设自己的工厂，并主要向夏普出售计算器（及相关产品）。
泰国的关键部件和生产设备来自日本；采购和行政管理来自台北；泰国的管理层是台湾人；泰国提供较低技能的劳动力和土地。
所有的产品都被出口。
在国际贸易的统计中，生产是以泰国的名义出现的；在泰国的投资在国际投资统计中是以台湾的名义出现的；日本公司获得了大部分的利润；客户认为产品是日本的（Bernard and Ravenhill 1995）。

 

第三个背景是，
美国的高度支持使东亚三国在快速工业化和城市化的阶段，在美国的援助下，持续出现对外支付赤字。
即使他们使用了大量的战略性保护措施来促进进口替代，他们在选定的部门吸纳了大量的进口。
相比之下，大多数发展中国家由于缺乏大规模的外部援助，无法维持快速工业化和城市化所需的对外收支赤字，除非由多边开发银行的贷款提供资金，而这些银行自20世纪80年代以来大多带有新自由主义的条件，与美国对东亚三国的援助条件不同。

 

我现在谈谈东北亚的国家角色和权力安排，将其与新自由主义监管国家的模式进行比较。

 

5 东北亚发展型国家的特点

发展型国家 "是Chalmers Johnson（1982）在研究日本的崛起、MITI和日本的奇迹时提出的。4

 

他用这个短语指的是'计划-理性国家'，与'市场-理性国家'这两大类型的资本主义形成对比。
市场理性国家集中于'横向'政策，以提高整个经济的生产力，包括市场监管、交通基础设施、教育，如美国的典型（他说，错了（Wade 2017b））。
计划理性的国家执行这些相同的横向政策，但也使用更多的'纵向'（部门选择性）政策来引导生产结构实现国家设定的目标（主要是通过影响市场分配，与共产主义国家相反，后者更多的是依靠计划分配而不是市场分配）。
约翰逊将日本作为其发展型国家行动的案例研究，简要地关注该国在 19 世纪中叶被迫开放后的几十年，然后详细地关注战后快速增长的几十年。
这些文献强调了

(1) 主要国家行为者的 "发展心态"--他们用规范和认知模式来构思和实施国家领 导的国家发展项目，这与新自由主义经济学的基本观点相反，即与市场相比，国家本质上 是无效率和掠夺性的。
(2）权力关系的重塑，以确保具有发展思维的国家行为者的主导地位；以及

(3）支持发展思维的机构、战略和政策（Haggard 1990；Wade 1990；Ravenhill 1993；Weiss 1998；Amsden 2001；Haggard 2018；Thurbon 2016；Khan forthcoming, 2018）。

 

###@

4 关于该思想的历史，请参见Haggard（2018）和Woo-Cumings（1999）。
5 Myrdal的 "硬国家 "的想法，与 "软国家 "形成对比，是一个明显的先导。
米达尔对 "软国家 "的定义是，与西欧出现的国家相比，
南亚以及大部分发展中世界普遍存在的社会 "无纪律"。
用他的话说，'不守纪律'是指'立法、......守法和执法方面的缺陷，公职人员普遍不服从命令，而且往往与有权有势的人和团体相勾结......他们的行为应该受到监管'（Myrdal 1970: 208）。###@ 

 

5.1 发展型心态

 

在东北亚的威胁环境中出现的发展型思维方式，包括精英们对以下内容的认同。

l   高而持续的经济增长率，以便 "迅速"（在几十年内）赶上发达国家。

l   高投资率与国内生产总值（GDP）的比率，以实现生产结构向更多生产部门的快速转移。

l   国家协调追赶战略，促进一些部门和功能领先于其他部门，无论是通过公共企业还是通过引导私人行为者进入他们本来不会进入的部门。

l   国家要抑制城市劳动力和农民的消费增长，以便腾出更多资源用于投资。

l   国家大力促进出口，这样，尽管国内消费增长受到限制，但高额投资仍可获利；但同时，国家产业政策必须以可行的进口替代为目标，通过有管理的贸易政策，而不是自由贸易，也不是在促进出口和进口替代之间的 "中性激励"，将外汇集中用于资本货物、中间产品和原材料（而不是消费品）的进口。

l   国家大力投资于教育（人是主要的禀赋，而不是自然资源），特别是工程，包括将学生送到西方国家接受大学教育，并规定他们有义务返回；和

l   国家要促进对西方技术的吸收，包括建立公共研发中心，使从国外购买或模仿的技术或由日本或西方公司的分支机构带来的技术 "本土化"。

 

支撑这种精英共识的是认识到投资资源是非常稀缺的，必须小心翼翼地加以管理。
精英们没有承诺 "自由市场 "或非战略性地融入世界经济会随着时间的推移产生一个追赶性的生产结构，美国顾问也没有推动这一议程，这与他们后来在世界其他地区的同行和世界银行形成鲜明对比。

 

要实现的生产结构的内容受到了经济发展的流行比喻的影响，就像河流的下降或大雁的V形飞行。

 

韩国和台湾的官员们看到他们的经济正在沿着同样的河道下行，或者以同样的V字形飞行，就像日本在大约10到20年前那样。
他们可以从日本过去的生产结构中得到具体的指导，了解他们应该投资什么（当然，要以对当前技术和市场发展的了解为前提，特别是在日本和美国）。
新自由主义模式故意没有这样的指南针。

 

东北亚官员更隐晦地认识到，一些部门的单位GDP比其他部门的单位GDP对长期增长的推动更大。
与其他具有高附加值潜力的部门（制造业）联系更紧密的部门比联系较少的部门（农业、渔业等）对增长的影响更大。

其次，
他们认识到，在大多数部门的早期阶段，很少有国内公司有能力在没有补贴或保护的情况下进行国际竞争，或者即使有，也是作为全球或区域价值链中低附加值部分的从属生产者，面临来自主导公司（主要是西方或日本）的压力，"为了留在原地而加快发展"。
在具有促进长期增长潜力的部门，他们认为问题不在于是否给予国家支持，以帮助获得规模经济并向其他公司和部门提供 "外部性"（有益但未支付外溢效应），而在于如何支持。

 

第三，
官员们认识到，对工业转型至关重要的部门的进口替代需要高水平的原材料、资本设备和技术的进口；因此，出口收入的快速增长。
商业人士了解到，出口业绩是政府对他们作出全面回应的主要标准之一。
如果他们的出口表现良好，当他们在任何情况下面临意外伤害时，政府都会提供帮助。
在这三个国家，政府都创造了一种出口 "文化"，即出口成为更广泛的政府和企业关系中决策的一个 "焦点"。

 

5.2 国家能力和官僚机构-企业机构

 

新自由主义经济学有一个 "善治 "模式，强调与经济政策有关的各个政府部门之间的制衡，因此在中央政府层面，权力应该是横向分散的，没有一个强大的协调中心。
它强调政府机构和企业之间的公平关系，以避免企业俘获政府的一贯危险，因为政府官员有 "机会主义 "行为的倾向。

 

发展型国家模式强调可能需要重塑权力关系，以使其支持发展型思维以及国家试图通过其加速生产转型的机构和干预措施。
在东北亚，土地改革对于消除地主-国家联盟形式的工业发展的潜在障碍至关重要（如在菲律宾）。
另外，在战后的几十年里，所有三个政府都能对企业挥舞大棒。
台湾和韩国在20世纪80年代末之前一直是一党制和军事独裁的混合体。

 

在发展型国家模式中，国家在经济治理方面的高 "能力 "不仅来自其财政和法律能力，也来自其 "嵌入式自治 "的制度安排，用彼得-埃文斯的明显矛盾的说法（埃文斯 1995）。
国家及其官员与资本家有着密切的工作关系，加上约束资本家和资本的能力。
他们有必要的自主权来制定和实施经济未来增长的战略远景，并根据这一远景来约束资本的所有者和管理者
（而不是被他们中的特定群体所俘获，为了他们自己的利益而牺牲更大的项目）。
他们还与这些资本的所有者和管理者保持足够密切的关系，以获得信息反馈和企业对国家项目的认同。
在台湾，当一个行业有超过五家公司时，政府要求他们成立一个行业协会
（因此，台湾羽毛出口商协会）。
企业选举官员，但政府或国民党（KMT）党任命秘书。

 

嵌入自治的 "嵌入 "部分并不包括工会的许多投入，特别是在80年代末之前的韩国和台湾。
劳工压制，工人阶级的政治边缘化，是该模式的一部分，以压低劳工成本，防止消费需求侵蚀投资-利润-再投资的循环，并保持国家-企业未来转型的愿景（Kohli 2004）。
另外，非政府组织也受到了严格的限制。

 

比较韩国和印度的公共基础设施官僚机构，我的研究发现，
韩国的机构给予员工多种激励，包括个人和集体的激励，使他们的行为符合机构的目标，
而印度的对应机构几乎没有--它的激励倾向于业务人员威胁要提供糟糕的服务，以便客户在桌子底下付钱给他们以获得正常服务（Wade 1982b, 1985）。
台湾和韩国的官僚机构当然不是 "干净的"；除了试点机构、中央银行和其他少数机构外，国家的某些部门的腐败已经制度化。
但韩国的腐败更多的是作为一种税收或利润分享机制，而不是作为一种价格。
民用工程合同的竞标者知道必须回扣给官员的惯例，由于不同竞标者的回扣基本相同，他们更倾向于根据 "优点 "进行分配。
相比之下，在印度，投标人会提供不同的回扣金额，而官员会根据谁提供的回扣最多进行分配。

 

5.3 政策层面

 

Chalmers Johnson总结了日本战后几十年到60年代影响工业的一系列手段。

 

控制所有的外汇和技术进口，这使他们（MITI 官员和美国援助官员）有能力选择发展的产业；有能力发放优惠融资、税收减免和保护不受外国竞争的影响，这使他们有能力降低所选产业的成本；有权力命令建立卡特尔和以银行为基础的工业联合体......这使他们有能力监督竞争。
(Johnson 1982: 199)

 

约翰逊认为，官僚的指导或行政指导在 1970 年代的产业结构政策中发挥了核心作用，甚至对日本后来进入技术密集型产业也有重要意义。

 

