"九卅运动 "誰领导？

 "九卅运动 "的领导人都来自陆军。

空军、海军和警察指挥部都没有参与。

然而，当空军的领导人得知这一运动及其成功时，他们欢呼雀跃。

他们认为，

忠于苏加诺总统的内部军事行动阻止了一场右翼阴谋。

据报道，苏加诺本人也对广播公告的性质感到惊讶，但他愿意等待，看看发生了什么，局势将如何发展，然后再表态。

The September 30th Movement’s leaders were from the Army.

 Neither the Air Force nor the Navy nor the police command were involved.

 However, when the leaders of the Air Force were informed of the movement and its success, they cheered.

 They believed that an internal military action, loyal to President Sukarno, had prevented a right-wing plot.

 Reportedly, Sukarno himself was surprised by the nature of the radio announcement, but he was willing to wait and see what had happened and how the situation would develop before taking a position.

印度尼西亚共产党领导人艾迪特和人民青年团的一些成员也在10月1日的某个时候抵达哈利姆空军基地。

他们在不同的大楼里，无法与军队叛乱的领导人直接沟通。

该运动切断了城市的电话线，他们没有对讲机或收音机。

他们也没有坦克，这是当时政变策划者的标准装备。

Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, and some members of the People’s Youth also arrived at Halim Air Force Base at some point on October 1.

 They were in a different building, and unable to communicate directly with the leaders of the Army rebellion.

 The movement had cut off telephone lines in the city, and they didn’t have walkie-talkies or radios.

 Nor did they have tanks, the standard equipment for coup plotters at the time.45

混乱持续了不超过一天：

在12个小时内，运动被粉碎了，现在由右翼的苏哈托将军领导的军队直接控制了国家。

The confusion lasted for no longer than one day: within twelve hours, the movement was crushed, and the Army, now led by right-wing General Suharto, was in direct control of the country.

五十多年后的今天，我们仍然没有完全了解谁策划了9月30日的Gerakan行动，也不知道这次夜袭的真正目的是什么。

我们有的只是一系列可信的理论。

More than fifty years later, we still don’t have a complete understanding of who planned the Gerakan 30 September, or what the real purpose of the night raid was.

 What we have is a range of credible theories.

历史学家约翰-罗萨（John Roosa）提出的一个可能版本是，艾迪特通过军方的一个共产党中间人帮助策划了这次突袭。

由于他与军队的谈话是秘密和间接的，双方（艾迪特和运动）最终都签署了一个构思不周且注定要失败的计划。

他们打算悄悄地逮捕这些将军--这在印尼早已成为惯例，因为在1945年苏加诺本人被绑架之前，他们就已经被当作叛徒提交给总统。

在这个版本中，他们的死亡将是无能和恐慌的结果。

这可能是最 "保守 "的说法，也是对PKI最有力的证明。

艾迪特只告诉了党内的一小部分人--甚至没有告诉中央委员会和政治局。

在这个版本中，

艾迪特和一小部分高层共产党员对这些将军的意外死亡负有责任，

而且他们是被美国和英国的错误信息运动所激怒而这样做的，这些错误信息运动的目的是让他们认为自己别无选择，只能采取行动。47

One possible version of the story, put forward by historian John Roosa, is that Aidit helped to plan the raid through a Communist intermediary within the military.

 Because his conversations with the Army were secret and indirect, both sides (Aidit and the movement) ended up signing off on a plan that was badly conceived and doomed to failure.

 They intended to quietly arrest the generals—as had long been customary in Indonesia, since before Sukarno himself had been kidnapped in 1945—and present them to the president as traitors.

 Their deaths, in this version, would have been the result of incompetence and panic.

 This is probably the most “conservative” of the credible accounts, the account that presents the strongest case against the PKI.

 Aidit would have only told a tiny group of people in the party—not even the Central Committee nor the Politburo.

