越南，'63 和現在
Vietnam, ‘63 and Now
January 27, 1975, Page 25Buy Reprints
The writer headed the Polish delegation to the International Control Commission in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964. In 1968, the Government dismissed him as professor of law at Warsaw University. He is now professor of political science at Queens College of the City University of New York.
Two years have elapsed since the Vietnam agreement and protocols were signed and “peace” was announced.
More than ten years ago, I participated in various behind‐the‐scenes diplomatic negotiations. Now that emotions surrounding the conflict have flared up once more, it might be interesting to consider what the Western world could have achieved in Vietnam and compare that with the new reality following the war.
In the spring of 1963, I was secretly asked by President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, the secret‐police Ngo Dinh Nhu, through Roger Lalouette, the French Ambassador to Saigon, to approach the Government in Hanoi in order to explore the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the struggle.
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During the subsequent months, I had many wide‐ranging discussions with the highest North Vietnamese officials, including President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong. The basic question was this: In case of American withdrawal, what kind of real guarantees could be given by them that a united Vietnam would not merely become one more partner in the Communist bloc?
To resolve this problem, the North Vietnamese leaders were slowly developing plans, which I discussed with a group of Western ambassadors.
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Under the plans, North and South Vietnam could slowly develop postal, economic and cultural relations. Northern industrial goods would be paid for by the South with its rice.
Also, the North would not press for a speedy reunification, but instead coalition government would be set up in the South. I asked if such a government could be headed by Mr. Diem. In the summer of 1963 the answer was finally yes.
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Hanoi had always sought neutralization of the South. As for the North, both Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong were reluctant to accept the label “neutralization,” but were eager to accept the idea. North Vietnam would not become an aggressive outpost against other countries, and neither Soviet nor Chinese troops would under any conditions be allowed on Vietnamese soil.
I pursued the matter further: What guarantees could be offered to the West that Hanoi would keep its word? I stressed that the West would not be amused by a new game called “the international commission.” The answer was that in case of a United States withdrawal the North would be prepared to give all kinds of substantial guarantees and American participation in the supervisory process was not excluded.
At the time, I knew about strained relations between Hanoi and both Moscow and Peking; further, Hanoi's leaders wanted to preserve and widen their small margin of independence from their powerful allies, whom they hated and feared.
They were willing to accept a negotiated agreement whose result would not have been worse for the West than the one in 1973; Vietnam would have been divided into two parts, with free commercial and cultural intercommunication between them.
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This unstable situation would have been guaranteed by rivalry between the Soviet Union and China, and North Vietnamese animosity toward those countries, and Cambodian neutrality, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk's strong anti‐Communist tendencies.
Further guarantees would have been the development of Titoist trends in the Eastern bloc, intensified by a new Vietnamese “Titoism'; new political and economic cooperation with Western powers, and last, but by no means least, the American economic and political power that was undiminished by the war.
Today, following ten years of war and two years of “peace,” we face problems that existed potentially, or actually, in 1963:
Vietnam is divided into three parts; Hanoi is isolated, being reluctantly supported by its overprotective allies; the Vietcong is attacking; the regime in Saigon is unpopular, attacked anew by Buddhists, intellectuals and other non‐Communist opponents. Saigon's generals fight their private enemies far more effectively than they do the Communists.
In Cambodia, the Government is weaker than it was in 1963; Prince Sihanouk, in exile in Peking, against his inclinations has been pushed further to the left. In Laos, the same tape is being replayed: new shaky coalitions and no hope for the future, while the people remain indifferent—so long as they are not robbed or bombed.
Hegel remarked that all important facts and personages in history occur twice; Marx added that the first occurrence was as tragedy, the second as farce; Sir Francis Bacon in such a situation could only have advised the hapless to pray.
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越南，'63 和現在
作者於 1963 年和 1964 年率領波蘭代表團前往越南參加國際管制委員會。1968 年，政府解除了他在華沙大學擔任法學教授的職務。他現在是紐約市立大學皇后學院政治學教授。
自簽署越南協議和議定書並宣布“和平”以來已經過去了兩年。
十多年前，我參與了各種幕後外交談判。現在圍繞衝突的情緒再次爆發，考慮一下西方世界在越南取得的成就並將其與戰後的新現實進行比較可能會很有趣。
1963 年春天，總統吳庭艷和他的兄弟、秘密警察吳庭如通過法國駐西貢大使羅傑·拉盧埃特 (Roger Lalouette) 秘密要求我與河內政府接洽，以探討和平解決鬥爭。
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在接下來的幾個月裡，我與包括胡志明主席和範文同總理在內的北越最高官員進行了多次廣泛的討論。基本問題是：如果美國撤軍，他們可以提供什麼樣的真正保證，使統一的越南不僅會成為共產主義集團的一個夥伴？
為了解決這個問題，北越領導人正在慢慢制定計劃，我與一群西方大使進行了討論。
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根據計劃，北越和南越可以慢慢發展郵政、經濟和文化關係。北方的工業產品將由南方用大米支付。
此外，北方不會要求盡快統一，而是會在南方成立聯合政府。我問這樣一個政府是否可以由吳庭艷先生領導。1963 年夏天，答案終於是肯定的。
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河內一直尋求南方的中立。至於北方，胡志明和範文同都不願意接受“中和”的標籤，但都渴望接受這個想法。北越不會成為針對其他國家的侵略性前哨基地，蘇聯和中國軍隊在任何情況下都不允許進入越南領土。
我進一步追問：可以向西方提供什麼保證河內會信守諾言？我強調西方不會被一種叫做“國際委員會”的新遊戲逗樂。答案是，如果美國退出，朝鮮將準備提供各種實質性保證，並且不排除美國參與監督程序。
當時，我知道河內與莫斯科和北京之間的緊張關係；此外，河內的領導人還想保持和擴大他們對強大盟友的微弱獨立，他們又恨又怕這些盟友。
他們願意接受一項談判達成的協議，其結果對西方來說不會比 1973 年的協議更糟；越南將被分為兩部分，它們之間可以自由進行商業和文化交流。
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蘇聯和中國之間的競爭、北越對這些國家的敵意、柬埔寨的中立以及諾羅敦·西哈努克親王強烈的反共傾向，都可能導致這種不穩定的局面。
進一步的保證是東方集團鐵托主義趨勢的發展，新的越南“鐵托主義”加劇了這種趨勢；與西方列強的新的政治和經濟合作，最後但絕非最不重要的一點是，美國的經濟和政治實力並未因戰爭而削弱。
今天，經過十年的戰爭和兩年的“和平”，我們面臨著 1963 年潛在或實際存在的問題：
越南分為三個部分；河內是孤立的，不情願地得到過度保護的盟友的支持；越共正在進攻；西貢政權不得人心，再次受到佛教徒、知識分子和其他非共產主義反對者的攻擊。西貢的將軍們對付他們的私人敵人比對付共產黨人要有效得多。
在柬埔寨，政府比 1963 年更弱；流亡北京的西哈努克親王違背自己的意願被推向了更左的位置。在老撾，同樣的錄像帶正在重播：新的不穩定聯盟和對未來沒有希望，而人民仍然無動於衷——只要他們不被搶劫或轟炸。
黑格爾說，歷史上所有重要的事實和人物都會出現兩次；馬克思補充說，第一次是悲劇，第二次是鬧劇；弗朗西斯培根爵士在這種情況下只能建議倒霉的人祈禱。
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