冷戰與政變：巴西與美國的關係，1945-1964 年

冷戰與政變：巴西與美國的關係，1945-1964 年

Cold Warriors & Coups D'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964

W. Michael Weis

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书评：1997年5月1日

冷兵器与政变。巴西-美国关系，1945-1964

冷兵器与政变。巴西-美国关系，1945-1964。作者：韦斯，W.迈克尔。Albuquerque:新墨西哥大学出版社，1993年。注释。Bibliography.索引，ix，262页。布质。$39.95.

约翰-霍伊特-威廉姆斯

西班牙裔美国人历史评论》（1997）77（2）。363.

https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-77.2.363

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这是一本受欢迎的、有趣的、简短的（169页的文字）但令人失望的研究。该书涵盖了巴西历史上的一个真正的关键时期，在两个方面很强。自始至终，它始终正确地强调，美国的政策（以及大多数决策者）在巴西问题上是令人难以置信的愤世嫉俗、自私自利和虚伪的；几乎是咄咄逼人的。该书还恰当地强调了高级军官学校（ESG）和高级巴西研究学院（ISEB）在改变巴西经济、外交、政治甚至社会政策方面的作用。从本质上讲，这两个机构助产了现代巴西的诞生。

然而，这部作品出现了一些重大的、不寻常的遗漏和错误。其中最主要的是几乎没有提到剧中的关键人物之一弗农-沃尔特斯，他只在两页中被简单提及（156，167）。这个人从1944年到1964年以后，作为巴西驻意大利作战部队的联络官、几位美国总统的非正式代表、ESG的顾问、长期驻里约热内卢的武官等，对巴西军队的影响比任何其他外国人都大。为陆军和中央情报局工作的沃尔特斯恰好在访问领导1964年政变的人，他在意大利战役中的老朋友亨伯托-卡斯特洛-布兰科将军，他后来成为巴西五位将军总统中的第一位。然而，作者可以用一个典型的轻描淡写的例子来否定沃尔特斯。"沃尔特斯在[巴西]军方内部有很好的联系"（第156页）。

该书倾向于将巴西发生的事情归咎于美国，当然，这意味着对巴西人，特别是他们的政治和军事领导人给予的信任太少。文中早期出现了一个关键的短语，这也反映在书名中。"美国对1964年3月31日巴西军事政变的援助"（第7页）；但这种 "援助 "从未被阐明或界定。毫无根据的、有时甚至是滑稽的陈述让读者感到不安；例如，"艾森豪威尔退缩了，因为与库比契克会面会影响到他的高尔夫比赛"（第87页）。

最后，尽管作者不断断言巴西和美国军队在整个研究期间保持着非常密切的关系（与政治家和外交官不同），但读者不禁要问，为什么那些从1964年到1985年执政的受过ESG培训的将军会破坏这些温暖的关系。增加几页的后记可能会解决这个难题。

杜克大学出版社1997年版权所有

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BOOK REVIEW| MAY 01 1997

Cold Warriors and Coups d’Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964 

Cold Warriors and Coups d’Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964. By Weis, W. Michael. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993. Notes. Bibliography. Index, ix, 262 pp. Cloth. $39.95.

John Hoyt Williams

Hispanic American Historical Review (1997) 77 (2): 363.

https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-77.2.363

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This is a welcome and interesting, short (169 pages of text) but disappointing study. Covering a truly pivotal period of Brazilian history, the book is strong in two areas. Throughout, it consistently and correctly stresses that U.S. policy (and most policymakers) was incredibly cynical, self-serving, and hypocritical concerning Brazil; almost aggressively offensive. It also properly places great emphasis on the role of the Escola Superior da Guerra (ESG) and the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB) in transforming Brazilian economic, diplomatic, political, and even social policies. In essence, those two institutions midwifed modern Brazil into existence.

The work, however, makes some major, and unusual, omissions and errors. Chief among the former is the virtual absence of one of the key players in the drama, Vernon Walters, who is but briefly mentioned on two pages (156, 167). This man, from 1944 until well after 1964, had more influence on the Brazilian military than any other foreigner, as liasion officer to the Brazilian combat troops in Italy, informal representative of several U.S. presidents, adviser to the ESG, long-term military attaché in Rio de Janeiro, and more. Walters, who worked for both the Army and the CIA, just happened to be visiting the man who led the coup of 1964, his old friend from the Italian campaign, General Humberto Castelo Branco, who then became the first of five general-presidents of Brazil. Yet the author can dismiss Walters with a classic example of understatement: “Walters had excellent contacts within the [Brazilian] military” (p. 156).

The book tends to blame the United States for what transpired in Brazil, which, of course, means giving too little credit to the Brazilians, especially their political and military leaders. Early in the text appears a critical phrase, which is also reflected in the title: “American assistance to the Brazilian military coup of March 31, 1964” (p. 7); yet this “assistance” is never illuminated or defined. Unsupported, sometimes facetious statements jar the reader; for example, “Eisenhower balked because meeting Kubitschek would cut into his golf game” (p. 87).

Finally, although the author continually asserts that the Brazilian and U.S. militaries maintained a very close relationship throughout the period under study (unlike the politicians and diplomats), readers are left to wonder just why those same ESG-trained generals who ruled from 1964 to 1985 sundered those warm ties. The addition of a few pages of epilogue might have resolved that conundrum.

Copyright 1997 by Duke University Press