亨利-基辛格、迈克-蓬佩奥

 亨利-基辛格、迈克-蓬佩奥

亨利-基辛格知道，在环形公路的官僚机构中游刃有余的方法是建立跨越政治过道的友谊，进入学术界（他来自学术界）、媒体甚至好莱坞。

他知道外交的最佳手段是与外国政府建立背后的沟通渠道。

更重要的是，与冷漠的尼克松总统不同，基辛格在尼克松上台后担任国家安全顾问，他和蔼可亲，感情丰富。

基辛格登上政治舞台时，世界正从

冷战初期的意识形态分化

--两个等级森严的超级大国之间的决斗--

转向一个相互依存和多极化的新时代。

另一方面，

迈克-蓬佩奥不具备基辛格所拥有的智力。

在特朗普总统任命他为中央情报局局长之前，他是一名职业的右翼政治家。

与以往的中央情报局局长不同，蓬佩奥公开穿上了他的党性，几乎没有表现出客观分析的能力。

这使他与更为敏锐的基辛格有所区别，基辛格作为对话者的技巧在他最大的外交胜利中得到了展示：

美国与毛泽东的中华人民共和国之间的外交关系的开放。

作为国务卿，蓬佩奥似乎摒弃了客观的情报，而对特朗普的敌人发表了简短的、未经证实的言论--这是基辛格所不愿意做的。

对基辛格来说，与对手的关系和与美国盟友的关系一样值得珍惜。

基辛格明白，中苏关系脚下的土地正在发生变化。

他看到，曾经结盟的共产主义巨头的分裂现在意味着美国的外交开放。

他与毛泽东主义者的讨论使他确信，他们确实比苏联人更灵活。

这种洞察力有助于推动中美之间微妙的开放。然而，这种灵巧在像蓬佩奥这样的鹰派人士眼中是不存在的，他们看到的世界和特朗普一样：

我们与他们。

蓬佩奥与基辛格完全不同，基辛格拥有智慧和世界观，可以从一个危险的国际危机转向另一个危机。

蓬佩奥有限的战略举措是在没有必要存在的地方挑起危机。

如果蓬佩奥是基辛格教授在哈佛大学的一个班级的学生，他的同学们就会有意识地敦促蓬佩奥在获得不及格的成绩之前退学。

也许我们仍然可以学到这个教训。

Henry Kissinger understood the way to navigate the bureaucracy of the Beltway was to establish friendships across the political aisle, into academia (from which he hailed), the media and even Hollywood. He understood the best means to diplomacy was to establish back-channel communications with foreign governments. More importantly, unlike the aloof President Nixon, for whom Kissinger worked as National Security Advisor when Nixon took office, Kissinger was affable and emotional.

Kissinger arrived on the political scene as the world was shifting from its ideological bifurcation of the early Cold War—a duel between two hierarchical superpowers—to a new era of interdependence and multipolarity.

Mike Pompeo, on the other hand, does not have the intellect that Kissinger possessed. He was a career, right-wing politician before President Trump appointed him to head CIA. Unlike previous DCIs, Pompeo wore his partisanship openly, showing little ability for objective analysis. This separates him from the far more perspicacious Kissinger, whose skill as an interlocutor was displayed in his greatest diplomatic triumph: the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China.

As Secretary of State, Pompeo appears to eschew objective intelligence in favor of clipped, unproven remarks against Trump’s enemies—something Kissinger was loathe to do. For Kissinger, relationships with adversaries were as cherished as those with America’s allies.

Kissinger understood that the ground was shifting beneath the feet of Sino-Soviet relations. He saw that the split of the once-aligned communist giants now mean a diplomatic opening for the United States. His discussions with the Maoists assured him that they were indeed more flexible than the Soviets. This sort of insight helped further the delicate Sino-U.S. openness. This deftness, however, is lost on hawks like Pompeo, who see the world as Trump does: us versus them.

Pompeo is nothing like Kissinger, who had the intellect and worldview to navigate from one perilous international crisis to another. Pompeo’s limited strategic initiatives are to foment crises where none need to exist. If Pompeo were a student in one of Prof. Kissinger’s classes at Harvard, his fellow students would have had the good sense to urge Pompeo to withdraw before he received a failing grade. Perhaps this lesson can still be learned.