日本塑造产业结构的方法为台湾和南韩政府提供了模式。
他们采用了广泛的手段，包括定向信贷、财政投资激励（如对目前处于国家技术前沿的产品的生产进行退税）、贸易保护（与关税减免制度相结合，使生产者可以免关税进口用于出口的投入品，而对他们在国内市场上销售的产品支付关税），以及与打算在本国境内进行外国直接投资的跨国公司进行艰苦谈判（如对拟议的乙烯厂或芯片厂提出当地含量要求）（Wade 1990/2004, 1991）。
Richard Luedde-Neurath (1988)记录了韩国政府在向世界吹嘘其市场自由化浪潮的同时，所使用的精心设计的、往往是隐蔽的贸易和投资控制（也见Wade 1993，关于韩国和台湾）。

 

与其他许多不时使用类似手段的政府相比，东北亚的发展型国家通常会在国家援助的同时施加这样或那样的表现条件（Wade 1990/2004；Amsden 2001）。
这些条件可能涉及到在一个固定的时间内缩小进口产品和国内替代品之间的价格和质量差距，或者是推动国内生产的技术前沿（例如，对第一批生产超过一定能力的电力变压器的少数生产商提供税收优惠）。

 

关键的一点是，贸易保护并没有使生产商免受国际竞争压力的影响。
它使生产者免受国际竞争压力的影响，直到生产者成功地（几乎）匹配了竞争性进口产品的价格和质量，或未能这样做（Wade 1990/2004, 1993）。
霍华德-帕克正确地批评了普遍使用的 "笼统的、错误的产业政策，你说，"让我们保护整个行业""，但错误地暗示这是给予贸易保护的唯一方法（帕克2012）。

 

 随着美国的援助在1960年代中期结束，韩国和台湾都制定了技术发展计划。
例如，韩国政府于1967年成立了科学技术局，作为总理办公室的一个部门。
除了在国家中的这一中心位置，它还可以在公务员制度的规定之外自由地雇用高层人员。
另外，政府还建立了一个政府研究机构（GRI）网络，如韩国科学技术研究所和韩国高级科学研究所，都是在20世纪60年代末建立的。
它们与朴正熙总统和军方高层有着密切的联系，并得到了美国的大量援助。
GRI将 "外国知识本地化 "作为核心目标，这意味着首先要将这些知识传授给当地人，这也是韩国人的座右铭 "我们从不重复学习任何东西 "的精神。

 

台湾在经济部内设立了工业局，作为与农业推广服务平行的工业推广服务（到80年代初有大约150名工作人员，大部分是工程师）。
在过去的十年中，工程师们被分成各个部门的小组，走遍了全国各地（他们的工作合同要求他们每月有那么多天不在办公室），走访工厂，提供建议，听取问题，并反馈给政策讨论。
见附文3。

 

政府与韩国差不多同时开始将 "科学和技术 "组织的综合体制度化。
两国密切注视着对方，并派出团队相互学习。
两国都派出大量学生到美国学习科学和工程，并诱导他们返回。
台湾政府成立了一个专门的办公室来组织侨民：联系在美国公司工作的台湾人，这些公司都是台湾高度重视的行业（例如IBM），为他们提供有费用的旅行，让他们回台湾参加会议和建立联系，并促进他们全职回国。
台湾还建立了一个科技咨询小组（STAG），由科技部长和七至十名外国专家以及一个本地秘书处组成。
该小组每年召开两次会议，每次为期数天，审查投资建议，并吸取世界其他地区的技术发展知识。

 

值得重申的是，在阶级关系方面，国家在国家-资本关系中占主导地位，而国家则帮助资本在资本-劳动关系中占主导地位。

 

6 新加坡和香港

 

新加坡
从1830年到1963年一直是英国的殖民地（1942年到1945年是日本的残酷统治时期）。
直到1965年，它才成为一个主权国家。
它的发展故事与东北亚三国相似，除了人之外，它没有重要的自然资源，而且位于世界主要的东西向交通路线之一。
从20世纪50年代开始，它经历了快速的生产转型和融入世界经济，以制造业为主导。
它在世界收入等级中经历了一个超快的上升，从1965年美国平均收入的15%上升到1990年代中期的近70%。
与其他国家一样，它也有一个具有强烈独裁性质的发展型国家。
(从1959年开始定期举行议会选举，但几乎所有的席位都由人民行动党（PAP）赢得）。
国家对劳动力市场进行 "干预"，使工资水平远远低于生产力水平。
它通过政府控制的车辆设计了强制储蓄。
国家拥有土地，并确保越来越多的人居住在公有住房中，以长期租约形式出租：到1970年代中期，一半的人口居住在这种住房中（由建屋发展局拥有），今天，95%的人居住在这种住房中。
它通过一个公共卫生系统覆盖了所有新加坡公民，今天，这个系统将国内生产总值中用于医疗保健的极低比例与特别高的健康指标结合起来。

 

但新加坡的情况也与其他三个国家不同。
新加坡没有大量的农业人口。
它在很大程度上依赖于外国公司建立的大部分独资业务，以及国有企业。
行动中缺少一个本地的资本家阶层，因为人民行动党试图避免国家被本地资本家俘虏的可能性。
另外，从1950年代末到今天，威权体制一直保持着顽强的生命力。
与台湾和韩国在20世纪80年代相比，民众对政治自由化的压力明显不足（Barth 2017）。
国家通过以下方式避免了对民主化的要求：
监督高增长的经济；
对社会保护的要求做出反应；
统治足够宽松，
以至于新加坡人在日常生活中经常能够避开国家的一些限制；
保持高度的任人唯贤和清廉的公务员队伍--使公共部门的高级人员的工资与私营部门的同等人员保持密切一致，
并颠倒正常的法治，即 "在证明有罪之前无罪"，使公务员在被证明无罪之前 "有罪（腐败）"。

 

至于香港，
主流经济学家喜欢引用它的经济成就来肯定任何对东北亚成功的非新古典主义解释都是注定的，因为按照约翰-威廉姆森的说法，
香港实行了 "历史上任何经济体中最自由的发展战略"（威廉姆森 1999），
其他国家的成功原因一定与香港相似。
威廉姆森论点的第二部分是不纯的废话（不纯在于它包含了一丝真理）。

 

从1842年到1997年，香港是英国的殖民地。
当英国军队在第一次鸦片战争中击败中国军队并迫使中国经济开放时，英国将其作为 "战利品"。
与新加坡一样，它发展成为广大腹地的一个服务中心。
经济在转口贸易的支持下蓬勃发展，成为英印两国向中国出口鸦片和中国沿海贸易的基地，以及从大陆向世界其他地区的大量移民。
到1900年，小小的香港处理了巨大中国40%的出口和42%的进口（Haggard 1990: 116）。
20世纪40年代末，当上海的纺织业资本家和他们的现代机械在内战中取得胜利的前景下逃離大陆时，香港 "引进 "了一个在国民党主持下已经形成的轻工业企业家阶层。

 

在1997年之前的整个时期（除了1941年至1945年的残酷的日本统治时期），它主要由英国企业和高级公务员管理。
几乎所有的土地都属于英国皇室，英国皇室拍卖长期租约，并对所得收入保持低税率；由于社会保障体系的规模很小，所以税收也很低。
在其他情况下由国家机构执行的职能，在香港由体制完善的商业和银行企业执行，其人员和组织文化来自英国。

 

但是，香港国家确实进行了干预，为工业提供了一系列的公共产品：
它在20世纪50年代发起了香港工业联合会，并在1967年成立了贸易发展局以促进出口，
在1967年成立了生产力委员会和中心以提供培训和咨询，
并在1966年成立了出口信贷保险公司以应对商业上无法保险的风险。

 

Stephan Haggard总结了与其他国家的相似之处和不同之处：
"尽管香港的经济政策可能构成一个反常现象[接近自由放任]，
其政治结构显示出与东亚模式惊人的相似之处：
一个高度绝缘的国家；
有限的代表性[特别是 "劳工"]；
以及一个集中的和内部凝聚的经济决策结构"（Haggard 1990: 115）。

 

7 结论

 

东北亚无疑受益于资本主义（私人利润驱动的生产），受益于进入世界市场。
在这个程度上，主流是正确的。
但是，有五个条件必须要做。

 

首先，
在最初的几十年里，东北地区的经济与其说是依靠 "世界市场"，不如说是依靠对美国市场的 "帝国偏好"，以及对美国技术、美国资本、美国军事和民用援助以及美国公共采购的依赖，这是因为它们在美国遏制共产主义的地缘政治战略中扮演着重要角色，并向世界表明 "资本主义 "优于 "共产主义"。

 

第二，
美国的威胁意识，它致力于让前线盟友在经济上强大到足以成为对共产主义的可靠防御，以及它对国家经济政策制定和机构建设的密切参与，使国家精英们相对团结，而不是相互对立。
因此，在 "弱国/特殊利益国家/共同利益国家 "的谱系中，这些特殊利益国家正朝着共同利益国家的方向发展--在最初几十年里得到了美国的大力帮助。

 

第三，
在发展思维的指导下，发展型国家的组织方式与新自由主义国家的模式不同。
后者没有强大的协调中心
（因为由私人资本家扮演的市场，而不是国家，是资源协调机构），
各部委之间以及各部委与企业之间都有公平的关系。
发展型国家有一个或几个强大的协调和市场领导中心，立法机构在经济、金融和安全政策问题上的作用有限，并且本着 "嵌入式自治 "的精神，与私人资本家有完善的协商和协调机制。

 

第四，
这些政府大量使用了新自由主义游戏规则中不允许的政策和制度--如有管理的贸易、部门产业政策（"制造而非挑选自愿的赢家"）、有针对性的优惠信贷和资本控制。
这些工具旨在缓冲（而不是隔离）选定部门的生产者，使其免受国际竞争压力和波动的影响--因此，提高利润的保护和补贴是有绩效条件的，而且是强制的。
按照《华盛顿共识》的标准，整个综合体的得分都很低。
例如，台湾的金融体系过去和现在都让来访的西方经济学家感到绝望。
话虽如此，这些 "政府干预 "的效果并没有什么惊人的证据。
因果关系太难解开了。

 

