佩洛西在台湾。众议院议长访问的一个明显好处

 佩洛西在台湾。众议院议长访问的一个明显好处

南希-佩洛西去台湾是对的，

中国担心也是对的，

但当所有人都是对的时候，你会得到什么？

美国和中国之间正在酝酿一场可预防的危机，而且可能不是最后一次。

当你不得不开枪时，就开枪。不要说话。(图科，19世纪美国哲学家，《好、坏、丑》)

如果美国国会众议院议长想正式访问台湾，她应该这样做。

提前两周谈论、斟酌、含糊其辞和唧唧歪歪，会产生不请自来的压力和反压力，在你知道之前，你就盯上了两个超级大国之间无意的、但非常可预测的危机。

然后，

决定不是根据价值和效用作出的，

而是作为这些压力和考虑的结果。

如果中国对这样的访问感到不满和不安，

它应该以合乎逻辑的、令人信服的方式表达其保留意见，

而不是通过空洞的军事威胁的痉挛。

作为亚洲之行的一部分，

南希-佩洛西议长在台湾的访问的一个明显好处是，

它使美国和中国能够现场演练各自的风险和危机管理理论和机制。

由于中国急于展示其肌肉和力量，

当然是在俄罗斯在乌克兰失败的背景下，

以及在华盛顿 "对中国强硬 "的时代潮流下，

两国都有一个难得的机会来练习模拟危机模式。

到目前为止，

美国一直保持着克制和谨慎，

而中国则大肆发泄威胁，

包括其国防部长几周前在新加坡宣布，"中国将毫不犹豫地在对台战争中使用军事力量"，随后其他中国官员发出可怕而紧张的警告，如果天不遂人愿，佩洛西登陆台北，北京会采取什么行动。

中国的声势浩大的反应很可能是预先设定好的姿态。当然，在北京没有人认为地缘政治会受到访问的影响，也没有人认为中国的力量会因此而减弱。因此，解释可能在于习近平主席在被任命为连续第三个任期的中国共产党总书记和中国国家主席之前的国内政治议程。

佩洛西带着 "团结 "的信息抵达台湾，中国发怒了

调查发现，以色列人不关心中国的人权记录

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南希-佩洛西是对的。

众议院议长是继副总统之后的第二位总统继承人，如果她想访问台湾这个主权国家，支持台湾民主并向其保证美国的承诺，她完全有权利也不能被阻止这样做。

佩洛西在台湾是对美国外交政策生态系统的一个信息。不要再被中国欺负了，不要再无缘无故地被恐吓和对中国的威胁感到焦虑，不要再剖析中国的每一个声明以寻找侵略的迹象，不要再调侃末日的情景。

乔-拜登是对的。

如果美国总统以其作为制定、定义、塑造、优先考虑和执行外交和国防政策的领导人的身份和宪法权力，认为佩洛西的访问在这个时候是不明智的，有可能造成不必要的紧张局势，那么佩洛西议长应该重新考虑，尽管她几十年来一直对中国提出严厉的批评。

台湾是对的。

受制于五十年来中国不断的入侵威胁和台北不感兴趣的胁迫统一，台湾自然会欢迎佩洛西的访问，重申美国对其安全的承诺。

中国是（一半）正确的。

可以理解的是，佩洛西的访问被解释为美国对北京认为明显是中国国内问题的干涉，是对中国-台湾关系的无理干预。佩洛西的访问将产生进一步的不信任，但它不会改变该地区的地缘政治，所以为什么要这样做？

从习近平主席的角度来看，佩洛西的访问证明了中国的基本论点。国际体系是美国根据1945年的现实和条件建立的模型，并迎合了美国的霸权利益。它没有反映出中国的地位和力量。中国不是在挑战美国的霸主地位，而是希望对势力范围进行更明确的划分。佩洛西与台湾总统蔡英文会面，证明华盛顿正在竭力遏制中国要求被承认为超级大国。

当每个人都是正确的，你会得到什么？

一场危机。

不需要的和可预防的，但还是一场危机。中国国防部和外交部警告说会发生火灾，各种激动人心的发言人详细描述了他们认为中国可能采取的行动。与此同时，超过25万名互联网用户紧盯着飞行追踪应用程序和地图，跟踪美国空军C40 SPAR19航班的每一英里，这架飞机穿梭于佩洛西。

