Kitap Değerlendirmesi / 書評
阿塔圖爾克形象的 「形象研究」： 對 Stefan Ihrig 的著作《納粹想像中的阿塔圖爾克》的批判性解讀 1
H. Seçkin ÇELİK
Dr., Atatürk Institute, Hacettepe University E-mail: seckincelik2@gmail.com
ORCID 編號：0000-0001-9260-3754
Geliş Tarihi: 23.10.2017 Kabul Tarihi: 24.11.2017
2014年，Stefan Ihrig的博士論文《納粹想像中的阿塔圖爾克》一書由哈佛大學出版社出版。2 這本因其主題而引發爭論的書很快在2015年被翻譯成土耳其語。
第一章讨论了纳粹从土耳其独立战争中吸取的教训；
第二章分析了穆斯塔法-凯末尔统治下的新土耳其如何被视为纳粹的初步榜样，声称希特勒的政变企图是受到穆斯塔法-凯末尔而非墨索里尼的启发，这与历史学家的普遍看法相反。
在第三章中，作者研究了希特勒和納粹對土耳其的仰慕。
在第四章中，研究了對阿塔圖爾克的讚美以及他所代表的政治的捍衛。
在第五章中，論證了土耳其作為現代「völkisch」4 國家的模式，以及如何將被視為「修正主義」國家的土耳其外交政策再次作為榜樣。
第六章，也是最後一章，評價土耳其在第二次世界大戰期間的外交政策，認為土耳其與西班牙一樣，是親 「軸心 」的中立國家。
總結完書中的章節後，我們可以檢視書中的內容。但首先我會評估這本書的研究方法。
在研究的一開始；提到 2007 年慕尼黑的一位年長婦人指著該市的社會民主黨市長大喊：「希特勒是土耳其人的朋友，烏德也是。」從這個觀點來看，說明有關土耳其與希特勒的文獻不足以了解他們之間的關係。
之後，凱末爾主義被定義為「這個模棱兩可的生物，這個介於專制獨裁、布爾什維克主義、西方民主和法國革命傳統之間的交叉物」；
然而，據說本研究只會探討納粹黨人對土耳其的看法，至於納粹黨人對凱末爾主義者的看法是否正確的問題，則沒有被研究。5
作者表示，他已將這個議題交給其他人處理，並提到有關這個主題的文獻非常不足。
首先，對於這樣的研究必須提到這一點：
納粹和希特勒，尤其是在第二次世界大戰和大屠殺之後，理所當然地在世界和歐洲具有負面的涵義。
在說明了納粹的靈感來自於一個人或一種意識形態，以及這個人或意識形態是他們的行為和意識形態的來源之後，方法論上的偏好顯示在作品中只傳達納粹的觀念，並沒有使研究變得可理解，而這正是科學的基本功能。
如果觀念被扭曲，反而更難理解這個主題。因此，作者不考慮這樣的研究對被調查者的觀感或意識形態的影響是說不通的。
此外，他也沒有遵守對這個主題的承諾，他隨意介入納粹對凱末爾主義和阿塔圖爾克的相關觀感，而在他不想介入的地方，他卻變得沉默。
如果是這樣的話，就是一個錯誤的方法論選擇，讓人覺得納粹歪曲了作者介入的主題，而在他沒有介入的地方，納粹會做出一個準確的定義，讓人沒有糾正的餘地。作者的介入沒有標準。造成此主題的可能原因之一，是作者對阿塔圖爾克和土耳其所知甚少。
即使正在進行這樣的研究，作者對阿塔圖爾克和土耳其戰時期政治的有限了解，也令人質疑研究中包含的分析的品質和可靠性。
雖然與納粹的「阿塔圖爾克形象」沒有直接關係，但書中有一整章是關於二次大戰期間土耳其的外交政策。
在書中，Ihrig；雖然有努力將亞美尼亞問題與大屠殺聯繫起來（因為作者有一本關於這個主題的書7），但很難解釋為什麼這樣的研究的重要考驗，即對阿塔圖爾克及其時期的土耳其政治8的考驗，卻被高度忽視。
例如，作者不知道 Orhan Koloğlu 已經分析德國媒體如何報導阿塔圖爾克及其統治的研究。9
此外，作者也沒有使用任何概念框架來檢視這個主題，這對作品的分析部分造成了更大的障礙。
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在這篇批評中，我們將著重於這本書的三個主要主張。
第一個主張是，凱末爾主義和阿塔圖爾克 (Atatürk) - 無論被認為是真還是假 - 都是納粹意識形態的來源，並因此將其作為榜樣。
第二個主張是，亞美尼亞人被驅逐--作者稱之為亞美尼亞種族滅絕--是大屠殺的思想來源。
第三個主張是，土耳其在第二次世界大戰期間的外交政策可被視為「親軸心」的中立。10
鑑於作者很少提及納粹是否有理由建立這些聯繫，讀者只會覺得納粹德國幾乎所有的政治罪惡都是受到現代土耳其（1908 年後的土耳其）的啟發。
我們不能說作者沒有提到一些納粹的歪曲，作者大概也知道這會使文章完全具爭議性。這些歪曲只有少數被糾正，而且沒有提出糾正的標準11 ，書中還加了一章是關於與阿塔圖爾克形象沒有直接關係的時期。因此，讀者很難對阿塔圖爾克有一個平衡的看法，也很難意識到納粹分子是以他們自己的方式來看待阿塔圖爾克，並將其用於他們的政治/意識形態鬥爭中。我們將在文章其餘部分所陳述的三個主張的框架下，擴大 Ihrig 分析中的問題。
首先，我將分析土耳其的獨立戰爭，土耳其是一個榜樣。Ihrig 在他的書的第一部分寫道，土耳其的獨立戰爭對於德國民族主義者來說是一個極大的啟發，而且他指出在這個問題上他們比義大利的民族主義者更有影響力。
作者驚訝地指出，由於戰後對《凡爾賽條約》的「反感」；中央、自由派和社會民主派的刊物與民族主義者發展了關於土耳其的共同論述。12
在1920年代，土耳其被視為一個榜樣，主要是因為土耳其不像義大利，它成功地拒絕了協約國所強加的一戰後條約（塞夫勒條約），因而脫穎而出。
同 樣 地 ， 土 耳 其 的 獨 立 戰 爭 也 在 很 多 尚 未 獨 立 的 國 家 引 起 轟 動 。
在德國，對《凡爾賽條約》的反應是如此負面，以至於極端民族主義出版物甚至以甘地的和平主義抵抗為典範。
例如，有報紙說穆斯塔法-凱末爾在 1919 年有 30 萬人！14
1921 年 1 月通過國家誓言（Misak-ı Milli）的日期是 1921 年 1 月--作者並沒有用任何額外的資訊來糾正15--土耳其試圖拯救被佔領的伊茲密爾被稱為「土耳其不可分割主義」。
1922 年土耳其擊敗希臘軍隊後，極端民族主義的德國媒體錯誤地利用穆斯塔法-凱末爾的形象來維護反民主的魅力型領導，並將土耳其獨立說成是好戰政治的誕生，這與穆斯塔法-凱末爾在戰爭時期的和平政策背道而馳。
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簡而言之，土耳其獨立戰爭17不僅在納粹德國，也在世界上許多地方引起了正面的反應，但卻被德國極端民族主義者歪曲，以達到他們自己的政治目的。
