對越南反戰運動的反思
以及戰爭結束後奇怪的平靜（1）
作者：約翰·穆勒
摘自 Peter Braestrup 編， 《越南的歷史》 （馬裡蘭州蘭納姆：美國大學出版社，1984 年出版），第 151-57 頁。
REFLECTIONS ON THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT
AND ON THE CURIOUS CALM AT THE WAR’S END1
by John Mueller
From Peter Braestrup (ed.), Vietnam as History (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 151-57.
越戰最令人難忘的一點是，美國國內興起了一場聲勢浩大的反對戰爭或反對美國參與戰爭的運動。該運動在存在期間引起了媒體的廣泛關注，並從此激發了一些民間傳說。
本文就越南反戰運動對公眾輿論、政治選舉、美國越南政策以及北越戰略的影響提出了一些不連貫的推測。最後，文章總結了一些關於美國公眾在 1975 年接受動盪戰爭結束時出乎意料的平靜的觀察。
幾年前，我做過一項研究，比較了公眾對
越戰和韓戰的看法。
透過各種測試我發現，儘管電視據稱使越南戰爭變得獨一無二，但實際上戰爭對公眾輿論的影響卻非常相似。
兩場戰爭都得到了相同人口群體的支持：
尤其是年輕人和受過良好教育的人。
撤退和升級的情緒大致相同，並且大多來自同一群體。
此外，在可比的時期內，這些戰爭的受歡迎程度大致相同；
也就是說，
雖然越戰最終變得比朝鮮戰爭更不受歡迎，但這只是在美國傷亡人數大大超過前一次戰爭之後才發生的。
對戰爭的支持趨勢也遵循著同樣的過程：隨著美國傷亡的增加，基本支持下降，並遵循相同的數學關係。 （2）
這種相似性似乎令人驚訝，因為儘管兩場戰爭有許多共同之處，
但韓戰並沒有激發任何有組織的公眾抗議，
這與越戰期間引發的抗議完全不同。
如果人們關注兩次戰爭期間的口頭抗議和媒體對抗議的報道，就會發現後來的戰爭似乎更加不受歡迎。
在我看來，這些發現表明在評估口頭抗議時需要注意兩點。
第一點是相當明顯的：
人們應該謹慎地認為，那些大聲疾呼的煽動者一定代表著他們聲稱代表的群眾。
工會領導人可能不會代表工人發言，積極的女權主義者可能無法準確代表女性，而道德多數派可能正如保險桿貼紙所暗示的那樣，兩者都不是。
其次，也許更有趣的是，
至少在 1968 年之前，
越南抗議運動在影響公眾輿論方面的努力實際上可能適得其反 -
也就是說，如果沒有抗議，這場戰爭可能會更不受歡迎。
後者建議背後的理由源自於一個眾所周知的輿論現象。
許多人在對某一問題作出決定時，受其支持者的影響比受其內容的影響更大。
如果出現一個問題，如果富蘭克林·羅斯福支持它，而且總的來說，我發現自己同意羅斯福的觀點並信任他，那麼我有理由採納他的觀點作為我自己的觀點，至少作為初步的近似。
這種認可程序具有明顯的效率，並且可以雙向發揮作用。具有負面情緒的支持者可能會降低問題的接受度。例如，1940 年，如果將當時備受爭議的查爾斯·林德伯格 (Charles Lindbergh) 的名字與一項對德國人友好的提議聯繫在一起，那麼對該提議的支持率就會大幅下降。 (3)
現在，事實證明，
越南抗議運動在美國公眾中引發了前所未有的負面情緒。
1968 年，密西根大學進行了一項民意調查，要求公眾以 100 分制對各種團體和人物進行評分。
有三分之一的受訪者給越戰抗議者打了零分，這是最低的評分，而只有 16% 的受訪者給他們打了較高的分數。
其他研究則表明，
儘管媒體的報導嚴重偏向示威者，
但民眾對 1968 年民主黨全國代表大會騷亂的反應絕大多數是對芝加哥警方有利，而對示威者不利。 （4）
反對戰爭的行為與暴力擾亂、臭氣彈、褻瀆國旗、褻瀆語言和對美國價值的蔑視聯繫在一起。
這些協會不僅會對公眾輿論產生負面影響，還會嚇跑更多「值得尊敬的」潛在戰爭反對者，使他們不敢加入反戰。
反戰運動與政治選舉
除了努力影響公眾對戰爭的看法之外，越南抗議運動還關心選出其認可的候選人。儘管友好候選人在某些地方確實表現不錯，特別是在一些初選中，而且一些地方反戰公投也獲得通過，但這場運動似乎並沒有取得很大成功。即使在柬埔寨入侵後，人們為影響 1970 年國會選舉做出了巨大努力，但似乎也沒有改變太多席位。
然而，在總統選舉中，抗議運動可能產生了一些影響：它可能在理查德·尼克森當選總統的過程中發揮了重要作用。兩次。
