邱吉爾對孟加拉飢荒的責任是否與希特勒對大屠殺的責任一樣？

邱吉爾對孟加拉飢荒的責任是否與希特勒對大屠殺的責任一樣？

在公眾意識中，孟加拉飢荒的歷史常常被簡化為這個簡單的問題。它主要源自於Madhusree Mukerjee的作品，他在 2010 年出版的著作《邱吉爾的秘密戰爭》揭開了英國殖民歷史中一個基本上被遺忘的部分。她的說法在印刷品和網路上被廣泛重複。

儘管許多關於邱吉爾參與其中的評論有些誇張，但事實是飢荒造成了大約 350-380 萬孟加拉人的死亡。對於戰前擁有 6,180 萬人口的國家來說，這意味著孟加拉人口減少了 6.1%，其中至少一半在一年內死亡。當時，這些孟加拉人被官方理解為英國臣民。英國歷史上還沒有哪位首相導致如此多的本國公民死亡。

考慮到這一點以及有關邱吉爾的大量文獻，幾乎完全沒有討論他對 2010 年之前的飢荒的反應，這是非同尋常的。正如Fielding 等人在2020 年談到邱吉爾時所寫的那樣，「他在一生中曾受到很多批評，但從未在公開場合因他在1943 年孟加拉飢荒中所扮演的角色而受到批評。即使是檔案的發布和重要日記的出版也沒有改變但在馬杜斯里·穆克吉(Madhusree Mukerjee) 的高度批判性研究發表後，即使對於那些希望為邱吉爾開脫的人來說，這個問題也成為了一個重要的參考點。

這是一個複雜的主題，我花了時間完整地寫出我的研究。不幸的是，這導致了一個非常長的多部分答案，我向所有喜歡簡短「是或否」的人表示歉意。

下面我打算有系統地闡述這次飢荒的事件和原因。
在部分內容中，我將調查有關邱吉爾參與飢荒的一般史學。
在第二部分中，我將探討邱吉爾本人的個人態度和觀點。
在第三部分中，我詳細介紹了孟加拉和印度本身的情況。
在第 4、5 和 6 部分中，我將重點放在英國糧食運輸這一更大的問題以及邱吉爾和戰時內閣的決定。
第七部分是結論和選定的參考書目。

沉默是金：邱吉爾的史學
在穆克吉之前，甚至連批評傳記作家（例如克萊夫龐廷）都完全忽視了孟加拉飢荒，邱吉爾和吉爾伯特（他的官方傳記作者）各自寫了六卷，但從未提及孟加拉的存在。即使到了 2001 年，詹金斯也能寫出近 1000 頁而不提及它。甚至韋戈爾德2008年的學術專著也明確聚焦於邱吉爾和印度，儘管多次提到飢荒，但從未討論過邱吉爾在其中所扮演的角色。但在穆克吉的猛烈攻擊之後，它就不再被忽視了，儘管許多人試圖盡快駁回它（除了英國前保守黨首相鮑里斯·約翰遜撰寫的邱吉爾傳記中，孟加拉再次因其缺席）。

黑斯廷斯在2011 年為邱吉爾撰寫的傳記中用一小段內容介紹了孟加拉，但到2018 年，安德魯·羅伯茨(Andrew Roberts) 感到被迫用幾頁的篇幅來講述絕望的後衛防禦，他堅稱，“如果有食物可用且易於運輸，邱吉爾就會派出它。”蘭沃斯在 2017 年用了整整一章的篇幅來辯護，堅稱“邱吉爾多次採取措施、任命人員並發出指示，盡最大努力緩解孟加拉的飢荒”，並在 2015 年《標準周刊》的一篇文章中寫道”，“如果沒有邱吉爾，1943 年孟加拉飢荒將會更加嚴重。塔克瓊斯在 2021 年對此進行了簡要介紹，但小心翼翼地將注意力幾乎完全集中在 1943 年末和韋維爾的行動上，並寫道邱吉爾的決定「嚴厲但可以理解」。 2013年，勞倫斯的辯護沒有那麼有力，但仍然得出結論：「最終，是對行動必要性的嚴格計算決定了孟加拉飢荒救濟的歷史」。

慕克吉面前並非完全沉默。一個例外是薩維帕利·戈帕爾（Sarvepalli Gopal）在布萊克和路易斯 1993 年的選集中發表的文章“丘吉爾和印度”，儘管它只用了半頁的篇幅介紹了這一事件。沉默的另一個部分例外是赫爾曼，他在2009 年確實提到了飢荒，並承認“邱吉爾對他而言是冷酷無情的”，並且“在飢荒問題上......證明是不理性的：他幾乎堅決反對任何食品運輸」 ，儘管他在短短幾頁內跳過了整個飢荒，更願意關注韋維爾的成功而不是丘吉爾的失敗，並堅持認為丘吉爾應該為他的總督的行動分享一份功勞，因為他任命了他。然而，2010年，赫爾曼在《最好的時刻》對穆克吉的書進行評論時，堅決為邱吉爾的行為辯護，堅稱「邱吉爾和他的內閣在不破壞戰爭努力的情況下尋求一切方法來減輕痛苦」。

他的流行傳記中的所有這些辯護都只受到對飢荒本身的事件和原因的最表面的理解。幾乎沒有人提及任何有關飢荒本身的歷史學家（只有勞倫斯提到兩位作者作為資料來源），並且主要依賴其他邱吉爾傳記作者以及對埃默里和戰時內閣會議紀要的選擇性引用。邱吉爾的辯護也主要基於這些選擇性的引述。他們對飢荒起因的理解是基本的，重複認為飢荒幾乎完全是由緬甸入侵和米德納普爾旋風造成的，儘管自 80 年代以來飢荒的歷史學家就指出這些因素只會對飢荒產生影響。米總量的影響很小，本身不可能造成飢荒。

迄今為止，在邱吉爾的傳記中，只有托伊沒有為他辯護，他在2010 年寫道，「似乎無法避免這樣的結論：管理不善導致了比他們需要的更糟糕的後果，而邱吉爾自己的反應非常無能，而且，這很誘人，冷酷無情。最後評論道：「他未能對孟加拉飢荒做出充分反應。在這裡，他表現出了真正的冷酷無情，而且目光短淺。但對於邱吉爾的作用仍然沒有系統性、嚴格的歷史分析。

最近出現了幾本書，批判性地審視邱吉爾在飢荒中的遺產。 2021 年，惠克羅夫特寫道，「邱吉爾的支持者試圖為他在飢荒期間的行為辯護，這是一項無望的任務」。的行為“過失犯罪” ，並直接指責邱吉爾，不僅因為他的言論，還因為“拒絕宣布該省進入緊急狀態，立即扭轉導致人民挨餓的政策，並從全國其他地區運來大米和麵粉。”然而這些「罪行」其實與邱吉爾並沒有直接關係。儘管阿里讀過一些關於飢荒本身的批評文獻，但他對邱吉爾的攻擊似乎仍然和他的支持者的辯護一樣無知。

當然，邱吉爾在多大程度上參與了孟加拉飢荒的起因和管理不善，這是一個重要的問題，因為他當時是大英帝國的首相。然而，僅僅關注他的行為就陷入了還原論的觀點，即所有世界事件都可以用「偉人」的行為來解釋。它未能審查系統性問題以及其他參與其中並應承擔責任的個人。邱吉爾的行為固然可以受到批評，但如此規模的災難很少是由一個人的疏忽和冷漠造成的——有很多指責。

第二部分：「喧嘩與騷動」：邱吉爾自己的話
許多人主要根據朗沃斯所說的「有罪的引文」來譴責或捍衛邱吉爾。然而，精選的個人名言並不是分析歷史的糟糕方法。然而，值得先提出它們，讓它們擺脫困境。

對邱吉爾的批評通常會突顯他私下所說的言論。這些內容大部分取自他的政治對手的日記，可以說是來自有偏見的來源。然而，這並不一定意味著它們不準確。這些引文的數量來自多個人，因此具有一定程度的準確性。捍衛者認為，這些私人評論應該與邱吉爾支持印度的評論相平衡。然而，此類評論通常是在公開場合發表的。儘管如此，我們不能忽視他們。

事實上，托伊寫道，「1943 年 3 月，教育部長 RA 巴特勒 (RA Butler) 在契克斯 (Chequers) 拜訪了邱吉爾…」。發起了最可怕的攻擊，稱他們粗俗、骯髒、腐敗。當我看到我的對手怒視我時，我總是不得不用誇張的方式把他們引出來。

如果邱吉爾故意在私下發表「誇張」的針對印度的攻擊性言論來激怒人們，那麼他的許多言論就會被人們重新審視。然而，也有人認為他用這個藉口來掩飾自己更極端的觀點。

安德魯‧羅伯茲 (Andrew Roberts) 在《傑出的邱吉爾主義者》(Eminent Churchillians，1993) 中提供了詳細介紹邱吉爾種族主義的一章的介紹。他首先說：「儘管直到20 世紀50 年代末左右，種族主義觀點幾乎被普遍持有，但邱吉爾的種族主義比大多數人更嚴重……他是一位堅定的白人，更不用說盎格魯撒克遜人了，他是個至上主義者，在種族問題上思考問題。

羅伯茨重點介紹了邱吉爾的一長串引言，其中包括他在1908 年寫道，他相信英國軍官階級“比布干達人優越，就像威爾斯先生的火星人對我們一樣”，並且他談到了印第安人東非，「英屬東非的每一個白人都厭惡他們應該與歐洲人平等的想法」。 1943 年 9 月，在白宮的一次午餐會上，他「說為什麼要為盎格魯-撒克遜人的優越性感到抱歉？他們更優秀」。他的私人秘書戴維·亨特寫道：「邱吉爾總體上相當反黑人」。 1952 年 1 月，他告訴他的醫生：“當你學會將一個種族視為低等生物時，就很難擺脫這種思維方式；”當我還是一名下層時，在我看來，印第安人與白人並不相同。

在經歷了這些和其他事件之後，羅伯茨總結道：「毫無疑問，當時的邱吉爾……是一個頑固不化的種族主義者。雖然他的態度在 20 世紀 50 年代左右可能很常見，但其表達的惡毒程度是同時代人所見不到的」。

安德魯羅伯茨是一個有趣的消息來源，因為他最近將邱吉爾描述為“英雄”，而他 2018 年的傳記為他在孟加拉飢荒中的行為進行了辯護。在2021 年接受《電訊報》採訪時，羅伯茨為邱吉爾辯護，聲稱「他說了一些貶損其他種族的事情，但這並不意味著他希望其他種族的人發生不好的事情，這就是我的觀點」。認為種族主義者是。只是說他認為白人優於非白人是顯而易見的……他出生於 1874 年，當時……有一種科學信念認為種族之間存在著等級制度……

“如果你把邱吉爾視為他那個時代的人，並且欣賞他一生為非白人所做的事情。”顯然羅伯茨的論點是錯誤的，但它表明了即使是邱吉爾的支持者也被迫嘗試的辯護。關於針對印度人的種族主義言論，羅伯茲最終辯稱，「邱吉爾所說的這些話並不是真心的」。

進一步引用邱吉爾的種族主義和麻木不仁的評論如下：

埃默里的日記 1944 年 8 月 4 日，「我失去了耐心，忍不住告訴他，我認為他的觀點與希特勒的觀點沒有太大區別」。

穆克吉寫道，據埃默里稱，1942 年 11 月 12 日，邱吉爾咆哮道「被世界上僅次於德國人的最野蠻的民族趕出了印度」。

韋維爾日記，1943 年 6 月 24 日，「[邱吉爾]對印度抱有一種好奇心，總是不願聽到印度的好消息，並且傾向於相信最壞的情況。他心裡仍然保留著他的騎兵下屬對印度的看法。

韋維爾日記，1943 年 7 月 27 日，“[邱吉爾]討厭印度以及與之相關的一切。”

穆克吉寫道，1945 年，「邱吉爾告訴他的私人秘書，「印度教徒是一個骯髒的種族，『他們只是被保護著，免受應有的厄運』。 （拉出意味著快速繁殖。）”

然而，隨著時間的推移，邱吉爾的觀點似乎確實有所軟化。慕克吉寫道，「1953 年6 月…邱吉爾發現自己站在尼赫魯的女兒英迪拉甘地旁邊…『你一定因為英國人對待你父親的方式而憎恨英國人，』邱吉爾說… ……'我們從來沒有恨過你，'她回答。 「我曾經說過，但現在不這樣做了，」他回答。

「所有朋友在一起」：邱吉爾的公眾同情
另一方面，溫斯頓對印度的公眾看法則要謹慎得多。但即使在那裡也能找到線索，例如 1943 年 10 月 6 日他在韋維爾勳爵告別晚宴上的演講。隨著時間的推移，印度歷史上的這段插曲必將成為黃金時代。這篇演講是在孟加拉數百萬人喪生的情況下發表的，這表明邱吉爾對印度的現實是多麼盲目。

邱吉爾經常表現出自己對印度採取仁慈（儘管居高臨下）的態度。 1943 年 10 月 8 日，韋維爾在日記中寫道，邱吉爾指示他任命他為總督。 「[邱吉爾]制定了一項幾乎毫無意義的指令公式…」該指令指示韋維爾，「多年來第一次世界大戰的嚴峻壓力帶來了物資匱乏的狀況，在一些地區瀕臨真正的飢荒」 ，關於印度。必須盡一切努力，甚至透過轉移戰爭急需的運輸來解決當地的短缺問題。