在此背景下的第二個問題是，有人聲稱凱末爾主義的土耳其（無論認為是對是錯）是納粹德國的意識形態源頭。首先，我想提一下在這個問題上做了平衡分析的Koloğlu是如何評價親納粹媒體如何向讀者傳達土耳其的：
「所有提出來美化阿塔圖爾克的理由，都是希特勒政府為了替自己討回公道而設定的話題，也是為了顯示他們行為的這些理由。這種趨勢在納粹媒體中非常強大，以至於他們聲稱希特勒是神派來指導國家命運的。他們還聲稱，阿塔圖爾克也是在國家的關鍵時刻出現的關鍵人物（比任何人都優越）。此 外 ， 為 了 支 持 希 特 拉 鞏 固 黨 勢 ， 以 及 在 一 個 屋 簷 下 當 總 統 的 主 題 ， 有 人 聲 稱 阿 塔 圖 爾 克 說 他 也 是 這 樣 的 作 風 ， 並 視 之 為 「光 榮 」。"18
Ihrig 發現希特勒對阿塔圖爾克的巨大興趣，理所當然是對文獻的貢獻。
然而，希特勒和納粹對阿塔圖爾克的態度似乎是遵循一種意識形態的策略，而不是將他視為意識形態的引導者。
從分析的角度來看，這個區別非常重要，因為阿塔圖爾克和他的觀點被納粹有系統地扭曲了。如上文所述，Ihrig 不時對這些歪曲保持沉默。他沒有提及的主題相當重要。此外，讀者對於阿塔圖爾克和他的思想也是一知半解。
例如，阿塔圖爾克在按照他的指示編寫的公民教科書中，認為民主比其他政體優越。19
在反映他的觀點的土耳其高中歷史教科書中，指出種族沒有社會價值。21
Ihrig 也承認，阿塔圖爾克並沒有奉行赤化主義或帝國主義政策。22
阿塔圖爾克透過各種結盟條約，為地區和平作出貢獻。雖 然 在 摩 蘇 爾 (Mosul)問 題 上 對 土 耳 其 採 取 反 對 態 度 ， 但 土 耳 其 卻 一 直 是 國 際 聯 盟 的 忠 實 成 員 ， 與 希 特 拉 的 德 國 剛 好 相 反 。作為一種外交姿態，阿塔圖爾克甚至在 1934 年被他的前對手希臘總理埃萊夫特里奧斯-維尼澤洛斯（Eleftherios Venizelos）提名為諾貝爾和平獎的候選人。23
在他於 1938 年逝世後，國際聯盟紀念他為「天才的國際和平使者」。24
土耳其的外交政策是「和平」，而希特勒的外交政策則是「戰爭」。
阿塔圖爾克捍衛的教育系統能夠消除各民族之間的偏見，並符合他的人道主義理想25 ；
而希特勒的德國則建立了一個種族主義政權和政治議程。26
希特勒在西班牙內戰中支持佛朗哥，土耳其則多年來繼續承認共和國政府。
在這個框架下，我們需要提及書中其他有問題的地方。
根據 Ihrig 的說法，阿塔圖爾克在時序上排在墨索里尼之前，是墨索里尼的榜樣。德國極右翼媒體宣傳德國需要一個「德國的 Kemal Pasha」和「安卡拉政府」。
在希特勒 1923 年的政變企圖中，很少提到外國的靈感來源，但「穆斯塔法‧凱馬爾的例子」比「羅馬進軍」更有影響力。
希特勒將阿塔圖爾克為救國而進行的革命相提並論，他有時會想著回應那些在審判中稱他的行為為救國的「叛國主義」的人。
在德國，極右翼組織在第一次世界大戰剛結束時就為了政變的目的而組織起來。
例如，在1920-1921年間，由於巴伐利亞首相Gustav von Kahr的容忍政策，巴伐利亞成為近15個「右翼軍團」的收容所。
1920年3月，沃爾夫岡-卡普（Wolfgang Kapp）領導的未遂政變也是眾所周知的。28
因此，希特勒的行動不需要外國的靈感來源。希特勒對阿塔圖爾克的成功和聲望的詮釋和反思是一種重大的歪曲，反映了他試圖與一個能被大眾看好的例子建立平行關係。
儘管有聲稱阿塔圖爾克對希特勒有影響，但令作者感到驚訝的是，在希特勒的著作《我的貢獻》中並沒有提及阿塔圖爾克。
在《我的貢獻》一書中，被視為 「世界偉人 」29 之一的墨索里尼被簡短地提及，而根據作者的看法，這足以說明這種情況有一點重要性。
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另一點是，作者從未提及德國媒體所提供資料中的問題，德國媒體幾乎從民族鬥爭一開始就將土耳其定義為獨裁國家。
由於1921年及1924年的憲法並不包含獨裁，而在獨立戰爭期間，議會暫時賦予總司令穆斯塔法‧卡馬爾特殊權力。
在獨立戰爭期間，安卡拉沒有一黨專政。
眾所周知，作者不太談論這些資訊，因為他對土耳其和阿塔圖爾克有這樣奇怪的評論：
「納粹充分利用了阿塔圖爾克的故事，這並不奇怪。畢竟，正如一位作者所強調的，隨著新土耳其的建立，阿塔圖爾克成為了「先驅，為歐洲越來越普遍的專制政體鋪路」。
在 1923 年 10 月 之 前 ， 土 耳 其 政 權 尚 未 確 定 ， 單 一 政 黨 政 府 尚 未 成 立 ， 墨 索 里 尼 已 經 上 台 ， 普 里 莫 ‧ 德 ‧ 里 維 拉 將 軍 (General Primo de Rivera)亦 已 於 1923 年 發 動 政 變 。
更重要的是，阿塔圖爾克的開明專制政府與這些政府及其目標有相當大的差異。31
1923 年，土耳其發生了政治革命，共和國成立，而非政變。31
1923 年，土耳其發生了一場政治革命，成立了共和國，而非政變。
阿塔圖爾克由代表投票選為總統。成為歐洲榜樣的問題是一個相當不同的問題；
因為在 1929 年，土耳其仍在嘗試被接納為歐洲的一部份，並拒絕接受寫有「小亞細亞」字樣的信件，正如土耳其教育部長 Taray 先生所言。32
作者對於阿塔圖爾克作為榜樣的相對可接受的看法是；對阿塔圖爾克的讚美並沒有威脅到希特勒崇拜33 ，因為土耳其並非希特勒德國在歐洲與世界政治中可能的競爭對手。
事 實 上 ， 這 與 Ihrig 對 「 土 耳 其 作 為 榜 樣 」 的 重 視 是 相 矛 盾 的 。
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其次；我們會提到 Ihrig 對亞美尼亞問題的看法，以及納粹假設在土耳其的少數民族政策對阿塔圖爾克和土耳其的形象是有效的。
事實上，作者對「亞美尼亞種族滅絕」問題的態度是整本書取向的一個微觀例子。
首先，作者彷彿承認了「亞美尼亞種族滅絕」，他說：
「到了第三帝國初期，土耳其的「少數民族問題」主要已經「解決」。
安納托利亞的大多數亞美尼亞人不是在亞美尼亞種族大屠殺中喪生，就是隨後離開土耳其。」34
然而，僅在一頁之後，他又說，「在此辯論亞美尼亞種族大屠殺是否確實發生是沒有意義的」。
根據作者的說法，19 世紀的現代反猶太主義和德國的反亞美尼亞主義有著相同的根源。
亞美尼亞人被視為「東方的猶太人」。
其次，作者指出納粹是隨著亞美尼亞種族滅絕以及土耳其獨立戰爭而成長的。36