但事实是，拜登总统只能尝试和劝说，但不能阻止佩洛西去台湾。

美国行政部门和立法部门之间的权力分工是明确的，

佩洛西议长领导着一个独立但平等的政府部门。

这一点中国人可能在理论上理解，但无法真正接受。就他们所知，总统可以而且应该取消她的行程。

试图通过五角大楼和国家安全委员会来表达不满，是白宫能做的全部。

但是，如果拜登成功地说服佩洛西，认为这种访问的成本效益等式是净负值，这将使中国更加胆大妄为，中国将推断出恐吓和威胁是有效的，他们有权力实际否决众议院议长对第三国的访问。这对未来的对峙不是好兆头。

佩洛西的访问还提出了一个外交政策上的难题，

它突出了在

拜登总统去年在三个不同场合作出的保卫台湾免受中国侵略的承诺，

以及华盛顿官方坚持的 "一个中国 "政策

和

美国在台湾问题上的 "战略模糊 "的补充政策之间取得平衡的困难。

美国介入台湾的历史本身就有些模糊不清。1954年，在朝鲜战争之后，美国与福尔摩沙--葡萄牙语的岛名，在 "台湾 "之前，签署了一项防御条约。

一年后，美国国会通过了福尔摩沙决议，授权总统保护位于台湾海峡、靠近中国大陆的离岸岛屿，此前中国在1954-1955年对这些岛屿进行了轰炸。

1972年，理查德-尼克松总统对中国的突破性访问开启了美中关系的新时代，

到1979年，吉米-卡特总统建立了全面的外交关系。应中国的要求，美国降低了与台湾的关系，从未正式承认其主权，

但卡特签署了《台湾关系法》，规定美国将向台湾提供足够的手段和军事平台来保护自己，但承诺的范围却很模糊。

美国政策的两大支柱

 "战略模糊 "和 "一个中国 "保持不变，

直到拜登承诺美国会保护台湾，尽管与台湾不存在正式的联盟或条约。

对中国来说，这些声明被认为是对以往政策的公然背离，而美国与印度、澳大利亚和日本建立的 "四国联盟 "又进一步强化了这一政策。

这些事态发展疏远了中国，使其相信华盛顿的侵略是为了限制北京在南海的回旋余地和势力范围。

从北京方面看，佩洛西的访问是经过深思熟虑的，与这一轨迹相一致。

从它的角度来看，拜登总统不在背后支持它是不可理解的。

这场人为的危机很可能会以言语上的针锋相对而结束。但根据中美关系的发展以及佩洛西之行所引起的敌意和狂热，这几乎是最后一次这样的危机。

Pelosi in Taiwan: The one clear benefit of House speaker's visit

Nancy Pelosi is right to go to Taiwan, and China is right to worry, but when everyone is right, what do you get? A preventable crisis is brewing between the U.S. and China, and probably not the last of its kind

When you have to shoot, shoot. Don’t talk. (Tuco, 19th century American philosopher, “The Good, The Bad and the Ugly”)

If the speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress wants to officially visit Taiwan, she should do so. Talking, deliberating, equivocating and kvetching about it two weeks in advance generates unsolicited pressures and counter-pressures and before you know it, you’re staring at an unintended, but very predictable crisis between two superpowers.

Decisions are then not made on merit and utility, but as an outcome of these pressures and considerations.

If China is unhappy and unnerved by such a visit, it should express its reservations in a logical, convincing way, not through spasms of hollow military threats.

The one clear benefit of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in Taiwan, as part of her Asia tour, is that it enables the U.S. and China to live-exercise their respective risk and crisis management doctrine and mechanisms.

With China eager to flex its muscles and project power, certainly against the background of Russia’s failure in Ukraine, and with a “tough on China” zeitgeist in Washington, both nations had a rare opportunity to practice simulation crisis mode.

So far, the U.S. has been restrained and measured, while China went on a vociferous tantrum of threats, including its defense minister declaring a few weeks ago in Singapore that “China will not hesitate to use military force in a war over Taiwan,” followed by dire and nervous warnings from other Chinese officials on what Beijing might do if, heaven forbids, Pelosi lands in Taipei.

China’s vocal response may very well be pre-determined posturing. Surely, no one in Beijing thinks that geopolitics will be affected by the visit, nor that China’s power is diminished by it. The explanation, therefore, likely lies with President Xi Jinping’s domestic political agenda ahead of his appointment to a third consecutive term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and president of China.

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Nancy Pelosi is right. The speaker of the House of Representatives is second in line of succession to the presidency, after the vice president, and if she wishes to visit the sovereign country of Taiwan, support Taiwanese democracy and assure it of U.S. commitments, she has every right and cannot be prevented from doing so.