 In this version, Aidit and a tiny group of high-level Communists would have been guilty of contributing to the accidental deaths of those generals, and they would have been provoked into doing so by those US and UK misinformation campaigns, which were explicitly designed to make them believe they had no choice but to act.46

有人问，既然苏加诺在位时共产党的地位已经确立，为什么艾迪特还要对军队采取武装或暴力行动？

艾迪特非常清楚，PKI的影响力完全建立在软实力上，而军队拥有所有的武器。

而训练有素的军人负责逮捕他们熟睡的上级军官，怎么会意外地把他们全部杀死并扔进井里呢？

This story doesn’t convince everyone.47 Why, some ask, would Aidit take armed or violent action against the Army when the Communist Party’s position was so well established with Sukarno in office? Aidit knew very well that the PKI’s influence was entirely based on soft power, and that the military had all the weapons.

 And how is it that trained military men charged with arresting their sleeping superior officers would accidentally end up killing all of them and throwing them in a well?

有许多相互竞争的理论。

本尼迪克特-安德森（Benedict Anderson），也许是二十世纪最有名的印尼专家，和学者露丝-麦克维（Ruth McVey）在1966年提出了一个说法，在这个说法中，这场运动基本上就是它所说的那样--PKI没有參與—單純的军队内部行动。48 

结果，安德森被赶出印尼26年之久。

就在他于2015年去世前，他说他仍然相信这是事实。

There are a number of competing theories.

 Benedict Anderson, perhaps the most famous Indonesia expert of the twentieth century, and scholar Ruth McVey presented an account in 1966, in which the movement was largely what it says it was—an internal Army movement that the PKI did not help organize.48 As a result, Anderson was kicked out of Indonesia for twenty-six years.

 Just before his death in 2015, he said he still believed this to be the case.49

还有一种完全合理的说法是，尘埃落定后上台的苏哈托将军策划或渗透了这场运动，也许是在外国的帮助下，策划了他的上台。

毕竟，他与叛乱的领导人关系密切。

苏哈托与纳苏蒂和亚尼有过冲突，他是唯一没有成为运动目标的高级、公开的右倾军队官员。

前外交部长苏班德里奥，也就是那个不得不听霍华德-琼斯否认中情局在1958年轰炸该国的人，提出了一个可信的内幕消息，即

苏哈托事先得到了领导九卅运动的朋友的通知；

他承诺支持他们，但却计划按兵不动，以叛乱为借口夺取政权。50 

G30S领导人拉蒂夫事后也说，苏哈托事先被告知了这些计划。

Then there are the entirely plausible assertions that General Suharto, the man who rose to power after the dust settled, planned or infiltrated the movement, perhaps with foreign assistance, to engineer his rise to power.

 He was, after all, close to the leaders of the rebellion.

 Suharto had a history of conflict with Nasution and Yani, and was the only high-ranking, openly right-leaning Army official not targeted by the movement.

 Former Foreign Minister Subandrio, the same man who had to listen to Howard Jones deny that the CIA was bombing the country back in 1958, presents a credible insider’s account, in which Suharto was notified in advance by his friends leading the September 30th Movement; he pledged his support to them, but instead planned to hold back and use the rebellion as a pretext to seize power.50 G30S leader Latief also said, afterward, that Suharto was informed of the plans in advance.51

我们知道这是个阴谋。

除非中央情报局和印尼军方等其他组织公布他们所掌握的信息，否则我们只能根据现有的证据来推测其真实性。52 

但故事的下一部分并无悬念。

We know there was a conspiracy.

 Unless the CIA and other organizations such as the Indonesian military release what they have, we can only theorize as to its true nature based on the available evidence.52 But the next part of the story is not in doubt.

10月1日事件发生后，苏哈托将军掌握了国家的控制权，并说了一系列刻意准备的谎言。

这些谎言成为世界上最大的国家之一几十年来的官方教条。

After the events of October 1, General Suharto seized control of the country, and told a set of deliberate, carefully prepared lies.

 These lies became official dogma in one of the world’s largest countries for decades.