首先，根據學術研究，沒有證據顯示阿塔圖爾克在驅逐亞美尼亞事件中扮演任何角色。
儘管 Ihrig 似乎不同意納粹對新土耳其所使用的「現代 völkisch 國家」定性的有效性，但他建議用歐洲化來取代。37
在這一點上，並沒有關於阿塔圖爾克對民族主義理解的重要差異的資料。接納被迫離開德國的猶太學者在其他地方簡短提及，但卻沒有提及在 1935 年大選中選出四名亞美尼亞、希臘、猶太血統的代表。38
此外，也沒有提及採納民法及不論宗教信仰給予平等權利。作者說納粹是在「亞美尼亞種族滅絕」中成長的；
然而，有關希特勒的資料顯示，在亞美尼亞事件之前，他就是一個反猶太人和種族主義者。
他在他的著作《我的奋斗》中表达了这一点。39
因此，在歐洲種族主義情緒的影響下，希特勒已經「成長」出對維也納世界主義的反應。40
還應該注意的是，在反映納粹觀點的文獻中，有人試圖將阿塔圖爾克對伊斯坦堡世界主義的反應與希特勒對維也納世界主義的反應相提並論，但作者沒有必要糾正這一點。
然而，阿塔圖爾克並沒有在伊斯坦堡世界主義的影響下產生希特勒式的觀點，這無疑是比糾正阿塔圖爾克個人生活更重要的問題。
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最後，我們會提到作者對土耳其在第二次世界大戰期間外交政策的主張。
根據作者的說法，土耳其與納粹德國關係密切，即使不如意大利與德國關係密切。
德 國 人 在 土 耳 其 看 到 的 意 識 形 態 上 的 相 似 之 處 ， 仍 未 完 全 反 映 在 其 外 交 政 策 上 。在 戰 爭 開 始 時 ， 土 耳 其 與 英 國 和 法 國 簽 署 了 結 盟 條 約 ， 因 此 在 稍 作 猶 豫 後 ， 便 應 該 加 入 對 德 戰 爭 。然 而 ﹐ 土 耳 其 與 德 國 的 關 係 越 來 越 密 切 ﹐ 她 希 望 德 國 贏 得 戰 爭 ﹐ 因 而 利 用 其 對 海 峽 的 控 制 權 幫 助 德 國 。
在阿塔圖爾克時期被鎮壓的突厥人組織41再次捲土重來。很 明 顯 ， 除 了 Ismet Inonü之 外 ， 國 內 每 個 人 都 是 親 德 的 。
儘管 Ihrig 說「很遺憾，這裡不是廣泛處理這個議題的地方」；但他在資源有限的情況下遵循修正主義的路線。
由於土耳其是一個親於維持現狀的國家，因此將修正主義強國德國與義大利視為威脅，土耳其從 1930 年代後半期開始發展與英國的關係。
由阿塔圖爾克發起的和睦關係在1939年與英國和法國簽訂的結盟條約中達到了高潮。
與作者所假定的相反，這份條約沒有要求土耳其在戰爭打到地中海時自動參戰。
土 耳 其 在 這 方 面 提 出 了 三 個 強 烈 的 條 件 。聯 盟 條 約 是 與 三 個 國 家 簽 訂 的 ﹔ 但 法 國 是 以 停 戰 來 解 除 戰 爭 的 。第 二 ﹐根 據 與 英 法 簽 訂 的「 特 別 協 定 」第 六 條 ﹐土 耳 其 只 能 在 英 法 承 諾 的 戰 爭 裝 備 到 達 後 才 能 參 戰 。42
第 三 ， 土 耳 其 對 條 約 作 出 保 留 。根 據「 第 二 號 議 定 書 」， 土 耳 其 所 承 擔 的 義 務 不 會 導 致 該 國 與 蘇 聯 發 生 武 裝 衝 突 。然 而 ﹐ 德 國 與 蘇 聯 簽 署 了 不 侵 略 條 約 ﹐ 並 共 同 瓜 分 了 波 蘭 。如 果 土 耳 其 參 戰 ﹐ 她 將 會 面 對 與 波 蘭 相 同 的 結 局 。但 以 下 事 實 終 止 了 和 解 的 可 能 性 ﹕ 1939 年 8 月 簽 署 了 德 蘇 互 不 侵 略 條 約 ﹔ 土 耳 其 希 望 與 蘇 聯 簽 署 的 條 約 要 求 共 同 保 衛 海 峽 ﹔ 蘇 聯 要 求 對 條 約 作 出 保 留 ， 以 避 免 與 德 國 發 生 可 能 的 武 裝 衝 突 。在此背景下，土耳其的目標是以各種可能的方式置身於戰爭之外。因此，這方面的專家 Selim Deringil 在其關於第二次世界大戰土耳其外交政策的重要研究中使用了以下表述：
「土耳其在回顧期間的外交政策，仍是近代國際關係史上走鋼線的重大外交壯舉之一。(......)在 1941 年的地圖上，這個國家形成了「一個長方形的貧乏領土」，突出於納粹主宰的歐洲，完全被軸心國或親軸心國的軍隊包圍。土 耳 其 在 被 包 圍 及 誘 惑 的 情 況 下 ， 仍 然 能 夠 達 到 她 的 主 要 目 標 ， 那 就 是 遠 離 圍 繞 著 她 的 滿 目 瘡 痍 的 世 界 。
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在 這 部 份 中 ， 作 者 既 沒 有 談 及 納 粹 與 蘇 聯 的 條 約 ， 也 沒 有 談 及 蘇 聯 與 德 國 瓜 分 波 蘭 ， 更 沒 有 談 及 蘇 聯 對 芬 蘭 的 攻 擊 。
此 外 ， 土 耳 其 不 斷 宣 稱 與 英 國 結 盟 。共和人民黨（CHP）的半官方刊物《Ulus 報》批評希特拉和墨索里尼的帝國主義政策，並站在被佔領國家一邊。
而 伊 諾 紐 在 與 希 特 拉 的 信 件 中 針 對 性 地 批 評 了 希 特 拉 的 政 策 ﹔
在 攻 擊 土 耳 其 的 情 況 下 ， 伊 諾 紐 向 希 特 拉 表 明 了 土 耳 其 的 決 心 ：
「土 耳 其 確 實 希 望 與 德 國 簽 訂 條 約 ， 以 保 障 自 己 免 受 德 國 攻 擊 ， 但 同 時 希 望 與 英 國 保 持 聯 盟 ， 並 明 顯 保 留 在 必 要 時 與 英 國 進 行 政 治 及 軍 事 合 作 的 可 能 性 ， 至 少 是 間 接 合 作 。
但 土 耳 其 的 主 要 憂 慮 之 一 是 歐 洲 在 戰 後 會 被 蘇 維 埃 化 ﹐ 土 耳 其 在 海 峽 問 題 上 會 受 到 壓 力 。
邱 吉 爾 亦 憂 慮 歐 洲 會 被 蘇 維 埃 化 。49
此 外 ， 在 德 黑 蘭 會 議 上 ，50 羅 斯 福 說 ：
「 如 果 他 是 土 耳 其 總 統 ， 他 會 要 求 在 飛 機 、 坦 克 及 設 備 上 付 出 這 樣 的 代 價 ， 以 致 如 果 允 許 這 個 要 求 ， 將 會 無 限 期 地 延 遲 「 霸 權 」 的 發 動 。
在 土 耳 其 有 一 些 人 較 為 同 情 德 國 人 對 抗 蘇 維 埃 ， 他 們 的 想 法 是 「 我 敵 人 的 敵 人 」 或 是 基 於 意 識 形 態 的 原 因 。
