Ottomans Imagining Japan： 東方、中東與二十世紀之交的非西方現代性》。(Palgrave Macmillan Trans- national History.

rene´e worringer. Ottomans Imagining Japan： 東方、中東與二十世紀之交的非西方現代性》。(Palgrave Macmillan Trans- national History.) New York： Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. $100.00.

RENE´E WORRINGER. Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. (Palgrave Macmillan Trans- national History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. xviii, 350. $100.00.

Ren´ee Worringer 的研究目的是恢復陷入困境的奧斯曼社會中不同階層所想像的強大日本的各個層面。在闡述相關議題與原始資料的引言章節之後，接下來的四章（共九章）將重點放在 1876 年到 1909 年之間，也就是專制的阿布杜勒哈米德二世（Sultan Abdu¨lhamid II）統治的時期，他對自上而下的現代化很感興趣，對政治改革卻不感興趣。在同一段短時間內，日本正處於從以武士制度為基礎的封建制度，到代表立憲君主（明治天皇）統治的中央寡頭政體的徹底轉變之中。軍 事 力 量 的 迅 速 發 展 使 日 本 有 能 力 擊 敗 清 朝 中 國 （ 1895 年 ） 及 沙 皇 俄 國 （ 1905 年 ） 。全球對日本擊敗俄羅斯的反應和從中汲取的教訓結合起來，成為整本書中一個重要的、經常性的主題。一個亞洲憲政國家打敗了一個歐洲帝國。太陽似乎在 「東方 」再次升起；亞洲的團結現在可能擊退 「西方 」相對較近的進展。Worringer 詢問這種潛在的運氣逆轉對於橫跨亞洲和歐洲的鄂圖曼人意味著什麼。

Worringer 利用奧斯曼土耳其語和阿拉伯語檔案文件、報紙、書籍和論文，以及適當的二手資料來源，將有時相互矛盾或與實際事件不符的日本想像拼湊在一起。其中一個想像中的日本是泛伊斯蘭主義者的產物，他們預期日本的異教徒天皇和人民即將皈依伊斯蘭教，日本的謠言孕育了這個毫無根據的希望。激進的青年土耳其人看到了另一個日本，一個在教育體系中植入了理想化的、天衣無縫的民族主義的日本。這種觀點為他們提供了一個奧圖曼憲法政體的模型，這個政體由 「最合適 」的人領導，就像他們自己一樣，他們受到實證主義和社會達爾文主義的影響。另 一 個 較 少 意 識 化 但 仍 然 屬 於 蘇 丹 及 其 密 謀 的 日 本 。他 們 看 到 日 本 文 化 及 精 神 統 一 的 重 要 組 織 原 則 ， 這 些 原 則 以 天 皇 的 身 份 為 中 心 ， 在 政 治 上 與 蘇 丹 相 似 。阿 卜 杜 勒 哈 米 德 的 新 聞 審 查 制 度 遏 制 了 對 明 治 憲 法 的 討 論 ， 這 可 能 會 增 加 對 恢 復 被 擱 置 的 鄂 圖 曼 憲 法 的 支 持 。由 於 害 怕 與 擴 張 主 義 的 俄 國 發 生 衝 突 ， 崇 高 帝 國 未 能 與 日 本 談 判 條 約 。蘇 丹 和 他 的 顧 問 也 對 日 本 一 再 要 求 簽 訂 條 約 有 強 烈 的 疑 慮 。

 

日本一再要求簽訂一項包含投降利益（特別是治外法權）的條約，就像歐洲列強在鄂圖曼時期所享有的一樣。阿 卜杜勒哈米德認為，日本因其地理位置而受到保護，不會受到歐洲的強烈干預，而他在很大程度上因現有的投降而不得不忍受歐洲的干預。

日本人提出治外法权要求的时间非常接近他们自己拒绝所有外国人享有这一特权的时间（1885 年）。埃及記者很快就指出，日本從歐洲的債務中解脫出來，並且新近從數十年之久的《不平等條約》中贏得自由，以此作為他們成功的解釋，而鄂圖曼埃及本身自1882年起就被英國佔領，主要是由於它不償還歐洲的債務。然而，這種分析並沒有清楚說明埃及如何能效法日本。