然而，韋維爾發現這項指令是空洞的，因為儘管它談到了食品運輸的必要性，但他知道內閣早些時候對實際這樣做持頑固態度。韋維爾在日記中寫道，他把這本書拿給利奧·埃默里看，“埃默里讀完後說，‘你被一陣熱風吹到了印度。’”

此外，邱吉爾在1943年11月4日寫給加拿大總理威廉·金的信和他在1944年4月29日寫給羅斯福的信經常被認為是邱吉爾竭盡全力幫助緩解飢荒。然而，儘管邱吉爾的官方言論充分展現了他的行動，但它們未能充分代表內閣決定和行動的現實。

邱吉爾在給羅斯福的信中描述了他的活動：「我嚴重關注印度的糧食狀況及其對我們聯合行動可能產生的反應…我已經能夠安排35萬噸小麥…我不知道還能做什麼。然而，這既誇大了他自己的行動，也否定了他採取更多行動的機會。

然而，邱吉爾的公開聲明和著作也具有相關性。 1935年，他透過甘地的中尉甘夏姆·比爾拉（Ghanshyam Birla）寫信給甘地：「我不在乎你對英國的忠誠度是多少。我不介意教育，但要給大眾更多黃油……我真誠地同情印度。

當比爾拉將這一訊息轉達給甘地時，甘地回答說：「我對邱吉爾先生在殖民地辦公室的時候有很好的回憶，從那時起，我就一直認為我永遠可以信賴他的同情和善意。

1943 年 7 月，邱吉爾告訴印度駐戰時內閣代表阿科特·拉馬薩米·穆達利亞爾爵士：「印度人在任何方面都不如白人的舊觀念必須消失。我們必須成為朋友。我希望看到一個偉大的、閃亮的印度，我們可以為它感到自豪，就像我們為一個偉大的加拿大或澳大利亞感到自豪一樣。

戰後，他在回憶錄中寫道：“印度軍隊的光榮英雄主義和軍事品質……無與倫比的勇敢。」（邱吉爾，《命運的鉸鏈》，第 182 頁）

除此之外，他的行為的歷史記錄有時也表現出對印度的一些擔憂。阿姆利則大屠殺後，他公開反對戴爾，認為他的行為不合理。他支持甘地在南非的工作，1906 年在殖民地辦公室任職期間維護印度人的權利，並支持印度賤民種姓的權利。

當時，有些印度人確實把他視為朋友。印度總統薩韋帕利·拉達克里希南 (Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan) 在邱吉爾去世後寫道：“印度政府和人民得知邱吉爾去世的消息，深感悲痛。”尊敬的。溫斯頓·邱吉爾爵士，我們所認識的最偉大的英國人……他令人難忘的服務將被人們銘記幾個世紀。

大使 BN Chakravarty 也讚揚了邱吉爾：“現在榮耀已經離去，但記憶將永存……可以毫不誇張地說，從來沒有這麼多人對一個人如此感激。” 」

第三部分：「遠雷」：孟加拉飢荒的早期成因
早在1934年，社會科學家米特就指出了孟加拉的地方性飢荒。 6300萬人口中的大多數人都在勉強維持生計。

不幸的是，對於這種情況我們沒有採取任何措施。有時有人聲稱殖民政府故意使孟加拉去工業化，故意使其不發達。雖然幾乎沒有證據表明這一點，但政府對該省缺乏投資和關注可能產生了非常相似的效果。

1945 年，當時的孟加拉總督理查德·凱西(Richard Casey) 寫道：「在我看來，最突出的是該省的行政管理嚴重不足……實際上，孟加拉沒有灌溉或排水系統，沒有中世紀的農業系統，也沒有沒有道路，沒有教育，沒有家庭手工業，醫院完全不足，沒有有效的衛生服務，也沒有足夠的機械來應對困境。甚至沒有計劃來彌補這些缺陷……在過去的某個時候，英國政府顯然決定孟加拉……應該以盡可能少的支出運行。

格里諾在 1982 年出版的《現代孟加拉的繁榮與苦難》中表示，他「確信，如果沒有匱乏和混亂的根本條件，飢荒就不可能發生」。

孟加拉政治：「行政混亂」
導致飢荒嚴重的問題之一是政治失敗。自 1935 年以來，儘管印度仍由總督統治，但各省已獲得自己的選舉和民主部會。然而，儘管民選部門負責進口和食品供應等內政，但他們經常被赫伯特州長邊緣化。部分原因是他們的弱點。胡克總理一直任職到 1943 年 3 月，由納齊穆丁（後來的巴基斯坦總理）取代，納齊穆丁在兩年內幾乎沒有任何成就，直到他的政府垮台。

此外，由於總督不應該行使權力，赫伯特幾乎沒有官僚機制來有效地行使權力。 1944 年凱西接任時，他「驚訝地發現孟加拉政府沒有經濟顧問」。

納拉揚指出，「孟加拉省自治的運作是最近飢荒的主要原因之一」。森和慕克吉都同意，並將省政府的「行政混亂」視為造成飢荒的主要原因之一。

1942 年：加爾各答街頭陷入恐慌
1942 年 2 月 15 日，新加坡淪陷，3 月 10 日仰光淪陷，孟加拉處於前線，實際上毫無防禦能力。英國驚慌失措。邱吉爾已於 1941 年 11 月 14 日頒布了「焦土」政策，並於 30 日致函林利斯戈總督，開始實施「拒絕政策」。儘管遭到抗議，埃默里仍然寫道：“至關重要的是，破壞應該是無情的。”

雖然它原本應該只在三個沿海地區進行，但影響卻會波及更遠的地方。該政策的目的只是購買和清除“剩餘”大米。但許多大米在鄉村被凍結而沒有記錄或被毀掉。該政策還取消了交通運輸，摧毀了數千艘船隻，儘管它們是許多人的生命線。儘管赫伯特本人這樣做了，排擠了胡克，但納拉揚在 1944 年寫道，「胡克和他的手下，由於他們的沉默順從，也是愚蠢行為的同謀」。

米和價格
早在 1943 年，《政治家》就宣稱，「這場飢荒是人為造成的」。然而，也發生了幾起導致糧食減少的事件。緬甸的陷落伴隨著 1942 年 10 月 16 日的颶風、洪水和稻根病。 1942/43 年主要冬季收成不佳。因此，1944年飢荒調查委員會報告稱，供給短缺是飢荒的主要原因。

然而，這一觀點在 1981 年被森推翻。格里諾也估計，儘管自然因素產生了影響，但 1943 年仍有 90% 的米正常供應。

這種說法認為，正是這種不受抑制的通貨膨脹直接導致了飢荒。飢荒委員會認為這是次要因素，但森表示這是主要原因。雖然大多數學者都遵循森的論點，但鮑布里克（Bowbrick，1986）、戈斯瓦米（Goswami，1990）、陶格（Tauger，2003、2009）和奧格拉達（Ó Gráda，2007、 2010）提出了一些值得注意的挑戰，他們認為孟加拉實際上存在短缺，而且沒有普遍存在。不過，我在這裡遵循了森的觀點。

天價上漲實際上使數百萬人買不起米。市場凍結是因為種植者不願意出售，即使有米，普通農民也買不起。

政府救濟
然而，正如森所寫，“無論飢荒是如何造成的，打破飢荒的方法都需要在公共分配系統中提供大量食物。”

當時，實現這一目標的解決方案被認為是政府收購大米，然後以低成本傾銷到市場上。然而，儘管多次“搶糧”，但嚴厲、低效的執行最終卻造成了相反的效果，製造了更大的恐慌，導致現有庫存消失在黑市中，推高了價格。

慕克吉寫道：“孟加拉政府已經因戰爭的到來而陷入嚴重混亂，嘗試了一個又一個“解決方案”，推進臨時措施，這造成了進一步的不確定性……與監管類似：在整個時期，一項監管（或反監管）探索了一個又一個的監管制度，這只會加劇市場不穩定和行政混亂等。

此外，儘管頒布了《飢荒法》，但並未遵守。基本原則是政府必須為工人提供「測試」救濟，為非工人提供慈善救濟，並為土地所有者提供農業貸款。官員們從未正式宣布發生飢荒，表面上是為了避免損害公眾信心，直到1944 年1 月31 日才開始實行全面配給計畫。不足意味著配給量有限。 12 月 2 日，孟加拉所有大米出口終於被禁止，但頗有爭議。 12 月 22 日，禁止將任何大米帶出該地區。

這種缺乏的部分原因是未能獲得所需的糧食庫存。部分原因是無能的結果。從 1943 年 1 月起，土木供應部似乎完全放棄了為各地區提供食物的努力，而將所有精力集中在單獨為加爾各答提供食物上。這是一座戰爭危機重重的城市，需要大量的食物來維持運作。但僅對加爾各答的關注就導致各地區挨餓。

納茲穆丁在蘇赫拉瓦迪領導下成立了新的民用供應部。然而，1943 年 5 月，他首先宣布孟加拉並不缺乏大米，此後他的努力就是強迫囤積者釋放庫存，然後徵用它們。這產生了相反的效果。

庫存低的另一個原因是對各省的出口管制導致他們實施了事實上的保護主義政策。雖然德里在三月下令從其他過剩省份發貨，但大多數省份未能交付配額。由於庫存極為有限，從 1943 年 9 月起，政府似乎將大部分精力集中在將「病貧者」從街上轉移到城外的貧困房屋。

然而，經過長時間的延誤後，其他盈餘省份承諾的貨物從 10 月到 12 月開始交付。然而，分配問題導致大量食物滯留在城市，而各地區仍處於飢餓狀態。

10 月 26 日，新任總督韋維爾勳爵抵達加爾各答。他走進城市和各地區，立即徵用了一個陸軍團，將糧食運送到各地區。慕克吉寫道：「韋維爾組織這些救援工作的敏捷性既證明了他自己的主動性，也與至少一百萬人挨餓的冷漠和冷漠形成了非常令人不安的對比。 ……對許多人來說，1943 年11 月發起的救濟力度太小，也太晚了。

遭受飢荒的民眾現在正遭受霍亂、瘧疾和天花的毀滅性爆發。然而，醫療援助從12月才開始，而且嚴重不足。此外，同樣的通貨膨脹也引發了“布料飢荒”，有報導稱，一些裸體的人是因為暴露而不是飢餓而死亡。

冬季收成很好，但收購工作又失敗。口糧店直到1944年1月31日才成立，口糧數量充足。然而，口糧店一開業，就有報道發放的糧食已經腐爛發臭。這是孟加拉部會行政混亂的一個鮮明例子，顯示這些米已經閒置了一年多，而數百萬人卻在挨餓。

1945 年 3 月 29 日，納茲穆丁的內閣垮台，新總督凱西宣布孟加拉實施緊急狀態。 6 月 12 日，韋維爾向埃默里報告說，“他非常高興……說這使他能夠比在一個部會的所有時期內取得更多的進步。”

第四部分：「我沒有看到船隻」：邱吉爾的內閣和糧食進口
因此，我們轉向也許是對英國在飢荒期間的行動最著名的批評，即糧食運輸問題。人們普遍認為，英國故意將糧食運輸從印度轉移出去，導致印度的糧食枯竭，而印度人民卻在挨餓。這話有一定道理，因為戰爭期間英國軍隊駐紮在印度，他們和平民一樣需要食物。由於戰爭，軍隊的供應被認為比平民的糧食供應更重要。這不僅被認為是有效進行戰爭軍事行動的必要條件，也是為了維持對印度統治本身的控制。

雖然印度境內的食物分配不均，但飢荒期間，印度也出口食物，這種做法即使在當時仍有爭議。這種做法在1943年7月結束，但這次禁止出口太晚了，而且有漏洞。數量不多，而且不是發往英國，而是供應錫蘭和中東。儘管如此，事後看來這仍然是個錯誤。

此外，飢荒期間印度的航運整體受到極大限制。這本身並沒有導致飢荒，但它會加劇後果。

最後，威斯敏斯特收到了額外運送穀物的請求，但始終遭到拒絕或削減到無益的水平。同樣，雖然這並沒有導致飢荒，但它是殘酷的疏忽，導致飢荒持續的時間更長，而且比其他情況下更具破壞性。

本節將考慮英國食品分配問題的這四個面向；印度境內的糧食分配存在軍事和民用需求之間的競爭利益、飢荒期間印度的糧食出口、印度整體服務的國際航運受到限制，以及未能滿足更多國際航運的要求。

航運危機：1942 年 9 月至 1943 年 3 月
到 1942 年 12 月，東部的航運狀況已經十分嚴峻。正如貝倫斯所說：「絞索開始閉合……在1941 年下半年……從該地區以外來到這些國家的船隻比平時少了，而該地區內的船隻……可供使用的船隻也更少了。這並不是由於任何總體決定，而僅僅是戰爭問題。

英國的戰時政策基於兩個基本優先事項：保持作戰靈活性和足夠強大的士氣，以便不列顛群島願意在必要時繼續戰爭。我們可以在多大程度上將邱吉爾政府的決定歸咎於他們，這要求我們牢記這一基本事實。

貝倫斯寫道，「因此，根本需要是在歐洲和遠東戰爭的航運索賠之間做出決定……只有一種可行的可能性——切斷印度洋航行」。 1943 年 1 月 5 日，邱吉爾發布法令，將東部戰區的運輸數量減少到 40 個（3 月至 8 月期間每月為 109 個）。穆克吉認為，這項決定是基於萊瑟斯勳爵對問題的嚴重誇大。然而，這些都是邱吉爾和他的內閣所依據的數字和信念。這些數據在到達邱吉爾辦公桌之前可能已經被修改過，但他似乎真誠地相信英國股市正在迅速接近危機局勢。