正如作者所言，1941 年至 1944 年間，都蘭主義出版物出現了復甦；然而，這些出版物所表達的觀點不斷受到《Ulus 報》社論的批評，並未反映官方觀點。此外，以人文主義觀點著稱的 Hasan Âli Yücel 成為教育部長 (1939-1946)，並實施教授人文主義課文的課程。這些政治起初受到都蘭主義、民族保守主義和伊斯蘭主義團體的低聲批評，後來則大聲批評。
關於海峽，儘管盟國不時有批評者，但這些批評並未聲稱土耳其奉行親德政策。眾所周知，由於海峽的戰略重要性，土耳其承受了來自戰爭各方的巨大壓力。
蘇 聯 擔 心 德 國 戰 艦 會 通 過 海 峽 ，
而 德 國 人 則 擔 心 協 約 國 會 通 過 海 峽 向 蘇 聯 輸 送 援 助 。
可 以 說 ， 當 時 海 軍 並 不 強 大 的 土 耳 其 在 面 對 這 些 壓 力 時 面 對 了 非 常 困 難 的 局 面 。53
對 協 約 國 而 言 ， 問 題 在 於 土 耳 其 對 通 過 海 峽 的 船 隻 噸 位 的 限 制 。在土耳其給蘇維埃的照會中，土耳其表示會出現一些問題，因為德國試圖通過條約中一些關於船隻噸位和類型的條款，而這些條款是有技巧的，一旦了解了這一點，就會採取預防措施。54
關於這一主題的例子還有很多，但我希望我已經證明了 Ihrig 所提供的資訊是非常不準確的，而且因為提供選擇性的資訊而造成了非常錯誤的結果。
Ihrig 在結論部分指出與納粹對阿塔圖爾克和土耳其的看法有關的問題。
例如，他在一個部分是這樣寫的：
「這個願景是高度選擇性的，只強調作者和第三帝國想要看到的東西；這個願景也是極度固定和僵化的，到了 1933 年，它已經變成了石頭。自 1919 年以來的土耳其「現實」或當代土耳其的任何發展，都無法改變土耳其這個石化的模擬圖像。由於土耳其在第二次世界大戰期間的外交政策已被充分闡釋，我想在結論中集中討論其他觀點。
首先，與土耳其和阿塔圖爾克有關的納粹形象從頭到尾都是選擇性的，而且是基於歪曲的，因此，儘管土耳其在改變，但一時的判斷仍保持不變的論點是不正確的。
其次，作者從一開始就對土耳其建立的政治體制、土耳其的目標、阿塔圖爾克的願景提供了非常有限的資訊，對於納粹的看法是否真實，他也採取了模糊的態度。
簡而言之，作者並沒有完全表現出扭曲，也沒有克制自己對凱末爾主義的認識與詮釋。
作者反對那些聲稱凱末爾主義不是法西斯主義；
但它是「一種教育獨裁」56 的人。
然而，他在他的研究中表示，他不會研究凱末爾主義是否是法西斯主義，而在這裡，他陳述了他自己對凱末爾主義與法西斯主義之間關係的評論。
他這種自相矛盾的態度很好地說明，他既沒有避免使用自己對凱末爾主義的評論與知識，也沒有確切地表現出他的歪曲。因
此，納粹黨為了自身利益而歪曲阿塔圖爾克與凱末爾主義是不爭的事實，但作者在呈現這些資訊的同時，也將亞美尼亞問題／「亞美尼亞種族滅絕」以及土耳其外交政策親德的說法納入其中。
在這樣做的同時，他既依賴於對凱末爾主義真實本質的不充分文獻回顧，又根據納粹分子對阿塔圖爾克和凱末爾主義的歪曲而態度曖昧。而這樣的偏好，使得讀者更難正確地理解這個主題。在這一點上，這項研究在科學工作所需的客觀性上並不具說服力，因為它也帶有嚴重的方法論與分析問題。
Kitap Değerlendirmesi / Book Review
“An Image Study” on
Atatürk’s Image: A Critical
Reading on Stefan Ihrig's Book "Atatürk in the Nazi
Imagination" 1
H. Seçkin ÇELİK
Dr.,
Atatürk Institute, Hacettepe University E-mail: seckincelik2@gmail.com
ORCID No: 0000-0001-9260-3754
Geliş Tarihi: 23.10.2017 Kabul Tarihi: 24.11.2017
In 2014, the book Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, which is the doctorate study of Stefan Ihrig,
was published by Harvard University Press.2 This book,
which sparked a debate due to its topic, was quickly translated into Turkish in 2015.3 The book is of 311 pages and six chapters including
the index. The first
chapter discusses the lessons which Nazis took from the Turkish War of
Independence; the second chapter analyzes how the New Turkey under Mustafa
Kemal’s rule is perceived as a preliminary role model for the Nazis, claiming that Hitler was inspired in his coup attempt by Mustafa Kemal rather
than Mussolini, contrary
to what is generally thought
by historians. In the third chapter, the author studies
Hitler’s and the Nazis’ admiration of Turkey. In the
fourth chapter, praise
for Atatürk and the defense
of his politics he represents are examined. In the fifth chapter,
it is argued that the model of Turkey as a modern “völkisch”4 state and how the foreign
policy of Turkey,
considered as a “revisionist” country,
is taken as a role model again.
