斯大林和毛泽东在莫斯科的最后一次会面时，斯大林给了他一份长长的名单，显示了隐藏在中国共产党内的数百名苏联特工，这是真的吗？如果是这样，为什么？
Quora，你最好爱死我了，因为我花了很大的力气来验证这项指控，因为我以前看到过，而且自己也相当感兴趣。
我把这个问题保存了很久，因为我早就记得读过一本书，其中指控斯大林为了讨好毛泽东而清算他的中国情报人员，但我从未想过这是可能的，把它归结为历史的戏剧性。
但看，我找到了陈述这些指控的确切书籍，尽管是在一个脚注中，即西蒙-塞巴格-蒙特菲奥雷的《斯大林》。红色沙皇的法庭。
'毛泽东带来了一个中国礼物的宝库和几车大米。漆器装饰品仍然挂在格拉诺夫斯基的莫洛托夫退休公寓的墙上，斯大林把大米分给了他的朝臣们。作为回报，斯大林向他提供了他在中国政治局的苏联代理人的名字。回到北京后，毛泽东迅速地清算了他们。
毛泽东、斯大林的生日和朝鲜战争》，斯大林。红色沙皇的法庭》，（第602页）。
看看资料说明，蒙蒂菲奥里为这一章引用了大量的文本、访谈和作品，但看完资料后，只有一个提到了背叛，即《克里姆林宫冷战内幕：从斯大林到赫鲁晓夫》，作者是弗拉迪斯拉夫-祖博克和康斯坦丁-普列沙科夫（强调是我的）。
'显然，双方都把签署的条约和协议视为纯粹的形式。中苏联盟的真正力量在于毛泽东个人对作为最高共产主义领导人的斯大林的效忠。作为回报，斯大林向毛泽东赠送了一份礼物，在他看来，任何亚洲沙特人都会喜欢：他赠送了向莫斯科报告的共产国际的中国线人网络。这是斯大林在世界各地对其'第五纵队'的又一次背叛；随后，中国共产党内数百名亲苏的共产党员被谋杀或监禁。
斯大林与破碎的和平》，《克里姆林宫的冷战内幕：从斯大林到赫鲁晓夫》，（第61页）。
再往前看，从这一节的资料说明中，祖博克和普列沙科夫从1995年BBC的一部纪录片中得出了这一指控，片名为《莫斯科的使者》。东方是红色的。这部纪录片采用了对冷战时期几个关键时刻在场的翻译的采访，为这项指控提供了来源。
斯大林和毛泽东会晤期间的口译组成员米哈伊尔-卡皮察和当时在中国境内活动的克格勃官员伊万-拜巴科夫说了以下的话。
巴伊巴科夫："我们编制了要移交的特工名单。每个人都有一份简短的报告，一页到一页半。这些都交给了中国情报部门的领导人。当然，对于管理这些特工的情报人员来说，这很难......这是一个难以忍受的时刻。他们与这些特工中的一些人共事多年，甚至可以说是几十年。
KAPITSA：'一方面，这很结束，但如果你杀了另一个人，你就不可能是高尚的。在我知道这些人中有许多人与他们一起工作，其中许多人是朋友。这很可怕'。
最后，我不能说我很惊讶，因为斯大林代表了硬性现实主义与恶性理想主义的复杂混合体，形成了一个名副其实的暴君，从所有的解释来看，他概括了'目的决定手段'这句话。在他们的关系中，这个人一直在相当程度上欺负毛泽东，所以可以理解（对马基雅弗利主义者来说），斯大林牺牲了一些小卒子来获得国王。
斯大林是一个奇怪的政治家，他将真正的马克思列宁主义信仰与地缘政治治理的艰难现实融合在一起，而这些信仰往往在很大程度上是矛盾的，以至于他撼动了历史的支柱。
在这种情况下，我们至少可以理解对长期以来一直忠于莫斯科的代理人采取这种残酷的手段的政治考虑。
Is it true that on the final meeting between Stalin and Mao in Moscow, Stalin gave him a long list showing the hundreds of Soviet agents hidden within the Communist Party of China? If so, why?
Quora, you better love me for this because I went to ridiculous lengths to verify this charge as I had seen it before and was quite interested in myself.
I had this question saved for quite some time because I had long remembered reading a book that charged Stalin with liquidating his Chinese intelligence agents in order to ingratiate Mao but never thought it possible, chalking it up to the dramatics of history.
But lo and behold, I find the exact book that states the charges, albeit in a footnote, Simon Sebag Montefiore’s Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar:
‘Mao had brought a treasure trove of Chinese gifts and several carriages of rice. The lacquer ornaments still hang on the walls of Molotov’s retirement flat on Granovsky and Stalin divided the rice among his courtiers. In return, Stalin presented him with the names of his Soviet agents in the Chinese Politburo. Back in Peking, Mao swiftly liquidated them.’
‘Mao, Stalin’s Birthday and the Korean War’, Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar, (p. 602)
Looking at the source notes, Montefiore cites a wide array of texts, interviews, and works for the chapter but after looking at the sources, only one mentions the betrayal, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev by Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov (emphasis mine):
‘Obviously, both sides regarded the signed treaties and agreements as mere formalities. The real strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance was in Mao’s personal allegiance to Stalin as the supreme Communist leader. In return for this, Stalin presented Mao with a gift that, in his opinion, any Asian satrap would have liked: he gave away the Comintern network of Chinese informers who reported to Moscow. It was another of Stalin’s many betrayals of his ‘fifth column’ around the world; subsequently, hundred of pro-Soviet Communists in the CCP were murdered or imprisoned.’
‘Stalin and Shattered Peace’, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, (p. 61)
Going even further, looking at the source notes for this particular section, Zubok and Pleshakov drew this charge from a 1995 BBC documentary titled, Messengers of Moscow: The East is Red. The documentary, which employs interviews with interpreters present at several critical junctures of the Cold War, provides the source for this charge.
Mikhail Kapitsa, a member of the Interpreting Team during the meetings between Stalin and Mao and Ivan Baibakov, a KGB officer operating within China at this time, would state the following:
BAIBAKOV: ‘We compiled lists of agents to be handed over. There was a short report on each, a page to a page and a half. And these were handed to the leaders of Chinese intelligence. Of course, for the intelligence officers who ran these agents, it was difficult . . . it was a difficult moment to live through. They had worked with some of these agents many years, even decades you could say.’
KAPITSA: ‘On the one hand side, it was very over but you cannot be noble if you kill another man. Before I know many of these people work with them and many of them were friends. It’s horrible.’
In the end, I can’t say I’m surprised as Stalin represented a complex amalgamation of hard realism with virulent idealism that formed a veritable tempest of a man who, by all interpretations, encapsulated the phrase ‘the ends justify the means.’ The man had bullied Mao considerably throughout their relationship up to that point, so it was understandable (to a Machiavellian) that Stalin sacrifices a few pawns to get the king.
Stalin was a strange politician, blending real Marxist-Leninist beliefs with the hard realities of geopolitical governance that, more often than not, were contradictory to such a large degree that he shook the very pillars of history.
In this vein, we can at least understand the political calculus of undertaking such a cutthroat maneuver against agents who had been so loyal to Moscow for so long.
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