第五，
从早期开始，他们就致力于发展国内的技术能力，如大学的工程学院和公共实验室，积极寻找西方的技术，并将其本土化以部署在国家企业中，后来还进行了世界标准的创新，并吸引了大量的海外研究生回来，而不是像拉丁美洲的许多国家那样，依赖外来的西方跨国公司。

 

如前所述，新加坡确实依赖西方跨国公司--这些公司对谁发号施令没有任何疑问。

 

这些观点有助于理解东北亚国家如何克服两种权力逻辑，这两种逻辑使大多数边缘国家成为边缘国家，并像双螺旋一样交织在一起，产生了我们所知的玻璃天花板或中等收入或中等能力陷阱。
来自西方核心区的离心压力，
以及穷国领导人要坚持某种政治权力结构的动力，
甚至要以国家发展为代价，
以防敌对集团从多元化经济发展创造的新机会中获益，
利用他们的新财富篡夺权力。

 

完整的东亚发展型国家是自我限制的，因为一揽子计划包括：
（1）围绕国家发展项目的精英共识；
（2）工业规划的官僚机构；
（3）一系列工业指导工具；以及
（4）对劳工的压制。
来自于精英们对高投资率的共同信念，
即必须迅速提升生产结构，提高大众生活条件，
抑制国内叛乱，支持强大的军队，
再加上知道许多国内公司不能与发达国家的公司 "公平竞争"。

 

一些分析家说，到今天为止，东北亚的发展型国家已经被侵蚀到 "发展型国家已经死亡 "的地步（Pirie 2017）。
诚然，随着这些经济体实现 "高收入"，它们朝着新自由主义的方向发展，这既是结构上的原因，也是为了支持它们与西方的联盟。
在结构上，他们面临着发达国家共同的问题：他们变得不太能够产生足够的盈利投资机会来吸收国内储蓄（特别是考虑到各种限制消费的政策）。
他们远没有出现严重的资本短缺，而是开始出现资本充裕的情况。
同时，生产力的总体水平变得足够高，大多数公司不需要补贴或保护就能在国内或国外竞争。
国家已经退出了劳动与资本的关系（退出了关于工资和工作条件的谈判），并依靠 "市场纪律"--失业的威胁和破产的威胁--将劳动力置于资本的控制之下。
国家也在很大程度上退出了信贷的分配，从现在 "独立 "的中央银行和大部分的贷款与创造新的生产能力没有关系就可以看出。
因此，在台湾和韩国，资本与劳动的关系和资本的分配已经市场化了；国家大部分都退出了。

 

这些新自由主义的趋势变得更加容易，因为在它们作为发展型国家的历史上，国家抵制了朝向社会民主方向建立社会保护的行动。
今天，公共福利仍然不发达，法律障碍阻碍了工人阶级的集体行动。
公共社会支出占国内生产总值的比例仍然远远低于经合组织的平均水平，独立工会中的劳动力比例也远远低于经合组织的平均水平。

 

政府允许工资在国民收入中的份额不断下降。
自20世纪80年代以来，收入不平等一直在稳步上升。
增长模式依靠不断增加的家庭债务和外国需求--出口来弥补需求缺口，而这两者都是脆弱的来源。

 

这两个国家都已经高度暴露于中国的经济危机，或者说是各种形式的武装斗争。

 

同时，东北亚国家（包括新加坡）的特点仍然是发展型思维，促使国家不断推动生产转型。
发展型国家在东亚并没有像Iain Pirie（2017）所说的那样 "衰落 "或 "消失"，而是 "进化 "了，以应对变化的参数。
用Christopher Dent的话说。
虽然政策工具和手段可能已经改变，但发展型国家仍然主持着各种适应性和变革性的经济项目，这些项目越来越多地涉及与跨国资本的合作"（Dent 2007: 227）。

 

国家的大部分领导权采取了由不同的经济和国家安全目标组合驱动的总体 "社会使命 "的形式。
在过去的几十年里，所有的东北亚（资本主义）案例都经历了令人眼花缭乱的组织重组，以追求国家创新目标。
首先，
我们可以看到一个相当稳定的运动，即从国家主导的努力，将外国创新本土化并部署在国内经济中（减少采用者的风险），到管理在全球技术经济前沿创新的不确定性。
其次，
人们可以看到随着时间的推移，往往与政府的变化相吻合：从相当集中的、自上而下的控制（使用从旧的发展型国家的原则中提取的创新政策的制定、合法化和实施方法），到更分散的、"边缘岛屿 "的创新机构（借鉴美国和英国等国家的做法），再回到更集中的控制，借鉴发展型思维的更新版本（Karo 2018）。

 

总之，
我们不应该谈论东北亚发展型国家的死亡和新自由主义或后发展型国家的崛起，而是谈论发展型国家从1.0到2.0的转变。

 

在东北亚之外，
2008年的北大西洋金融风暴和随之而来的长期衰退在一定程度上削弱了对新自由主义发展共识的信任，
重新唤起了 "受人尊敬的 "圈子对产业政策和发展型国家的兴趣。
证据清楚地表明，经济发展的速度足以缩小与发达国家的差距，这确实很难。
它首先需要一个国家内部的强大联盟接受 "发展思维"，并维持一个机构进程，从私营部门获得有关投资机会和障碍的信息，促使私营企业升级和多样化，在有前途的方向赞助投资举措，否则私营部门不会进行投资，并推动工程和科学方面的教育。
所有这些都不需要完全复制发展型国家。
它可以在国家以下的区域层面和部门层面进行。
只要有高层的政治支持，就可以部分完成，就像台湾的工业发展局和科技顾问团（如前所述）一样。
但第一步是要接受华盛顿共识的政策议程是一个无法追赶的秘诀。

 

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Wade, R. (1992a). '东亚经济的成功。Conflicting Paradigms, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence'. World Politics, 44(2): 270-320 .

 

Wade, R. (1992b). How to make "Street Level" Bureaucracies Work Better: 印度和韩国》。IDS Bulletin, 23(4): 51-54 .

 

 

WIDER Working Paper 2018/101

Escaping the periphery

The East Asian ‘mystery’ solved

Robert H. Wade* September 2018 

 

Abstract:

 

Few non-western countries have reached the general prosperity of Western Europe and North America in the past two centuries. The core–periphery structure of the world economy created in the early decades of the Industrial Revolution has proved robust, even after seven decades of self-conscious ‘development’ following the Second World War. Just about all the countries which were in the periphery in 1960 remain in the periphery today. The clearest exceptions are in capitalist Northeast Asia, namely, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea; to which the island states of Singapore and Hong Kong might be added. How did they escape?

 

Keywords:

centre, periphery, state capacity, US empire Acknowledgements: Deepak Nayyar, Ana Celia Castro, Fanny Alcocer, Jakob Vestergaard 

 

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* London School of Economics, London, UK, email: r.wade@lse.ac.uk .

 

This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on ‘Asian Transformations: An Inquiry into the Development of Nations’ .

 

Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2018 Information and requests: publications@wider.unu.edu ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-543-5 https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2018/543-5 Typescript prepared by Lesley Ellen .

 

The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency—providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research .

 

The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as well as earmarked contributions for specific projects from a variety of donors .

 

Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland

 

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors.

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  The fast growth of developing countries which used a lot of import protection and other forms of dirigisme ‘had a lot of mystery for me [and for all of us] who advocate hands-off markets.’ (William Easterly (2002), emphasis added)

‘[A] nation that opens its economy and keeps government’s role to a minimum invariably experiences more rapid economic growth and rising incomes.’ (Louis Uchitelle (2002), reporting on the consensus among business executives and government leaders at the World Economic Forum meeting in 2002)

‘The most important thing in life is to have a goal, and the determination to achieve it.’ (In English and Chinese, on plaque in entrance to Industrial Development Bureau, Taipei, reported in Weiss and Thurbon (2004))

 

1 Introduction

 

When historians look back on the second half of the twentieth century they will likely see the economic renaissance of East Asia as one of the seminal events. Starting with Japan in the 1950s, it rolled on to Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s; later (but less) to Southeast Asia; and into China in the 1990s. It represents the first major challenge to the global hierarchy of military, economic, and cultural power created by the British Empire and its European counterparts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, then led by the United States, since the Second World War. It has begun to restore the region to the forefront of world development which it earlier occupied for more than a thousand years before being eclipsed in the new western-centric world order (Arrighi 2007) .

 

Our focus is on the world order of Northeast Asia, created by Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and then integrated into the emerging American empire after the Second World War. Myrdal’s (1968) Asian Drama said little about Northeast Asia, focused as it was on South Asia and secondarily on Southeast Asia .

 

Section 2 of this paper sets out evidence on the exceptional economic performance of Northeast Asia. Section 3 summarizes the mainstream or neoliberal understanding of the causes of this exceptional performance. Section 4 outlines a partial alternative explanation, focused on the conditions of location, endowments, and timing which predisposed political leaders in Northeast Asia to create ‘developmental states’ and sustain them over decades. Section 5 elaborates the characteristics of these states, in contrast to the regulatory state favoured in the neoliberal paradigm. Section 6 is about Singapore and Hong Kong. Section 7 concludes .

 

2 Exceptional economic performance in Northeast Asia

 

Today we see that the Northeast Asian countries remain among a small set of non-western economies to have escaped the typical structural constraints on developing countries. But instead of ‘developing countries’ or ‘emerging economies’ we should speak of ‘peripheries’ in the core– periphery structure of the world economy. The core emits impulses; the periphery receives impulses and supplies the core with inputs that sustain the core’s technological, economic, financial, and military dominance—including supplies of skilled people (Fischer 2015) .

 

Furthermore, the Northeast Asian countries remain among a still smaller set of non-western countries which have developed mostly indigenously owned firms across a broad range of major global industries, able to act as first-tier suppliers to (western or Japanese ) multinationals (MNCs) and even compete head-to-head with them. The range includes chemicals, petrochemicals, electronics, steel, shipbuilding, cars, and car parts, and more recently, biotech, advanced semi-conductors, nanotechnology, and space exploration. This achievement reflects their development of an indigenous capacity for technological innovation-on-the-world-frontier. Yet they are located some 9,000 kilometres across the Pacific from the world’s biggest and most innovative market, while nextdoor Mexico has languished .