1968年，尼克森的替代者是休伯特·漢弗萊。在民主黨初選和大會期間，抗議運動（或至少是其最激烈的抗議分子）對尤金·麥卡錫等反戰候選人的命運感到憤怒，他們集中精力確保漢弗萊的失敗，
他們認為漢弗萊是林登·約翰遜政策的繼承者和越南戰爭的重要共同發起人。
這種觀點是可以理解的，儘管漢弗萊後來試圖表明他對約翰遜在越南的政策有許多疑慮，但 1968 年的抗議者很難知道這一點。然而，即使承認這一點，
選舉中的對手也是尼克森，他堅定地支持戰爭努力，並長期支持升級戰爭和激進的反共主義。
另一方面，
漢弗萊長期以來一直支持國際談判、軍備控制和調解。
1968 年，他們的口頭政策可能並無太大差別（漢弗萊顯然不能承受在選舉期間疏遠黨內的約翰遜派），但他們對戰爭與和平問題的直覺卻已公開記錄在案。
抗議運動不僅選擇忽視這些有據可查的分歧，而且還積極尋求羞辱和擊敗漢弗萊。
當副總統在芝加哥競選時，他受到了“Dump-the-Hump”的喧囂和混亂；
當尼克森冒險前往那裡時，他以和平王子的身份出現，並得出這樣的教訓：
他的當選將使美國街頭恢復平靜。
令人驚訝的是，儘管面臨許多問題，漢弗萊幾乎贏得了選舉。黨內的許多反戰人士最終都加入了進來，但他們的支持是勉強的、輕視的，而且為時已晚。其他人則袖手旁觀。這個優勢足以讓尼克森入主白宮。
四年後，
民主黨的權力機構基本上掌握在反戰分子手中。
它改變了規則以避免1968年的慘敗，卻又犯了另一個錯誤：
提名喬治·麥高文，他是現代任何政黨推出的最糟糕的總統候選人。
麥戈文成功做到了看似不可能的事情：
儘管麥戈文代表多數黨，儘管他的對手很難被擊敗，但其受歡迎程度遠不及高華德 1964 年的對手林登·約翰遜，而且也更加脆弱，但他獲得的民眾選票比例仍然低於巴里·高華德 1964 年的選票比例。
反戰運動與越南政策
反戰運動對美國政策和決策者的影響似乎相當有限，
尤其是在 1968 年。
也許林登·約翰遜在談判中做出的努力是因為國內的怨恨，
但是，由於這些努力直到 1968 年才取得成果，所以這並不是什麼成就。
和平運動可能對 1968 年春節後美國政策的各種變化產生了一些氛圍上的影響。但約翰遜和克拉克·克利福德等主要參與者的記述，以及赫伯特·尚德勒等人對這一時期歷史的一般描述，都傾向於表明，這些變化——甚至約翰遜決定不再參選——很可能都是出於與國內抗議活動無關的原因。 （5）
反戰運動可能在後來的尼克森時代產生了更大的影響。
在 1968 年所有主要政黨的總統候選人中（甚至包括約翰遜），
尼克森可能是最不願意放鬆在越南的軍事存在、最不願意撤出美國軍隊、最不願意在談判中做出核心讓步、最不願意看到國家「接受歷史上的第一次失敗」的人。
反戰運動可能對尼克森加快撤軍速度以及使他比計劃提前撤出柬埔寨入侵起到了重要作用。
尼克森和外交政策顧問亨利·基辛格的回憶錄無疑表明了他們對反對派運動的相當關注。
有趣的是，
當尼克森在 1971 年感到必須對北越進行某種懲罰性轟炸時，他選擇在一年中唯一能保證美國大學空無一人的時間進行轟炸：
聖誕節和新年之間。
但也應該記住，尼克森當選後，反戰運動的範圍變得更加廣泛。尤其是許多曾經因為效忠約翰遜政府而支持戰爭的自由派民主黨人，在選舉後擺脫了這種忠誠，
轉而反對這場很快就演變成「尼克森戰爭」的戰爭。
此外，
雙重發展——
- 戰爭成本的增加和南越在遏制理論中重要性的下降
- （由於 20 世紀 60 年代末印尼和中國威脅的緩和變化）——
因此，雖然反戰運動保留了早期更浪漫的過去的一些元素，
但反戰運動開始由更受尊敬的人主導——事實上甚至包括休伯特·漢弗萊。
在那個時代，它是一種完全不同的動物，它的要求更有可能有效。
最具影響力的反戰措施，
即國會於 1973 年頒布的戰爭權力限制，是在反戰運動作為一種街頭現像不再存在之後很久才被採納的。
運動的一些無效性，特別是在 1965 年至 1968 年期間，可能是由於其處理問題的方式所致。大部分抗議似乎都是為了推動談判，
- 而北越認為，談判的先決條件是無條件停止對其領土的一切轟炸。
事實上，從某些方面來說，
反戰運動可能無意中被政府內部支持轟炸的人利用了。
- 抗議者不斷強調爆炸造成了巨大的破壞並殺害了“無辜平民”，以表明爆炸具有軍事威力。
敵人因轟炸而“受到傷害”，為了反駁“無辜平民”的論點，他們可以說將努力減少“附帶損害”。
此外，有些人可能在內部爭辯說，
在北越這樣一個完全動員的國家裡，沒有一個平民是無辜的，因此平民傷亡都是好事。
對政府成員來說，
- 可能更有效的論點是強調轟炸對美國人生命和金錢造成的損失。
