令人震惊的失败：中国如何在1979年输给了越南

 令人震惊的失败：中国如何在1979年输给了越南

关键点。

北京可能输了这场战争，但从长远来看，它赢了。以下是这场冲突如何帮助解放军诞生痛苦但必要的军事改革。

中国在20世纪80年代对越南的行动通常被分为四个阶段。

在第一阶段，中国和越南进一步巩固了他们在边境的地位。这一直持续到1981年。

第二和第三阶段包括从1981年到1987年不断升级的跨边界进攻行动，强度逐渐增加。

最后一个阶段是解放军从边境地区撤出。中国入侵的政治目的是为了 "惩罚 "越南对泰国和柬埔寨的持续好战行为。由于越南军队正在进入柬埔寨，中国军队也将继续这样做。在军事上，中国将边境冲突视为一种方式，通过在边境测试新的理论和装备，使解放军从一支过时的战斗部队发展成为一支现代化的部队。

这篇报道最初在2019年9月刊登，由于读者的兴趣，现重新发表。

据一些消息来源称，解放军在1979年战争中的表现非常糟糕，甚至连越南指挥官都感到惊讶。这是其依赖朝鲜战争式的步兵突击战术的结果，这是由于解放军的行动不灵活和军事思想的停滞。指挥结构的布局以及支持它的基础设施，无法支持由较小的高质量部队组成的机动战。

1979年战争结束后，解放军内部进行了许多改革和重组。旧的领导层被清除，新的军官被引入。最后，在1984年出现了对这些改革进行检验的情况。1983年底，邓小平会见了柬埔寨诺罗敦-西哈努克亲王。王子希望得到帮助，因为越南士兵在柬埔寨境内取得了重大进展。因此，邓小平决定动员解放军在1984年进行一次重大的进攻行动。进攻的目标是占领老山和者阴山地区。经过1984年4月大部分时间的准备性炮击，地面攻势终于在4月28日启动。五个步兵团袭击了老山周围的山顶阵地，逐一攻克。这并不是一个完全成功的故事，因为这些团伤亡惨重，而且采用了与1979年类似的僵硬战术。被指派进攻者阴山的两个团的情况要好一些。灵活的指挥使攻击被推迟到合适的时机，攻击取得了巨大的成功，所有的越南阵地都被攻占。负责这些团的师长很快就被提拔为第十一军的指挥官，这次进攻被作为解放军现在能够完成的教科书式的例子来引用。

越南人在MD-84战役中发起反击，试图夺回他们在老山攻势中失去的阵地。整个6月和7月，中国在老山的阵地遭到了反击。这些攻势的事后报告表明，中国军事现代化被证明是成功的一个可能原因。越南老兵回忆说，由于中国在前线部署了新的夜视设备，他们甚至在夜间也被中国的大炮轰击。此外，中国的物流也达到了新的效率水平。一位中国炮兵指挥官说，在击退反击的过程中，他可以随心所欲地执行射击任务，而不用担心弹药供应问题，这在他的职业生涯中还是第一次。

在老山地区的行动也是解放军侦察部队发展更大直接行动能力的催化剂。1984年，一支越南Dac Cong突击队摧毁了解放军的反炮兵雷达后，邓小平要求解放军总参谋部建立类似的能力。所有中国军区都被命令组织侦察旅，然后在整个老山地区进行轮换。共成立了15个侦察旅，其中3至5个在任何时候都被部署到该地区。这些旅在突袭后方地区方面非常活跃，他们获得的经验后来被解放军用来帮助创建他们自己的特种作战部队。

总的来说，虽然中越边境战争看起来无足轻重，但事实证明，它们是解放军改革的有效试验场。老山地区的火力试验使解放军成长为一支具有前瞻性思维的新领导队伍。新的技术和组织结构也得到了试验和改革，并获得了战斗经验，导致了中国特种部队的建立。用一位中国将军的话说，边境冲突 "使他实现了用现代方法发动现代战争的梦想"。1979年至1990年的中越边境冲突可以被看作是现代解放军诞生的熔炉，它是从1979年进攻越南的伐木部队改革而来的。

作者参考了《第三次印度支那战争中的中国军事战略》（Edward C. Dowd）和《邓小平的长期战争：1979-1991年中越军事冲突》（张晓明）。

查理-高在格林奈尔学院学习政治和计算机科学，经常就国防和国家安全问题发表评论。这篇文章最初在2019年9月刊登，由于读者的兴趣，现重新发表。

图片。路透社

Shocking Defeat: How China Lost to Vietnam in 1979

Key Point: 

Beijing may have lost the war, but it won in the long-run. Here's how the conflict helped birth painful but necessary military reforms in the PLA.