 

Just how exceptional is the economic performance of Northeast Asia is clear from the answer to the question: how many non-western countries have reached the general level of prosperity of Western Europe and North America in the past two centuries? Fewer than ten. The small number of catch-ups makes the point that the main long-term growth pattern in the world economy has been: ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett 1997) .

 

A World Bank (2013) study confirms this conclusion. It identified 101 countries in 1960 as ‘middleincome’ and found that of those, only 13 reached ‘high-income’ almost five decades later, by 2008 .

 

Table 1 shows, for 1970 and 2010, the average income of several East Asian countries as a percentage of US average income, plus India and Brazil. Taiwan and Korea, together with China, stand out for the magnitude of their catch-up. Most of the rest of the world looks more like Indonesia, India, and Brazil .

 

Table 1: Country average income as % of US real average income, 1970 and 2010  Note: Penn World tables 9.0, based on 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) numbers, rounded to nearest ventile .

 

Source: Author’s update from Cherif and Hasanov (2015) .

 

Taiwan held the world record for the number of years of continuous 6 per cent or more growth until 2010, at 32 years (from 1962 to 1994). Korea came second, at 29 years (1962 to 1991). China broke Taiwan’s record in 2010; by then it had grown continuously at more than 6 per cent for 33 years, if its growth statistics can be trusted (Pritchett and Summers 2014) .

 

Investment rates underpinning these growth performances are shown in Table 2 for blocs of countries plus China. By way of comparison, the UK figure for 1990 was 19 per cent and the US figure was 17 per cent .

 

Table 2: Gross capital formation/GDP, selected entities (%)  Note: LICs = low-income countries, MICs = middle-income countries .

 

Source: World Development Indicators, 12/22/2015 .

 

 We have to keep in mind that most of the non-western countries which ‘made it’ into developed country status have small populations (future China aside) .

 

The rarity of income and production catch-up on the scale of Northeast Asia, and the relatively small ‘demographic mass’ involved, suggests that the world economy contains a segmentation analogous to a ‘glass ceiling’ or ‘middle-income trap’. The idea is at odds with neoclassical development theory, which presumes the world economy is an open-ended system with no overall structure of a core–periphery kind, analogous to a marathon race in which the position of each runner is a function of internal fitness .

 

The next section discusses the causes proposed by analysts writing in the mainstream economics paradigm, often called neoliberalism. Their interpretation—emphasizing market liberalization in Northeast Asia—has been the most influential in the more general debate about economic development, including in the World Bank. I suggest that its influence stems less from the power of confirming evidence than the combination of sheer simplicity (Occam’s Razor) and fits with a pro-western capital ideological story driven by other causes .

 

3 Northeast Asia’s rise in the neoliberal paradigm

 

By the 1980s, when Northeast Asia’s rise began to attract sustained attention from western policy analysts, most economists and the western-controlled multilateral development organizations (including the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and its Development Centre) viewed their subject through the lens of neoliberalism—the newly resurgent economic faith in the West, including in development economics .

 

Neoliberal philosophy says that ‘the market’ is the best institution for both economic growth and liberty. Even where unambiguous ‘market failures’ are identified, they are generally best left untreated, because the societal costs of correcting them through ‘state intervention’ are likely to be higher than the societal gains. The optimum degree of openness to the international economy is close to maximum openness, because global integration raises competitive pressure on all domestic producers and thereby makes national economies more flexible and channels resources to their most efficient uses. The idea that governments should curb competition in the interests of helping some firms and industries reap economies of scale, and curb global integration in the interests of national social cohesion and national employment, has little value in this way of seeing (Wade 1992a, 2017a, 2017b) .

 

The World Bank’s (1993) book, The East Asian Miracle, is a relatively sophisticated case in point. It examined the causes of success in eight ‘high-performing Asian economies’: Japan, the three firstgeneration newly industrialized economies of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and three second-generation Southeast Asian economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, plus Hong Kong .

 

The book argues that the states made important contributions to the fast growth of these countries by ensuring ‘the fundamentals’: low inflation and competitive exchange rates; human capital; effective and secure financial systems; low price distortions; easy access to foreign technology; and low bias against agriculture .

 

In other words, the states implemented effective ‘horizontal’ policies, applied across all sectors .

 

But ‘strategic’ interventions—sector-specific policies to promote specific industries or even specific firms—‘generally did not work’ (World Bank 1993: 354, emphasis added; Wade 1996) .

 

 The take-away message: ‘openness to international trade, based on largely neutral incentives, was the critical factor in East Asia’s rapid growth’ (World Bank 1993: 292) .

 

This argument makes Northeast Asia a powerful confirmation of the neoliberal answer to Adam Smith’s question: how does market capitalism generate human welfare? The answer is market liberalization—and in a global context, global integration, or moving towards ‘the world as one economic country’, having no more restrictions on economic flows or ownership claims across borders than US states have across theirs. It is an argument not just for free trade but also for free capital movement; conversely, it downplays the value of both national sovereignty and democracy .

 

In short, the World Bank concluded that, contrary to William Easterly in epigraph one, East Asia’s rise was no mystery. The main causes are identified in epigraph two, the pro-western capital argument from the World Economic Forum .

 

4 The rise of the developmental state

 

We can give a more interesting answer by asking: what conditions enabled Myrdalian cumulative causation between rising state capacity, rising internal peacefulness, and rising incomes. Put the other way, what conditions enabled Japan, Taiwan, and Korea to avoid the common fate of the periphery—the ‘weak state’, with a well-entrenched ruling group fighting internal enemies, supplying narrowly focused public goods to favour its own supporters, and loosely enforcing the rule of law? What conditions enabled them to begin with the ‘special-interest state’ (a wellentrenched ruling group able to maintain internal stability, tending to favour its own supporters in order to fortify its grip on power but also focusing over time on long-term national goals), and then transition towards the ‘common-interest state’ providing broadly based public goods, thereby helping to raise incomes and reduce discontent (Besley and Persson 2011) .

 

We need to keep in mind the point made by Francis Fukuyama: ‘Holding on to a certain structure of political power is often a life-and-death issue for leaders of poor countries’ (Fukuyama 2004: 49). This holding on to power often results in low state capacity and low commitment to national development goals, even to the point of the rulers creating antagonistic relations between government ministries in case rival groups benefit from the new economic opportunities created by a national development project and use their new wealth to try to replace the incumbents, perhaps by investing in violence .

 

It turns out that the answer to how Northeast Asia sustained the cumulative causation between rising state capacity, rising incomes, and rising internal peacefulness is closely related to the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and the United States, and the resulting structure of the regional economy. The rise of Northeast Asia is far from a story of a small group of marathon runners forging ahead in an open race .

 

4.1 The ‘luck’ of location, endowments, and timing

 

The historian Bruce Cumings reminds us: ‘If there has been an economic miracle in East Asia, it has not occurred just since 1960; it would be profoundly ahistorical to think that it did’ (Cumings 1984: 3). In a longer treatment we would begin with causes of East Asia’s economic pre-eminence up to the seventeenth century. Cutting short this longue duree, I begin in the late nineteenth century and the three ‘orders’ in East Asia at that time (Woo 2016) .

 

 The first was the world of state-capitalist Northeast Asia, created by Japan with its late nineteenth century colonization of Korea and Taiwan, followed in the 1930s and first half of the 1940s by colonization of Manchuria and down the east coast of China. The Japanese colonial government treated Korea and Taiwan as offshore farms, mines, and industries, closely integrated to the core .

 

It replicated similar economic and political institutions and policies as earlier in Japan— nationalistic, insular, militaristic, state-permeated, focused on raising productivity in agriculture, mining, and early manufacturing, and committed to providing mass elementary school education .

 

By 1940 somewhere between 50 and 70 per cent of Korean and Taiwan children were in elementary school. All three countries were more homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion than most other countries .

 

The second world order, created by western colonialists, comprised Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. The colonialists transformed the economy (entrepôt Hong Kong apart) into commodity production for western markets, mainly in the form of plantations, empowering big landlords. But outside the extractive sectors, colonial governance was more passive, more accepting of incumbent landed elites than in Japan’s empire. By 1940 only about 2 per cent of children were in elementary school in the French colony of Vietnam. Also, the host societies were ethnically and religiously much more diverse than in Northeast Asia .

 

The third world was China, which later, in the post-Second World War decades, came to be seen as an enemy of the new US-shaped order in capitalist Northeast Asia .

 

Our interest is the Japanese–centred world of Northeast Asia, starting with Japan’s forced opening in the mid-nineteenth century. For some 250 years before the mid-nineteenth century Japanese rulers isolated the country. In 1853 Commodore Perry of the US navy sailed into Edo (now Tokyo) harbour with a fleet of warships and demanded that Japan open up to American commerce. His visit sent shockwaves through the country’s leaders, who feared that America might take Japan as a colony as it strove for dominance across the Pacific. News had already reached Japan of European states gobbling up chunks of China through what later came to be known as the Unequal Treaties, from 1839 to 1849, by which European states imposed European laws on foreigners in China and set tariffs on goods imported through the treaty ports. Would Japan be next? The Japanese government responded with wholesale reforms to create a centralized state and national identity as the basis for a strong military. The guiding spirit was expressed by a Japanese leader in the wake of Perry’s visit: ‘If we take the initiative, we can dominate; if we do not, we will be dominated’ .

 

The Meiji restoration of 1868 launched a frenzy of industrialization and militarization lasting several decades, guided by the developmental mindset that emerged from the brutal collective choice of ‘sink or swim’. The government undertook a Big Push in state capacity, including fiscal, legal, and public goods. It sent teams of officials around the western world to investigate ways to organize a modern society, such as a tax system, a post office, a railroad, an army, a state constitution, a parliament, a judiciary, and the like, and then implemented the best models at home .

 

Japan militarized so fast and effectively that in 1894–95 its navy defeated China’s and a decade later defeated Russia’s. The latter sent a shockwave through western governments, as the first time in the modern era that an Asian state had defeated a European state. Japan went on to become the first non-western country to catch up with the West in broad measures of production structure, military strength, and mass living conditions .