- 轟炸對共產黨的戰爭努力（特別是在北方）沒有產生足夠的影響，不足以證明在飛機和飛行員方面的花費是合理的。 （7）
反戰運動與北越戰略
- 越戰的支持者經常認為，反戰運動增強了共產黨繼續戰爭的意志，因此反戰抗議起到了延長戰爭的效果。 （8）
正如威廉·威斯特摩蘭將軍經常評論的那樣，
- 這場戰爭是一場消耗戰，是一場“意志之戰”，
- 雙方都會懲罰對方，直到最終一方屈服
- （他的分析似乎總體上是正確的，儘管戰爭並沒有按照他預想的方式發展。）
- 因此，在這場戰爭中，保持士氣尤為重要。
- 似乎美國的反戰抗議讓河內感到鼓舞，
- 而北越國內缺乏反戰跡象讓華盛頓感到沮喪。
然而，關鍵的考量不是反戰是否鼓舞了共產黨，而是這種鼓勵對他們繼續戰爭努力的能力是否重要。關於這個問題的所有證據尚未出爐，但似乎無論美國國內有多少反對的聲音，
- 北越都準備好繼續戰爭，只要有必要。
- 在北方，更重要的是在南方戰場上，
- 建立和維持士氣的機制依賴組織和政治技巧，而與來自國外的消息幾乎沒有關係。
事實上，今天，在南方取得勝利八年多後，他們仍在印度支那繼續與新的敵人作戰，毫不鬆懈。
- 早在反戰運動出現之前，長期戰爭的承諾似乎就已經成為他們心理構成的一個重要組成部分。
隨著美國軍隊撤出越南，反戰運動逐漸消退。 1975 年，美國在印度支那的外交政策以失敗告終，美國支持的政府在共產黨的攻擊下可恥地垮台，反戰運動在政治舞台上幾乎消失了。戰爭期間，
- 許多戰爭支持者曾警告說，
- 共產黨接管該地區將會在美國國內造成廣泛的政治影響，
- 例如新麥卡錫主義的興起，因為舊麥卡錫主義似乎常常受到 1949 年中國「淪陷」到共產主義的推動。 （11）
與這些可怕的預言相反，
美國公眾對東南亞的崩潰表現出了異常平靜的態度，對於誰失去了越南，幾乎沒有任何爭論。
最令人驚訝的是，
主持這場災難的人，傑拉爾德·福特總統，
在 1976 年競選連任時，實際上將印度支那事件作為對自己有利的論據：
“當我在 1974 年上任時，”他反复辯稱，“我們仍然捲入了東南亞的一場戰爭；
現在我們過著幸福的和平生活”，
他的結論是吉米·福特似乎已經得出的荒謬性論點。
接受失敗
- 我認為大眾如此輕易地接受 1975 年的崩盤至少有三個原因。
首先，
- 1973 年 1 月的和解在很大程度上已經使這場戰爭與美國的情感脫鉤；
- 也就是說，有兩年的“相當長的一段時間”，戰爭似乎又回到了印度支那人的手中。
- 這項發展的關鍵是 1973 年初美國戰俘的回歸。
- 他們的歸來對大眾而言意味著戰爭的結束。 （12）
1971年5月，一項民調詢問美國軍隊是否應該在年底前撤出越南；
68%的人表示同意。
當被問及如果撤軍意味著“共產黨接管南越”，他們是否仍支持撤軍時，只有 29% 的受訪者表示同意。
當被問及是否贊成撤軍，「即使這會威脅到（而不是付出）北越關押的美國戰俘的生命或安全」時，支持率迅速下降：
只有 11% 的人表示同意。 (13)
這種發自內心的公眾態度普遍受到政治家們的讚賞（也許喬治·麥戈文除外），而爭取釋放戰俘的政治需要有助於維持和平談判——以及美國參與戰爭——持續多年。
- 理性上，人們可能會質疑這項耗費數千人生命去拯救數百名戰俘的政策，但在很大程度上，這是別無選擇。 （14）
- 然而，一旦戰俘返回，這個問題得到解決，戰爭很快就會被遺忘。 （15）
其次，如上文所述，由於
- 南越在1965年後冷戰中的重要性大大降低，
但民調證據表明，美國公眾對南越人相當不尊重，甚至是蔑視，
- 如果他們不能有效地為自己而戰，公眾早就準備拋棄他們。
當時大約有15%到35%的公眾贊成從越南撤軍；
但是，當民意調查問題包含「假設南越開始自相殘殺」這一條件時，這一比例上升至 54%，而當民意調查問題包含「如果南越政府決定停止戰鬥」這一條件時，這一比例上升至 72%。
其他民調顯示，對南越的承諾以及對越戰後血腥屠殺的擔憂，是民眾支持這場戰爭的次要因素。
第三，印度支那的崩潰可能因為一個從本質上來說並不重要的附帶事件而更容易被接受：
- 1975年柬埔寨共產黨捕獲了美國船隻“瑪雅圭斯號”，隨後美國軍隊又大膽地奪回了它。
- 但這次冒險的戲劇性和男子氣概可能有助於緩解美國人的痛苦。
- 可以相信的是，儘管共產黨可以擊敗我們在東南亞的昔日盟友，但他們在真正的美國勢力面前卻無能為力。
筆記
1. 版權所有 1984 約翰‧穆勒 (John Mueller)。
