蘇聯利益在華沙集團，其他地方是紙老虎：不敢直接面對美蘇戰爭

蘇聯利益在華沙集團，其他地方是紙老虎：不敢直接面對美蘇戰爭

蘇聯目標還是賣武器和援助

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 尼克松将驻欧美军的警戒级别提高了一个档次。

第六舰队的水兵被召回他们在地中海的舰艇，而在美国，第82空降师也为潜在的行动做好了准备。[66]

警戒--几乎完全是针对常规部队的--旨在警告有关各方，特别是苏联和叙利亚，美国正在考虑采取军事行动。

 

Therefore, Nixon decided in the Situation Room that any appeals for restraint from other countries be diverted to the Syrian invaders and their Soviet sponsors in the first instance. We would insist on Syrian withdrawal from Jordan as a precondition to negotiations. Such a policy required some demonstration of US commitment. Nixon therefore raised the alert level for US forces in Europe by one notch. Sailors of the Sixth Fleet were recalled to their ships in the Mediterranean, and in the United States the 82nd Airborne Division was readied for potential action.[66]

The alert – almost exclusively for conventional forces – was designed to warn the concerned parties, especially the Soviet Union and Syria, that US military action was being considered.

 

在制定了战略之后，尼克松遵循其一贯的做法，将战略的实施交给下属。

他离开了情况室，让西斯科、亚历山大-海格将军（当时是我的副手）和我去处理细节问题。

以尼克松的名义给以色列总理戈尔达-梅尔的电文指出，美国将抵制外部势力--指苏联--的干预，并敦促她不要超出现有的动员范围，以便给我们的战略以时间来巩固。

给侯赛因国王的信息表明，他可以依靠我们的支持来恢复现状。

还向北约盟国发出了信息，告知他们战备决定及其背后的原因。

 

Having set the strategy, Nixon followed his usual practice of leaving its implementation to subordinates. He departed the Situation Room, leaving Sisco, General Alexander Haig (then my deputy) and me to take care of the details. A message to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, on Nixon’s behalf, stated that the United States would resist the intervention of outside powers – meaning the Soviet Union – and urged her not to go beyond the existing mobilization in order to give our strategy time to take hold. The message to King Hussein indicated that he could rely on our support to restore the status quo. Messages were also sent to NATO allies advising them of the readiness decisions and the reasoning behind them.

 

面对美国拒绝容忍由苏联支持的叙利亚军事压力的这种表现，莫斯科结束了它在危机中的角色。

第二天（9月21日）下午，在一个大使馆的外交招待会上，多布里宁的副手把我拉到一边，告诉我苏联顾问在叙利亚部队进入约旦时已经离开。

随着苏联的支持被大大取消，叙利亚部队正式返回他们的基地，侯赛因重新控制了他的国家。

 

In the face of this demonstration of American refusal to tolerate Syrian military pressure backed by the Soviet Union, Moscow ended its part in the crisis. Seeking me out at a diplomatic reception at an embassy the next afternoon, September 21, Dobrynin’s deputy took me aside to inform me that Soviet advisors had left Syrian forces as they crossed into Jordan. With Soviet backing substantially removed, the Syrian troops duly returned to their bases, and Hussein retook control of his country.

 

这种管理约旦危机的策略反映了尼克松在随后的危机管理中反复出现的模式：

经过一段时间的思考，然后采取足以使对手相信进一步升级构成不可接受的风险的突然行动。

在这两方面，1970年9月的经验将预示着1973年10月更为重要的中东危机的到来。

 

This strategy of managing the Jordan crisis reflected a pattern that would recur in Nixon’s subsequent crisis management: a period of reflection, followed by a sudden move comprehensive enough to convince the adversary that further escalation posed unacceptable risk. In both respects, the experience of September 1970 would preview the even more consequential Middle East crisis in October 1973.