 

At the same time a powerful group of chauvinist ideologues began to advocate for a new panAsian order led by Japan, to fend off western empires. This group paved the way for Japan to take Korea and Taiwan as colonies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and later, large parts of mainland China.1 Following Japan’s defeat in World War Two, Korea reverted to the unified kingdom it had been for a thousand years before it became a Japanese colony—now with a president rather than a king or emperor. Taiwan reverted to a neglected province of the Chinese polity, as before it became a Japanese colony in 1895 .

 

After the war, Japan continued to be ruled by the developmental mindset institutionalized during the Meiji restoration and fortified in the 1930s in the build up to war. A similar mindset began to be institutionalized in national elites of independent Korea and Taiwan, building on the developmental legacy of Japanese colonialism. Having emerged in Japan in response to the external threat of the United States, it re-emerged in Japan and was created anew in Korea and Taiwan in response to another external threat, from close-by communist states of mainland China, North Korea, and Russia. More broadly, the developmental mindset emerged from the combination of:

 

• lack of natural resources, above all, land and energy, which allowed the countries to escape ‘the natural resource curse’ (overvalued exchange rate hindering manufactured exports, and government based on control of natural resource enclaves, ignoring the rest of the population), and on the other hand, abundance of people, with a long history of mass literacy and elementary education, which made them outliers for countries at their income levels;2

 

• huge post-war challenges to reconstruct (as distinct from create de novo) physical and organizational infrastructure;

 

• imperative of building up industry to escape low value-added activities and grow the exports needed to pay for industrialization and military imports; and

 

• perception of immanent and existential threat from nearby communist countries, which necessitated a strong military, US protection, and high-speed industrialization, while at the same time allowing mass consumption and living conditions to improve by enough to limit domestic unrest—which enemy neighbours could exploit .

 

Early post-war Taiwan, with a population of six million, received a turbulent influx of between one and two million in 1949 as the Nationalist (Kuomintang) army and government lost the longrunning civil war with the Red Army and Chinese Communist Party, and its leaders, officials, military, and sympathizers fled to Taiwan, 150 kilometres from the mainland. The incomers, under Chiang Kai-shek, claimed to still constitute the rightful ruling regime of China; so they planned merely to regroup in Taiwan for later resumption of the civil war on the mainland. The native Taiwanese, most of whose ancestors had come from the mainland two and more centuries before and had experienced fifty years of total separation from the mainland under Japanese rule, saw the incomers as foreign, and vice versa. With little need for support from the local elite, the Nationalists implemented a disciplined one-party state on Taiwan, applying lessons from their disintegration on the mainland, and discriminating economically and politically in favour of themselves. They constantly invoked the threat of communist invasion or subversion to justify authoritarian rule. The threat was real. For example, the Red Army bombarded Nationalist-held small islands close to the mainland in 1954 and 1958.

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1 Following its victory in the Sino–Japan war of 1894–95, Japan formally annexed Taiwan into the Japanese Empire in 1895, as the first (formal) step in implementing the Southern Expansion Doctrine. The annexation lasted till Japan’s Second World War defeat in 1945. Japan began creeping colonial rule in Korea in the 1870s and made Korea a ‘Protectorate’ in 1905 and a full-fledged colony in 1910. Japanese rule broke the pre-colonial Yangban’s (landed elite’s) hold on the state. Senior positions in the state were filled with Japanese bureaucrats, who applied economic development lessons from the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) to Korea. They encouraged Korea-based Japanese business groups, similar to the zaibatsu at home, with state-financed credit, cheap electricity, and other benefits. It is widely believed in Korea that Japanese colonialism heavily damaged the economy’s growth potential. We should qualify this belief with the fact that factories left behind at the end of the war fairly quickly regained pre-war levels of production, thanks to the know-how in the heads of Koreans who had worked as middle managers in Japanese-owned companies. Also, the pre-war experience of Japanese zaibatsu made it easier for President Park Chung Hee and his government to nurture Korean equivalents, the chaebol, in a similar relationship to the state. Other favourable longterm causes include ethnic homogeneity, cultural propensity to take organizational goals as one’s own personal goals up and down the hierarchy, and more. On organizational incentives in Korean and Indian bureaucracy, see Wade (1982a, 1982b, 1985, 1992b) .

 

2 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris compiled 1961 data for 74 developing countries. Taiwan was 44th in per capita income, 12th by ‘socio-political’ development, and 4th by ‘development potential’ (Wade 1990/2004: 109) .

 

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 In short, Taiwan at this time was a ‘special-interest’ state, but the well-entrenched (and semiforeign) ruling group was disciplined to provide broader (rather than narrower) public goods both by the external threat and by the US government .

 

The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 pitted communist North Korea backed by China and the Soviet Union against South Korea backed by the US and a coalition of US allies. The numbers ‘killed and missing’ were: South Koreans—210,000 from the military and one million civilians; North Koreans—406,000 from the military and 600,000 civilians; Chinese—600,000 from the military; and American theatre deaths—37,000. The war ended with an armistice but no peace treaty, the peninsula divided into North and South. The two sides are technically still ‘at war’. From the end of the war till today the North Korean regime has undertaken sustained provocation and terror in the South. At the time of my fieldwork in South Korea in 1979, every metre of beach on the country’s long coastline was raked at sunset and inspected at dawn in the hunt for footprints of North Korean sabateurs .

 

As in Taiwan, South Korea’s rulers—following the military coup led by Park Chung-hee in 1961— implemented a tightly disciplined military dictatorship, using the external threat as its justification .

 

Park had been educated in a Japanese military academy and served in the Japanese army in Manchuria, when he studied the history of the Meiji Restoration and the role of the state in Japan’s industrialization. He was chief architect and driving force of Korea’s developmental state from 1961 till his assassination in 1979. Following the spirit of the Japanese pre-war military, his core belief was ‘we can do anything if we try’, as though all problems could be overcome by sheer willpower. Soon after taking power, he arrested leading businessmen and threatened them with jail (for ‘corruption’) unless they left for the United States and returned with export orders; he expropriated houses of senior military (clustered in one part of Seoul), on grounds that their salaries could not possibly have afforded such houses, and handed the area to the diplomatic colony; and he closed down the golf course in the heart of Seoul built as a facility for American troops and the Korean elite .

 

Korea and Taiwan transitioned to a democratic regime as late as the second half of the 1980s, well after they had passed through the demographic transition. Even Japan was almost a one-party state; the Liberal-Democratic party was the majority party in nearly every government from 1955 to the present. The dominant political philosophies of these countries emphasized ‘order’ and ‘nationalism’ more than ‘liberty’ and ‘free enterprise’, in contrast to neoliberal philosophy, despite western media presenting them as lovers of liberty and free enterprise and the American way of life, the better to justify aid against communists .

 

 4.2 The US role in Northeast and Southeast Asia

 

Before the Second World War the United States had little presence in Northeast Asia. It entered in force as part of its larger dominance or hegemony strategy. In East Asia and in western Europe it saw severe and persisting communist state enemies. So ‘containment of communism’ became the top US foreign policy priority in both East Asia and western Europe (Lee 2017) .

 

After several decades of close ties to Chiang and the Nationalists, including the Second World War alliance, the United States after 1949 plunged into Cold War with communist China and then into hot war in Korea. The US saw communist China and communist North Korea—with communist Russia close by—as a severe threat to its emerging ‘Pacific sphere of influence’. But despite powerful voices in Washington wanting the US to help Chiang re-start the civil war on the mainland, Secretary of State Dean Acheson prevailed in his call for ‘strategic restraint’ and a less aggressive policy of building ‘a great crescent’ of containment around China .

 

The US poured in assistance to its three Northeast Asian allies—troops, economic advisors, political advisors, teachers, accompanied by large financial transfers. Drawing on New Dealers’ experience of trying to foster pro-development governments in Latin America before the war, US advisors helped construct centralized, top-level agencies to plan the use of very scarce capital and helped construct an effective civil service, police, judiciary, and education system. During the American Occupation of Japan (from 1945 to 1952) the Japanese government instituted ‘the most restrictive foreign-trade and foreign exchange control system ever devised by a major free nation’, with American blessing (Hollerman 1979). The country’s renaissance was much helped by the Korean War, 1950 to 1953, because it made Japan the main source of American procurements .

 

The Prime Minister at the time, Shiguru Yoshida, later declared, the war was a ‘gift of the gods’ .

 

The US government gave strong backing for expropriative land redistribution in all three countries .

 

The land reforms helped establish political order and support for industrialization by curbing the landed classes and strengthening peasant support for the state—making the rural population a less fertile site for communist subversion. They created a small farmer agrarian structure receptive to intense state efforts to raise agricultural productivity as a condition for fast industrialization (Dore 1965; Wade 1982a) .

 

The US government made clear that assistance would not be sustained indefinitely. It gave assistance in the spirit of raising the capacity of the state to finance and man its own bureaucracy and military, so that US resources and personnel could be scaled back without danger to Cold War containment. The periods of intense US involvement in helping to create the developmental state and ward off military attack were: Japan 1948 to 1964; Taiwan 1950 to 1965; and South Korea 1945 to 1965 .

 

Note that the ending of intense US involvement came as the US and allies geared up military efforts on behalf of South Vietnam, fearing that ‘communism’ might triumph in Indochina after it had semi-failed in Korea. Korea sent 320,000 troops to fight alongside South Vietnamese and American troops and received in return tens of billions of dollars in grants, loans, tech transfer, and preferential markets from the Johnson and Nixon governments .

 

In short, thanks to the threat of communist state expansion in a region the US sought to make its sphere of influence (having been attacked from the western Pacific at Pearl Harbour), the US transferred huge resources to the East Asian three. It raised their foreign exchange reserves (allowing them to run sustained current account deficits), boosted their investment ratios to unusually high levels, and helped to discipline the use of investable funds by strengthening the commitment of national elites to transform the production structure towards manufacturing and away from agriculture and commodities, and create appropriate planning and implementation organizations. Also, it gave the aid and loans in a form that did not dilute national ownership of the industrial sector, in contrast to Latin America’s reliance on US firms to establish subsidiaries. And it gave Northeast Asian countries privileged access to its giant high-income market for manufactured goods .

 

In the case of Taiwan, the US financial transfers averaged about US$600 million a year from 1951 to 1965 (2016 dollars), the biggest US aid transfers per capita in the world through that period .