1942 年 12 月 9 日，總督林利斯戈致電印度國務卿利奧·阿默里，轉達“印度糧食形勢嚴重惡化”，並要求立即進口 60 萬噸小麥。埃默里於 12 月 15 日回复，解釋說這「需要克服巨大的障礙」。正如埃默里解釋 1942 年底的運輸問題時，英國的進口被認為已經“被削減”，無法應對任何進一步的削減。

儘管林利斯戈在 12 月 18 日、12 月 18 日、12 月 22 日和 26 日分別寫道，「最慷慨和最直接的幫助絕對是必要的」。直到 1 月 8 日，埃默里才向戰爭運輸部長萊瑟斯勳爵（Lord Leathers）發送了一份備忘錄，概述了這項請求。林利斯戈1月10日再次寫道，「我們必須強調，印度的小麥情勢變得更加嚴峻」。他解釋說，7月承諾的陸軍小麥中，還有27,900噸需要在2月安排運輸，除此之外，印度在4月底前還需要20萬噸用於民用，還需要額外的儲備40萬。

戰時內閣：1943 年 1 月 12 日至 18 日
1943 年 1 月 12 日，戰時內閣首次開會討論向印度進口額外糧食的問題。內閣將此事提交給主總統約翰·安德森（1930 年代曾任孟加拉總督）領導的主總統委員會，併計劃派遣一名專家顧問。安德森委員會同意在 4 月底之前供應 14 萬噸，低於要求，但正如貝倫斯所寫，四個月內供應 60 萬噸將涉及整個印度洋地區幾乎所有航運的持續使用。 “即使在和平時期，如此規模的要求也一定會造成很大的困難。”

然而，1943 年 2 月 18 日，戰時內閣報告稱，印度「局勢已大大緩和」。在這次會議上，他們還討論了從同一航運區域的其他幾個國家進口穀物的緊急需求。為了滿足這些要求，不可避免地要考慮不同的優先事項。外交大臣寫道，「土耳其將成為未來戰爭戰略的一個重要因素…[應該]給予她特別優惠的待遇」。然而，儘管如此，三月土耳其的需求也無法滿足。萊瑟斯建議印度可以削減救濟物資以供應肯亞。最終，1 月 12 日商定的數量中，只有 58,000 噸運往印度。該數量僅略低於同期交付給整個中東的數量。

「充足」信念：1943 年 3 月至 6 月
1943 年 3 月 18 日，林利斯戈寫信給埃默里說，「目前印度的糧食狀況總體上已大大改善」。當局勢日益惡化時，向威斯敏斯特報告這是一件非同尋常的事情。但它卻讓人洞察印度中央政府在這個關鍵時期的想法。平內爾接到指示，只要他“傳播自給自足的福音”，價格就會下跌，囤積的庫存就會被釋放。承認這一點。印度的要求。

此外，Mukerjee 寫道，“1943 年 1 月至 7 月期間，即使發生飢荒，印度也出口了 71,000 噸大米。”大部分大米將被送往錫蘭的橡膠種植園，這些橡膠種植園被認為對戰爭至關重要。直到 1943 年 7 月 23 日，中央政府才宣布禁止進一步出口大米，但即使在禁令之後，也常常允許少量的特別許可證。

貝倫斯指出，現在是印度的關鍵時刻，英國政府只是無知，沒有意識到印度只能靠大量進口才能生存。但他認為，即使事後看來，即使早在 1942 年夏天就提供了船隻將大量小麥運往印度，這場災難仍然是「不可避免的」。

然而，即使貝倫斯是對的，進口可能無法完全避免災難，但飢荒的任何緩解仍將挽救無數生命。然而他認為，此時「印度的事態經不起分析」。貝倫關於世界航運的複雜性以及戰爭部運輸部無力克服這些複雜性的論點令人信服。然而，這也不是一個全有或全無的問題。即使貝倫斯是對的，而且印度對進口的迫切需求對於威斯敏斯特的分析人士來說絕對是不透明的，但他們仍然收到了一些線索，儘管是部分和微弱的，表明一場相當大的危機正在逼近。

第五部分：不是揮手而是溺水－日益嚴重的危機

無知與冷漠：1943 年 6 月至 1943 年 8 月
直到夏天才收到更多進口請求。相反，中央政府同意赤字和食品價格將在印度內部管理。然而，6 月 6 日，林利斯戈寫信給埃默里，稱「食品狀況…再次惡化」。

7 月 2 日，赫伯特寫信給林利斯戈，他認為自己之前在給總督的報告中「輕描淡寫地犯了錯」。赫伯特總結道：“除非我們能夠立即從外部獲得足夠數量的糧食，否則我們將不得不面臨災難。”

七月，格雷戈里委員會在印度開會審查糧食問題。他們敦促禁止出口，建議進口150萬噸；包括立即50萬噸。 1943 年 7 月 13 日，林利斯戈寫信給埃默里，“我們必須明確表示，我們已推遲回到 HMG，直到最後一刻。”

這是利尼斯戈對飢荒的原因造成的，他在接近威斯敏斯特時猶豫不決，他對問題的一再輕描淡寫，以及他在印度國內的不充分和拖延反應，導致孟加拉一直挨餓，直到7月下旬才採取有效措施。

航運委員會：1943 年 7 月 30 日
1943 年 7 月 30 日，戰時內閣的航運委員會審議了林利斯戈向戰時內閣提出的請求。然而，戰爭運輸部長萊瑟斯勳爵反對每月從澳洲運輸超過 3 萬噸大麥，而可以從伊拉克運輸 10 萬噸大麥。但未經選舉產生的技術顧問查韋爾勳爵（邱吉爾的耳朵）向邱吉爾指出，儘管印度去年冬天對糧食有需求，但「緊急情況消失了。」查韋爾不相信需要進口，並寫道， “英國……已經生活水平的下降比印度還要嚴重”，這表明威斯敏斯特對孟加拉的真實情況有多麼無知。

戰時內閣：1943 年 8 月 4 日
1943 年 8 月 4 日，戰時內閣開會討論運輸請求。埃默里準備的備忘錄確實提到，「飢荒狀況……確實已經開始出現」。然而，這並沒有給孟加拉的局勢帶來正確的印象，那裡有數萬人已經餓死。

查韋爾和萊瑟斯在內閣中都確信印度正在誇大其問題以達到效果。內閣決定只提供區區5萬噸。

埃默里在日記中寫道，他如何「奮力反抗」「查韋爾教授的胡言亂語，他……像溫斯頓一樣，討厭印度」。無論這些指控的真相如何，人們都可以懷疑埃默里也只是因為自己無法說服同事相信自己的立場而感到沮喪。

1943年8月13日，林利斯戈回覆埃默里說，「印度政府和我不能對印度現在的持續穩定負責」。 9 月 4 日，埃默里再次寫道，“他已於 9 月 3 日與萊瑟斯談過，但“他的總體立場是，他確實缺乏船隻。然而，自今年年初以來，情況有所改善，導致史密斯所說的「運輸過剩」。然而，正如貝倫斯所說，這種情況仍然不穩定。

此後，埃默里沒有向威斯敏斯特進一步示好，林利斯戈在給埃默里的信中也沒有提及飢荒，直到9 月18 日總督向埃默里提供了關於孟加拉狀況的更詳細報告，現在首次詳細說明了大規模死亡事件。

林利斯戈為什麼等了這麼久只能推測，但看看他截至 8 月 28 日從赫伯特那裡收到的報告就可以了解很多資訊。赫伯特寫信給他，「我認為我們可以聲稱已經取得了良好的進展……據我所知，情況並不像媒體報道的那麼糟糕」。他將所有問題歸咎於前胡克部的政治拖延，並聲稱他勸說新的納粹穆丁部採取更好行動的努力已經成功。

然而，8 月 22 日，《政治家》報紙刊登了一張飢餓的孟加拉人的照片，引起了國際轟動，並給當局帶來了極大的尷尬。正是這一點，也許比其他任何事情都更促使當局採取行動。

真相大白：1943 年 9 月 – 1943 年 11 月
赫伯特因突發疾病於 9 月 4 日被盧瑟福取代。直到這個日期之後，林利斯戈向埃默里提交的報告才開始包含大規模飢餓和死亡的關鍵細節。

在盧瑟福 9 月 15 日的報告之後，林利斯戈於 9 月 18 日寫信給埃默里，轉發了這一消息：“據報道死亡……據報道，飢荒狀況普遍存在。” 9 月 20 日，“我預計將會出現大規模的死亡事件。”

9 月 23 日，埃默里向下議院發表聲明，在數月否認存在飢荒之後，他承認「過去 7 個月加爾各答的死亡率比正常水平高出 30%」。

戰時內閣：1943 年 9 月 24 日
1943 年9 月24 日，內閣面臨大量文件，其中包括一份GHQ 情報摘要，其中最後提到了關鍵細節：「飢荒現在很普遍…每天從街道和房屋中清除屍體……霍亂、天花飢餓導致數百人死亡……苦力死於飢餓」。然而萊瑟斯勳爵聲稱，在下一次收穫之前仍然「不可能」獲得額外的船隻。唯一可用的來源是中東庫存的 50,000 噸，這些庫存用於非正常作業。內閣決定總共運送20萬噸，其中一半是伊拉克大麥（對降低米價毫無用處）。這再次遠低於確定的必需的最低數量 500,000（伊拉克大麥將無法交付）。

正是在這次會面之後，埃默里在他的日記中寫道：「溫斯頓的說法也許是對的，無論如何，飢餓的孟加拉人的飢餓沒有強壯的希臘人那麼嚴重，但他沒有充分考慮到這個國家的帝國責任感。

戰時內閣：1943 年 11 月 3 日、11 月 10 日和 12 月 16 日
戰時內閣在11 月初又召開了兩次會議，第一次是在11 月3 日討論加拿大提出的10 萬噸（但不包括運輸）的提議，因此內閣拒絕了該提議。問題不在於食物的存在，而是如何在需要的地方提供食物。 11 月 10 日，戰時內閣討論了向印度增加進口的問題。

埃默里在日記中寫道：「溫斯頓對印第安人像兔子一樣繁殖並無所事事地每天獲得一百萬美元的薪水進行了初步的讚揚後，向萊瑟斯詢問了他的看法。他說一月和二月他可以管理5萬噸。溫斯頓同意這一點，我必須感到滿意。埃默里還在這次會面後寫道，“溫斯頓非常不喜歡印度以及與之相關的一切，以至於他除了浪費航運空間之外什麼也看不見。”

然而邱吉爾在他的回憶錄中寫道：「[皮革]很少無法完成我設定的艱鉅任務。有幾次，當所有參謀人員和部門流程都未能解決調動額外師或將其從英國船隻轉運到美國船隻或滿​​足其他需要的問題時，我向他提出個人呼籲，困難似乎解決了。魔法一樣消失了」。然而，無論萊瑟斯有多麼「神奇」的力量，邱吉爾在這起案件中似乎並沒有提出這樣的個人訴求。

11 月 10 日，加拿大也提出調動一艘船將其提供的 10,000 噸小麥運往印度。最初內閣也拒絕了這項提議，但政治反彈迫使他們在 12 月 16 日同意。這艘船確實會起航，儘管幾個月後才會抵達印度。

直到 1943 年 9 月，內閣決定只提供少量航運來緩解印度危機，這一點可以得到部分辯護。是一個偉大的時期，難以輕易克服。然而，9月24日以及11月3日和10日的決定並沒有因為這兩個問題而成為他們的藉口。萊瑟斯現在擁有「過剩」的船隻，媒體和內閣官方文件充滿了關鍵細節，這些細節本應讓他們付出充分而艱苦的努力。

然而，儘管證據發生了變化，他們的結論仍然相同。他們仍然全心全意地認為大量進口是不必要的，並繼續將印度危機視為比其他考慮因素更重要的事情。

確實，如果邱吉爾和他的內閣按要求運送了全部貨物，那麼飢荒本身就無法避免。那時已經太晚了，很可能仍有數百萬人死亡。然而，同樣有可能的是，苦難會得到部分緩解，貨物也可能及時到達，從而拯救數十萬人的生命。

「未來的問題」：1943 年 11 月和 12 月
到 11 月，韋維爾的努力已經取得了一些成果。然而，這導致先前對飢荒的否認變成了過早慶祝飢荒的結束。總督委員會糧食委員 Srivastava 於 12 月 18 日表示，「我們現在面臨未來的問題…糧食危機可能已經結束」。然而，正如 1943 年最後幾個月訪問孟加拉的納拉揚所寫的那樣，“飢荒或多或少已經被趕出了城市地區，但鄉村地區仍然存在。”儘管格里諾計算出 1943 年已有 100 萬人死亡，但大多數死亡尚未到來。到 1946 年，這一數字將達到 350 萬或更多。

相較之下，整個二戰期間英國的總死亡人數（包括所有軍人和平民死亡）僅為 45 萬人。

第 6 部分：「請先生，我可以再吃點嗎」——1943 年 12 月底 - 1944 年
12 月底，韋維爾收到了1944 年國防糧食預算的修訂版，並寫信給內閣重新考慮1944 年100萬噸的出口量。你可以透過我來警告他們，這是我經過深思熟慮的判斷，除非我們現在能保證在 1944 年期間收到 100 萬噸（重複 100 萬噸）糧食，否則我們將走向飢荒和通貨膨脹的災難」。

