艾迪特设计的930事件并没有受到外国干预。

 北京和雅加达之间的战略对接在 "930 "运动后一夜之间崩溃。

10月1日黎明前，总统府警卫队的军队绑架了六名反共高级将领，后来被杀害。

第二天，苏哈托将军发动了有效的反击。

随着他的上台，苏哈托开始在全国范围内对所谓的共产党员和共产党同情者进行清洗，并升级为二十世纪最严重的大规模屠杀之一34 

据估计，有超过50万人被杀害。

由于PKI的领导人Dipa Nusantara Aidit是该运动的主要参与者，苏哈托政权一再指责中国共产党参与了930事件，尽管这种指责未经证实。

外交关系于1967年中止，并一直保持到冷战结束。

苏哈托政权的宣传将华裔与共产主义联系在一起，使得这一少数民族在1965-66年的大屠杀中容易遭受暴力。

虽然大屠杀针对的是PKI成员，但许多普通的中国人却被骚扰、监禁，或被剥夺财产，并被连带驱逐出群岛。

在苏哈托随后的三十年统治中，通过了一些歧视性的法律：

例如，华裔在其公民证上被赋予了特殊的称号，中文教育被禁止。

The strategic alignment between Beijing and Jakarta雅加达 collapsed overnight after the September Thirtieth Movement.

 Before dawn on October 1, army units from the Presidential Palace guard abducted and later killed six senior anti-Communist generals.

 The next day, General Suharto launched an effective counterattack.

 As he rose to power, Suharto started a nationwide purge of alleged Communists and Communist sympathizers, which escalated into one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century. 34

 It is estimated that more than 500,000 people were killed.

 Because the leader of the PKI, Dipa Nusantara Aidit, was a major participant in the movement, the Suharto regime made repeated, although unverified, accusations that Communist China was involved in the September Thirtieth Movement.

 Diplomatic relations were suspended in 1967 and remained so until the end of the Cold War.

 The Suharto regime’s propaganda, which associated the ethnic Chinese with Communism, made this minority susceptible to violence during the mass killings of 1965–66.

 While the mass killings targeted PKI members, many ordinary Chinese were harassed, imprisoned, or deprived of their possessions and expelled from the archipelago by implication.

 Under Suharto’s ensuing three-decade rule, a number of discriminatory laws were passed: for instance, the ethnic Chinese were given a special designation on their citizenship cards and Chinese-language education was banned.

传统观点认为，公众对中国和华裔的敌意是对PKI在北京的唆使下试图篡夺国家权力的反应。

但最新的证据显示，艾迪特设计的930事件并没有受到外国干预。

中国高层领导人知道艾迪特的计划。

但该计划的迅速实施让他们大吃一惊。

在 1965 年 8 月 5 日与毛泽东的会面中，艾迪特描绘了在没有苏加诺的情况下他将采取的政策。35

艾迪特与毛泽东分享的策略与 10 月 1 日实际发生的情况非常相似。

毛泽东并不是苏哈托政权和一些英语作家所描述的 "政变设计师"。36

同时，艾迪特也不是本-安德森和露丝-麦克维所描述的印尼军队内部权力斗争中的替罪羊。

 约翰-罗萨的《大规模屠杀的借口》认为，一个秘密的特别局（Biro Khusus）应对这场运动负责，这个特别局包括艾迪特，但不包括PKI中央委员会政治局（politburo）的其他成员和该党的普通成员。38 

毛泽东与艾迪特的谈话可能是我们目前获得的最好的证据，表明艾迪特是运动中的一个有意识的行为者，而北京的影响却很有限。

Conventional wisdom holds that the public hostility against the PRC and the ethnic Chinese was a reaction to the PKI’s attempt, at Beijing’s instigation, to usurp state power.

 But newly available evidence reveals that Aidit designed the September Thirtieth Movement free from foreign intervention.

 Top Chinese leaders were aware of Aidit’s scheme.

 But the swift execution of the plan took them by surprise.

 In his meeting with Mao Zedong毛泽东 on August 5, 1965, Aidit sketched out what he would do in a political scenario without Sukarno.

35 The strategies Aidit shared with Mao bear a strong resemblance to what actually happened on October 1.

 Mao was not the “architect of the coup,” as he was portrayed by the Suharto regime and some English-language writers.

36 Meanwhile, Aidit was not a scapegoat in an internal power struggle of the Indonesian army, as he was depicted by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey.

37 John Roosa’s Pretext for Mass Murder suggests that a secret Special Bureau (Biro Khusus), which included Aidit but excluded other members of the PKI’s Central Committee Political Bureau (politburo) and the rank and file of the party, was responsible for the movement.

 But Roosa’s book does not contain solid proof of Aidit’s role.

38 The Mao-Aidit conversation is probably the best evidence we have obtained so far to indicate that Aidit was a conscious actor in the movement while Beijing’s influence was marginal.