The sixth and last chapter evaluates Turkey’s foreign policy
during the Second World War, which is argued to be pro-Axis neutral like Spain. After summarizing the chapters of the book,
we can examine the content of the book. But at first I will evaluate the
methodology of the book.
At the beginning of the study; it is mentioned
that an elderly woman in Munich in 2007 pointed to the city’s social-democratic mayor, shouting “Hitler was a friend of the
Turks and so is Ude” and from
this view, it is indicated that the literature on Turkey and Hitler
is inadequate to understand their connections. After that, Kemalism
is defined as “this ambiguous creature,
this cross between
authoritarian dictatorship, Bolshevism,
Western democracy, and the French revolutionary tradition”; however it is said that only the perceptions
of the Nazis about Turkey will be addressed in this study, and the question of whether or not the Nazis are right
about their view of Kemalists
is not examined.5 The author indicates
that he has left that subject
to others and referred to a very inadequate “literature”6 on the topic. First of
all, this has to be mentioned for such study: Nazis and Hitler, especially
after the Second World War and the Holocaust, had rightfully
negative connotations in the world and in Europe. After stating that
Nazis inspired by a person or an ideology and that the person or the ideology
is the source of their actions and their ideology; the methodological preference which indicates
only transmitting Nazi’s perceptions in the work does not make the study comprehensible which is the basic function
of science. If the perception is distorted, on the contrary,
it makes it harder to understand the subject.
Therefore, it is not justified for the writer to not consider the effect of
such a study on the perception of the investigated person or ideology.
Moreover, he did not keep his promise about this topic, he intervened in Nazi
perceptions related to Kemalism
and Atatürk at his will and he became silent
where he did not want to. That is, in case, is a
wrong methodological choice for the
impression that Nazis distorted the subject where the author intervened and
where he did not, Nazis would have made an accurate definition that would leave
no room for correction. There are no criteria for the author’s interventions.
One of the probable causes of this topic is that the author has little knowledge about Atatürk and Turkey. Even though such a study is being carried out, the author’s
limited understanding of Atatürk and Turkish politics during the interwar period
calls into question
the quality and the reliability of analyzes included in the study.
Although it does not have a direct relation with the
Nazi’s “Atatürk image”,
a whole chapter devoted to Turkish foreign
policy during World War II in the book. In the book, Ihrig; while there is an effort to link the Armenian problem to the
Holocaust (as the author has a book about this
topic7), it is difficult to explain why the vital examination for such a study,
the examination of Atatürk and Turkish politics8 during his period, is
highly neglected. For instance, the author
is unaware of the study by Orhan
Koloğlu who already analyzed how the German press covered Atatürk and
his rule.9 Moreover, there is no conceptual framework that the author
uses to examine the subject. That hinders
the analytical part of the work more.
In this criticism, we will focus on the book’s
three main claims. The first claim is that Kemalism and Atatürk -either
perceived true of false- have been a source
of Nazi ideology and have consequently adopted
it as a role model.
The second claim is that Armenian Deportation -the author refers to this
as Armenian Genocide- is the intellectual source of the Holocaust. The third claim is that Turkey’s foreign
policy during the Second World
War can be viewed as “pro-Axis” Neutrality.10 Given that the author
makes little mention
of whether or not the Nazis
were justified in making these connections, the reader is left with the perception
that almost all political sins of Nazi Germany were inspired
from Modern Turkey
(post 1908 Turkey).
We cannot say that the author does not mention some Nazi distortions,
and the author probably knows that this will
make the text entirely controversial. Only a few of these distortions have been corrected, no criteria were put
forward for these corrections11 and a chapter which is about a period that not directly
related to Atatürk’s image was added to
the book. Therefore, it is difficult for readers to get a balanced
view on Atatürk and realize that Nazis perceive
it in their own way and that they use it in their political/ideological struggle.
We will enlarge upon the problems in Ihrig’s analyzes within the framework of three claims we stated in the rest of the
article.
Firstly, I will analyze Turkish War
of Independence about Turkey being a role-model.
In the first part of his book, Ihrig writes that the Turkish War of
Independence is an extremely inspiring
source for German
nationalists, and he indicates that they are more influential than Italian nationalists in
this matter. The author astonishedly states that due to the “aversion” to the Versailles Treaty
after the war; central,
liberal and social democratic publications have developed
a common discourse
on Turkey with the nationalists. According to the leftist-
liberal media press in which author also agreed with , Turkey became “dangerously” important in Germany.12 Turkey was seen as a role model in the
1920s primarily because, unlike Italy, Turkey stood out with its successful
rejection of the post-WWI treaty (Sevres Treaty) imposed by the Entente Powers.
