以色列的存在并不是对埃及的威胁，与以色列的战争才是。安全概念的基础是与埃及的对手和平相处的过程，而不是消灭它。

 以色列的存在并不是对埃及的威胁，

与以色列的战争才是。

安全概念的基础是与埃及的对手和平相处的过程，

而不是消灭它。

@@@

萨达特的英语说得很好，虽然有些呆板，但准确而正式--也许是因为他在战争期间在英国监狱里从报纸、短篇小说和书籍中自学的缘故。 [130]

他的论述很强调，眼睛微微眯起，仿佛在观看某个遥远的地平线。

他说，他的结论是，没有美国的长期善意，就不可能取得进展。

因此，他将寻求与美国的和解和中东地区的持久和平。

他追求的是基本态度的改变，而不是地图上的线条。

 

Sadat spoke in excellent English if in a somewhat stilted manner, precise and formal – perhaps because he had taught himself from newspapers, short stories and books while in British prisons during the war.[130]

His exposition was delivered emphatically, with his eyes slightly narrowed, as if viewing some distant horizon. He had concluded, he said, that no progress could be made without long-term American goodwill. He would therefore seek reconciliation with America and a lasting peace for the Middle East. His quest was for a change in basic attitudes, not of lines on a map.

 

他给了我他的基辛格计划。

他问，我的计划是什么？

 

He had given me his Kissinger Plan. What, he asked, was mine?

 

我说，对话的目的是实现持久和平。

然而，其持久性将取决于各方分阶段获得对方的信任，从而对进程本身产生信心。

第一次行动不可能实现和平或信任。

我继续说，在目前，萨达特的基辛格计划过于雄心勃勃。

以色列军队更现实的撤退线将远远低于他的建议，即在米特拉和吉迪山口以西的某个地方。

这可能需要几个月的时间来进行谈判。

我们将尽最大努力实现脱离接触进程，以期继续这一进程，并在此基础上开展和平进程。

 

The objective of the dialogue, I said, was a lasting peace. Its durability, however, would depend on the parties’ gaining each other’s confidence in stages, thereby accruing confidence in the process itself. A first move could not possibly achieve either peace or confidence. At the present moment, I continued, Sadat’s Kissinger Plan was too ambitious. A more realistic withdrawal line for Israeli forces would fall well short of his proposal, somewhere to the west of the Mitla and Gidi passes. It would probably require several months to negotiate. We would do our best to achieve the disengagement process, with a view to continuing it, and base a peace process on it.

 

与萨达特的谈话经常被思考的停顿所打断。

现在，在其中一次停顿之后，他只回答了两个字。

'以色列呢？

我同样隐晦地回答说，我把与梅尔总理一起制定的六点方案递给他。

 

A conversation with Sadat was frequently interrupted by pauses for reflection. Now, after one of those pauses, he responded with just two words: ‘And Israel?’ I replied, similarly cryptically, by handing him the six points worked out with Prime Minister Meir.

 

萨达特看了几分钟的文件，没有任何讨论就接受了它。

他总结说，纳赛尔寻求骚扰美国进行合作的做法是不明智的。

第三军不是埃及和美国之间问题的核心。

相比之下，萨达特自己的目标是与美国建立信任关系，与以色列实现和平。

为了象征性地表达这一点，他将在我们会面后宣布我们甚至没有提议的事情：

通过在华盛顿设立一个由大使领导的埃及利益部门，结束埃及自1967年以来对美国的外交抵制。

大使将于1973年12月被任命。

(这与同年早些时候我们与中国建立关系时遵循的程序相同）。

全面的外交关系将在缔结脱离接触协议后建立。

 

Sadat looked at the paper for a few minutes and accepted it without any discussion. Nasser had been unwise, he summed up, to seek to harass America into cooperation. The Third Army was not the heart of the matter between Egypt and America. Sadat’s own aim, by contrast, was relations of confidence with America and peace with Israel. To express this symbolically, he would announce after our meeting what we had not even proposed: an end to Egypt’s diplomatic boycott of the United States, in place since 1967, through the establishment of an Egyptian interest section in Washington, headed by an ambassador. The ambassador would be named in December 1973. (This was the same procedure we had followed earlier that same year in establishing relations with China.) Full diplomatic relations would follow the conclusion of a disengagement agreement.

 

这些话不是以条件的形式提出的，也不是要求对等的，而是描述了一个理想的方向。

与我们后来了解到的他的顾问们几乎一致的意见相反，萨达特决定冒险听从一位美国国务卿的话，即美国将在三个月内促进埃及和以色列的领土谈判取得重大进展。

在整个过程中，第三军将一直被困住。

如果出现任何差错，萨达特就会被毁掉，埃及就会受到羞辱。

 

These remarks were put forward not in conditional form, nor as a demand for reciprocity, but rather as a description of a desirable course. Against what we later learned was the near-unanimous sentiment of his advisors, Sadat had decided to take his chances on the word of an American secretary of state that the United States would facilitate significant progress in Egyptian–Israeli territorial negotiations over a period of three months. Throughout, the Third Army would remain trapped. If anything were to go wrong, Sadat would be ruined and Egypt humiliated.

 

一个看似微小的步骤--在第三军陷入困境后为其提供非军事物资--创造了一个初步合作的机会，并成为和平进展的象征。

当我还在开罗时，助理国务卿乔-西斯科和埃及外交部长伊斯梅尔-法赫米将与梅尔夫人在华盛顿制定的、现在已被萨达特接受的六点内容变成了条约语言。

 

A seemingly minor step – non-military supplies for the Third Army after it had become beleaguered – created an opportunity for preliminary cooperation and became a symbol for progress towards peace. While I was still in Cairo, the six points worked out with Mrs Meir in Washington and now accepted by Sadat were put into treaty language by Assistant Secretary of State Joe Sisco and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy.

 

访问结束时，萨达特实现了他大胆赌博的最初目的：

他打破了现状，以便为在美国的主持下与以色列进行谈判提供可能性。

他的最终目的是结束与以色列的冲突，自1967年6月的战争以来，这场冲突耗尽了埃及的精力和信心。

在他看来，以色列的存在并不是对埃及的威胁，与以色列的战争才是。

这种威胁可以通过一种新的安全概念来减少并最终消除，这种安全概念的基础是与埃及的对手和平相处的过程，而不是消灭它。

 

By the end of the visit, Sadat had achieved the initial purpose of his daring gamble: he had broken the status quo in order to open the possibility of negotiation with Israel under American auspices. His ultimate purpose was to end the conflict with Israel that had sapped Egyptian energy and confidence since the June 1967 war. In his mind, the existence of Israel was not a threat to Egypt’s being; war with Israel was. That threat could be reduced and ultimately eliminated through a new concept of security based on the process of peace with Egypt’s adversary rather than its annihilation.