2. John Mueller，《戰爭、總統與公眾輿論》 （紐約：Wiley，1973 年），第 3 章。 26. 另請參閱本卷其他部分「公眾輿論與越戰」。
3. Hadley Cantril，《衡量輿論》（新澤西州普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1947 年），第 33 頁。 41.
4. 約翰‧P‧羅賓遜，《公眾對政治抗議的反應：1968 年芝加哥》，《輿論季刊》，1970 年春季，第 1-9 頁。
5. 林登·B·約翰遜，《有利位置》（紐約：霍爾特出版社，1971年）；克拉克·克利福德，《對越南的重新評估》，《 外交事務》 ，1969年7月；赫伯特·Y·尚德勒，《總統的垮台》（新澤西州普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1977年）。
6. 萊斯利·格爾布和理查德·貝茨在其重要著作 《越南的諷刺》（華盛頓特區：布魯金斯學會，1979 年）中指出，由於對戰爭代價的失望，遏制共產主義的戰後共識在 1965 年至 1968 年間破裂（另見理查德·K·貝茨的《重溫不幸》，《夏季》第 195 年，第 195 年第 10 頁），《夏季不幸》，《夏季》第 195 年），第 105 年第 105 年第105年《夏季》。但需要補充的是，同時東南亞共產主義的威脅，以及因此遏制越南共產主義的價值，已經急劇下降； 1965-66年的政變使印度尼西亞不再處於共產主義的邊緣，而中國則因自我毀滅的文化大革命而轉向國內。有關越南的這種“衰落”，請參閱約翰·穆勒的《越南的修訂版》，《武裝部隊與社會》，1982 年 12 月。
7. 參見 Alain C. Enthoven 和 K. Wayne Smith 著《多少才夠？ 》（紐約：哈珀，1971 年），ch。 8.
8.例如，保羅·尼采，載於威廉·S·湯普森和DD·弗里澤爾編《越南的教訓》（紐約：Crane, Russak，1977年），第153頁。 6. 另請參閱 Allan E. Goodman 著《失去的和平》（斯坦福，加州：胡佛研究所出版社，1978 年），第 63 頁。 116.
9. 關於「越南：一萬日戰爭」系列。
10. 越南共產黨軍隊的死亡率是第二次世界大戰中日本軍隊的兩倍。有關這些問題的討論，請參閱約翰·穆勒（John Mueller）的《在越南尋找‘臨界點’》，《國際研究季刊》，1980 年 12 月，第 497-519 頁。那些認為北越在 1972 年聖誕節爆炸事件後陷入絕望並瀕臨崩潰的評論家們需要提供令人信服的證據，不是說損失有多大，而是說共產黨已經達到了「崩潰的臨界點」——他們不再願意像過去在付出巨大代價後那樣彌補損失，他們最終準備放棄對長期戰爭的狂熱。
11. 不完美的類比。 20 世紀 50 年代初期的反應不僅是因為 1949 年共產黨在中國取得勝利，還因為一年後美國發現自己在北韓與共產黨中國開戰。
12. 作為對這種脫鉤觀念接受程度的一個例子，哈里森·索爾茲伯里在 1983 年召開的越南問題會議上宣稱：“戰爭暫時結束已經 10 年了。” （“重新開啟篇章”，《記者》，1983 年 5 月，第 6 頁）。
13. 民調公司發布，1971 年 5 月 8 日。
14. 亨利‧基辛格在回顧越南談判的各種選擇時，提出了絕對有必要遣返戰俘。 「單方面撤軍…不會奏效；這只會讓我們的戰俘落入河內手中」； 「即使越南化進行到底，我們的戰俘也不會回來」( 《白宮歲月》，波士頓：利特爾布朗出版社，1979 年，第 1011、1039 頁)。不遣返戰俘而結束戰爭的選擇似乎甚至不是理論上的考慮。
15. 對戰俘的情感依附常常是美國歷史上的主導主題。這個問題是朝鮮戰爭期間漫長和平談判的核心問題，而對巴丹美國戰俘命運的憤怒加劇了人們對第二次世界大戰期間日本人的仇恨，其程度幾乎與珍珠港事件一樣嚴重。另一個例子是，政界人士和媒體幾乎完全關注1979年至1981年的伊朗人質危機，但實際上卻忽略了歷史上可能具有更大意義的問題和事件。
REFLECTIONS ON THE VIETNAM ANTIWAR MOVEMENT
AND ON THE CURIOUS CALM AT THE WAR'S END (1)
by John Mueller
From Peter Braestrup (ed.), Vietnam as History (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 151-57.