Similarly, Turkish War of Independence also created excitement in many countries
that did not yet gain their independence. The reaction given to
the Versailles Treaty was so negative in Germany that ultra-nationalist
publications even exemplified Gandhi’s pacifist resistance.13 From
Ihrig’s writings, it is understood that German ultranationalist press made a lot of fake
news about Turkey. For example, it was stated in a newspaper that Mustafa Kemal had 300,000 men in 1919!14 While the date January
1921 was given
for the adoption of the Nation’s Oath (Misak-ı Milli) -the author did
not correct that with any additional information15 -, Turkey’s
attempt to save the occupied Izmir was called “Turkish Irredentism”. After Turkish victory against the Greek forces in 1922, the ultranationalist German press, erroneously used the image of
Mustafa Kemal to defend the charismatic leadership against democracy and presented the Turkish Independence as
the birth of warlike politics, which is contrary to Mustafa Kemal’s
peaceful policies in the interwar
era.16
In
short, Turkish War of Independence,17 which created
positive reactions in many
parts of the world and not just Nazi Germany, was distorted by German ultra-nationalists to serve their own political
goals. The second
issue within this context
is the claim that Kemalist
Turkey -either perceived right or wrong- is an ideological source for Nazi Germany. First of all, I would like to mention how Koloğlu, who has made a balanced analysis on this issue, assesses
how the pro-Nazi
press conveyed Turkey
to its readers:
“All of the reasons that have been put forward to glorify Atatürk are the
topics that Hitler
government set to gain justice for themselves and to show these reasons for their
behaviors. This tendency was so powerful in Nazi Press that they claimed that Hitler was sent by a divine
power to direct
the fate of the nation.
They also claimed that Atatürk was also a key man
(superior than anyone else) who appeared at the nation’s moment of truth. Moreover, in
order to support Hitler’s consolidation of the party and to the theme
which is the presidency under one roof,
it had been claimed that Atatürk
stated that he was in the same style and regarded it as ‘honorable’.”18
Ihrig’s finding of Hitler’s huge interest on Atatürk is rightly a contribution
to the literature. However, the attitude of Hitler and the Nazis regarding Atatürk
seems to be following an ideological strategy rather than regarding him as
an ideological guide. Analytically, this distinction is very important, since
Atatürk and his views were systematically distorted by Nazis. Ihrig, as we
mentioned above, remains
silent from time to time about these distortions. The topics he fails to mention are quite important. Moreover, readers are left in the
dark about Atatürk and his ideas. For
example, Atatürk held democracy superior to other
regimes in the civics textbook
that was prepared
in line with his directives.19 In
the high school Turkish history textbooks which were reflecting his views, it
was stated that races did not have a social value.20 In other words, the Kemalist
regime was defending
the democracy as a mission
to be achieved. 21 As Ihrig also acknowledges, Atatürk
did not pursue
irredentist or imperialist policies.
22 Atatürk contributed to regional peace through various alliance treaties. Despite its attitude against Turkey on Mosul question,
leaving this problem behind,
Turkey has been a loyal member of League of Nations
- Contrary to Hitler’s Germany-. As a
diplomatic gesture, Atatürk was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in
1934 by his former foe, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos.23 Following his death in 1938, League of Nations memorialized him as “a genius international peacemaker”.24 Whereas Turkey’s
foreign policy was “peace”, Hitler’s was “war”. While Atatürk defended an
education system which would eliminate prejudices among all nations and which
would be suitable to his humanitarian ideals25; Hitler’s Germany set up a racist
regime and political
agenda. While Jewish
professors, who were the values of Germany, were dismissed from the German universities
under Hitler’s rule, Atatürk’s Turkey invited them to Turkish
universities.26 Whereas Hitler supported
Franco in the Spanish Civil War, Turkey
continued to recognize the Republican government for years.
Within this framework, we need to mention the other problematic points in the book. According to Ihrig, Atatürk
came chronologically before
Mussolini about being a role model. German extreme right-winger press
was propagandizing that Germany needed a “German Kemal Pasha” and an “Ankara Government”. In Hitler’s coup attempt in 1923, foreign sources of inspiration were rarely mentioned, but “Mustafa Kemal example” was influential rather than the “Roman March”. Drawing a parallelism between the revolution that Atatürk made for the salvation of the nation, Hitler sometimes
thought responding to the ones who called his actions “traitorism” which he made for the salvation of the nation at his trials.27 Due
to the lack of information given by the author about the topic, the writings at
this part are not enlightening enough. In Germany, extreme right-wing organizations were organized for the purpose
of the coup in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. For
example, in 1920-1921, Bavaria became a shelter
for nearly 15 “right-wing
juntas” due to Bavarian Prime Minister Gustav
von Kahr’s tolerant
policies. In March
1920, the failed coup attempt led by Wolfgang Kapp is also well-known.28 Thus,
Hitler did not need a foreign source of inspiration for his actions. Hitler’s interpretation and reflection of
Atatürk’s success and prestige
was a significant distortion and reflected an effort to establish a parallelism with an example that can
be regarded well by public. Despite the claims of Atatürk’s influence on
Hitler, the author is surprised that there was no mention
of Atatürk in Hitler’s
book, Mein Kampf. In the book,
Mein Kampf; Mussolini who was regarded
as one of “the world’s
great men”29 was mentioned
briefly, and according to the author that is enough to show that this situation has a little
importance.
Another point is that the author has never
mentioned the problem in the information given by German press which defined
Turkey as a dictatorship from almost the beginning of the National Struggle. As
the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions did not contain a dictatorship and during the Independence war, exceptional powers were temporarily
given to Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal by the Assembly. During the War of Independence, there was no single
party rule in Ankara. It is well understood that the author does not talk much
about these information because he has this weird comment
about Turkey and Atatürk:
“It’s no surprise that the Nazis made
full use of Atatürk’s story. After all, as one author stressed, with the New Turkey Atatürk had become ‘the pioneer and the one who paved the way forth he kind of authoritarian regime that came to be more and more commonplace in Europe’.”30 It is quite hard to understand this comment. Until October 1923, when the government regime of Turkey was not determined and one single party government was not set, Mussolini had already came to power and General Primo de Rivera had already staged
his coup in 1923. More important than these,
Atatürk’s enlightened authoritarian administration has considerable differences
than these governments and their goals.31 In 1923, there was a political
revolution which the Republic were established in Turkey,
not a coup. Atatürk was elected as President by the vote of the
deputies. The problem of being an example to Europe poses a quite different
problem; because in 1929 Turkey was still trying
to be accepted as a part of Europe and was rejecting letters written “Asia Minor” on it, as stated by Turkish Minister of Education, Mr. Taray.32 The relatively acceptable view of the author regarding
Atatürk as a role model is that; the praises to Atatürk did not threaten Hitler
cult33, because Turkey was not among Hitler’s Germany’s possible competitors in European and world politics. In fact, this is in
contradiction with the great importance attributed by Ihrig to “Turkey as a role model”.