 

The US civilian and military aid officials were particularly attentive to ensuring the appropriate use of the resources they transferred to the Nationalist government, well aware of the history of wanton corruption during the Nationalist Party’s decades of mis-rule on the Chinese mainland before retreating to Taiwan in 1949. US resources went directly to firms in the fertiliser, shipping, cement, aluminium, paper, glass, sugar, chemical, synthetic fibre, and pharmaceutical industries .

 

US officials helped draw up regulations for property rights, investment, export-processing zones, and the like. They consistently opposed the many senior people in the Nationalist government committed to establishing new enterprises as public rather than private enterprises. They put their weight behind those wanting strong state leadership of a largely private sector economy .

 

In 1959 the director of the US aid mission to Taiwan proposed an eight-point economic reform programme, which included unification of the exchange rate, liberalization of controls on foreign exchange, and privatization of state-owned enterprises. Based on this proposal, the government launched its Nineteen-Point Program of Reform in early 1960, which amounted to a cautious, controlled sequence of promoting exports, opening the economy, replacing some imports in line with an industrial strategy, privatizing a few state-owned enterprises (leaving the commanding heights—the upstream input supplying firms—in public ownership, contrary to American wishes), plus creating or strengthening several agencies to pilot the programme. The US offered a large loan conditional on fulfilling certain goals of the programme .

 

James Lee (2017) sums up: ‘By the end of the official aid program in 1965, Taiwan had acquired a developmental state, in which the instruments of state guidance remained but the basis of development was private industry’. The US sponsored similar reforms in Japan and South Korea .

 

Compare US strategy in its former colony, the Philippines, where the US saw no existential threat.3 In response to a communist-led insurgency in parts of the countryside, the government and the US relied on a counterinsurgency strategy—and did not try land reform, which would have upset the existing landlord–government complex. The US did not provide anything close to its Northeast Asia level of assistance for the Philippines’ own attempt at indigenous industrialization, or encourage effective state planning. It remained relaxed as aid resources fed into existing landlorddominated patronage networks, as it was not relaxed further north .

 

The US supported the Filipino government’s emphasis on intensification of agricultural goods and raw materials, not industrial goods (Lee 2017; Rock 2017). Why? The US saw the Philippines as a periphery of the regional economy focused on threatened Northeast Asia. The top American priority was to industrialize Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, so as to give them the ability to stand up to their enemies and provide front-line defence of the United States. Filipino commodities exported to these countries would provide cheap inputs for people and industry, and help their industrialization while also removing their temptation to import commodities from communists .

 

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3 The Philippines was under Spanish rule for centuries before the US took it as a colony in 1898. US rule lasted till 1941. The US colonial administration was much less dense than the Japanese administration in Korea and Taiwan, and ruled through landed elites .

 

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So the Philippines ‘suffered’ from not having a communist enemy able to threaten the survival of its pro-American state. Neither its own elite nor the US government pushed for a ‘production transformation’ coalition. The Philippines remains a periphery in the wider East Asian economy to this day .

 

Three broader points about the geopolitics and timing should be made. First, in the US and Japanese vision, Japan was to be tied to the United States by economic, political, and ideological means, and was itself to be the restored core of the Northeast Asian regional economy. Taiwan and South Korea were to be lower-cost semi-peripheries (though this terminology was not used) .

 

All three were to receive easy access to the US market, and favoured for public procurement, on account of their security importance to the United States. Encouraged by their governments’ commitment to the vitality of these economies, US and Japanese firms took their first steps of importing cheap-labour manufactures from domestic producers or from their own operations there (not from next-door Mexico) .

 

Second, timing mattered. The Big Push development efforts in Northeast Asia coincided with the US leading a big multilateral trade and investment liberalization project through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which placed more pressure on developed countries to open their markets than on developing countries to open theirs. Northeast Asian firms, and branches of western multinational corporations, were the ‘first movers’ to take advantage of the new export opportunities, using western demand to compensate for relatively low domestic demand out of low incomes and small populations. In particular, they rode the wave of post-war mass consumption of oil-automobile-mass production products of the fourth great technological revolution, and then, from the 1970s, the wave of emerging demand for the information and telecommunication products of the fifth revolution. With their head start, they were well established and moving up value chains and down cost curves by the time producers in other developing countries came into the game .

 

The regional economy developed a pattern of integration famously known as the ‘flying geese’ model. As industries in Japan became uncompetitive, they moved offshore to Taiwan or Korea (or switched supply to local producers); as costs rose in Taiwan and Korea, the process repeated to cheaper sites in Southeast Asia and Indochina—and over the 1990s, China. But an often overlooked qualification to the flying geese model is that whole industries generally did not move; the high value-added parts remained at home and the lower value-added activities were offshored .

 

Rather, Northeast Asia saw an early development of what would later be called ‘global value chains’ and should more accurately be called ‘regional value chains’ .

 

Here is an example. In the 1970s Japanese electronics firms like Cassio, Canon, and Sharp began to offshore the assembly of low-end calculators to Taiwan firms in the role of ‘original equipment manufacturers’. The production equipment and key components (such as liquid crystal displays) came from Japan, and the calculators were branded as Japanese. One of the main Taiwanese companies was Jinbao Electronics. In 1990, after extensive consultation with Sharp, Jinbao decided to open its own factory in Thailand and sell calculators (and related) mainly to Sharp. The key components and production equipment in Thailand came from Japan; the procurement and administration came from Taipei; the management in Thailand was Taiwanese; and Thailand provided the lower skilled labour force and the land. All the production was exported. The production appeared in international trade statistics as Thai; the investment in Thailand appeared in international investment statistics as Taiwanese; Japanese firms got most of the profit; and the customers thought the product was Japanese (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995) .

 

 The third contextual point is that high levels of US support enabled the East Asian three to run sustained external payments deficits during their stage of fast industrialization and urbanization— financed by US assistance. Even as they used substantial and strategic levels of protection to foster import replacement, they sucked in huge volumes of imports in selected sectors. In contrast, most developing countries, lacking large-scale external assistance, could not sustain the external payments deficits that would have been necessary for fast industrialization and urbanization— unless financed by loans from the multilateral development banks, which have carried mostly neoliberal conditionalities since the 1980s, unlike US conditions in its assistance to the East Asian three .

 

I now turn to the role of the state and the arrangement of power in Northeast Asia, comparing it to the model of the neoliberal regulatory state .

 

5 Characteristics of the Northeast Asian developmental state

‘Developmental state’ was coined by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his study of Japan’s rise, MITI and the Japanese Miracle .

 

4 He used the phrase to refer to a ‘plan-rational state’, in contrast to ‘marketrational state’, two broad types of capitalism. The market-rational state concentrates on ‘horizontal’ policies to improve productivity across the economy, including market regulation, transport infrastructure, education, as typified by the United States (he said, wrongly (Wade 2017b)). The plan-rational state carries out these same horizontal policies but also uses more ‘vertical’ (sectorally selective) policies to steer the production structure towards state-set goals (mostly by influencing market allocations, in contrast to communist states which relied on plan-allocation more than market-allocation). Johnson took Japan as his case study of the developmental state in action, focusing briefly on the decades after the country’s forced opening in the mid-nineteenth century and then at length on the post-war fast-growth decades.5 Since Johnson’s book on Japan, a sizable literature has applied the idea of the developmental state to other cases, as a way to understand relative long-run economic performance. This literature emphasizes: (1) the ‘developmental mindset’ of the key state actors—the normative and cognitive models with which they conceive and implement the idea of a state-led national development project, in contrast to the basic idea of neoliberal economics that states are inherently inefficient and predatory as compared to markets; (2) the remaking of power relations so as to secure the dominance of state actors with a developmental mindset; and (3) institutions, strategies, and policies supporting the developmental mindset (Haggard 1990; Wade 1990; Ravenhill 1993; Weiss 1998; Amsden 2001; Haggard 2018; Thurbon 2016; Khan forthcoming, 2018) .

 

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4 For a succinct account of the history of the idea see Haggard (2018) and Woo-Cumings (1999) .

 

5 Myrdal’s idea of the ‘hard state’, in contrast to ‘soft state’, is an obvious precursor. Myrdal defined ‘soft state’ to mean the societal ‘indiscipline’ prevalent in South Asia and by extension much of the developing world, as compared to the states which had emerged in western Europe. ‘Indiscipline’ referred to, in his words, ‘deficiencies in legislation, … law observance and enforcement, widespread disobedience by public officials and, often, their collusion with powerful persons and groups … whose conduct they should regulate’ (Myrdal 1970: 208) .

 

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5.1 The developmental mindset

 

The developmental mindset, as it emerged in the threatening environment of Northeast Asia, included elite agreement on the following:

• High and sustained economic growth rates, so as to catch up with developed countries ‘quickly’ (within a few decades);

• High rates of investment to gross domestic product (GDP) so as to achieve rapid movement of the production structure into more productive sectors;

• The state to coordinate the catch-up strategy and promote some sectors and functions ahead of others, whether through public enterprises or through steering private actors into sectors they would otherwise not enter;

• The state to curb the growth of consumption by the urban labour force and farmers, so as to free up more resources for investment;

• The state to promote exports intensively, so that the high investment could be profitable despite restrained growth of consumption at home; but at the same time, state industrial policy must target feasible replacement of imports and concentrate foreign exchange on imports of capital goods, intermediate goods, and raw materials (not consumer goods) by means of a managed trade policy, not free trade and not ‘neutral incentives’ between export promotion and import substitution;

 • The state to invest heavily in education (people being the primary endowment, not natural resources), especially engineering, including sending students to the West for university education and putting them under obligation to return; and

• The state to boost the take-up of western technology, including by establishing public R&D centres able to ‘domesticate’ technologies purchased or imitated from abroad or brought in by branches of Japanese or western companies .

 

Underpinning this elite consensus was recognition that investment resources were very scarce and had to be carefully husbanded. The elite had no commitment to the idea that ‘free markets’ or unstrategic integration into the world economy would produce a catch-up production structure over time, nor did American advisors push this agenda, in contrast to their later counterparts in other parts of the world and the World Bank .

 

The content of the production structure to be aimed at was influenced by popular metaphors of economic development, like descending a river or flying in a V-shaped formation of geese .