戰時內閣：1944 年 2 月 7 日、17 日、21 日、3 月 20 日和 4 月 24 日
然而，1944 年的情況與1943 年末基本相同。 ，在不影響戰爭需要的情況下，任何船隻都不能倖免。戰時內閣於 2 月 7 日、17 日和 21 日舉行會議，沒有任何變動。正如韋維爾在今年稍後的日記中所寫，「我收到的第一個請求與《霧都孤兒》在一個眾所周知的場合遇到的驚訝和懷疑幾乎一樣」。

問題是戰時內閣從已經成立的糧食委員會獲得了領導權。韋維爾在4 月26 日寫道，他對此的印像是：「那個老威脅，教授（查韋爾），萊瑟斯，一個感興趣的團體，只關心保住他的船，PJ 格里格，他總是對印度調皮，還有盧埃林，食品部長對印度一無所知，只關心保護國內的糧食供應。態度很簡單，沒有運輸，不能要求美國人提供一些，以防萬一他們這樣做，而是從英國的配額中扣除……我認為，如果他們有任何真正的希望，他們會[讓印度人民挨餓]總督會同意的。 7 月 23 日，他再次寫道：“印度辦事處完全未能發揮其影響力。”

然而，韋維爾並沒有被嚇倒。他親自寫信給帝國總參謀長布魯克陸軍元帥和其他參謀長，請他們提供協助。 3月18日，他們回覆稱，可以立即釋放25艘船隻，用於從澳洲運輸20萬噸小麥，並在軍用船隻上分配10%的貨艙，這將在「12年內提供12萬噸小麥」。月」。他們還建議向美國人尋求幫助。這有效地削弱了萊瑟斯「無能為力」的論點。

1944 年 3 月 20 日，布魯克出席了戰時內閣會議。萊瑟斯勉強同意只建造 25 艘艦艇，但他表示，“現在不應向印度做出超過 20 萬噸的承諾。”任何有關使用 10% 儲存空間的提案的討論均未記錄。

關於與美國人的接觸，埃默里後來寫信給韋維爾說，「皮革公司已經在運輸問題上與美國人發生瞭如此大的困難，他覺得自己根本無法與他們接觸更多」。事實上，正如穆克吉總結的那樣，「萊瑟斯建議不要詢問美國人，因為他們可能真的同意。那麼‘他們肯定會從我們這裡奪走他們給予印度的任何東西’，比如船隻。

3月和4月，嚴重的雷暴天氣導致農作物遭到破壞，孟買港還發生了意外爆炸，造成45,000噸糧食被毀。

1944 年 4 月 24 日，內閣再次召開會議。此之外別無他法。埃默里在日記中寫道，邱吉爾一如既往地“粗暴”，“幾乎說我們不能讓印度的飢餓幹擾行動。”然而，他勉強同意向華盛頓發出電報。

邱吉爾於 4 月 29 日向羅斯福發出了這封電報。它是由萊瑟斯起草，其中包括許多自我辯護。雖然提到了韋維爾的“最嚴重的警告”以及 1943 年的“嚴重飢荒”，但他也提到了孟加拉的“稻米豐收”，但沒有具體說明總督預計的稻米短缺程度。相反，他寫道：“1944 年前 9 個月，我已經能夠安排 35 萬噸小麥從澳大利亞運往印度。我不知道我們還能做得更多。”然而，6 月 3 日，羅斯福做出答复，拒絕了這項請求。很難說這是因為羅斯福真的無能為力，還是因為請求的措辭使得拒絕是不可避免的。

「太少也太晚」—1944 年 6 月 – 1944 年 12 月
6 月 6 日，法國入侵開始。這就是邱吉爾和萊瑟斯一直擔心預訂運費的原因。儘管諾曼第登陸日最初沒有損失船隻，但埃默里報告說，“萊瑟斯確信第二戰線將吸收越來越多的船隻。”

6 月8 日，阿默里於6 月8 日直接寫信給邱吉爾，要求推行在軍用運輸中使用10% 空間用於食品的額外提議，並在邱吉爾同意後於當天將該提議轉發給韋維爾。然而，還有更多的延誤，6 月20 日，韋維爾寫信給埃默里，「經過大約六個月的討論，我們在糧食進口問題上沒有取得任何進展，這是可恥的……[糧食]委員會大多數成員的目標似乎純粹是阻礙並拖延。

韋維爾在六月下旬直接寫信給邱吉爾，「如果英國政府的態度繼續下去，可以而且將會用理性來表現出短視和冷酷……英國政府現在幫助印度相對容易。分配的船隻數量不會很多。

參謀長們於 6 月 22 日會見了邱吉爾，同意透過全面維修緊縮從澳洲釋放 20 萬噸。韋維爾對這種安排很滿意。在總結出貨情況時，他報告說，1943年10月至1944年4月期間已交付35萬噸，1944年第一季額外交付5萬噸，到9月底將交付40萬噸。這個80萬噸的總量並不是糧食政策委員會1943年底建議的150萬噸，但他承認他認為這應該就夠了。

然而，韋維爾於 7 月 5 日向阿默里報告說，「這個決定太少也太晚了。它的媒體報導非常糟糕，並且增加而不是減輕了公眾的焦慮。 1944 年 8 月，參謀長建議再增加 30 萬噸。但內閣繼續延後到九月。但同時，從 8 月 15 日到 9 月底，French 爵士（英國食品部常務秘書）訪問了印度進行調查。韋維爾在 9 月 29 日寫道，弗倫奇的報告應該會有所幫助。

事實上，埃默里於 10 月 9 日寫信給韋維爾表示「立場已經改變」。最後決定，1944年第四季可以運送30萬噸，儘管其中7.5萬噸必須是麵粉而不是穀物。一半將從澳洲發貨，另一半將從北美發貨。正如韋維爾在 10 月 11 日的日記中所寫，“在HMG 兩次表示根本不可能進口之後，經過 9 個月的艱苦奮鬥，我為印度獲得了 70 萬噸。”

10 月 24 日，韋維爾寫信給邱吉爾，親自回顧擔任總督的過去一年，「我覺得 HMG 忽視了印度的重大問題，有時甚至充滿敵意和蔑視……在 HMG 現在提供的幫助下，我們應該能夠保持食物的位置，但也僅此而已。

1944 年 12 月 16 日，韋維爾從加爾各答回來後在日記中寫道：「凱西的問題似乎比平常少了。他現在有一個‘embaras de Rice’，如果我們能保證在 1945 年下半年更換它，他很樂意大量出售。

然而到了 1945 年，運輸仍然是一個問題。 4月9日，韋維爾在倫敦出席內閣會議，並在日記中寫道：「一個沉悶的內閣，但它讓我認識到，當飢餓發生在歐洲時，人們對養活飢餓人口的態度截然不同。在這種情況下，荷蘭需要食物，當然會有船隻，這與我們要求船隻向印度運送食物時得到的答案完全不同。

5月18日，戰時內閣再次審查航運情勢。他們同意在 1945 年 7 月至 12 月期間每月向印度供應 10 萬噸小麥。

7 月 11 日，邱吉爾在大選中輸給了阿特利領導的工黨，埃默里也被投票落選。新任印度國務卿是佩西克-勞倫斯，他在眾議院對政府對飢荒的反應持極為批評的態度。他於8月3日上任。韋維爾在日記中寫下自己的看法，“我認為工黨可能會對印度更感興趣、更同情，但他們對此會有一些奇怪的想法。”

然而，韋維爾在 12 月 30 日寫道，“隨著 HMG 背棄所有進口承諾，孟買和馬德拉斯的局勢正在惡化，一場嚴重的糧食危機似乎再次出現。”不過他也寫道，“工黨政府總體上讓事情變得更容易，因為印度受到更多關注，前景也更令人同情。”

情況持續改善，但從未結束，直到殖民統治和分治結束時爆發的更明顯的暴力和死亡事件使情況變得模糊。可以說，孟加拉從未完全康復。

第七部分：「我們不會萎靡或失敗。我們將堅持到底」—結論

上述對飢荒事件和原因的分析不能用長篇大論來簡潔地概括，即邱吉爾應承擔很大一部分責任，赫伯特或胡克等人應承擔很大一部分責任。導致並加劇其他因素。一個更有同情心的內閣本來可以有所作為，但即使是一個更加冷酷無情的內閣，如果沒有孟加拉的行政混亂、省際間不願放棄盈餘、腐敗、囤積、昏睡和簡單，也不可能造成飢荒。

此外，飢荒之前的數百名官員實際上將孟加拉夷為平地長達一個半世紀，而不是有效管理和適當地發展它。有人可能會說，這種災難是帝國主義本質的必然結果。人們的本性是更關心那些他們認為與自己相似的人，而不是那些他們認為不同的人。儘管孟加拉議會的言論與任何倫敦人一樣都是王室的平等臣民，但現實是孟加拉對大多數人來說是看不見的、心不在焉的。普遍存在的冷漠、忽視和過失犯罪實際上已融入該系統。

特別是關於邱吉爾的罪責，很容易證明邱吉爾持有即使在他那個時代也是極端的種族和種族主義觀點，儘管這些年來這些觀點有所軟化並導致了輕微的重新評估。然而，他的觀點並不像其他因素那樣對他的行為產生重要影響。他對印度內部社會政治的反感和完全無知意味著他完全依賴那些能夠說服他自己是對的人的建議。這些人與他有著同樣的固執、固執己見、極端保守主義以及不願充分考慮戰爭勝利之外的因素的人。

萊瑟斯和查韋爾的建議主導了他的考慮，他們的能力和態度本身對緩解飢荒無益，而他完全忽視或憤怒反對埃默里和韋維爾等反對觀點，儘管越來越多的證據證明了他們的觀點。儘管邱吉爾享有政治家的聲譽，但他經常表現出無法應付不同意見的能力。他更喜歡固執地向前推進部分訊息，而不是等待收集證據，一旦向前推進，他就很難被說服改變，無論證據是否相反。邱吉爾的名言就像雜草一樣，但有一些可以用來總結他的方法，例如「如果你正在經歷地獄，請繼續前進」、「永不、永不、永不放棄」和「成功就是從失敗中跌跌撞撞」直至失敗，但仍不喪失熱情」。

總而言之，儘管邱吉爾對導致飢荒的事件沒有責任，但他肯定會受到批評，因為他從1943 年9 月起充分認識到飢荒後未能充分緩解飢荒。確實造成了飢荒。

「誰控制過去」：參考書目

二手資料

注意：其他來源也用於背景，但這些是我使用的主要文字。

阿里將軍、塔里克、溫斯頓邱吉爾：他的時代，他的罪行，(2022)，Verso

Behrens，CBA，商船運輸和戰爭需求，（1955 年），女王陛下文具辦公室

Brennan, Lance，孟加拉政府的饑荒救濟，1943 年，（1988 年），《亞洲研究期刊》，47，第 3 期，542-67

Chatterji，喬亞，孟加拉分裂：印度教的地方自治主義和分裂，1932-1947 年，（1994 年），劍橋大學出版社

Paul R. Greenough，《現代孟加拉的繁榮與苦難：1943-1944 年的飢荒》，（1982 年），牛津大學出版社

Mukherjee，Janam，《飢餓的孟加拉：戰爭飢荒與帝國的終結》，（2015），牛津大學出版社

Mukerjee，Madhusree，《邱吉爾的秘密戰爭：第二次世界大戰期間大英帝國和印度的蹂躪》，（2010），基礎書籍

經濟辯論

彼得·鮑布里克，“飢荒的原因——對森教授理論的反駁。” (1986)，食品政策 11，編號。 2，第 105-124 頁

Goswami, Omkar，《1943 年孟加拉飢荒：重新審視資料》，(1990)，《印度經濟與社會歷史評論》27，第 1 期。 4，第 445-463 頁

Ó 格拉達，科馬克，淹沒的漣漪？作為經濟史的二十世紀中國和印度的飢荒，（2007）都柏林大學經濟研究中心工作論文系列

Ó Gráda, Cormac，《充足、充足和充足》：重溫 1943-44 年的孟加拉飢荒 (2010)，都柏林大學經濟研究中心工作論文系列

Sen, Amartya，《貧窮與饑荒：關於權利與剝奪的論文》，(1981)，牛津大學出版社

馬克·陶格，《權利、短缺和 1943 年孟加拉飢荒：另一種視角》，（2006 年），《農民研究雜誌》卷。 33，第 1 期

馬克‧陶格，《第二次世界大戰中的印度饑荒危機》，(2009)，英國學者卷。我，第 2 期，166-96，

主要來源

約翰·巴恩斯和大衛·尼科爾森（編），《海灣帝國：裡奧·阿默里日記：1929-1945》（1988 年），哈欽森

Mansergh, Nicholas（編），《權力的轉移》1942-7；卷。 I-VII (1970-77)，女王陛下的文具辦公室

Mitter, SC，《孟加拉復甦計畫》，(1934)，The Book Company Ltd

Moon, Penderel，（編輯），Wavell：總督日記，（1973 年），牛津大學出版社

納拉揚，《TG 孟加拉飢荒》，(1944)，圖書有限公司

約翰·伍德海德爵士（主席），飢荒調查委員會，《孟加拉報告》，（1945 年），印度政府出版社（可訪問： http: //www.bowbrick.org.uk/key_documents_on_the_bengal_fami.htm ）