第 6 章至第 8 章為特定主題，第 9 章為總結。第 6 章介紹了青年土耳其人的分支--聯盟與進步委員會 (聯盟派) 的制度，他們在 1908 年恢復了鄂圖曼憲法，並在 1909 年迫使阿布杜哈米德退位。從 1909 年到大戰期間，聯盟派一直主宰著奧圖曼政府。這個世俗化和精英化的政府很快就遭到了泛伊斯蘭主義者、少數民族和那些不僅想要憲法還要民主的人的反對，其中包括許多幻想破滅的青年土耳其人。幾乎每個人都選擇性地汲取日本的靈感來為自己的事業辯護；有關日本的資訊越來越準確，但仍然是為了達到目的而想像出來的。第 7 章展示了看似單一的日本如何與奧圖曼人，尤其是阿拉伯人和基督徒的種族、語言和宗教身份的多樣性形成對比。同盟主義者本身也逐漸被後奧托曼形式的突厥主義或泛突厥主義所吸引，這種主義往往具有令人不安的種族含義，在第一次世界大戰期間促成了亞美尼亞種族大屠殺。開羅的記者與帝國其他地區的記者一樣，都對日本抱持不滿的態度，並對日本新興的即時主義目標視而不見。

本研究是 Palgrave Macmillan 跨國歷史系列的一部份，切入了當前流行且重要的跨國趨勢，考驗每個人的語言能力。Worringer 對鄂圖曼土耳其語和阿拉伯語文獻的運用令人印象深刻，這使她能夠說明和捍衛書名所表達的基本論點。最後一章作為尾聲，追溯土耳其共和國和阿拉伯語在戰爭時期對日本的持續提及，即使日本帝國主義與明治憲法的理想背道而馳。作者在最後一章中辯稱，想像中的日本為全球現代性（相對於西方現代性）的論述提供了基礎。除了這個或許具有挑釁性的結論之外，作者在全書中巧妙地將 「日本 」與 「西方 」對立起來。

 

584 書評

 

除了這個或許具有挑戰性的結論之外，作者在全書中巧妙地提出了幾個學術界普遍關心的議題，例如對「他者」廣泛且不斷變化的認知、二元論所建構的鏡像世界、帝國與國家的論述，以及建構在教育、宗教與語言之上的身份認同。

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The purpose of Ren´ee Worringer’s study is to recover various aspects of a strong Japan imagined by different segments of a troubled Ottoman society. After an in- troductory chapter that lays out the issues and source materials involved, the next four (of nine) chapters fo- cus on the period between 1876 and 1909, the reign of autocratic Sultan Abdu¨lhamid II, who was interested in top-down modernization and disinterested in political reform. During the same short time period, Japan was in the midst of a sweeping change from feudalism, based on the samurai system, to a centralized oligarchy ruling on behalf of a constitutional monarch, the Meiji emperor. Rapid development of military power made Japan capable of soundly defeating Qing China (1895) and tsarist Russia (1905). Global reactions to and les- sons extracted from Japan’s defeat of Russia combine into a weighty, recurrent theme throughout the book. An Asian constitutional state had defeated a European imperial state. The sun appeared to be rising again in the “East”; Asian solidarity might now push back the relatively recent advances of the “West.” Worringer asks what this potential reversal of fortunes meant for Ottomans who straddled Asia and Europe.