 

Officials in South Korea and Taiwan saw their economies descending the same stretch of river, or flying in the same V-formation, as Japan some ten to twenty years before. They could look to Japan’s past production structure for a tangible guide to what they should be investing in (qualified, of course, by knowledge of current developments in technology and markets, especially in Japan and the USA). The neoliberal model deliberately has no such compass .

 

Northeast Asian officials recognized, more implicitly than explicitly, that a unit of GDP from some sectors gives a larger boost to longer-run growth than a unit from other sectors. Sectors which are more closely linked to others with higher value-added potential (in manufacturing) have a higher impact on growth than less connected ones (in agriculture, fisheries, and the like). They recognized, second, that in the early stages in most sectors, few domestic firms have the ability to compete internationally without subsidies or protection, or if they do, it is as subordinate producers in low value-added portions of global or regional value chains, exposed to pressure from the lead firms (mostly western or Japanese) ‘to run faster to stay in the same place’. In sectors with high potential to boost longer-run growth, they saw that the question was not whether to give state support in order to help reap economies of scale and provide ‘externalities’ to other firms and sectors (beneficial but unpaid for spillovers), but how .

 

Officials recognized, third, that import replacement in sectors vital to industrial transformation required high levels of imports of raw materials, capital equipment, and technology; and therefore fast growth of export earnings. Business people learnt that export performance was one of the main criteria by which government responded to them across the board. If their export performance was good, government would help when they faced unexpected injury in whatever context. In all three countries, the government created an export ‘culture’, in the sense that exporting became a ‘focal point’ for decisions in wider government–business relations .

 

5.2 State capacity and bureaucracy–business institutions

 

Neoliberal economics has a ‘good governance’ model which emphasizes checks and balances between the various government ministries concerned with economic policy, so at central government level, authority should be horizontally decentralized, without a strong coordinating centre. And it emphasizes arms-length relations between government agencies and business, to avoid the ever-present danger of business capturing government, given the propensity for government officials to behave ‘opportunistically’ .

 

The developmental state model emphasizes the likely need to remake power relations so as to make them support the developmental mindset and the institutions and interventions through which the state tries to accelerate production transformation. In Northeast Asia the land reforms were crucial in removing a potential blockage to industrial development in the form of a landlord– state alliance (as in the Philippines). Also, all three governments in the post-war decades were able to wield a big stick over business. Taiwan and Korea were a mix of one-party states and military dictatorships until the late 1980s .

 

In the developmental state model the state gains high ‘capacity’ in economic governance not only from its fiscal and legal capacity but also from its institutional arrangements of ‘embedded autonomy’, to use Peter Evans’ apparently oxymoronic phrase (Evans 1995). The state and its officials have a close working relationship with capitalists, plus the capacity to discipline capitalists and capital. They have the autonomy needed to formulate and implement a strategic vision for the economy’s future growth and to discipline the owners and managers of capital in line with that vision (not be captured by specific groups of them to work in their own interest at cost to the larger project). They also maintain close enough relationships with these owners and managers of capital to get information feedback and corporate buy-in to the national project. In Taiwan, when there were more than five firms in an industry the government required them to form an industry association (hence, a Taiwan Feather Exporters’ Association). The firms elected the officials—but the government or Kuomintang (KMT) party appointed the secretary .

 

The ‘embedded’ part of embedded autonomy did not include much input from labour unions, especially in South Korea and Taiwan before the late 1980s. Labour repression, political marginalization of the working class, was part of the model, to keep down labour costs, prevent consumption demand from eating into the cycle of investment-profits-reinvestment, and keep the state-business vision of future transformation on track (Kohli 2004). Also, non-governmental organizations were tightly constrained .

 

Comparing public infrastructure bureaucracies in Korea and India, my research found that the Korean agency gave multiple incentives, individual and collective, for staff to act in line with the agency’s objectives, while the Indian counterpart had virtually none—its incentives inclined the operational staff to threaten poor service so that clients would pay them under the table to receive normal service (Wade 1982b, 1985). The bureaucracies of Taiwan and Korea were certainly not ‘squeaky clean’; corruption was well institutionalized in certain parts of the state, with the exception of the pilot agencies, the central bank, and a few others. But Korean corruption functioned more as a tax or profit-sharing mechanism than as a price. Bidders on civil works contracts knew the conventions about how much had to be kicked-back to officials, who, since the kick-back was much the same between different bids, were more inclined to allocate according to ‘merit’. In India, by contrast, bidders would offer different amounts of kick-back, and officials allocated more in line with who offered the most .

 

5.3 The policy level

 

Chalmers Johnson summarized the array of instruments for influencing industry in Japan’s postwar decades through the 1960s:

 

control over all foreign exchange and imports of technology, which gave them [MITI officials, and US aid officials] the power to choose industries for development; the ability to dispense preferential financing, tax breaks, and protection from foreign competition, which gave them the power to lower the costs of the chosen industries; and the authority to order the creation of cartels and bank-based industrial conglomerates … which gave them the power to supervise competition. (Johnson 1982: 199)

 

Johnson argues that bureaucratic dirigisme or administrative guidance played a central role in industrial structure policies into the 1970s and was even significant in Japan’s move into moretechnology-intensive industries later on .

 

Japan’s methods for shaping the industrial structure provided models for the governments of Taiwan and South Korea. They deployed a wide range of instruments, including directed credit, fiscal investment incentives (such as tax rebates on production of products currently on the country’s technology frontier), trade protection (combined with a tariff-rebate system so that producers could get tariff-free import of inputs which went into their exports while they paid the tariffs on what they sold on the domestic market), and hard bargaining with multinationals intending to make foreign direct investments within the national territory (such as local content requirements on a proposed ethylene plant or chip plant) (Wade 1990/2004, 1991). Richard Luedde-Neurath (1988) documents the elaborate and often covert trade and investment controls used by the Korean government at the same time as it boasted to the world of its waves of market liberalization (see also Wade 1993, for Korea and Taiwan) .

 

In contrast to many other governments which used broadly similar instruments from time to time, the developmental states in Northeast Asia normally imposed performance conditions of one kind or another to accompany state assistance (Wade 1990/2004; Amsden 2001). The conditions might relate to closing the price and quality gap between imports and domestic substitutes within a fixed time, or to pushing out the technological frontiers of domestic production (for example, tax incentives for the first few producers to make electrical transformers above a certain capacity) .

 

The key point is that trade protection did not insulate producers from international competitive pressure. It buffered producers from international competitive pressure until such time as the producers succeeded in (almost) matching the price and quality of competing imports, or failed to do so (Wade 1990/2004, 1993). Howard Pack is right to criticize the common use of a ‘a generalized, blunderbuss industrial policy where you say, “Let’s protect an entire industry’’’, but wrong to imply that it is the only way to give trade protection (Pack 2012) .

 

 Korea and Taiwan both instituted technology development programmes as US aid came to an end in the mid-1960s. For example, the Korean government established the Science and Technology Agency as a department of the Prime Minister’s Office in 1967. As well as this central location in the state, it had freedom to hire top-level staff outside of civil service rules. Separately, the government established a network of government research institutes (GRIs), such as the Korea Institute for Science and Technology and Korean Advanced Institute of Science, both in the late 1960s. They had strong links direct to President Park and the top levels of the military; and received ample assistance from the US. The GRIs took ‘localizing foreign knowledge’ as a core objective, meaning above all, getting this knowledge into the heads of locals, in the spirit of the Korean motto, ‘We never learn anything twice’ .

 

Taiwan created the Industrial Development Bureau within the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to operate as an industrial extension service parallel to the agricultural extension service (with a staff of about 150 by the early 1980s, mostly engineers). For decade after decade its engineers, divided into sectoral teams, travelled the length and breadth of the country (their job contracts required them to be out of the office so many days per month), visiting factories, giving advice, listening to problems, and feeding back into policy discussions. See epigraph 3 .

 

The government began to institutionalize a ‘Science and Technology’ complex of organizations at about the same time as Korea. The two countries watched each other closely and sent teams to learn from each other. Both countries sent large numbers of students to study science and engineering in the United States, with inducements to return. The Taiwan government established a special office dedicated to organizing the diaspora: contacting Taiwanese working in US firms in sectors of high priority in Taiwan (for example, IBM), offering them expense-paid trips back to Taiwan for conferences and networking, and facilitating full-time repatriation to Taiwan. Taiwan also established a Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG), comprised of the Minister of Science and Technology plus between seven and ten0 foreign experts, and a local secretariat. The group met for several days at a time, twice a year, to review investment proposals and to draw in knowledge about technology developments in the rest of the world .

 

It bears repeating that in class terms, the state dominated in state–capital relations, and the state helped capital to dominate in capital–labour relations .

 

6 Singapore and Hong Kong

 

Singapore was a British colony from 1830 till 1963 (with a brutal Japanese interregnum from 1942 to 1945). It became a sovereign state as recently as 1965. Its development story is similar to that of the Northeast Asian three in that it had no significant natural resources beyond people, and location on one of the world’s main east–west communication routes. Starting in the 1950s, it underwent a fast production transformation and integration into the world economy, led by manufacturing. And it experienced a super-fast rise in the world income hierarchy, from about 15 per cent of US average income in 1965 to nearly 70 per cent by the mid-1990s. Like the others, it had a developmental state of strongly authoritarian character. (Regular parliamentary elections were held from 1959, but virtually all seats were won by the People’s Action Party (PAP).) The state ‘intervened’ in labour markets to keep wage levels well below productivity levels. It engineered forced savings through government-controlled vehicles. It owned the land and ensured that a high and rising portion of the population lived in publicly owned housing, rented out on long leases: by the mid-1970s, half of the population lived in this accommodation (owned by the Housing and Development Board (HDB)), today, 95 per cent. It covered all Singapore citizens by a public health system, which today combines a very low percentage of GDP spent on health care and exceptionally high health indicators .