戰時內閣結論，CAB-65/20-65/52（1941 年 11 月 3 日至 1945 年 5 月 13 日）（可取得：內閣文件 - 國家檔案館）

戰時內閣備忘錄，CAB-66/28-66/65（1942 年 8 月 21 日 – 1945 年 5 月 24 日）（可取得：內閣文件 - 國家檔案館）

戰時內閣秘書筆記（諾曼布魯克）CAB 195/1-195/2（1942 年 4 月 13 日至 1942 年 11 月 23 日）（可從：國家檔案館取得）

邱吉爾傳記

注意：這些並不是飢荒的好來源。我將它們放在這裡只是作為我在帖子中明確引用的書籍清單。我還搜尋了許多其他人，以尋找有關飢荒的提及（或沉默），但包含完整清單是沒有意義的。

Gopal, Sarvepalli，《邱吉爾與印度》，布萊克，R. 和路易斯，Wm。 R.，邱吉爾，（1993），牛津大學出版社

馬克斯·黑斯廷斯，《溫斯頓的戰爭 - 邱吉爾，1940–1945》，(2010)，阿爾弗雷德·A·克諾普夫

赫爾曼、亞瑟、甘地和邱吉爾：摧毀帝國並鑄就我們時代的史詩般的競爭，（2008），Bantam Books

朗沃斯，理查德·M.，溫斯頓·邱吉爾，神話與現實：他實際上做了什麼和說了什麼，（2017），麥克法蘭公司

詹姆斯勞倫斯、邱吉爾與帝國：帝國主義者的肖像 (2013)，Weidenfeld & Nicolson

安德魯‧羅伯茨，《傑出的邱吉爾主義者》，(1994)，魏登菲爾德和尼科爾森

安德魯‧羅伯茨，《邱吉爾：與命運同行》(2018)，《維京人》

理查‧托伊，《邱吉爾的帝國：創造祂的世界與祂所創造的世界》，(2010)，亨利‧霍爾特公司

塔克瓊斯、安東尼、邱吉爾，大師與指揮官：戰爭中的溫斯頓邱吉爾 1895-1945 年，(2021)，魚鷹出版社

韋戈爾德、奧裡奧爾、邱吉爾、羅斯福和印度：第二次世界大戰期間的宣傳，(2008)，勞特利奇

傑弗瑞‧惠克羅夫特，《邱吉爾的影子：邱吉爾的一生與來世》，(2021)，WW Norton & Company

Was Churchill as responsible for the Bengal Famine as Hitler was for the Holocaust?

In public consciousness, the history of the Bengal Famine has often been reduced to this simple question. It is derived primarily from the work of Madhusree Mukerjee, whose 2010 book, Churchill’s Secret War took the lid off a largely forgotten part of Britain’s colonial past. Her claims were widely repeated across print and the internet.

While many comments on Churchill's involvement are hyperbolic, nevertheless the fact is that the Famine was responsible for the deaths of perhaps 3.5-3.8 million Bengalis. In a country of 61.8 million people before the War, this represented a loss of 6.1% of Bengal’s population, at least half of these dying in a single year. At the time, these Bengalis were officially understood to be British subjects. No other Prime Minister in British history has ever presided over the deaths of so many of his own citizens.

Given this and the massive amount of literature written on Churchill, the almost complete absence of any discussion of his response to the famine prior to 2010 is extraordinary. As Fielding et al writes of Churchill in 2020, “He had been much criticized in his own lifetime, but never, in public, for his role in the Bengal famine of 1943. Even archival releases and the publication of key diaries alone did not change this, but after the publication of Madhusree Mukerjee’s highly critical study the issue became a significant point of reference even for those who wished to exculpate Churchill.”

This is a complex subject and I have taken the time to write out my research in full. Unfortunately this has resulted in a very long multi-part answer, and I apologise to all those who prefer a brief “yes or no”.

In the following parts I intend to lay out the events and causes of the famine systematically.
In part I will survey the general historiography on Churchill's involvement in the Famine.
In Part 2 I will examine the personal attitude and opinions of Churchill himself.
In Part 3, I detail the situation in Bengal and India itself.
In Parts 4, 5, and 6 I focus on the larger issue of British food Shipments and the decisions of Churchill and the War Cabinet.
Part 7 is the Conclusion and a selected bibliography.

Silence is Golden: The Historiography on Churchill
Before Mukerjee even critical biographers (e.g. Clive Ponting) had overlooked the Bengal Famine entirely, and both Churchill and Gilbert (his official biographer) wrote six volumes each but managed to never once mention the existence of Bengal. Even as late as 2001 Jenkins could write almost 1000 pages without mentioning a word of it. And even the scholarly monograph by Weigold in 2008, explicitly focused on Churchill and India, despite mentioning the famine several times, never discussed Churchill’s role in it. But after Mukerjee’s blistering attack, it could no longer be ignored, though many try to dismiss it as quickly as they can (except in the biography of Churchill written by Boris Johnson, the previous UK Tory Prime Minister, where again Bengal was conspicuous by its absence).

Hastings’ biography of Churchill in 2011 covered Bengal in a short paragraph, but by 2018 Andrew Roberts’ felt forced to devote several pages to a desperate rear-guard defence, insisting that, “if food had been available and easily transportable Churchill would have sent it.” Langworth in 2017 devotes an entire chapter to the defence, insisting that, “Churchill repeatedly took measures, appointed people, and issued instructions to alleviate as best he could the famine in Bengal”, and in a 2015 article in the Weekly Standard the author wrote, “Without Churchill, the 1943 Bengal famine would have been worse.” Tucker-Jones in 2021 covers it briefly but is careful to focus almost entirely on late 1943 and Wavell’s actions, writing that Churchill’s decision, “was harsh but understandable.” Lawrence in 2013 was less robust in his defence, but still concludes that, “In the end it was the harsh calculus of operational necessity that dictated the history of the relief of the Bengal famine”.

The silence wasn’t total before Mukerjee. An exception was the essay ‘Churchill and India’ by Sarvepalli Gopal, in Blake and Louis’ 1993 anthology, though it covers the incident in only half a page. Another partial exception to the silence was Herman who in 2009 did mention the famine and acknowledge that “For his part Churchill proved callously indifferent”, and “proved...irrational over the famine issue: he was almost resolutely opposed to any food shipments”, though he skips over the entire famine in only a couple of pages, preferring to focus on Wavell’s successes than Churchill’s failures, and insisting that Churchill deserves a share of the credit for his Viceroy’s actions, since he appointed him. However, in 2010 in a review of Mukerjee’s book in Finest Hour Herman robustly defended Churchill’s actions by insisting, “Churchill and his cabinet sought every way to alleviate the suffering without undermining the war effort”.

All these defences in his popular biographies suffer from only the most surface understanding of the events and causes of the Famine itself. Almost none refer to any historian of the Famine itself (only Lawrence mentioning two authors as sources), and rely primarily on other Churchill biographers and selective quotes from both Amery and the War Cabinet minutes. Churchill’s defence is also based largely on these selective quotations. Their understanding of the causes of the Famine is basic, repeating the belief that it was caused almost entirely by the Burmese invasion and the Midnapore Cyclone, even though historians of the Famine have, since the 80’s pointed out that these factors would have only had a small effect on the total quantity of rice and couldn’t have caused a famine by themselves.

Of the biographies of Churchill up to recently only Toye didn’t defend him, writing in 2010, “it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that maladministration made the consequences worse than they need have been, and that Churchill’s own reaction was grossly inept and, it is tempting to add, callous.” And concludes with a remark on, “his failure to respond adequately to the Bengal famine. Here he displayed genuine callousness, and short-sightedness to boot.” But there is still no systematic, rigorous historical analysis of Churchill’s role.

Very recently several books have emerged looking critically at Churchill’s legacy over the famine. In 2021 Wheatcroft writes, “Churchill’s partisans have a hopeless task when they try to defend his conduct during the famine”, and again in 2021 Ali excoriated Churchill as fiercely as Mukerjee, describing his actions as “criminally negligent”, and blames Churchill directly, not only for his remarks, but “the refusal to declare a state of emergency in the province, immediately reverse the policies that starved the people of food, and send in rice and flour from other parts of the country.” These “crimes” however actually had nothing to do with Churchill directly. Although Ali has read some of the critical literature on the Famine itself, his attacks on Churchill still seem to be as uninformed as the defences of his supporters.

Certainly the extent of Churchill’s involvement in both the causes and mismanagement of the famine of Bengal is an important question, since he was Prime Minister of the British Empire at the time. However, to focus on his actions alone falls into the reductionist idea that all world events can be explained by the actions of a “Great Man”. And it fails to examine both the systemic problems and the various other individuals who were also involved and culpable. Churchill’s actions can certainly be criticised, but a disaster of this magnitude can rarely be caused by the negligence and indifference of one man - there is plenty of blame to go around.

Part 2: “Full of Sound and Fury”: Churchill in His Own Words
Many people focus primarily on condemning or defending Churchill based on what Langworth calls the “incriminating quotations”. Selected personal quotes however are a poor method of analysing history. Yet it’s worth bringing them up first to get them out of the way.

The criticisms of Churchill generally highlight comments he said in private. These are largely taken from the diaries of his political opponents and can be argued as being from a biased source. However, this does not necessarily mean they are inaccurate. The number of these quotations, sourced from several individuals, give a degree of veracity to them. Defenders argue that these private comments should be balanced by comments Churchill made in support of India. Such comments were commonly made in public however. Nevertheless, we cannot dismiss them.

Indeed, Toye writes , “In March 1943 R. A. Butler, the Education minister, visited [Churchill] at Chequers…” .Butler wrote that Churchill “launched into a most terrible attack on the 'baboos,' saying that they were gross, dirty and corrupt." Toye continues, “At this, Clementine protested that he didn’t mean what he was saying, and Churchill admitted this was true: ‘but when I see my opponents glaring at me, I always have to draw them out by exaggerated statements’.”

If Churchill intentionally made “exaggerated” offensive remarks about India in private in order to provoke people then this would cast many of his comments in a new light. However, it could also be argued that he used this excuse as a convenient cover for his more extreme opinions.

Andrew Roberts, in Eminent Churchillians (1993), provides an introduction to one chapter detailing Churchill’s racism. His begins by saying, “although racist views were almost universally held until around the end of the 1950s, Churchill was more profoundly racist than most…He was a convinced white-not to say Anglo-Saxon – supremacist and thought in terms of race to a degree that was remarkable even by the standards of his time.”(p211).

Roberts highlights a laundry list of quotes from Churchill, including that he wrote in 1908 that he believed the British officer class was “as superior to the Buganda as Mr Wells’ Martians would have been to us”, and that he said of the Indians of East Africa, “the idea that they should be put on equality with the Europeans is revolting to every white man throughout British East Africa”. At a lunch at the White House in September 1943 he “said why be apologetic about Anglo-Saxon superiority; that they were superior”. David Hunt, his Private Secretary wrote “Churchill was on the whole rather anti-black”. In January 1952 he told his doctor, “When you learn to think of a race as inferior beings it is difficult to get rid of that way of thinking; when I was a subaltern the Indian did not seem to me equal to the white man."

After these and others, Roberts concludes, “Indisputably then Churchill…was an unrepentant racist. Whilst his attitudes may have been common until around the 1950s, they were expressed with a virulence which would not have been found in contemporaries”.

Andrew Roberts is an interesting source, as he has more recently described Churchill as “heroic”, and his 2018 biography defends his actions in the Bengal Famine. In a 2021 interview for the Telegraph Roberts defended Churchill by claiming that, “the fact that he said things that were derogatory to people of other races does not make him somebody who wants bad things to happen to people of other races, which is what I think a racist is. Just to say that he thinks that white people were superior to non-whites is obvious…he was born in 1874 while…there was a scientific belief that there were a hierarchy of the races…

“If you treat Churchill as a man of his time and also appreciate the things that he did for non-white people throughout his life.” Clearly Roberts’ argument is fallacious, but it shows the kind of defence even Churchill’s supporters are forced to attempt. Regarding the racist comments against Indians specifically Roberts finally falls back on the defence that, “Churchill did not mean these things that he said”.

Further quotes highlighting Churchill’s racist and insensitive comments are as follows:

Amery’s diary 4 August 1944, “I lost patience and couldn't help telling him that I didn't see much difference between his outlook and Hitler's”.

Mukerjee writes that on 12 November 1942 according to Amery, Churchill ranted on "being kicked out of India by the beastliest people in the world next to the Germans."

Wavell’s Diary, 24 June 1943, “[Churchill] has a curious complex about India and is always loth to hear good about it and apt to believe the worst. He has still at heart his cavalry subaltern’s idea of India.”

Wavell’s Diary, 27 July 1943, “[Churchill] hates India and everything to do with it.”

Mukerjee writes that in 1945 “Churchill told his private secretary that "the Hindus were a foul race 'protected by their mere pullulation from the doom that is their due.' (Pullulation means rapid breeding.)”

However, Churchill does appear to have softened his views a little over time. Mukherjee writes, “In June 1953…Churchill found himself standing next to Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi… ‘You must have hated the British for the treatment meted out to your father,’ Churchill said…‘We never hated you,’ she responded. ‘I did, but I don't now,’ he replied.”

“All Pals Together”: Churchill’s Public Sympathies
On the other hand Winston’s public views on India are much more measured. But clues can be found even there, such as in his speech at the Farewell Dinner to Lord Wavell on 6 October 1943. “I am in a state of subdued resentment about the way in which the world has failed to recognise the great achievements of Britain in India… I hope we shall find in the future that [there is] a truer recognition of what we have done… this episode in Indian history will surely become the Golden Age as time passes.” This speech, given while millions were dying in Bengal, demonstrates just how blind Churchill was to the realities of India.

