川普總統對全球軍事和經濟秩序進行重組的背後是一個宏大但存在嚴重缺陷的想法：
- 他似乎確信新興強大的美國能夠將俄羅斯從中國拉出來，
- 並成為莫斯科和北京之間的權力掮客。
然而，川普願景中的經濟振興部分本週遭到了全球金融市場的嚴厲譴責。投資人擔心，他的新「解放日」關稅將減少美國進入全球市場的管道，而國內製造業卻不會立即受益。如果情況惡化，對美國消費者來說將只有痛苦，沒有收穫。
但除了周四華爾街的崩盤之外，更大的危險可能在於川普對俄羅斯和中國的政策。他認為，
- 讓莫斯科成為烏克蘭和平協議的合作夥伴將會形成三個勢力範圍——
- 美國將在俄羅斯和中國的力量之間扮演平衡者的角色。
這種對
- 「逆基辛格」策略
的期望或許只是幻覺。
許多分析家預測，無論川普如何花言巧語，
- 俄羅斯和中國都將繼續其「無限制」的夥伴關係。
同時，由於
- 歐洲和亞洲國家懷疑美國是否願意遏制俄羅斯和中國的力量，
- 美國可能會嚴重損害其在歐洲和亞洲的聯盟。
關注川普上任 100 天
美國前副國務卿、現任亞洲集團主席的 Kurt M. Campbell 認為，
- 「從歷史上看，美國對任何關係的了解都沒有中國和俄羅斯之間那麼多。」
他認為，普丁和習近平之間的深厚私人友誼是經過數十次會議和數千小時的討論培養起來的。
坎貝爾認為，如果川普認為他可以控制這種動態，那他就錯了。
此外，普丁和習近平預見了川普的到來。
- 「當中國和俄羅斯領導人會晤時，議程的首要議題之一就是預測美國將如何尋求分裂他們，」
坎貝爾解釋道。兩人都認為美國是個衰落的大國，而
- 川普是新「大遊戲」中一個反覆無常、不可靠的玩家。
- 分化俄羅斯和中國的想法是
- 亨利·基辛格在 20 世紀 70 年代初向北京開放的核心理由。
但當時，中國有理由懼怕俄羅斯的實力，並尋求與美國抗衡。美國外交官試圖重新點燃這種焦慮——向中國辯稱，其經濟利益在於西方，向俄羅斯辯稱，
- 中國崛起的力量將會吞噬中國——但收效甚微。
俄羅斯和中國週邊的國家也玩著各自的三邊遊戲，希望獲得影響力。一個典型的例子就是
- 白俄羅斯，
- 它是俄羅斯的被迫鄰國，
- 但其領導人亞歷山大·盧卡申科 卻宣稱與中國建立了「全天候全面戰略夥伴關係」。
白俄羅斯自由劇院創始人、白俄羅斯出生的異議人士娜塔莉亞·卡利亞達 (Natalia Kaliada) 解釋道，
- 中國牌是莫斯科的「安全掩護」。
但在關鍵時刻，
- 中國絕對不會傾向明斯克而非莫斯科。
從川普從事商業的初期起，他就既是一個顛覆者，也是一個交易撮合者。
在他的公開評論中，他似乎迫切地希望拉攏普丁加入烏克蘭和平協議。
他已經將普丁從賤民地位中拯救出來，壓制並斥責烏克蘭總統澤連斯基，並認可俄羅斯的一些主要要求。
- 但川普做出的讓步越多，
- 普丁想要的就越多——
甚至連川普本週都表示，他「非常生氣」和「惱火」。
前國家安全委員會官員、現任布魯金斯學會成員的菲歐娜·希爾認為，川普在爭取普丁的同時，
- 也「想與中國達成大協議」。
他認為習近平是志同道合的人。 “我可以用一句話來概括川普的對華政策：
- ‘習近平是我的朋友’，」
川普第一任期內的一位中國顧問告訴我。這看起來仍是事實。儘管川普擁有多名鷹派的對華顧問，但他似乎仍
- 傾向於三邊合作，
- 而非與俄羅斯和中國等「大國」對抗。
這正是美國在歐洲和亞洲的長期盟友感到緊張的地方。如果川普尋求在俄羅斯、中國和美國之間劃分影響力，這些小國最終可能會面臨被冷落的風險。
- 美國所承諾的核武「延伸威懾」可能變得不可靠——
- 迫使盟友打造自己的核武或尋求新的聯盟。
- 川普似乎已經放棄了對舊全球經濟秩序的領導。
美國兩個最重要的貿易夥伴日本和韓國已經收到了這個訊息。他們上週末與中國舉行了貿易談判，北京表示，三國將協調對美國新關稅的回應。
所有地方的所有事物都同時出現。這是對川普全球經濟和安全政策變革的有用的簡要描述。總統如此急切地渴望改變，他可能沒有註意到全球舞台上正在發生的最大事件：
- 俄羅斯和中國正在打川普牌。
archive.today webpage capture | Saved from | ||
| All snapshots | from host www.washingtonpost.com | ||
| WebpageScreenshot | |||
 share download .zip report bug or abuse Buy me a coffee | |||
The long odds for Trump’s ‘Reverse Kissinger’ gamble
Why it will be so hard for the president to drive a wedge between China and Russia.