Pelosi in Taiwan is a message to America’s foreign policy ecosystem: Stop being bullied by China, stop being intimidated for no reason and anxious about China’s threats, stop dissecting every Chinese statement for signs of aggression and stop flirting with doomsday scenarios.

Joe Biden is right. If the president of the United States, in his capacity and constitutional authority as the leader who crafts, defines, shapes, prioritizes and executes foreign and defense policy, believes that a visit by Pelosi is unwise at this point and has the potential to create unnecessary tensions, Speaker Pelosi should have reconsidered, despite her decades-long harsh criticism of China.

Taiwan is right. Subjected to fifty years of constant Chinese threats of invasion and a coerced unification that Taipei is not interested in, it is only natural that Taiwan would welcome a visit by Pelosi, reaffirming U.S. commitment to its security.

China is (half) right. A visit by Pelosi can understandably be interpreted as American meddling in what Beijing sees as a patently domestic Chinese issue and an unjustifiable intervention in Chinese-Taiwanese relations. Pelosi’s visit will generate further mistrust, but it will not change the geopolitics of the region, so why do it at all?

From President Xi Jinping’s perspective, a Pelosi visit vindicates China’s basic argument: The international system is modeled by the U.S. based on 1945 realities and conditions and caters to American hegemonic interests. It does not reflect China’s ascendancy and power. China isn’t challenging the U.S. for supremacy, but wants a clearer division of spheres of influence. Pelosi meeting Taiwanese President Thai In-wen is evidence that Washington is doing all it can to curb China’s demand for recognition as a superpower.

When everyone is right, what do you get? A crisis. Unwanted and preventable, but a crisis nevertheless. The Chinese defense and foreign ministries warned of conflagration, with various agitated spokespeople describing in detail what they think China may do. At the same time, over 250,000 internet users are glued to flight tracking applications and maps following every mile of U.S. Air Force C40 SPAR19 flight, the plane shuttling Pelosi.

But the truth is, President Biden can only try and persuade, but cannot prevent Pelosi from going to Taiwan. The separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches in the U.S. is clear, and Speaker Pelosi heads a separate but coequal branch of government. This is something the Chinese may understand in theory, but cannot really come to terms with. For all they know, the president could and should have cancelled her trip.

Trying to express displeasure through the Pentagon and the National Security Council is all the White House could do. But if Biden had been successful in persuading Pelosi that the cost-benefit equation of such a visit is net-negative, that would have emboldened China, which would infer that intimidation and threats work and that they have the power to actually veto a visit by the Speaker of the House to a third country. That would not bode well for future standoffs.

Pelosi’s visit also presents a foreign policy dilemma by highlighting the difficulty of striking a balance between a pledge to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression, made by President Biden on three separate occasions in the last year, and Washington’s official adherence to a “one China” policy and the complementary policy of American “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.

The history of American involvement in Taiwan is somewhat ambiguous itself. In 1954, following the Korean War, the U.S. signed a defense treaty with Formosa – the Portuguese name of the Island, preceding “Taiwan”.

A year later, the U.S. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, authorizing the president to protect the offshore islands located in the Taiwan Strait, close to mainland China, following Chinese bombardment of the islands in 1954-1955.

President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972 set in motion a new era in American-Chinese relations, and by 1979, President Jimmy Carter established full diplomatic relations. At China’s request, the U.S. downgraded relations with Taiwan, never recognizing its sovereignty officially, but Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulated that the U.S. would provide Taiwan with sufficient means and military platforms to defend itself, yet left the scope of the commitment vague.

The two pillars of U.S. policy, “strategic ambiguity” and “one China,” remained intact, until Biden pledged U.S. protection despite the fact that no formal alliance or pact exists with Taiwan. For China, those statements were construed as a flagrant departure from previous policy and were further reinforced by the U.S. forging of the Quad alliance with India, Australia, and Japan.

These developments alienated China and convinced it that Washington’s aggression is meant to constrict Beijing’s maneuvering room and sphere of influence in the South China Sea.

As seen from Beijing, Pelosi’s visit is deliberate and consistent with this trajectory. From it point of view, it is unfathomable that President Biden is not behind it.

This artificial crisis will likely end with a rhetorical tit-for-tat. But based on the development of U.S.-Chinese relations and the animosity and fervor the Pelosi trip engendered, it is hardly the last crisis of this sort.