Chinese operations against Vietnam in the 1980s are often divided into four phases. In the first, the Chinese and Vietnamese further entrenched their positions along the border. This lasted until 1981. The second and third phase consisted of escalating offensive operations across the border from 1981 to 1987, gradually increasing in intensity. The last phase involved the PLA’s withdrawal from the border region. The political objectives of the Chinese incursions were to “punish” Vietnam for its continued belligerence towards Thailand and Cambodia. Since Vietnamese troops were going into Cambodia, Chinese troops would continue to do the same. Militarily, China saw the border conflict as a way to evolve the PLA from an antiquated fighting force to a modern one, by testing new doctrines and equipment on the border.

This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

The PLA’s performance in the 1979 war was so bad, even Vietnamese commanders were surprised, according to some sources. This was a result of its reliance on Korean War–style infantry assault tactics, due to the operational inflexibility and stagnation of military thought in the PLA. The layout of the command structure, and the infrastructure that supported it, could not support maneuver warfare by smaller units of higher-quality forces.

Following the 1979 war, many reforms and reorganizations occurred within the PLA. Old leadership was removed, and a fresh set of new officers was brought in. Finally, in 1984 the situation presented itself for a test of these reforms. Late in 1983, Deng Xiaoping met with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The prince wanted help, as Vietnamese soldiers were making significant gains inside of Cambodia. As a result, Deng decided to mobilize the PLA for a significant offensive operation in 1984. The offensive’s objectives were to capture the areas of Laoshan and Zheyinshan. After preparatory barrages throughout most of April 1984, the ground offensive was finally launched on April 28. Five infantry regiments assaulted hilltop positions around Laoshan, taking them one by one. This was not a total success story, as these regiments took heavy casualties and used inflexible tactics similar to 1979. The two regiments assigned to assault Zheyinshan fared better. Flexible command allowed the attacks to be postponed until the opportune time, and the attack was a great success, with all Vietnamese positions being captured. The divisional commander in charge of those regiments was soon promoted to command the Eleventh Army, and the attack was cited as a textbook example of what the PLA could now accomplish.

The Vietnamese launched counterattacks in the MD-84 Campaign in an attempt to reclaim the positions they lost in the Laoshan offensive. Counterattacks occurred against the Chinese positions at Laoshan throughout June and July. After-action reports from these offensives suggest that Chinese military modernization proved to be a possible reason for success. Vietnamese veterans recalled being shelled by Chinese artillery even at nighttime, due to the deployment of new Chinese night-vision devices to the frontline. In addition, Chinese logistics achieved new levels of efficiency. One Chinese artillery commander remarked that in repelling the counterattacks, he could execute as many fire missions as he wished without worrying about ammunition supply for the first time in his career.

Operations in the Laoshan sector also were the catalyst for the development of greater direct-action capability among the PLA’s reconnaissance units. After a Vietnamese Dac Cong commando unit destroyed a PLA counterbattery radar in 1984, Deng Xiaoping asked the PLA General Staff to create similar capabilities. All Chinese military regions were ordered to organize reconnaissance brigades, which were then rotated throughout the Laoshan sector. Fifteen reconnaissance brigades were created, three to five of which were deployed to the sector at any given time. These brigades were very active in raiding rear areas, and experience gained by them was later used by the PLA to help create their own special-operations forces.

Overall, while the Sino-Vietnamese border wars might have seemed insignificant, they proved to be an effective testing ground for the PLA’s reforms. Trials by fire in the Laoshan sector allowed the PLA to grow a new cadre of forward-thinking leadership. New technologies and organizational structures were also trialed and reformed, and combat experience was gained that lead to the creation of Chinese SOF. In one Chinese general’s words, the border conflict “allowed him to achieve his dream of waging modern war by modern methods.” The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 can be seen as the crucible in which the modern PLA was born, reformed from the lumbering army that attacked Vietnam in 1979.

The author was informed by Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War by Edward C. Dowd and Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam 1979–1991 by Xiaoming Zhang.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

Image: Reuters