Churchill often presented himself as having a benevolent (though patronising) approach to India. Wavell wrote in his diary on 8 October 1943 regarding Churchill’s instructions to him on appointing him Viceroy. “[Churchill] had produced a formula for a directive which was mostly meaningless…” The Directive instructed Wavell that “The hard pressures of world-war have for the first time for many years brought conditions of scarcity, verging in some localities into actual famine, upon India. Every effort must be made, even by the diversion of shipping urgently needed for war purposes, to deal with local shortages.”

Wavell found this directive to be hollow however, for though it spoke of the necessity of diverting shipping for food, he knew the Cabinet’s earlier intransigence about actually doing this. Wavell wrote in his diary that he showed it to Leo Amery and, “Amery on reading it said ‘you are wafted to India on a wave of hot air.”

In addition, the letter Churchill wrote to William King the Prime Minister of Canada on 4 November 1943, and the letter he wrote to Roosevelt on 29 April 1944 are often cited as Churchill doing everything in his power to help alleviate the Famine. However, while Churchill’s official words present his actions in the best light, they fail to adequately represent the reality of the Cabinet decisions and actions.

In the letter to Roosevelt Churchill described his activity: “I am seriously concerned about the food situation in India and its possible reactions on our joint operations… I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat…I cannot see how to do more.” Nevertheless this both exaggerated his own actions and dismissed the chances of doing more.

However, public statements and writings by Churchill are also relevant. In 1935 he wrote to Gandhi, via his chief lieutenant Ghanshyam Birla: “I do not care whether you are more or less loyal to Great Britain. I do not mind about education, but give the masses more butter…..I am genuinely sympathetic towards India.”

When Birla relayed this message to Gandhi, Gandhi replied: “I have got a good recollection of Mr. Churchill when he was in the Colonial Office and somehow or other since then I have held the opinion that I can always rely on his sympathy and goodwill.”

In July 1943 Churchill told Sir Arcot Ramasamy Mudaliar, India’s representative to the War Cabinet: “The old idea that the Indian was in any way inferior to the white man must go. We must all be pals together. I want to see a great shining India, of which we can be as proud as we are of a great Canada or a great Australia.”

And after the war, in his memoirs he wrote of, “the glorious heroism and martial qualities of the Indian troops…the unsurpassed bravery.” (Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p182)

Apart from this, the historical record of his actions do also demonstrate some concern for India at times. He spoke out against Dyer after the Amritsar massacre, considering his actions unconscionable. He supported Gandhi’s work in South Africa, standing up for Indian rights during his time in the Colonial office in 1906, and he supported the rights of the Untouchable caste in India.

At the time, some Indians certainly did consider him a friend. On Churchill’s death, the President of India Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan wrote: “It is with profound sorrow that the Government and people of India have learnt of the passing away of the Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Churchill, greatest Englishman we have known…His unforgettable services will be cherished for centuries.”

And Ambassador B.N. Chakravarty, praised Churchill also: “Now the glory has departed, but the memory will endure ….It is no exaggeration to say that never was so much owed, by so many, to one man.”

Part 3: “Distant Thunder”: The Early Causes of the Famine in Bengal
Endemic starvation in Bengal was pointed out by social scientist Mitter as early as 1934. Although Bengal was perceived by many as “Golden Bengal”, this had become a mirage, and the majority of its population of 63 million balanced on a knife-edge of subsistence-living.

Unfortunately nothing was ever done about this situation. There are claims sometimes made that the colonial government purposely de-industrialised Bengal to intentionally make it underdeveloped. While there is little evidence of this, the lack of investment and attention the government gave the province had perhaps a very similar effect as if they had.

In 1945 the then Governor of Bengal, Richard Casey, wrote, “What stands out principally in my mind is the pitiful inadequacy of the administration of the province…Bengal has, practically speaking, no irrigation or drainage, a medieval system of agriculture, no roads, no education, no cottage industries, completely inadequate hospitals, no effective health services, and no adequate machinery to cope with distress. There are not even plans to make good these deficiencies…….. At some time in the past, the British administration evidently decided that Bengal…should be run on the minimum possible expenditure.”

Greenough, in his 1982 Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal says he has become “convinced that famine could not have developed but for an underlying condition of dearth and disorder.”

Bengal Politics: “administrative chaos”
One of the problems contributing to the severity of the Famine was political failure. Since 1935 the Provinces had been granted their own elections and democratic Ministries, although India was still ruled by the Viceroy. However although the elected Ministry was responsible for internal affairs such as imports and the supply of food, they were often sidelined by Governor Herbert. Partially this was due to their weakness. Prime Minister Huq lasted until March 1943, replaced by Nazimuddin (later Prime Minister of Pakistan) who achieved little in two years before his government collapsed.

Furthermore, because the Governor wasn’t supposed to be exercising power, Herbert had little of the bureaucratic machinery to do so effectively. When Casey took over in 1944 he was “astonished to find that there isn’t an economic advisor to the Government of Bengal” He wrote in June 1944 that such a basic administrative tool as accurate crop statistics was missing.

Narayan noted that, “The working of Provincial Autonomy in Bengal was one of the main causes of the recent famine”. Both Sen and Mukherjee agree and include “administrative chaos” in the Provincial Government as one of their primary causes of the Famine.

1942: Panic in the Streets of Calcutta
On 15th Feb 1942 Singapore fell and Rangoon fell on 10 Mar, leaving Bengal on the front lines, effectively defenceless. Britain panicked. Churchill had already issued a “scorched earth” policy on 14 Nov 1941 and on the 30th Leo Amery wrote to Viceroy Linlithgow to begin the “Denial Policy”. Despite protests Amery wrote: "it is essential that destruction should be ruthless."

Although it was supposed to be carried out only in three coastal districts, its effects would spread much further. The policy was intended to only purchase and remove “surplus” rice. But much rice was left frozen in the countryside unrecorded or destroyed. The policy also removed transport, destroying thousands of boats though they were a lifeline for many. Although Herbert had done this himself, sidelining Huq, Narayan would write in 1944, “Huq and his men, by their silent compliance, were also accessories to the folly”.

Rices and Prices
As early as 1943, The Statesman would declare, “this famine is man-made”. Yet there were also several incidents which contributed to reduce food. The fall of Burma was coupled with a cyclone on 16 October 1942, floods, and a paddy-root disease. And the main winter harvest of 1942/43 was poor. Thus the Famine Enquiry Commission in 1944 reported that that shortage of supplies was the primary cause of the famine.

This view however was overturned by Sen in 1981. J Mukherjee summarises Sen’s view that starvation, “clearly resulted…from sharp wartime inflation in India that left the poor of Bengal unable to purchase rice.” Greenough also estimated that although natural factors had an effect, 90% of the usual supply of rice was still available in 1943.

This argument is that it was this unchecked inflation that directly caused the Famine. The Famine Commission recognised this as a secondary factor, but Sen said it was the primary cause. While most scholars follow Sen’s argument some notable challenges have been made by Bowbrick (1986), Goswami (1990), Tauger (2003, 2009), and Ó Gráda (2007, 2010), arguing there was actually a shortage in Bengal and no widespread hoarding by traders. I have followed Sen’s view here though.

The astronomical price rises effectively put rice beyond the reach of millions. The market froze because cultivators were discouraged to sell and even where rice was available the ordinary peasant could not afford it.

Government Relief
However, as Sen wrote, “no matter how a famine is caused, methods of breaking it call for a large supply of food in the public distribution system.”

At the time, the solution to achieve this was believed to be for the government to buy up rice and then dump it on the market at a low cost. However, despite several “food drives”, the heavy-handed and inefficient execution ended up causing the opposite effect, creating more panic, causing existing stocks to disappear into the black market, and driving prices up higher.

Mukherjee writes, “The administration of Bengal, already thrown into acute disarray by the advent of war, attempted one “solution” after another, advancing ad hoc measures, that created further uncertainty…Similarly with regulation: throughout the period one regulatory (or anti-regulatory) regime after another was explored, which only fed both the market instability and administrative chaos, etc.”

Furthermore although there was a Famine Code published, it was not followed. The underlying doctrine was that the government must provide “test” relief for workers, charitable relief for non-workers, and agricultural loans for landholders. Officials never officially declared a famine, ostensibly to avoid damaging public confidence and a general rationing scheme wasn’t started until 31 January 1944. From Sep 1943 gruel kitchens were finally set up in the districts, but the lack of supplies meant that the rations contained barely 800 calories. On 2 December the export of all rice from Bengal was finally prohibited, controversially late. And on 22 December taking any rice out of the districts was banned.

Partly this lack was the result of a failure to acquire the food stocks needed. Partly it was the result of incompetence. From January 1943 onwards the Civil Supplies Department seemed to give up on trying to feed the districts at all, rather focusing all their efforts on feeding Calcutta alone. It was a war-critical city and required a considerable amount of food to keep it going. But the preoccupation with Calcutta alone left the Districts to starve.

Nazimuddin formed a new Ministry of Civil Supplies under Suhrawardy. In May 1943 however he began by announcing that there was no shortage of rice in Bengal his efforts from then on were to coerce hoarders into releasing stocks and then requisitioning them. This had the opposite effect.

Stocks were low also because the controls on exports given to the provinces had led them to enact a de facto policy of protectionism. While shipments from other surplus Provinces was ordered by Delhi in March, most Provinces failed to deliver their quotas. With extremely limited stocks, from Sep 1943 the government seemed to focus most of its efforts on removing the “sick destitutes” from the streets and take them to poor houses outside the city.

However after long delays, the promised shipments from other surplus Provinces started to be delivered from October through December. However problems of distribution left tons of food sitting in storage in the city while the districts remained starving.

On 26th October Lord Wavell, the new Viceroy, arrived in Calcutta. He travelled into the city and the districts and immediately requisitioned a regiment of the Army to move food into the Districts. Mukherjee writes, “The alacrity with which Wavell organized these relief efforts was, at once, a testimony to his own initiative, as well as a very troubling contrast to the apathy and indifference with which at least a million people had already been left to starve… the relief initiated in November 1943, for many, was far too little and far too late.”

The famine-stricken populace was now succumbing to devastating outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and smallpox. Medical aid however had only started in December, and was grossly inadequate. Further, a “cloth famine” had also been caused by the same inflation and there were reports that some naked people were dying because of exposure rather than starvation.

The winter harvest was excellent, but efforts to procure it was again a failure. Ration Shops were only established on 31 January 1944, with ration amounts of a sufficient size. However, as soon as the ration shops opened there were reports that the grains being distributed were rotten and stinking. This was a stark example of the administrative chaos of Bengal’s ministry, demonstrating this rice had been sitting around for more than a year while millions starved.

On 29 March 1945 Nazimuddin’s ministry fell and the new Governor Casey declared emergency rule in Bengal. On 12 June Wavell reported to Amery that, “He is very pleased… says that it has enabled him to get more improvements done than in all the period under a Ministry.”

Part 4: “I See No Ships”: Churchill’s Cabinet and Grain Imports
So we turn to perhaps the most well known criticism of British actions during the famine, the question of grain shipments. It is commonly believed that Britain purposely diverted food shipments away from India, draining it of food while the population starved. There is some truth to this, in that British military forces were present in India during the war, and they needed to be fed as well as the civilians. Due to the war the provisioning of the military was considered more of a priority than the feeding of the civilian populace. Not only was this seen as required in order to effectively prosecute the military operation of the war, but also in order to maintain control of the Raj itself.

While food was distributed unequally within India, food was also exported from India during the famine, a practice that was controversial even at the time. This practice ended in July 1943, but this banning of exports was late, and loopholes existed. The amount was small, and it was not sent to Britain, but to supply Ceylon and the Middle East. Nevertheless, it was still a mistake in hindsight.

In addition, shipping for India overall was greatly restricted during the famine. This did not itself cause the famine, but it would have exacerbated the consequences.

And finally, requests for additional shipments of grain were received in Westminster and consistently rejected or cut to unhelpful levels. Again, while this did not cause the famine, it was cruelly negligent and caused the famine to continue for longer and be more ruinous than it could otherwise have been.

These four aspects to the problem of British food distribution will be considered in this section; the distribution of food within India between the competing interests of military and civil requirements, the export of food from India during the famine, the restriction of international shipping that served India overall, and the failure to meet the requests for more international shipping.

Shipping Crisis: September 1942 – March 1943
By December 1942 the Shipping situation in the East was already critical. As Behrens remarks: “The noose began to close …in the later part of 1941…There were fewer ships coming to these countries from outside the area than in peace and of the ships inside the area…fewer were available for their use.” This was not due to any overarching decision, but simply the problems of war.

British wartime policy was based on the twin fundamental priorities of maintaining both operational flexibility, and a strong enough morale so the British Isles would be willing to continue the war for as long as necessary. How far we may blame Churchill’s government for the decisions they made requires us to keep in mind this fundamental fact.

Behrens writes that, “the fundamental need was thus to decide between the claims on shipping of the war in Europe and the Far East….there was only one practicable possibility – to cut the Indian Ocean sailings”. On 5 January 1943 Churchill sent an edict to cut shipping in the Eastern theatres to 40 (compared to 109 per month between March and August). Mukerjee argues that this decision was based on a critical exaggeration of the problem by Lord Leathers. Nevertheless, these were the figures and the beliefs which Churchill and his Cabinet were operating under. The figures may have been massaged before they reached Churchill’s desk, but he seems to have genuinely believed that British stocks were rapidly approaching a crisis situation.

