尼克松政府与阿以冲突，1969-1973年

 1973年的阿以战争

1973年的阿以战争是美国对中东外交政策的一个分水岭。

它迫使尼克松政府认识到，阿拉伯国家对以色列不愿意从其1967年占领的领土上撤出的失望情绪可能会对美国产生重大的战略影响。

因此，这场战争为国务卿亨利-基辛格的 "穿梭外交 "铺平了道路，并最终促成了1979年的以色列-埃及和平条约。

尼克松政府与阿以冲突，1969-1973年

理查德-尼克松总统上任时坚信，阿以在被占领土命运上的对峙会损害美国在阿拉伯世界的地位，并破坏美苏缓和关系的前景。

为了打破僵局，他命令国务卿威廉-罗杰斯（William Rogers）与苏联就解决中东问题的参数进行谈判，目的是达成一项每个超级大国都能向其地区客户推销的协议。

然而，到1969年12月，苏联、埃及和以色列都拒绝了所谓的 "罗杰斯计划"，该计划要求以色列撤回到1949年的停战线，并进行 "不大程度的修改"，以换取和平。

罗杰斯计划的失败导致尼克松暂停了与苏联达成解决方案的努力，并使国家安全顾问亨利-基辛格的论点更加可信，即只要埃及这个主要的阿拉伯国家仍然与苏联保持一致，美国就不应迫使以色列做出让步。

1970年夏天，尼克松与基辛格决裂，允许罗杰斯提出一个更有限的倡议，以制止以色列和埃及在苏伊士运河沿线的 "消耗战"，苏联已经在军事上参与其中。

"罗杰斯二号 "呼吁以色列和埃及同意三个月的停火，并在联合国调解员贡纳-亚林的主持下进行谈判，双方都接受了这一建议，并在8月7日停止了战斗。

然而，尼克松的外交胃口被埃及和苏联将防空导弹移至运河附近的努力以及叙利亚对约旦内战的干预所破坏。

直到1971年2月，基辛格反对过早奖励苏联客户的论点再次发挥了作用。

然而，1971年2月，埃及总统安瓦尔-萨达特为尼克松政府提供了一个建立阿以和平的新机会。

萨达特提议，如果以色列国防军从运河东岸撤军，埃及将重新开放苏伊士运河，后来还同意了进一步撤军的时间表。

他还表示，如果以色列国防军撤到国际边界，他将放弃对以色列的所有交战要求。

然而，罗杰斯试图利用萨达特的声明，努力实现一个临时解决方案的努力遭到了以色列人的反对，并且几乎没有得到基辛格和尼克松的支持。

基辛格认为，埃及提出的临时解决方案以及当年9月提出的苏联和平计划将被以色列人拒绝，他不希望在中东问题上的不和破坏1972年5月莫斯科峰会前的缓和努力。

对尼克松来说，在1972年总统选举前避免美以关系出现危机的愿望加强了这种推理。

在莫斯科峰会之后，美国人和苏联人故意避免讨论中东问题，萨达特又采取了两项行动，让尼克松政府打破阿以僵局。

1972年7月，他决定将苏联军事顾问驱逐出埃及，并通过他的国家安全顾问哈菲兹-伊斯梅尔（Hafiz Isma'il）与基辛格开辟了一条秘密通道。

1973年2月，伊斯梅尔会见了基辛格，并告诉他，埃及愿意与以色列签署一项单独的和平协议，该协议可能涉及国际边界两侧的非军事区和沙姆沙伊赫等敏感地点的维和人员。

然而，埃及和以色列的正常化必须等到以色列从1967年征服的所有领土上撤出。

以色列人的反应停滞不前，尼克松和基辛格几乎没有努力去改变他们的想法。

尽管萨达特公开表现出沮丧，以及约旦国王侯赛因和苏联秘书长勃列日涅夫的警告，尼克松和基辛格认为，鉴于军事平衡，埃及和叙利亚不会攻击以色列，这种观点得到了美国情报界大部分人的支持。

直到1973年秋天，总统和基辛格认为，任何美国的外交举措都必须等到10月份以色列选举之后。

战争及其后果

1973年10月6日，埃及和叙利亚袭击了以色列在西奈半岛和戈兰高地的部队。

尽管最初以色列受到了挫折，但现在既是国务卿又是国家安全顾问的基辛格认为以色列会很快获胜。

他担心阿拉伯人的溃败会迫使苏联进行干预，提高他们在阿拉伯世界的威信，破坏缓和关系。

因此，他建议美国和苏联呼吁结束战斗，恢复到1967年的停火线。

不愿代表其客户进行干预的苏联同意了，但埃及人拒绝了停火建议。

为了避免阿拉伯国家的失败和军事干预，苏联随后开始向埃及和叙利亚提供武器补给。

到10月9日，在以色列国防军对埃及军队的反击失败后，以色列人要求美国也为他们做同样的事情。

尼克松不想看到以色列被打败，于是同意了，10月14日，携带武器的美国飞机开始抵达以色列。

随着美国空运的进行，战斗转向对阿拉伯人不利。

10月16日，以色列国防军部队越过了苏伊士运河。

萨达特开始对停火表现出兴趣，导致勃列日涅夫邀请基辛格到莫斯科谈判达成协议。

联合国安理会于10月22日通过了美国-苏联关于先停火后和谈的建议，成为第338号决议。

然而，事后，基辛格飞往特拉维夫，在那里他告诉以色列人，如果以色列国防军继续推进，美国不会反对，而他则飞回了华盛顿。

当基辛格回到美国后，他同意了苏联提出的寻求另一项停火决议的要求，安理会于10月23日通过了该决议。

然而，以色列人仍然拒绝停止。10月24日，勃列日涅夫给尼克松发了一条热线信息，建议美国和苏联派部队到埃及 "执行 "停火。

如果尼克松选择不这样做，勃列日涅夫威胁说："我们应该面临紧急考虑单方面采取适当措施的问题。"