5 min
Behind President Donald Trump’s shake-up of the global military and economic order is a big but deeply flawed idea: He appears convinced that a newly powerful United States can pull Russia away from China — and become the power broker between Moscow and Beijing.
The economic revitalization part of Trump’s vision got a sharp rebuke this week, though, from global financial markets. Investors fear that his new “Liberation Day” tariffs will reduce U.S. access to global markets without any quick benefit for domestic manufacturing. If things go badly, it will be all pain and no gain for American consumers.
But beyond Thursday’s Wall Street wipeout, the bigger danger might lie in Trump’s policies toward Russia and China. He believes that making Moscow a partner in a Ukraine peace deal will create three spheres of influence — with the United States playing balancer between Russian and Chinese power.
This hope of a “Reverse Kissinger,” as the strategy is often described, might be illusory. Many analysts predict that Russia and China will continue their “no limits” partnership, regardless of Trump’s blandishments. Meanwhile, the U.S. might severely damage its alliances in Europe and Asia as nations there doubt America’s willingness to deter Russian and Chinese power.
Follow Trump’s first 100 Days
“There is no relationship the United States has understood less, historically, than the one between China and Russia,” argues Kurt M. Campbell, a former deputy secretary of state and now chairman of the Asia Group. He sees the bond between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping as intensely personal, nurtured over scores of meetings and a thousand hours of discussion. If Trump thinks he can control that dynamic, he is mistaken, Campbell argues.
Plus, Putin and Xi see Trump coming. “When Chinese and Russian leaders meet, one of the foremost topics on the agenda is anticipating how the U.S. will seek to split them,” explains Campbell. Both see the United States as a declining power, and Trump as an erratic and unreliable player in the new “great game.”
The idea of dividing Russia and China was a central rationale for Henry Kissinger’s opening to Beijing in the early 1970s. But at the time, China had reason to fear Russia’s power and to seek a counterweight from the U.S. American diplomats have tried to rekindle this anxiety — arguing to China that its economic interests lie with the West, and to Russia that it will be swallowed by China’s rising power — with little success.
Countries on the periphery of Russia and China play their own trilateral games, hoping to create leverage. A classic example is Belarus, a captive neighbor of Russia whose ruler, Alexander Lukashenko, nonetheless boasts of his “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” with China. The China card is “safe cover” from Moscow, explains Natalia Kaliada, a Belarus-born dissident who founded Belarus Free Theater. But in a crunch, China would never lean toward Minsk rather than Moscow.
From Trump’s earliest days in business, he has been both a disrupter and a dealmaker. In his public comments, he appears desperate to draw Putin into a Ukraine peace agreement. Already, he has rescued Putin from pariah status, squeezed and scolded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and endorsed some of Russia’s main demands. But the more concessions Trump offers, the more Putin wants — to the point that even Trump said this week that he was “very angry” and “pissed off.”
Even as Trump woos Putin, he also “wants to make a big deal with China,” argues Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council official now with the Brookings Institution. He sees Xi as a kindred spirit. “I can sum up Trump’s China policy in one sentence: ‘Xi Jinping is my friend,’” a Trump China adviser told me during the president’s first term. That still appears true. Though Trump has many hawkish China advisers, he still seems to prefer trilateral cooperation over confrontation with the “big men” in Russia and China.
Here’s where the United States’ long-standing allies in Europe and Asia get nervous. If Trump is seeking a three-way division of influence among Russia, China and the U.S., these smaller countries risk ending up out in the cold. America’s promise of nuclear “extended deterrence” could become unreliable — forcing allies to build their own nuclear weapons or seek new alliances.
Trump already appears to have abandoned leadership of the old global economic order. Japan and South Korea, two of the United States’ most important trading partners, have gotten the message. They met for trade talks last weekend with China, and Beijing says the three countries will coordinate their response to new U.S. tariffs.
Everything everywhere all at once. That’s a useful shorthand description of Trump’s global economic and security policy makeover. The president is so impatient for change that he might not see the biggest event that’s taking place on the global stage: Russia and China are playing the Trump card.
- OpinionDavid IgnatiusTrump’s war on Big Law is a dangerous new developmentMarch 30, 2025
- OpinionDavid IgnatiusAre intelligence analysts still doing their jobs? We just got an answer.March 26, 2025
- OpinionDavid IgnatiusMove fast and trip over thingsMarch 24, 2025
- OpinionDavid IgnatiusWhat is Trump’s endgame? I answered your questions.March 23, 2025
沒有留言:
張貼留言
注意：只有此網誌的成員可以留言。