苏加诺变得更加公开地反美，而且比以往任何时候都更有魄力。

 琼斯相信，只要这不意味着国家的羞辱，苏加诺就会在马来西亚问题上退让，他告诉肯尼迪，总统访问印度尼西亚可能正是需要的。

肯尼迪同意并计划前往访问。19

但在肯尼迪去世几个月后，琼斯要求刚刚宣誓就职的约翰逊签署一份官方决定，继续援助印尼符合美国的国家利益。

约翰逊拒绝了。

”我知道，肯尼迪总统几乎会作为例行公事签署这项决定。

这是令人失望的，"琼斯回忆道。

12月，罗伯特-麦克纳马拉，肯尼迪留下的顾问之一，开始建议积极削减援助。

大使写道："因此，美国政策的重点开始转向更强硬的路线。”20 

这也是微笑的琼斯团结两国的方法的结束，这是他近十年来制定的战略。

Jones believed Sukarno would back off on Malaysia as long as that didn’t mean national humiliation, and he had told Kennedy a presidential visit to Indonesia was probably just what was needed.

 Kennedy agreed, and planned to come.19 But a few months after JFK’s death, Jones asked the newly sworn-in Johnson to sign an official determination that continued aid to Indonesia was in the US national interest.

 Johnson declined.

 “President Kennedy, I knew, would have signed the determination almost as a matter of routine.

 It was disappointing,” Jones remembers.

 In December, Robert McNamara, one of the advisers left behind by Kennedy, began suggesting aggressive curtailment of aid.

 “Thus began a shift of emphasis in American policy to a harder line,” the ambassador wrote.20 This was also the end of the Smiling Jones approach to uniting the two countries, the strategy he had developed for nearly a decade.

约翰逊确实与英国人达成了一项交易。

作为对他们在越南的支持的交换，华盛顿将在建立马来西亚的问题上支持他们。

Johnson did make a deal, with the British.

 In exchange for their support in Vietnam, where things were also beginning to escalate, Washington would back them on the creation of Malaysia.21

苏加诺注意到这个世界上最强大的国家对待他的方式发生了变化。

他甚至猜测，肯尼迪被杀是为了阻止他访问印尼并巩固华盛顿和雅加达之间的联盟关系。

Sukarno noticed a shift in the way the world’s most powerful country was treating him.

 He went so far as to speculate that JFK was killed in order to stop him from visiting Indonesia and cementing an alliance between Washington and Jakarta.22

华盛顿就印尼是否应该得到更多的援助展开了激烈的辩论。

而苏加诺也在观察。

针对这一讨论，这位印尼总统于1964年3月发表了一篇演讲，当时巴西的将军们正在对美国支持的阴谋进行最后的润色。

尽管他对不附带政治条件的援助表示感谢，但有一句用英语说的话，可以预见地成为头条新闻--并迅速传回了华盛顿。

他说，当有人提供带有政治要求的援助时，他给他们的信息是。

”带着你的援助去死吧！"

The debate raged in Washington as to whether or not Indonesia deserved more assistance.

 And Sukarno was watching.

 In response to that discussion, the Indonesian president gave a speech in March 1964, just as Brazil’s generals were putting the finishing touches on US-backed plots.

 Though he expressed gratitude for aid that was offered without political strings attached, one line, delivered in English, predictably made headlines—and traveled quickly back to Washington.

 When anyone offers aid that comes with political demands, he said that his message to them was: “Go to hell with your aid!”

正如琼斯所说，"他现在真的做到了。”23As Jones put it, “He had really done it now.”23

华盛顿方面对苏加诺的善意开始消散。

在接下来的几个月里，所有对国家政府的直接援助都完全枯竭了。

重要的是，有一个项目仍在继续。

美国继续将资金直接注入武装部队，军事顾问继续与印尼军队高层密切合作。

Whatever goodwill there was for Sukarno in Washington began to dissipate.

 Over the next few months all direct aid to the national government dried up completely.

 Crucially, one program continued.

 The US continued to pour money directly into the Armed Forces, and military advisers continued to work closely with Indonesian Army high command.

苏加诺变得更加公开地反美，而且比以往任何时候都更有魄力。