 

But the story also differs from that of the other three. Singapore had no significant agriculture population. It relied heavily on foreign firms establishing mostly wholly owned operations— together with state-owned enterprises. Missing in action was a local capitalist class, for the PAP sought to avoid the possibility of state capture by local capitalists. Also, the authoritarian regime has remained resilient throughout, from the late 1950s till today. Pressure from the population for political liberalization has been conspicuously lacking, in contrast to Taiwan and South Korea through the 1980s (Barth 2017). The state has avoided demands for democratization by: overseeing a high growth economy; being responsive to demands for social protection; ruling loosely enough that Singaporeans are often able to sidestep some state constraints in everyday life; and maintaining a highly meritocratic and squeaky clean civil service—keeping public sector senior salaries closely in line with private sector equivalents, and inverting the normal rule of law, ‘innocent till proven guilty’, to make civil servants subject to ‘guilty [of corruption] till proven innocent’ .

 

As for Hong Kong, mainstream economists like to cite its economic success to affirm that any non-neoclassical explanation of Northeast Asia’s success is doomed, because, according to John Williamson, Hong Kong practised ‘the most laissez-fare development strategy of any economy in history’ (Williamson 1999), and the causes of the others’ success must be similar to those of Hong Kong. The second part of Williamson’s argument is impure nonsense (impure in that it contains a grain of truth) .

 

Hong Kong was a British colony from 1842 until 1997. Britain took it as ‘spoils of war’ when the British military defeated the Chinese military and forced the economic opening of China in the First Opium War. Like Singapore, it developed as a service centre for a vast hinterland. The economy flourished on the back of entrepôt trade, as a base for British–India exports of opium into China and for coastal China trade, and for the vast emigration from the mainland to the rest of the world. By 1900 tiny Hong Kong handled 40 per cent of giant China’s exports and 42 per cent of its imports (Haggard 1990: 116). In the late 1940s it ‘imported’ an entrepreneurial lightindustrial class already formed on the mainland under Nationalist (KMT) auspices when Shanghai textile capitalists and their modern machinery fled there with the prospect of communist victory in the civil war .

 

For the entire period to 1997 (the brutal Japanese interregnum from 1941 to 1945 aside), it was governed largely by British businesses and senior civil servants. Virtually all the land belonged to the British Crown, which auctioned long-term leases—and kept taxes low on the proceeds; taxes were also low because the social security system was minimal. Functions which in the other cases were carried out by state agencies were performed in Hong Kong by well-institutionalized commercial and banking enterprises drawing personnel and organizational culture from Britain .

 

But the Hong Kong state did intervene to provide a range of public goods for industry: it initiated the Federation of Hong Kong Industries in the 1950s, and established a Trade Development Council in 1967 to promote exports, a Productivity Council and Centre in 1967 to provide training and consultancy, and an Export Credit Insurance Company in 1966 for risks not commercially insurable .

 

Stephan Haggard summarizes similarities and differences with the others: ‘although Hong Kong’s economic policy may constitute an anomaly [close to laissez faire], its political structure shows surprising parallels to the East Asian pattern: a highly insulated state; limited representation [especially of “labour”]; and a concentrated and internally cohesive economic decision-making structure’ (Haggard 1990: 115) .

 

 7 Conclusion

 

Northeast Asia undoubtedly benefited from capitalism (private profit-driven production), and from access to the world market. To this extent the mainstream is correct. But five qualifications have to be made .

 

First, for the first several decades the Northeast economies relied not so much on ‘the world market’ as on ‘empire preference’ to the US market—and to US technologies, US capital, US military and civilian aid, and US public procurement—thanks to their role in the US’s geopolitical strategy to contain communism and show the world that ‘capitalism’ was superior to ‘communism’ .

 

Second, the US’s threat perception, its commitment to getting front-line allies economically strong enough to be a credible defence against communism, and its intense involvement in national economic policy-making and institution building, kept the national elites relatively unified and not at each other’s throats. So on the spectrum of ‘weak state/special interest state/common interest state’ these were special interest states moving towards—with a lot of American help in the first decades— common interest states .

 

Third, steered by a developmental mindset, the developmental state was organized differently than the model neoliberal state. The latter has no strong centre of coordination (because markets played by private capitalists, not states, are the resource coordinating institution), and has arms-length relations between the various ministries and between ministries and business. The developmental state has one or a few powerful centres of coordination and market leadership, a limited role for the legislature in matters of economic, financial, and security policy, and well-developed mechanisms of consultation and coordination with private capitalists, in the spirit of ‘embedded autonomy’ .

 

Fourth, these governments made intensive use of policies and institutions frowned upon in the neoliberal playbook—such as managed trade, sectoral industrial policy (‘making, not picking, willing winners’), targeted concessional credit, and capital controls. These instruments were intended to buffer (not insulate) producers in selected sectors from international competitive pressure and volatility—so profit-raising protection and subsidies came with performance conditions, which were enforced. The whole complex would have scored poorly by Washington Consensus criteria. For example, Taiwan’s financial system was and remains the despair of visiting western economists. That being said, there is no knock-out evidence on the effects of these ‘government interventions’. The causality is too difficult to disentangle rigorously .

 

Fifth, from early on they undertook to develop domestic technological capacity, such as engineering faculties at universities and public laboratories, to aggressively seek out western technologies and domesticate them for deploying in national firms, and much later to undertake world-standard innovation and attract back a high proportion of overseas graduate students—this, rather than rely, as in much of Latin America, on incoming western multinational companies .

 

Singapore, as noted, did rely on western multinationals—which were left in no doubt as to who called the shots .

 

These points help to understand how Northeast Asian countries overcame two logics of power which keep most of the periphery as a periphery, and which intertwine like a double-helix to produce the result we know as the glass ceiling or the middle-income or middle-capability trap: the centrifugal pressures emanating from the western core, and the drive to hold on to a certain structure of political power on the part of leaders of poor countries, even at cost to national development, in case rival groups benefit from new opportunities created by diversified economic development and use their new wealth to usurp power .

 

The full-fledged East Asian developmental states were self-limiting, in the sense that the package of (1) elite consensus around the national development project, (2) bureaucracy of industrial planning, (3) array of industrial steerage instruments, and (4) repression of labour, came out of shared elite conviction of the imperative of high rates of investment to upgrade the production structure quickly, raise mass living conditions, inhibit domestic revolt, and support a strong military, coupled with knowledge that many domestic firms could not compete ‘on a level playing field’ with firms in developed countries .

 

Some analysts say that, as of today, the Northeast Asian developmental state has eroded to the point that ‘the developmental state is dead’ (Pirie 2017). It is true that as the economies achieved ‘high income’ they moved in a neoliberal direction, both for structural reasons and also to bolster their alliances with the West. Structurally, they faced the problem common to developed countries: they became less able to generate enough profitable investment opportunities to absorb domestic savings (especially given the various policies in place to restrain consumption). Far from a severe shortage of capital, they began to experience an abundance. At the same time, the general level of productivity became high enough for most firms not to need subsidies or protection in order to compete domestically or abroad. The state has withdrawn from the labour–capital relation (withdrawn from negotiations about wages and working conditions), and relied on the ‘discipline of the market’—the threat of unemployment and the threat of bankruptcy—to keep labour under capital’s control. The state has also substantially withdrawn from the allocation of credit, as seen in the now ‘independent’ central banks and in the large majority of lending having no link to the creation of new productive capacity. So, in both Taiwan and Korea the capital–labour relation and the allocation of capital have been marketized; the state is mostly out .

 

These neoliberal trends have been all the easier because during their history as developmental states the state resisted moves in a social democratic direction to build up social protections. Today, public welfare is still underdeveloped and legal obstacles block collective action among the working class. Public social spending as a share of GDP remains far below the OECD average, and the share of the labour force in independent trade unions also falls far short of the OECD average .

 

The governments have allowed the share of wages in national income to keep falling. Income inequality has steadily risen since the 1980s. The growth model relies on rising household debt plus foreign demand—exports—to close the demand gap, and both are sources of vulnerability .

 

Both countries have become highly exposed to an economic crisis in China, or forms of armtwisting .

 

At the same time, the Northeast Asian states (including Singapore) are still characterized by a developmental mindset driving the state to keep pushing for production transformation. The developmental state has not so much ‘declined’ or ‘disappeared’ in East Asia in favour of the neoliberal state, as Iain Pirie (2017) claims; it has ‘evolved’ in response to changing parameters. In Christopher Dent’s words: ‘while the policy tools and means may have changed, developmental states still preside over various adaptive-cum-transformative economic projects that increasingly involve a partnering with transnationalized capital’ (Dent 2007: 227) .

 

Much of the state’s leadership takes the form of overarching ‘societal missions’ driven by a varying mix of economic and national security objectives. Over the past several decades, all the Northeast Asian (capitalist) cases have experienced a dizzying number of organizational restructurings in the pursuit of national innovation objectives. Standing back, one can see, first, a fairly steady movement from state-led efforts to domesticate foreign innovations and deploy them in the domestic economy (mitigating risks for adopters), to managing uncertainties of innovating on the global techno-economic frontier. Second, one can see a zig-zagging path over time, often coinciding with changes of government: from fairly centralized, top-down control (using methods of formulating, legitimating, and implementing innovation policies drawn from the principles of the old developmental state), to more decentralized, ‘peripheral islands’ of innovation agencies (drawing on the approach of states like the US and UK), and back to more central control, drawing on an updated version of the developmental mindset (Karo 2018) .

 

In short, we should talk not of the death of the developmental state in Northeast Asia and rise of the neoliberal or the post-developmental state, but of the transformation of the developmental state from 1.0 to 2.0 .

 

Beyond Northeast Asia, the North Atlantic financial crash of 2008 and ensuing long recession has somewhat weakened credence in the neoliberal development consensus, reawakening interest in ‘respectable’ circles in industrial policy and the developmental state. The evidence is clear that economic development fast enough to reduce gaps with developed countries is really difficult. It requires, above all, that a powerful coalition within a country embraces a ‘developmental mindset’ and sustains an institutional process for eliciting information from the private sector about investment opportunities and obstacles, for nudging private firms to upgrade and diversify, for sponsoring investment initiatives in promising directions that the private sector would not otherwise undertake, and for pushing education in engineering and science. All this does not require replication of the developmental state in toto. It can be done at the sub-national regional level and at sector level. It can be done partially, as with equivalents to Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau and its Science and Technology Advisory Group (described earlier), provided they have top-level political support. But the first step is to accept that the Washington Consensus policy agenda is a recipe for not catching up .

 

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