This was the situation when on 9 December 1942, the Viceroy Linlithgow cabled the Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery to relay a “serious deterioration in the food situation in India,” and asked for the immediate import of 600,000 tons of wheat. Amery replied on 15 December explaining this had “formidable obstacles to overcome”. As Amery explained the shipping problem of late 1942, imports to Britain were perceived as “cut to the bone” already and could not cope with any further cuts.

Although on 18 December Linlithgow wrote on 18 Dec, again on 22, and 26 December saying, “the most liberal and immediate help is absolutely essential”. Only on 8 Jan did Amery send a memo to the Minister of War Transport, Lord Leathers, outlining the entreaty. Linlithgow wrote again on 10 Jan, “we have to emphasise that the wheat situation in India has become even more acute”. As he explained, of the Army wheat promised in July from a further 27,900 tons still needed shipping to be arranged for February, and in addition to this, India needed 200,000 tons for civil use before the end of April, with an additional need for reserves of 400,000.

War Cabinet: 12 and 18 January 1943
On 12 January 1943, the War Cabinet first met to discuss the import of additional foodgrain to India. The Cabinet referred the matter to the Lord President’s Committee under the Lord President John Anderson (previously Governor of Bengal in the 1930s), and planned also that an expert advisor should be sent. Anderson’s Committee agreed to supply 140,000 tons by the end of April, less than asked, but as Behrens writes, 600,000 tons in four months would have involved the continuous employment of almost all of the shipping within the entirety of the Indian Ocean Area. “A demand of this size must have occasioned great difficulty even in peace.”

However on 18 February 1943 the War Cabinet reported that “The position had eased considerably” in India. At this meeting they were also discussing urgent demands for cereal imports from several other countries in the same shipping area. Different priorities were inevitably attached to fulfilling the demands. The Foreign Secretary wrote that, “Turkey is going to be a vital factor in the future strategy of the war…and exceptionally favourable treatment [should be] accorded her”. Yet despite this high priority, in March even Turkey’s needs could not be met. Leathers suggested that Indian relief could be cut to supply Kenya. In the end only 58,000 tons of the amount agreed on 12 Jan was sent to India. The amount was only slightly less than the amount delivered in the same period to the entire Middle East.

The belief of “Sufficiency”: March to June 1943
On 18 March 1943 Linlithgow wrote to Amery that “The food situation in India generally is at present much improved”. This was an extraordinary thing to report to Westminster when the situation was deteriorating by the day. But it gives an insight into the thinking of the Indian Central Government during this critical period. Pinnell was instructed that if only he would "preach the gospel of sufficiency'', prices would drop and hoarded stocks would be released. Suhrawardy was appointed as food minister of the new Nazimuddin government but was instructed not to admit it. He too announced that the province faced no shortages. Therefore it appeared to the politicians in Westminster that India’s warning cries had been no more than crying wolf. Behrens points out that, “In these circumstances it was difficult to take the Indian demands seriously.”

In addition, Mukerjee writes that, “Between January and July of 1943, even as famine set in, India exported 71,000 tons of rice.” Much of this rice would be sent to the rubber plantations of Ceylon which were considered essential for the war effort. It was only on 23 July 1943 that the Central Government announced the ban of any further exports of rice, though special licenses for small amounts were often allowed even after the ban.

Behrens points out that this was the critical time for India, and that it was only in ignorance of the situation that the British government failed to realise that India could only survive with substantial imports. Yet even in hindsight, he argues, even if ships had been provided to carry large quantities of wheat to India as early as the summer of 1942 the calamity would still have been “inevitable”.

Nevertheless even if Behrens is right and imports might not have averted disaster altogether, still any alleviation of the famine would have saved countless lives. He argues however that at this time “the state of affairs in India defied analysis”. Behren’s argument of the complexities of world shipping and the inability of the Ministry of War transport to overcome them is compelling. Nevertheless this too is not an all-or-nothing question. Even if Behrens is right and India’s desperate need for imports was absolutely opaque to the analysts in Westminster, still they were receiving some clues, however partially and weakly, of a considerable approaching crisis.

Part 5: Not Waving but Drowning – The Growing Crisis

Ignorance and Indifference: June 1943 – August 1943
There were no more requests for imports until the summer. Rather it was agreed by Central Government that deficits and food prices would be managed within India. However on 6 June Linlithgow wrote to Amery, that “the food position… has again taken a turn for the worse”.

On 2 July, Herbert wrote to Linlithgow he felt he had previously “erred in the direction of understatement” in his reports to the Viceroy. Herbert concluded by saying that, “we shall have to face disaster unless we can get foodgrains at once in sufficient quantities from outside.”

In July the Gregory Committee met in India to review the food problem. They urged the ban on exports and recommended 1,500,000 tons of imports; including 500,000 tons immediately. On 13 July 1943, Linlithgow wrote to Amery, “We must make it clear that we have postponed coming back to H.M.G. until the last possible moment.”

This was Linithgow’s contribution to the causes of the Famine, his hesitancy in approaching Westminster, his repeated understatement of the problem, and his inadequate and delayed responses within India had left Bengal starving until late July with no effective measures being undertaken.

Shipping Committee: 30 July 1943
On 30 July 1943, the War Cabinet’s Shipping Committee considered Linlithgow’s request before the War Cabinet. The Minister for War Transport, Lord Leathers, however argued against shipping more than 30,000 tons a month from Australia while 100,000 tons of barley could be shipped from Iraq. But the unelected technical advisor Lord Cherwell (who had Churchill’s ear) noted to Churchill that despite India’s demands for foodgrains the previous winter, “the emergency vanished." Cherwell didn’t believe imports were needed and wrote that, “the U.K…has already suffered a greater drop in the standard of life than India”. This demonstrates the depth of ignorance in Westminster as to the true situation in Bengal.

War Cabinet: 4 August 1943
On 4 August 1943, the War Cabinet met to discuss the shipping request. The Memorandum prepared by Amery did mention, “Famine conditions… have indeed already begun to appear”. This however failed to give a correct impression of the situation in Bengal where tens of thousands were already dying of starvation.

In the Cabinet Both Cherwell and Leathers were convinced that India was playing up its problems for effect. The Cabinet decided to offer only a meagre 50,000 tons.

Amery wrote in his diary how he had “fought hard” against the “nonsense talk by Professor Cherwell [who]… like Winston, hates India”. Whatever the truth of these accusations, one can suspect Amery was also simply frustrated by his own inability to convince his colleagues of his position.

On 13 August, 1943, Linlithgow replied to Amery that, “the Government of India and I cannot be responsible for the continuing stability of India now”. Amery wrote again on 4 September that “he had spoken with Leathers on 3 September but, “His position broadly is that he has an actual deficiency of ships.” However, the situation had improved since the start of the year causing what Smith calls a “shipping glut.” Nevertheless, as Behrens argues, this situation remained precarious.

After this Amery made no further overtures to Westminster, and Linlithgow didn’t mention the famine in his letters to Amery until 18 Sep when the Viceroy provided a much more detailed report of Bengal conditions to Amery, now for the first time detailing mass deaths.

Why Linlithgow waited so long can only be speculated, but it is informative to look at the report he received from Herbert as late as 28 August. Herbert wrote to him, “I think we can claim to have made good progress…conditions are, I am advised, not as bad as would appear from the Press”. He blamed the political feet-dragging of the previous Huq ministry for all the problems and claimed that his efforts to cajole the new Nazimuddin ministry into better action had been successful.

However, on 22 August The Statesman newspaper had printed a photospread of starving Bengalis which became an international sensation and went on to cause great embarrassment for the authorities. It was this, perhaps more than anything else, that spurred the authorities into action.

The Truth Comes Out: September 1943 – November 1943
Herbert was replaced by Rutherford on 4 September due to sudden illness. It is only after this date that Linlithgow’s reports to Amery begin to include the critical details of mass starvation and deaths.

After Rutherford’s report on 15 September, Linlithgow wrote to Amery on 18 September forwarding the news that, “Deaths reported …famine conditions are reported to be widespread.” and on 20 Sep “I envisage a large death roll.”

On 23 September Amery made a statement to the House of Commons, where, after months of denying any famine existed, he admitted “the death rate in Calcutta in the last seven months has been 30 % above normal”.

War Cabinet: 24 September 1943
On 24 September 1943 the Cabinet was faced with extensive documents, including a G.H.Q. Intelligence Summary that finally mentions critical details, “famine conditions are now rife…daily removal of corpses from streets and houses…Cholera, small-pox and starvation are causing hundreds of deaths…coolies die by the wayside of starvation”. However Lord Leathers claimed it would still “not be possible” to get extra ships before the next harvest. The only available source was 50,000 tons from the stocks in the Middle East which were intended for irregular operations. The Cabinet decided to ship 200,000 tons overall, half of which was Iraqi barley (which would be useless in reducing rice prices). This was again, far less than the minimum 500,000 that had been determined to be essential (and the Iraqi barley would fail to be delivered).

It was after this meeting that Amery wrote in his diary, “Winston may be right in saying that the starvation of anyhow under-fed Bengalis is less serious than sturdy Greeks, but he makes no sufficient allowance for the sense of Empire responsibility in this country.”

War Cabinet: 3 and 10 November, and 16 December 1943
The War Cabinet met two more times in early November, the first on 3 November to discuss a Canadian offer of 100,000 tons, though no shipping, so the Cabinet rejected it. The problem was not the existence of food but making it available where it was required. On the 10 November the War Cabinet debated additional imports into India.

Amery wrote in his diary, “Winston, after a preliminary flourish on Indians breeding like rabbits and being paid a million a day for doing nothing, asked Leathers for his view. He said he could manage 50,000 tons in January and February. Winston agreed with this and I had to be content.” Amery also wrote after this meeting, “that Winston so dislikes India and all to do with it that he can see nothing but waste of shipping space.”

Churchill however wrote in his memoirs, “It was very rarely that [Leathers] was unable to accomplish the hard tasks I set. Several times when all staff and departmental processes had failed to solve the problems of moving an extra division or trans-shipping it from British to American ships, or of meeting some other need, I made a personal appeal to him, and the difficulties seemed to disappear as if by magic”. Yet whatever Leathers’ “magical” powers, Churchill seems to have made no such personal appeal in this case.

On 10 November Canada also offered to divert a single ship to transport 10,000 tons of their offered wheat to India. Initially the Cabinet refused this as well but political backlash forced them to agree on 16 December. The ship would indeed set sail, though it would not arrive in India for months.

The Cabinet’s decisions to provide only minor amounts of shipping to alleviate the Indian crisis can partially be defended up to September 1943. One can see that the information they were receiving was too meagre to fully inform them of the situation, and the shipping crisis of early 1943 was too great to easily overcome. However the decision of 24 September and 3 and 10 November did not have either of those two problems to excuse them. Leathers now had a “glut” of ships, and the press and Cabinet official documents were full of critical details which should have exercised them to full and strenuous efforts.

Nevertheless, despite the evidence changing, their conclusions remained the same. They continued to believe wholeheartedly that substantial imports were unnecessary, and continued to treat the Indian crisis as a lower priority than other considerations.

It is true that if Churchill and his Cabinet had sent the requested shipping in full then the Famine itself would not have been averted. It was far too late for that, and it is very likely that millions would still have died. However, it is equally likely that the suffering would have been alleviated in part, and that shipments could have arrived in time to save many hundreds of thousands.

”The problem of the future”: November and December 1943
By November Wavell’s efforts were already bearing some signs of fruit. Yet this caused the previous denial of famine to change to a premature celebration of its end. The Food Member of the Viceroy’s Council, Srivastava, said on 18 December, “we are now faced with the problem of the future…the food crisis is probably over”. However, as Narayan, who toured Bengal in the closing months of 1943 wrote, “The famine had been more or less driven out of urban areas, but it was still there in the countryside.” Although Greenough calculates that 1 million people had died in 1943, the majority of deaths were still to come. By 1946 it would be 3.5 million or higher.

For comparison the total deaths for the UK, including all military and civilian deaths, for the entirety of WWII was only 450,900.

Part 6:”Please Sir, May I have Some More” – End December 1943 – 1944
At the end of December Wavell received revised food estimates for defence in 1944 and wrote for the Cabinet to reconsider 1 million tons of export in 1944. On 4 January he wrote, “I think Cabinet must trust man on the spot. You can warn them from me that it is my considered judgment that unless we can be assured now of receiving one million (repeat one million) tons of food grains during 1944 we are heading for disaster both as regards famine and inflation”.

War Cabinet: 7, 17, and 21 February, 20 March, and 24 April 1944
Nevertheless 1944 continued much the same as late 1943. Despite Wavell’s impassioned pleas, Leathers continued to insist that no shipping could be spared without impacting the requirements of the war. The War Cabinet met on 7, 17, and 21 February, without any change. As Wavell wrote in his diary later in the year, “my first requests were received with much the same astonished incredulity as Oliver Twist encountered on a well known occasion”.

The problem was that the War Cabinet took its lead from the Foodgrains OCmmitee that had been set up. Wavell wrote on April 26 about his impression of it, “that old menace, the Professor (Cherwell), Leathers, an interested party, only concerned to hang on to his shipping, P J Grigg, who is always mischievous about India, and Llewelyn, the Food Minister, who knows nothing of India and is concerned to preserve his food supplies at home. Attitude simply is that there is no shipping and Americans can’t be asked to supply some in case they do so but deduct it from allotment for the UK…I think they would [let the Indian people starve] if they had any real hope that the Viceroy would consent.” On July 23 he wrote again of, “the complete failure of the India Office to make their weight felt.”