Secondly; we will refer to the views of Ihrig about the Armenian issue and
to the minority policies in Turkey that Nazis assumed to be effective in the
image of Atatürk and Turkey. In fact, the attitude of the author on the “Armenian
Genocide” is a micro example of the whole
book’s approach. First, the author states as if he acknowledges the “Armenian Genocide” by saying “by the beginning of the Third Reich the ‘minority question’
in Turkey had been mainly ‘resolved.’
Most of the Armenians of Anatolia had either perished in Armenian Genocide or subsequently left the country.”34 However, only one page later he also states that “there is no point debating here
whether an Armenian Genocide actually took place”.35 Then,
the author continues to call it Armenian Genocide without using any quotation
marks. According to the author, modern anti-Semitism in the 19th century and German anti-Armenianism shared the same roots. The Armenians
were seen as “the Jews of the Orient”. Secondly, the author states that the
Nazis grew up with the Armenian Genocide as well as the Turkish War of
Independence. Within this context, it is stated
that the Nazis were inspired
by the Armenian Genocide, and that one of the
lessons that Nazis got from the Kemalist victories was the “ethnic cleansing”
of the country.36 First of all, according
to the scholarship, there is no evidence
that Atatürk had any role in
Armenian Deportation. Although Ihrig does not seem to agree with the validity
of the “modern völkisch state” qualification that the Nazis use for New
Turkey, he suggests substituting it with Europeanization.37 At
this point, there was no information about the important differences in
Atatürk’s understanding of nationalism. Acceptance of Jewish scholars who were forced to leave Germany
briefly mentioned elsewhere, but there is no mention of selection of the
four Armenian, Greek, Jewish origin deputies in the 1935 General Elections.38 Moreover, there is no mention of adoption of civil law and of the equal rights
given regardless of the religion. The author says that the Nazis grew up with “Armenian Genocide”; however,
the information about Hitler shows that he was an anti-Semitist and racist before
Armenian incidents. He expressed this in his book, Mein Kampf. As writer was, in fact, aware that Hitler’s racist
feelings developed against Vienna’s cosmopolitanism.39 So, under the influence of racist feelings in Europe, Hitler was already “grown up” with
reaction to Vienna cosmopolitanism.40 It should also be noted that in the texts
reflecting Nazi view, it was tried to draw a parallelism between Atatürk’s
reaction to the cosmopolitanism of Istanbul and Hitler’s reaction to the
cosmopolitanism of Vienna but the author did not need to correct this. However, Atatürk did not develop Hitler-like views under the influence of cosmopolitanism in Istanbul,
and that is undoubtedly a matter that has much more importance than corrections
about Atatürk’s personal life.
Finally, we will mention the author’s claims
about Turkey’s foreign
policy during Second World War. According to the author,
Turkey was close to Nazi Germany, even if not as much as Italy
was to Germany. The ideological similarity that Germans saw in Turkey was not
still fully reflected in their foreign policies. After a little hesitation at the beginning of the war, Turkey was supposed
to join the war against Germany as a consequence of the treaty of alliance
she signed with Britain and France. However, Turkey became closer to Germany, she wanted to Germany to win the war, so she used her control
over Straits in favor of Germany.
Turanist organizations41 repressed during Atatürk
period were re-emerged again. Apparently, everyone in the state, except Ismet
Inonü, was pro-German. Although Ihrig says “unfortunately this is not the place to deal with this topic extensively”;
he follows a revisionist course with limited resources. Since Turkey is a pro-status quo country and thus perceived the
revisionist powers, Germany and Italy, as a threat, Turkey developed its
relations with Britain from the second half of the 1930s. The rapprochement
initiated by Atatürk culminated with an alliance
treaty signed with Britain and France in 1939. Contrary
to what the author assumes,
this treaty did not require Turkey to enter the war automatically when the war reached the Mediterranean.
Turkey put forward three strong conditions in this regard. The treaty of
Alliance was made with three countries; but France was out of war with a ceasefire. Secondly, according to the sixth
article of the “Accord
Special” signed with France and England, Turkey could enter the war
only after the war equipment promised by France and England came. However,
there was not enough equipment aid.42 Thirdly, Turkey made a reservation to the treaty.
According to “the Protocol No.2”,
the obligations undertaken by Turkey could not have caused this country to be dragged into armed conflict with the Soviets.
However, Germany and the Soviet
Union signed a pact of non-aggression and shared out Poland. If Turkey entered the
war, she would have faced the same
end with Poland. But these following facts put an end the possibility of reconciliation; the signing of German- Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty in August 1939,
the request for the common defense of the Straits for the treaty that Turkey wanted to sign with the Soviet Union and the Soviets requested
to make a reservation to
the treaty in order to refrain from a possible armed conflict with Germany.43 The
fact that the Soviet Union demanded the Straits from Germans in the wake of the war deepened
the skepticism of Turkey against
the Soviets. Within this context, Turkey’s
aim was to be able to stay out of the war in every possible way. Thus, an
expert on this topic, Selim Deringil uses the following expressions in his
important study of Turkish foreign policy in the Second World War:
“Turkish foreign
policy during the period under review remains one of the major diplomatic feats
of diplomatic tightrope walking in the annals of recent international relations. (…) The country seen on the map of 1941 forms, ‘a great oblong pad of poorly developed territory’,
jutting out into Nazi-dominated Europe, entirely surrounded by Axis or pro-Axis forces.