One of the most memorable aspects of the Vietnam War was the rise within the United States of a large, vocal movement in opposition to the war, or to American participation in it. The movement collected enormous press attention during its years of existence and has inspired something of a folklore since.
This paper presents some disconnected speculations about the effect of the Vietnam antiwar movement on public opinion, political elections, American Vietnam policy, and North Vietnamese strategy. It concludes with some observations about the unexpected calm with which the American public accepted the ending of the tumultuous war in 1975.
Some years ago I did a study comparing public opinion on the war in Vietnam with public opinion on the Korean War. Using various tests I found that, although television supposedly made Vietnam somehow unique, the wars actually affected public opinion quite similarly. Both wars were supported by the same demographic groups: the young and the well-educated, in particular. Sentiment for withdrawal and escalation was about the same and mostly came from the same groups. Moreover, the wars were about equally popular during the periods in which they were comparable; that is, while the war in Vietnam eventually became more unpopular than the Korean War, it became so only after American casualties there had substantially surpassed those of the earlier war. Trends in support for the wars followed the same course: basic support declined as U.S. casualties increased, and it did so according to the same mathematical relationship.(2)
This similarity seems surprising because, while the two wars had many things in common, the Korean War inspired no organized public protest remotely comparable to the one generated during the Vietnam War. If one paid attention to vocal protest and to media reports about that protest during the two wars, it would certainly seem the later war was far more unpopular.
It seems to me these findings suggest two cautions about assessing vocal protest. The first is fairly obvious: One should be careful about assuming vocal agitators necessarily represent the masses they purport to speak for. Labor union leaders may not speak for workers, active feminists may not accurately represent women, and the Moral Majority may, as the bumper sticker suggests, be neither.
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, it may be that the Vietnam protest movement, at least through 1968, actually was somewhat counter-productive in its efforts to influence public opinion--that is, the war might have been somewhat more unpopular had the protest not existed.
The reasoning behind this latter suggestion is developed from a well-known public opinion phenomenon. Many people, in making up their minds on an issue, are not influenced so much by its substance as by its endorsers. If an issue comes up and if Franklin Roosevelt is for it and if, in general, I find myself in agreement with Roosevelt and trust him, it is reasonable for me to adopt his view as my own, at least as a first approximation.
This endorsement procedure, with its obvious efficiencies, can work both ways. An endorser with negative vibrations can decrease the acceptance of an issue. For example, in 1940, if the name of the then-controversial Charles Lindbergh was associated with a proposal to be nice to the Germans, support for the proposal dropped considerably.(3)
Now, as it happened, the Vietnam protest movement generated negative feelings among the American public to an all but unprecedented degree. In a poll conducted by the University of Michigan in 1968, the public was asked to place various groups and personalities on a 100-point scale. Fully one-third of the respondents gave Vietnam War protesters a zero, the lowest possible rating, while only 16 percent put them anywhere in the upper half of the scale. Other studies suggest that popular reaction to the disturbances surrounding the Democratic convention of 1968 was overwhelmingly favorable to the Chicago police and unfavorable to the demonstrators, despite press coverage that was heavily biased in the demonstrators' favor.(4) Opposition to the war came to be associated with violent disruption, stink bombs, desecration of the flag, profanity, and contempt for American values. Not only would these associations tend to affect public opinion in a negative way, they also would tend to frighten away more "respectable" would-be war opponents from joining the cause.