Using Ottoman Turkish and Arabic archival docu- ments, newspapers, books, and essays, as well as ap- propriate secondary sources, Worringer pieces to- gether imagined Japans that were sometimes contradictory to each other or incompatible with actual events. One of these imagined Japans was the product of pan-Islamists who expected the imminent conversion to Islam by Japan’s pagan emperor and people, an un- founded hope nurtured by Japanese rumors. The po- litically activist Young Turks saw another Japan, one with an idealized, seamless nationalism embedded in the educational system. This view provided them with a model for an Ottoman constitutional regime led by the “fittest” men, like themselves, who were influenced by positivism and Social Darwinism. Another less ide- alized but still imagined Japan belonged to the sultan and his close advisors. They saw essential organizing principles of Japanese cultural and spiritual unity that centered on the figure of the emperor, a politically use- ful parallel for the sultan. Abdu¨lhamid’s censorship of the press curbed discussion of the Meiji Constitution that might increase support for the reinstatement of a shelved Ottoman constitution. The Sublime Porte de- liberately failed to negotiate a treaty with Japan for fear of igniting a conflict with expansionist Russia. The sul- tan and his advisors also had strong misgivings about

 

Japan’s repeated demands for a treaty that would in- clude capitulation benefits—especially extraterritorial- ity—such as European powers enjoyed in Ottoman do- mains. Abdu¨lhamid came to think that Japan was, by virtue of its geographic location, protected from inces- sant European interference that he had to endure largely as a result of existing capitulations.

The Japanese made demands for extraterritoriality very close to the time when they themselves denied that privilege to all foreigners (1885). Egyptian journalists would soon point to Japan’s freedom from European debt and its newly won freedom from the decades-old Unequal Treaties as an explanation for their success, while Ottoman Egypt itself had been occupied by Brit- ain since 1882, largely due to its non-repayment of Eu- ropean debt. That analysis, however, did not make it clear how Egypt could follow Japan’s example.

Chapters 6 through 8 take on specific topics while the ninth provides a conclusion. Chapter 6 covers the re- gime of a Young Turk offshoot, the Committee of Union and Progress (Unionists), who were able in 1908 to restore the Ottoman constitution and then force Ab- du¨lhamid to abdicate in 1909. Unionists dominated the Ottoman government from 1909 into the Great War. This secular and elitist administration very soon at- tracted opposition from pan-Islamists, minorities, and those who wanted not just a constitution but also de- mocracy, including many disillusioned Young Turks. Just about everyone selectively drew upon Japanese in- spiration to make an argument for a cause; information on Japan was becoming more accurate but it was still imagined to suit the objective. Chapter 7 demonstrates how a seemingly monolithic Japan served as a contrast with the diversity of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities among Ottomans, especially Arabs and Christians. The Unionists themselves were drawn in- creasingly to a post-Ottoman form of Turkism or pan- Turkism, often with unsettling racial implications that contributed to the Armenian genocide during World War I. Chapter 8 deals with Egyptian anti-imperial sep- aratism from Istanbul and anti-imperial nationalism against the British. Journalists in Cairo developed a dis- course on Japan along similar lines as the rest of the empire, and with a blind eye to Japan’s emerging im- perialist goals.

This study is part of the Palgrave Macmillan Trans- national History series, tapping into a currently popular and important transnational trend that strains every- one’s linguistic abilities. Worringer’s impressive use of Ottoman Turkish and Arabic documents allows her to illustrate and defend her basic thesis that is expressed in the book’s title. The concluding chapter serves as an epilogue, tracing continued republican Turkish and col- onized Arabic references to Japan into the interwar pe- riod, even as Japanese imperialism contradicted the ideals of the Meiji Constitution. The author argues in this last chapter that imagined Japans provided a basis for discourse on global—as opposed to Western—mo- dernity. In addition to this perhaps provocative conclu- sion, the author has throughout the book skillfully ne-

 

584 Reviews of Books

 

gotiated several issues of general scholarly interest, such as wide-ranging and ever-changing perceptions of the “other,” the hall of mirrors constructed by diplo- mats, discourses of empire and nation, and identities built on education, religion, and language.

PATRICIA RISSO

University of New Mexico

DAVID W. ELLWOOD. The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century. (Oxford History of Modern Europe.) New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp.

592. $65.00.