However, Wavell was not to be deterred. He wrote personally to Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Brooke and the other Chiefs of Staff asking them for their assistance. On 18 March they replied that they could immediately release 25 ships to be used to ship 200,000 tons of wheat from Australia, as well as the allocation of 10 per cent of cargo space on military vessels, which would provide “120,000 tons of wheat in 12 months”. The also recommended approaching the Americans for assistance. This effectively undercut Leathers’ argument that nothing could be done.

On 20 March 1944 the War Cabinet met, with Brooke in attendance. Leathers grudgingly agreed only to the 25 ships but said, “no commitment to India should now be made beyond the 200,000 tons.” Any discussion of the proposal for 10% of storage space to be used isn’t recorded.

Regardng the approach to the Americans, Amery wrote to Wavell later that “Leathers has had such difficulties with the Americans over shipping already that he feels he simply cannot approach them for more”. In reality, as Mukerjee summarises, “Leathers advised against asking the Americans-for they might actually agree. Then ‘they would certainly take anything away from us which they gave to India’ in terms of ships.”

In March and April there were heavy thunderstorms causing destruction to crops also an accidental explosion in the port of Bombay where 45,000 tons of food was destroyed.

The Cabinet met again on 24 April, 1944. However, though the minutes record that Churchill’s “sympathy was great for the sufferings of the people of India,” and they agreed 36,000 tons to replace the food lost in the Bombay disaster, nevertheless the Cabinet concluded that nothing else could be done. Amery wrote in his diary that Churchill was “truculent” as ever, “and came very near saying that we could not let Indian starvation interfere with operations.” A telegram to Washington was, however, reluctantly agreed to.

The telegram to Roosevelt was sent by Churchill on 29 April. Drafted by Leathers, it included much self-justification. While mention was made of Wavell’s “gravest warnings,” and also of the “grievous famine” of 1943 he also wrote of the “good crop of rice” in Bengal and no specific information of the extent of shortfall that the Viceroy anticipated. Instead he wrote that, “I have been able to arrange for 350,000 tons of wheat to be shipped to India from Australia during the first nine months of 1944. I cannot see how we could do more.” However, on 3 June Roosevelt replied, turning down the request. Whether this was because Roosevelt genuinely could not help, or that the request was worded so as a refusal was inevitable is hard to say.

”Too little and too late” – June 1944 – December 1944
On 6 June the Invasion of France began. This was what Churchill and Leathers had been so concerned about reserving shipping for. Although there were no initial losses of ships on D-Day, Amery reported that, “Leathers is convinced that the Second Front is going to absorb more and more.”

On 8 June Amery wrote directly to Churchill on 8 June asking to pursue the additional proposal of using 10% of space for food on military shipments and with Churchill’s agreement, forwarded the proposal to Wavell the same day. There were more delays however, and on 20 June Wavell wrote to Amery, “It is scandalous that we are making no progress about food imports after about six months’ discussion…The objective of most of the [Foodgrains] Committee seems to be purely obstruction and delay.”

Wavell wrote to Churchill directly in late June, “His Majesty’s Government’s attitude if maintained can, and will, be represented with reason as both short-sighted and callous…It would be comparatively easy for His Majesty’s Government to help India now. The number of ships to be allocated would not be large.”

The Chiefs of Staff met with Churchill on 22 June accepting the release of 200,000 tons from Australia by a general squeeze on maintenance. Wavell was pleased with this arrangement. In summary of shipments he reported that 350,000 tons had been delivered between October 1943 and April 1944, as well as an extra 50,000 tons in the first quarter of 1944, and 400,000 tons would come by the end of September. This total of 800,000 tons was not the full 1.5 million tons recommended by the Food Grains Policy Committee in late 1943, but he admitted he thought it should be enough.

However, Wavell reported to Amery on 5 July that the “decision has been too little and too late. It has had a very bad Press and has increased rather than allayed public anxiety.” In August 1944, the Chiefs of Staff recommended a further 300,000 tons. But the Cabinet continued to delay through September. Meanwhile however from 15 August to the end of Sep Sir French (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Food in UK) had toured India to investigate. Wavell wrote on September 29 that French’s report should help.

Indeed, Amery wrote to Wavell on 9 October that “Position has changed”. Finally a decision had been made that 300,000 tons could be sent in the fourth quarter of 1944, although 75,000 tons of it must be flour rather than grain. Half would be shipped from Australia and half was being made up by shipping from North America. As Wavell wrote in his diary for October 11, “After nine months of hard struggle I have got 700,000 tons for India after HMG had twice said no imports were possible at all.”

On 24 October Wavell wrote to Churchill personally reviewing the past year as Viceroy, “I feel that the vital problems of India are being treated by H.M.G. with neglect, even sometimes with hostility and contempt…With the help now being accorded by H.M.G., we should be able to hold the food position, but only just.”

On 16 December 1944, Wavell wrote in his diary after coming back from Calcutta that “Casey seemed to have fewer problems than usual. He has an ‘embaras de rice’ at the moment and would gladly part with large quantities if we could guarantee to replace it in the second half of 1945.”

In 1945 however shipping continued to be an issue. On April 9, Wavell attended Cabinet in London and wrote in his diary, “A dull Cabinet, but it brought home to me the very different attitude towards feeding a starving population when the starvation is in Europe. In this case it is Holland which needs food, and ships will of course be available, quite a different answer to the one we get whenever we ask for ships to bring food to India.”

On 18 May, the War Cabinet reviewed the shipping situation again. They agreed to supply India with 100,000 tons of wheat per month between July-December 1945. This was however on condition that India would supply Ceylon with 25,000 further tons of rice and the U.K. with 200,000 further tons of ground-nuts.

On the 11 July Churchill lost the General Election to Atlee’s Labour Party, alongside Amery who was also voted out. The new Secretary of State for India was Pethick-Lawrence, who had been extremely critical of the government response to the Famine in the House. He took office on 3 August. Wavell wrote his opinion in his diary, “I think Labour is likely to take more interest in and be more sympathetic towards India, but they will have some weird ideas about it.”

However, on December 30 Wavell wrote, “A serious food crisis seems to be developing again as HMG is going back on all its promises about imports and the situation in Bombay and Madras is worsening.” Though he also wrote, “a Labour government has on the whole made things easier, since rather more attention is paid to India and the outlook is rather more sympathetic.”

The situation continued, improving but never ending, until it became obscured by the more visible violence and deaths which broke out around the end of Colonial rule and partition. Arguably Bengal has never fully recovered.

Part 7: “We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end” - Conclusion

The above analysis of the events and causes of the Famine cannot be neatly summarised with a TLDR of so much per cent of blame allocated to Churchill and so much to Herbert or Huq etc. The complexity of factors remains entangled, each causing and exacerbating the others. A more sympathetic cabinet could have made a difference, but even a Cabinet with even more callous indifference couldn’t have caused the Famine without the administrative chaos in Bengal, the interprovincial reluctance to part with surplus, the corruption, hoarding, lethargy, and simple incompetence of so many individuals, both named and unnamed.

And further, the many hundreds of officials preceding the Famine, who effectively ran Bengal into the ground for one and a half centuries instead of administering it effectively and developing it appropriately. Some might say that such a catastrophe is an inevitable result of the inherent nature of Imperialism. It is the nature of people to care more about those they see as similar to them than those who they perceive as different. Despite the rhetoric in Parliament of the Bengalees being as equal subjects of the Crown as any Londoner, the reality was that Bengal was out of sight and out of mind for most. Endemic indifference, neglect, and criminal negligence was practically built into the system.

Regarding Churchill’s culpability in particular, it is easily demonstrated that Churchill held racial and racist views that were extreme even for his own time, despite the fact that these softened somewhat and led to a slight measure of re-evaluation over the years. Yet his views were not as important a cause of his behaviour as other factors. His antipathy and sheer ignorance towards Indian internal socio-politics meant he was entirely reliant on the advice of those individuals who could convince him they were right. This ended up being those who shared his traits of stubbornness, fierce opinionatedness, extreme conservatism, and reluctance to adequately consider factors beyond the winning of the war.

Advice from Leathers and Cherwell dominated his considerations, and their abilities and attitudes were themselves unhelpful to alleviating the Famine, while he completely ignored or raged against opposing views such as Amery and Wavell’s, despite a growing abundance of evidence demonstrating their case. Despite Churchill’s reputation as a statesman, he often showed an inability to cope with dissenting opinions. He preferred to bullheadedly charge forward on partial information than wait for the evidence to be collected, and once moving forward he could rarely be convinced to change, no matter the evidence to the contrary. Famous quotes by Churchill are like weeds, but a few are serviceable to sum up his approach such as, “If you are going through hell, keep going”, “Never, never, never give up”, and “Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm”.

In conclusion, though Churchill was not responsible for the events that led to the Famine, he can certainly be criticised for failing to alleviate it adequately once he became fully aware of it from September 1943. He may not have caused the 3.8 million deaths, but he can be seen to have been responsible for failing to save a significant proportion of them.

“Who Controls the Past”: Bibliography

Secondary Sources

NB: Other sources were also used for background , but these are the main texts I used.

General Ali, Tariq, Winston Churchill: His Times, His Crimes, (2022), Verso

Behrens, C.B.A., Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, (1955), Her Majesty’s Stationary Office

Brennan, Lance, Government Famine Relief in Bengal, 1943, (1988), The Journal of Asian Studies, 47, no 3, 542-67

Chatterji, Joya, Bengal Divided: Hindu communalism and partition, 1932-1947, (1994), Cambridge University Press

Greenough, Paul R., Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-1944, (1982), Oxford University Press

Mukherjee, Janam, Hungry Bengal: War Famine, and the End of Empire, (2015), Oxford University Press

Mukerjee, Madhusree, Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II, (2010), Basic Books

Economic Debate

Bowbrick, Peter, “The Causes of Famine – A Refutation of Professor Sen’s Theory.” (1986), Food Policy 11, no. 2, pp. 105-124

Goswami, Omkar, The Bengal Famine of 1943: Reexamining the Data, (1990), The Indian Economic and Social History Review 27, no. 4, pp. 445-463

Ó Gráda, Cormac, The ripple that drowns? Twentieth-century famines in China and India as economic history, (2007) UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series

Ó Gráda, Cormac, ‘Sufficiency and Sufficiency and Sufficiency’: Revisiting the Bengal Famine of 1943-44 (2010), UCD Centre For Economic Research Working Paper Series

Sen, Amartya, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, (1981), Oxford University Press

Tauger, Mark, Entitlement, Shortage, and the 1943 Bengal Famine: Another Look., (2006), Journal of Peasant Studies Vol. 33, Issue 1

Tauger, Mark, The Indian Famine Crises of World War II, (2009), British Scholar Vol. I, Issue 2, 166-96,

Primary Sources

Barnes, John, and Nicholson, David (Eds), The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries: 1929-1945 (1988), Hutchinson

Mansergh, Nicholas (Editor-in-Chief), The Transfer of Power 1942-7; Vols. I-VII (1970-77), Her Majesty’s Stationary Office

Mitter, S. C., A Recovery Plan for Bengal, (1934), The Book Company Ltd

Moon, Penderel, (ed), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal, (1973), Oxford University Press

Narayan, T. G. Famine Over Bengal, (1944), The Book Company Ltd

Woodhead, Sir John, (Chairman), Famine Enquiry Commission, Report on Bengal, (1945), Government of India Press (Available: http://www.bowbrick.org.uk/key_documents_on_the_bengal_fami.htm)

War Cabinet Conclusions, CAB-65/20-65/52 (3 November 1941-13 May 1945) (Available: Cabinet Papers - The National Archives)

War Cabinet Memoranda, CAB-66/28-66/65 (21 August 1942 – 24 May 1945) (Available: Cabinet Papers - The National Archives)

War Cabinet Secretary’s Notes (Norman Brook) CAB 195/1-195/2 (13 April 1942-23 November 1942) (Available: The National Archives)

Churchill Biographies

NB: These aren’t very good sources for the Famine. I include them here only as a list of the books I explicitly reference in my post. I searched many others as well for mentions (or silence) of the Famine, but the full list would be pointless to include.

Gopal, Sarvepalli, ‘Churchill and India’ in Blake, R., and Louis, Wm. R., Churchill, (1993), Oxford University Press

Hastings, Max, Winston’s War - Churchill, 1940–1945, (2010), Alfred A. Knopf

Herman, Arthur, Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age, (2008), Bantam Books

Langworth, Richard M., Winston Churchill, Myth and Reality: What He Actually Did and Said, (2017), McFarland & Company

Lawrence, James, Churchill and Empire: Portrait of an Imperialist, (2013), Weidenfeld & Nicolson

Roberts, Andrew, Eminent Churchillians, (1994), Weidenfeld and Nicolson

Roberts, Andrew, Churchill: Walking with Destiny, (2018), Viking

Toye, Richard, Churchill’s Empire: The World that Made Him and the World He Made, (2010), Henry Holt and Company

Tucker-Jones, Anthony, Churchill, Master and Commander: Winston Churchill at War 1895–1945, (2021), Osprey Publishing

Weigold, Auriol, Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II, (2008), Routledge

Wheatcroft, Geoffrey, Churchill’s Shadow: The Life and Afterlife of Winston Churchill, (2021), W. W. Norton & Company

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