The Antiwar Movement and Political Elections
In addition to its efforts to influence public opinion on the war, the Vietnam protest movement was concerned with electing candidates it approved. Although friendly candidates did do well here and there, particularly in some primaries, and, although some local antiwar referendums were passed, it does not appear the movement was very successful in this effort. Even the massive efforts to influence the congressional elections of 1970 in the wake of the Cambodian invasion do not appear to have shifted many seats.
In presidential elections, however, the protest movement may have had some impact: It may have been instrumental in electing Richard Nixon. Twice.
In 1968, the alternative to Nixon was Hubert Humphrey. In rage over the fate of antiwar candidates such as Eugene McCarthy during the Democratic primaries and convention, the protest movement--or at least its most vocal elements--concentrated on assuring the defeat of Humphrey, the man it saw as the legatee of Lyndon Johnson's policies and as an important co-author of the Vietnam War.
This is an understandable point of view and, while Humphrey later sought to demonstrate his many misgivings about Johnson's policies in Vietnam, it would have been difficult for the protesters to have known that in 1968. However, even granting that point, the alternative in the election was Nixon, a man who had rigidly supported the war effort and had a long record in favor of escalation and militant anti-communism. Humphrey, on the other hand, had long supported international negotiation, arms control, conciliation. Their verbal policies in 1968 may not have differed much (Humphrey obviously could not afford to alienate the Johnson wing o the party during the election), but their instincts about issues of war and peace were clearly on the public record.
The protest movement not only chose to ignore these well-documented differences, but also actively sought to humiliate and defeat Humphrey. When the Vice President campaigned in Chicago he was greeted by "Dump-the-Hump" clamor and chaos; when Nixon ventured there he came as the prince of peace and could draw the lesson that his election would return tranquility to the streets of America.
Amazingly, despite all his problems, Humphrey almost won the election. Many war opponents in the party joined up at the end, but their support was grudging, belittling, and too late. Others sat on their hands. The margin was enough to send Nixon to the White House.
Four years later the machinery of the Democratic party was largely in the hands of the antiwar element. It changed the rules to avoid the debacle of 1968 and committed another one: the nomination of George McGovern, the worst presidential candidate any party has put forward in modern times. McGovern managed to do the seemingly impossible: He gained a lower percentage of the popular vote than Barry Goldwater had in 1964, even though McGovern represented the majority party and even though he was up against a candidate who, though difficult to defeat, was far less popular and far more vulnerable than Goldwater's opponent, Lyndon Johnson, had been in 1964.
The Antiwar Movement and Vietnam Policy
The impact of the antiwar movement on American policy and policy-makers seems to be fairly limited, especially through 1968. Perhaps Lyndon Johnson's efforts at negotiations were increased by the rancor at home, but, since these efforts led to little until 1968, that is not much of an achievement.
There probably was some atmospheric impact of the peace movement on the various changes in American policy that took place in the post-Tet spring of 1968. But the accounts of major participants like Johnson and Clark Clifford, as well as the general histories of the period such as Herbert Schandler's, tend to suggest these changes perhaps even Johnson's decision not to run again--were fairly likely to have come about for reasons that have little to do with the protest at home.(5)
The antiwar movement probably had a greater impact later, in the Nixon era. Of all the major party presidential possibilities of 1968 (including even Johnson), Nixon was probably the one most reluctant to relax the military presence in Vietnam, to withdraw U. S. troops, to make central concessions in negotiations, to want to see the nation "accept the first defeat in its history." The antiwar movement may have been influential in getting Nixon to speed up troop withdrawals somewhat and in causing him to pull back from the Cambodian incursion a bit earlier than planned. Certainly memoirs by Nixon and by foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger suggest a considerable preoccupation with the opposition movement. It seems of interest that when Nixon felt he had to do some punishment bombing of North Vietnam in 1971, he chose to do it at the only time of the year when he could guarantee American colleges would be deserted: between Christmas and New Year's.
But it should also be kept in mind that the antiwar movement became considerably broader after Nixon's election. In particular, many liberal Democrats who had supported the war out of loyalty to the Johnson administration were released by the election from this commitment and could move toward opposition to what quickly began to become "Nixon's war." Moreover, twin developments--the increasing costs of the war and the declining importance of South Vietnam in containment theory (due to threat-moderating changes in Indonesia and China in the late 1960s)--caused disillusion with the war.(6) Thus, while elements remained from its earlier, more romantic past, the antiwar movement came to be dominated by more respectable types--including even Hubert Humphrey, in fact. It was quite a different animal in that era and its demands were more likely to be effective. The most consequential antiwar measures, the war powers restraints enacted by Congress in 1973, were adopted long after the antiwar movement had ceased to exist as a street phenomenon.
Some of the movement's ineffectiveness, particularly in the 1965-1968 period, may have been due to the way it dealt with the issues. Most of the protest seemed to be directed toward getting negotiations going, and a prerequisite for that, according to North Vietnam, was that all bombing of its territory be halted unconditionally. For the most part the issue between the administration and the war protesters was never met, because the antiwar movement kept asking for a bombing halt to "get negotiations going" and simply ignored the Communists' demand that the halt must be unconditional.