This wide-ranging volume describes how in the long twentieth century “American symbols and stories, im- ages, products, and people acquired a form of power that sooner or later penetrated every debate on the Old World’s prospects” (p. 1). The book’s main concern is with a form of “soft power” that has operated to in- fluence economy and culture. Direct American inter- ventions in war and occupation, and in international policy on trade, labor, and industry, are well described. However, these only provide background for how America has worked in Western Europe both as a per- vasive cultural force by means of its consumer products and media (film in particular) and as a vast source of myth and symbols. The concentration is on Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The chronology is determined by three general periods of war: 1898–1941, 1941–1960, and 1989–2009 (post-Cold

War).

During times of direct American interventions, but also, as David W. Ellwood argues, during times of American isolation, the United States figured in Eu- ropean discourses on the future, and in debates over capitalism, technology, and consumerism. Even before the Spanish-American War era that begins the book, European culture was saturated with clich´es and ste- reotypes about the U.S. After 1898, as Western Euro- peans began to question their own creation of moder- nity, “America itself became a metaphor” for modernity and a touchstone for its contestation (p. 32). Utopian visions of America pervaded those discussions of social and economic policy seen as socially progressive or growth oriented. Dystopian views served anti-modern- ism. Friedrich Nietzsche decried the American obses- sion with products, and historian Fritz Stern critiqued

U.S. mechanization and materialism. On the positive side, Antonio Gramsci saw in Fordism a model for a fairer share for workers and Leon Trotsky predicted the future triumph of Americanized Bolshevism. Oswald Spengler and Martin Heidegger also associated Amer- ican capitalism and Bolshevism, but decried their com- mon feature of decadent standardization and collectiv- ization. Adolf Hitler’s emphasis on spirit, culture, and national consciousness appeared to some as the perfect antidote to Franklin D. Roosevelt and his America, while H. G. Wells, L´eon Blum, and David Lloyd George all saw the New Deal as a model for social justice.

Ellwood’s previous scholarship has concentrated on

 

the liberation of Italy and Western European recon- struction in the post–World War II era. The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century con- centrates on cultural and social developments of this period. It draws on a growing corpus of European scholarship on the effects of the occupation and post- occupation. In the months just after the war, Germany, Italy, and Austria had become a world of horrors to which American actions contributed through intended callousness in some cases, and through ineptitude and neglect in others. The story in Britain is far different, but even there Americans seemed to take on some of the affects of an occupying army, unconsciously flaunt- ing their access to the same consumer goods denied a people who remained strictly rationed for some time. The combination of desire and derision this created marked the onset of Western Europe’s creation of its own consumer society in the late twentieth century and its ongoing angst over the results.

In the last section Ellwood describes the relationship between globalization and Americanization, arguing that the tensions that characterized Western Europe- ans’ views of America during the twentieth century have become internationalized. The incursion of American soft power on a global scale has clearly become a matter of hard power conflict. As in the Europe of the 1920s, American influence of the post-1989 era has been fe- verishly consumer and media driven, now resting on the Internet, with chaotic impacts. In both Western and Eastern Europe, globalization has unleashed a new yet familiar wave of identity politics with worrisome con- sequences. At the same time, Ellwood writes, global- ization has confirmed the Western European commit- ment to its own covenant with capitalism: a balance between the doctrine of profit, growth, and consump- tion, and the ideal of social protection and security. The post-2008 revived Thatcherism has not upended this. Volker Berghahn contends, and Ellwood agrees, that in Europe, as elsewhere in the world, American soft power is contracting (p. 517).

This is a central text for anyone who seeks to study Europe’s fractured relationship with modernity or to understand the relationship between America and Western Europe in the modern world. Ellwood de- scribes his book as a “life time’s project” and its con- tribution is equal to such an undertaking (p. 582). Its scope is massive, resting on the analysis of hundreds of scholarly works in at least four languages and drawing from substantial, wide-ranging, original research. Ell- wood is generous and informative in his employment of the works of others. His bibliography will be very useful to any student of modern history. This reader was dis- appointed with the break in narrative from 1960 to 1989, the era of countercultures and protest movements influenced by transatlantic trends. It was perhaps a mat- ter of book length. Had another 100 pages or more been allotted, I would happily have read them.

MARTHA L. HILDRETH

University of Nevada, Reno