美国的回应是在10月25日将其核力量置于全球警戒状态。

到了晚上，安全理事会通过了第340号决议，要求停火，将所有部队撤回到10月22日的位置，并由联合国观察员和维和人员监督停火，危机才得以缓解。

这一次，以色列人接受了该决议。

因此，1973年的战争以以色列的胜利而告终，但美国却付出了巨大的代价。

虽然这场战争没有破坏缓和关系，但它使美国比古巴导弹危机以来的任何时候都更接近与苏联的核对抗。

此外，美国对以色列的军事空运导致阿拉伯石油生产国对美国和一些西欧国家的石油运输实行禁运，造成国际经济动荡。

为基辛格在阿拉伯-以色列建立和平方面做出重大努力提供了舞台。

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States. The war thus paved the way for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979.

The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

President Richard Nixon came into office convinced that the Arab-Israeli standoff over the fate of the occupied territories could damage America’s standing in the Arab world and undermine prospects for U.S.-Soviet détente. In attempt to break the deadlock, he ordered Secretary of State William Rogers to negotiate with the Soviets on the parameters of a Middle East settlement, with the goal of reaching an agreement that each superpower could sell to its regional clients. By December 1969, however, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel had all rejected the so-called “Rogers Plan,” which called for Israeli to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines, with “insubstantial alterations,” in return for peace.

The failure of the Rogers Plan led Nixon to suspend efforts to reach a settlement with the Soviets and lent credence to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States should not push Israel for concessions so long as Egypt, the leading Arab state, remained aligned with the Soviets. In the summer of 1970, Nixon broke with Kissinger and allowed Rogers to present a more limited initiative to halt the Israeli-Egyptian “War of Attrition” along the Suez Canal, in which the Soviets had become militarily involved. “Rogers II,” which called for Israel and Egypt to agree to a three month ceasefire and negotiations under the auspices of U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring, was accepted by both parties, who stopped fighting on August 7. Yet Nixon’s appetite for diplomacy was spoiled by Egyptian and Soviet efforts to move anti-aircraft missiles closer to the Canal and Syrian intervention in Jordan’s civil war. Until February 1971, Kissinger’s arguments against prematurely rewarding Soviet clients again held sway.

In February 1971, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat presented the Nixon administration with a new opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Sadat proposed that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pulled back from the Canal’s east bank and later agreed to a timetable for further withdrawals. He also indicated that he would renounce all claims of belligerency against Israel if the IDF withdrew to the international border. Rogers’ efforts to capitalize on Sadat’s statements by working toward an interim settlement, however, were opposed by the Israelis, and received little support from Kissinger and Nixon. Kissinger believed that Egyptian proposals for an interim settlement, along with a Soviet peace plan tabled that September, would be rejected by the Israelis, and did not want discord over the Middle East to undermine efforts at détente before the Moscow summit of May 1972. For Nixon, such reasoning was reinforced by a desire to avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations before the 1972 presidential elections.

In the wake of the Moscow summit, where the Americans and the Soviets deliberately avoided discussing the Middle East, Sadat made two more moves to get the Nixon administration to break the Arab-Israeli stalemate. In July 1972, he decided to expel Soviet military advisors from Egypt, and opened a backchannel to Kissinger through Hafiz Isma‘il, his national security advisor. In February 1973, Isma‘il met with Kissinger and informed him that Egypt would be willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel that could involve demilitarized zones on both sides of the international border and peacekeepers in sensitive locations like Sharm al-Shaykh. However, Egyptian-Israeli normalization would have to wait until Israel withdrew from all the territories it had conquered in 1967. The Israelis responded haltingly, and Nixon and Kissinger made little effort to change their minds. Despite Sadat’s public displays of frustration, as well as warnings from Jordan’s King Hussein and Soviet Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon and Kissinger believed that given the military balance, Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, a view supported by much of the U.S. intelligence community. Until the fall of 1973, the President and Kissinger held that any American diplomatic initiative would have to wait until after Israel’s elections that October.

The War and its Consequences

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Despite initial Israeli setbacks, Kissinger, now both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, believed that Israel would win quickly. He feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. Thus, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union call for an end to the fighting and a return to the 1967 ceasefire lines. The Soviets, who were uneager to intervene on behalf of their clients, agreed, but the Egyptians rejected the ceasefire proposal. Wanting to avoid both an Arab defeat and military intervention, the Soviets then began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons. By October 9, following a failed IDF counter-attack against Egypt’s forces, the Israelis requested that America do the same for them. Not wanting to see Israel defeated, Nixon agreed, and American planes carrying weapons began arriving in Israel on October 14.

With the American airlift underway, the fighting turned against the Arabs. On October 16, IDF units crossed the Suez Canal. Sadat began to show interest in a ceasefire, leading Brezhnev to invite Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate an agreement. A U.S.-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington. When Kissinger returned to the United States, he agreed to a Soviet request to seek another ceasefire resolution, which the Security Council adopted on October 23. Yet the Israelis still refused to stop. On October 24, Brezhnev sent Nixon a hotline message suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops to Egypt to “implement” the ceasefire. If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25. By the end of the day, the crisis abated when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces to their October 22 positions, and U.N. observers and peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire. This time, the Israelis accepted the resolution.

The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States. Though the war did not scuttle détente, it nevertheless brought the United States closer to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis. The American military airlift to Israel, moreover, had led Arab oil producers to embargo oil shipments to the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval. The stage was set for Kissinger to make a major effort at Arab-Israeli peacemaking.