In some respects, in fact, the antiwar movement may have inadvertently played into the hands of those within the administration who favored bombing. By constantly stressing that the bombing was doing tremendous damage and killing "innocent civilians," the protesters suggested the bombing was militarily potent. Proponents of bombing were thus bolstered in their contention that the enemy was "hurting" because of the bombing, and to counter the argument about "innocent civilians," could say that efforts would be made to reduce "collateral damage." In addition some may have argued internally that no civilian in a totally mobilized country like North Vietnam was innocent anyway and therefore that civilian casualties were all to the good.
An argument likely to have been far more effective with members of the administration would have been to stress the costs of the bombing in American lives and dollars. When disillusionment with the bombing occurred inside the establishment, it mostly came from the realization that the bombing was ineffective militarily--that meaningful targets were few in number, very difficult to destroy with bombs, and easily repaired or compensated for when damaged. Thus the bombing was not having enough effect on the Communist war effort, particularly in the North, to justify the cost in planes and pilots.(7) Robert McNamara and other defense planners were among those most impressed by this dawning realization, but this potent argument was only occasionally emphasized by the antiwar movement, caught up as it was in rhetoric about the murderousness of American pilots and the innocence of the enemy.
The Antiwar Movement and North Vietnam's Strategy
It is often maintained by supporters of the Vietnam War that the antiwar movement strengthened the will of the Communists to continue the war, and thus that the war protest had the effect of prolonging the war.(8)
The war, as General William Westmoreland often observed, was a war of attrition, a "war of will" in which each side would punish the other until one finally caved in, (His analysis seems to have been generally correct, though the war didn't come out the way he intended.) Thus the ability to maintain morale was especially important in this war.
It seems likely the war protest in the United States was encouraging to Hanoi, even as the absence of signs of war opposition in North Vietnam was discouraging to Washington. At least one Communist leader in Vietnam has, in fact, admitted this in a postwar interview shown on public television.(9) The crucial consideration, however, is not whether the war protest was encouraging to the Communists but whether that encouragement was important to their ability to continue their war effort. All the evidence on this issue is not in, but it seems likely the North Vietnamese were prepared to continue the war for as long as necessary regardless of how much encouraging opposition there was in the United States.
The mechanisms used to build and maintain morale both in the North and, more importantly, on the battlefield in the South, relied on organizational and political skills that had little to do with news from foreign locales. In the course of the war the Communists probably suffered more battle deaths as a percentage of population than virtually any country in the last 160 years, and they seem to have been psychologically committed to continuing that conflict for a long time--even decades.(10) Indeed, today, more than eight years after their victory in the South, they continue to fight without let-up against new enemies in Indochina. A commitment to prolonged war seems to have been an essential part of their psychological make-up well before the antiwar movement came into being.
The antiwar movement faded as American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam and it was scarcely an element on the political scene in 1975 when American foreign policy in Indochina ended in debacle as U.S-supported governments collapsed ignominiously under Communist attacks. During the war many supporters of the war had warned that a Communist takeover in the area would, among other things, cause widespread political ramifications within the United States--the rise of a new McCarthyism, for example, since the old McCarthyism often seemed to have been impelled by the "fall" of China to Communism in 1949.(11)
Contrary to such dire predictions, the collapse in Southeast Asia was greeted with remarkable equanimity by the American public and there was very little debate over who lost Vietnam." Most amazingly, the man who presided over the debacle, President Gerald Ford, actually used the events in Indochina as a point in his favor when running for re-election in 1976: "When I came into office in 1974," he repeatedly argued, "we were still involved in a war in Southeast Asia; now we are blissfully at peace," His challenger, Jimmy Carter, seems to have concluded it was disadvantageous to point out the essential absurdity of Ford's argument.
The Acceptance of Defeat
I would like to suggest there were at least three reasons why the public found it so easy to accept the collapse of 1975.
First, to a considerable degree the war had become decoupled from American sensibilities by the settlement of January 1973; that is, there had been a "decent interval" of two years during which the war had seemingly been given back to the Indochinese.
Crucial to this development was the return of the American prisoners of war in early 1973. It is often suggested that Vietnam differed from other wars in that there was never a glorious homecoming for the returning soldier-heroes. But for this small group of men there was an emotional and well-publicized homecoming, and their return constituted a highly visible end to the war for the public.(12) The importance of the prisoner-of-war issue to American identification with the war should not be underestimated. In May 1971, a public opinion poll asked if American troops should be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of the year; 68 percent agreed. When asked if they would still favor withdrawal if such an action would mean "a Communist takeover of South Vietnam," only 29 percent of the respondents agreed. When asked if they approved withdrawal "even if it threatened [not cost] the lives or safety of United States POWs held by North Vietnam," support evaporated: only 11 percent agreed.(13)
This visceral public attitude was generally well appreciated by politicians (except, perhaps, by George McGovern), and the political necessity of winning release for the POWs helped keep the peace talks--and American participation in the war dragging on for years. Rationally, one might question a policy of spending thousands of lives to save hundreds of prisoners, but to a considerable degree, there was no choice.(14) However, once the prisoners returned and this issue was disposed of, the war could quickly be forgotten.(15)
Second, since the Cold War importance of South Vietnam diminished greatly after 1965, as suggested above, the chief reason to reinsert U.S. troops into the war in 1975 was to save or to defend the South Vietnamese. But poll evidence demonstrates that the American public viewed the South Vietnamese with considerable disrespect, even contempt, and the public had long been prepared to abandon them if they could not effectively fight for themselves. This could be seen as early as 1966. At that time some 15 to 35 percent of the public favored withdrawal from Vietnam; but this percentage lumped to 54 percent when the poll question was phrased to include the condition "suppose the South Vietnamese start fighting among themselves," and to 72 percent when it included the phrase, "if the South Vietnamese government decides to stop fighting." Other polls suggest the commitment to the South Vietnamese and fear of a postwar blood bath in Vietnam were relatively minor elements in popular support for the war.
Third, the collapse in Indochina was probably made easier to accept by an ancillary, if essentially insignificant, event: the capture in 1975 of the American ship Mayaguez by Cambodian Communists and its subsequent daring recapture by American troops. Although it cost about as many lives to rescue the ship as there were sailors aboard, the drama and macho derring-do of the venture probably served to mollify American anguish. It was possible to believe that, while the Communists could defeat our erstwhile allies in Southeast Asia, they were impotent against true American might.
NOTES
1. Copyright 1984 by John Mueller.
2. John Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), chs. 26. See also "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" elsewhere in this volume.
3. Hadley Cantril, Gauging Public Opinion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 41.
4. John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1970, pp. 1-9.
5. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, 1971), Clark Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal," Foreign Affairs, July 1969, Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
6. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts argue in their important The Irony of Vietnam (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979) that the postwar consensus on containing communism broke down between 1965 and 1968 through disillusionment over the costs of the war (see also Richard K. Betts, "Misadventure Revisited," The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1983, p. 105). But it should be added that at the same time the threat of communism in Southeast Asia, and therefore the value of containing communism in Vietnam, had decreased dramatically; Indonesia no longer seemed on the brink of communism due to the coup of 1965-66, and China had turned inward on its self-destructive Cultural Revolution. On this "devitalization" of Vietnam, see John Mueller, "Vietnam Revised," Armed Forces and Society, December 1982.
7. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper, 1971), ch. 8.
8. For example, Paul Nitze in William S. Thompson and D. D. Frizzell (eds), The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 6. See also Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 116.
9. On the series, "Vietnam: The 10,000 Day War."
10. The Communist battle death percentage in Vietnam was twice that of the Japanese in World War 11. For a discussion of these issues, see John Mueller, "The Search for the 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," International Studies Quarterly, December 1980, pp. 497-519. Commentators who suggest North Vietnam was desperate after the Christmas bombings of 1972 and on the verge of collapse need to supply convincing evidence not that the damage was extensive, but that the Communists' "breaking point" was reached--that they were no longer willing to recoup losses as they had after costly ventures in the past, and that they were finally about to abandon their fanatical commitment to protracted warfare.
11. An imperfect analogy. The reaction in the early 1950s was not simply to the Communist success in China in 1949, but to the fact that a year later the United States found itself at war with Communist China in Korea.
12. As an example of the thoroughness with which this decoupling has been accepted, Harrison Salisbury opened a conference on Vietnam in 1983 by declaring, "It's 10 years down the line since the war came to its halting end." ("On Reopening a Chapter," The Journalist, May 1983, p. 6).
13. Opinion Research Corporation release, May 8, 1971.
14. The utter necessity of getting the prisoners back is suggested by Henry Kissinger in his review of the options in the Vietnam negotiations. "Unilateral withdrawal ... would not do the trick; it would leave our prisoners in Hanoi's hands"; and "Vietnamization pursued to the end would not return our prisoners" (White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 1011, 1039). The option of ending the war without the return of the prisoners seems not to have been even a theoretical consideration.
15. The emotional attachment to prisoners of war has often been a dominant theme in American history. The issue was central to the lengthy peace talks in the Korean War, and outrage at the fate of American POWs on Bataan intensified hatred for the Japanese during World War 11 almost as much as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Another case in point is the almost total preoccupation by politicians and press with the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81, to the virtual exclusion of issues and events likely to be of far greater import historically.
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