Encircled and enticed as she was, Turkey was able to achieve her primary aim of
staying out of the universe of devastation which surrounded her.”44
In this
this part, the author talks about neither the Nazi-Soviet treaty, nor the Soviet’s
division of Poland with Germany,
nor Soviet’s attack
on Finland and nor making
nearly impossible for Turkey to form an alliance with the Soviet Union with
unacceptable demands. Moreover, Turkey was constantly declaring her alliance
with England. Ulus newspaper, the
semi-official publication of CHP (Republican
People’s Party) criticized imperialist policies of Hitler and Mussolini
and sided with the occupied countries.45 The signing of the non-aggression treaty with
Germany was closely related to the protection from the German army, which was
at the border of Turkey. And İnönü criticized
allusively the policy
of Hitler in the letters
between him and Hitler as that;
in case of attacking Turkey,
İnönü made the determination of the country clear to Hitler.46 Shortly before the
signing of the treaty, Ribbentrop wrote to Papen that he understood the main purpose of Turkey and stated: “Turkey would indeed like to conclude a treaty
with Germany in order to guarantee herself
aganist German attack, but would a the
same time like to remain allied to England and apparently to preserve the possibility of cooperating with her politically and militarily in case of neccessity, at least indirectly.”47 While there
was more than 2.5 years before the war was over, the Ulus newspaper
editorial mentioned in his column about the new world order, would appear in
the frame predicted by the Atlantic Pact.48 But one of the main concerns of Turkey was that Europe
would be sovietized after the war and that Turkey would be put under pressure
about the Straits. The European concern of Sovietization was also shared by W. Churchill. For this reason, even though
Churchill was unable to persuade İnönü to enter the war, Britain continued to
make weapon aids to Turkey.49 Moreover, at the Tehran Conference,50 Roosevelt said that “if he were in Turkish President’s place he would demand such a price in planes, tanks
and equipment that to grant the request would indefinitely postpone Overlord.”51
There were those in Turkey who were more
sympathetic to Germans against Soviets, either for the thought of “my enemy’s
enemy” or for ideological reasons. As the author stated, there was a revival between 1941 and 1944
in the Turanist publications; however, the views expressed in these publications were constantly criticized by Ulus newspaper’s editorial and did not reflect the official
view. Furthermore, Hasan Âli Yücel, known for his humanist
views, became Minister of Education (1939-1946) and implemented a curriculum
in which humanist texts were taught. These
politics were criticized at first in a low voice, then loudly by
Turanist, nationalist-conservative and Islamist groups.52
About the Straits, though the
Allies had critics from time to time, these criticisms did not claim
that Turkey was following a pro-German policy.
It is well known that Turkey
had so much pressure from all sides that were at war, because of the strategic importance
of the Straits. Whereas the Soviets were worried that the German warships would pass through
the Straits, and that the Germans were worried that Allies would
send aid to the Soviets through the Straits. It can be said that Turkey, which
had not a strong navy at the time, faced very difficult situations against
these pressures.53 For the Allies, the problem was related to Turkey's
restrictive interpretation of tonnage of ships going through the Straits.
In the note Turkey gave to Soviet,
it was stated that a few problems arouse,
because Germany tried to pass some articles
of the treaty which were about the tonnages and types of vessels with
trick and once this was understood, precautions were taken.54 There
are many more examples of this subject; but I hope I have shown that Ihrig has very inaccurate information and very wrong results with giving selective information.
Ihrig
points out the problems related to Nazis’ perceptions about Atatürk and Turkey at the conclusion
part. For example, he writes in a part as this: “This vision was highly selective and
accentuated only what the authors and the Third Reich want to see; it was also extremely settled and rigid,
and by 1933 it had turned to stone. Neither Turkish “reality” since 1919 nor any developments in
contemporary Turkey were to change this
petrified simulacrum of Turkey.”55 According to the author, the policy of Turkey during the Second World War played a role on the continuing of this image. As
the foreign policy of Turkey during Second World War has been adequately
explained, I want to concentrate on the other
points in the conclusion.
First of all, the Nazi image related to Turkey and Atatürk is
selective and based on distortions from beginning to end, so it would
not be correct to argue that one-time judgments remain same despite changing Turkey. Secondly, from the beginning
of the book, the author gave very limited information about the political regime
established in Turkey,
the objectives of Turkey, the vision of Atatürk, and he has a vague approach
about whether the perceptions of the Nazis were real or not. In short, the author did not exactly show distortions nor refrain from giving
his own knowledge and interpretations of Kemalism. The author objected to the ones claiming
Kemalism is not fascism; but it is “an
educational dictatorship”.56 However, he stated in his study
that he would not
examine whether Kemalism was fascism or not, and here he states his own
comments about the relationship between Kemalism and fascism. This
contradictory attitude of him is a good example of that neither he avoids of using his own comments
and knowledge about Kemalism nor he exactly shows the
distortions. As a result, it is a fact that Nazis distorted Atatürk and
Kemalism in terms of their own interest, but the author presents this
information as well as including the Armenian Question/ “the Armenian Genocide” and the claims
that are Turkey’s
foreign policy being
pro-German. While doing this, he both relies on the insufficient literature review on the true nature of Kemalism and he has an
ambiguous attitude according to the distortions of Nazis about Atatürk and Kemalism. And this is a preference that makes it more difficult
for readers to understand the subject properly. At this point, the study
is not persuasive in terms of the necessary objectivity in scientific work as it also carries serious methodological
and analytical problems.
1 I wish to thank Berk Esen for his valuable comments on this paper.
2 Stefan Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
3 Stefan Ihrig, Naziler ve Atatürk, trs. Ahmet Fethi Yıldırım, Alfa Basım Yayın, İstanbul, 2015. I have used both editions in this
article.
4 A German word, Völkisch
means racist-nationalist
5 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, pp. 6-7.
6 This literature consists of these;
A book of Plaggenborg comparing Fascism, Bolshevism and Kemalism, an article of Adanır about
this issue and a book of Arslan Bulut which gives the impression of being found
in a hurry, undoubtedly does not have an academical quality and purpose.
7 Stefan Ihrig, Justifying Genocide: Germany and the
Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2016.
8 The author's knowledge of
Turkey is so limited and usage of resource is so gracious that he thinks that
the first multi-party elections were held in 1947 after the Second World War.
See Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, p. 169. However,
the General Elections were held in 1946.
9 Orhan Koloğlu, Mazlum Milletler Devrimleri ve Türk Devrimi, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004.
10 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi İmagination, p. 214.
11 For example,
while inadequate information is given about some important points regarding
Atatürk and Turkish politics, it is pointed out that Nazis turned a blind eye
to some points of Atatürk's private life: “Furthermore, and also in line with Hitler’s
self- portrayal, Atatürk was often described as leading a very frugal
life: ‘As a real and true son of his nation, Kemal never led a luxurious but
always a simple life.’ Not
surprisingly, the “other Atatürk,” the heavy drinker and womanizer, was not
present in these texts.” Ibid, p. 158.
12 Ibid, pp. 10-15, 68.
13 Ibid, p. 77. Indian researcher Sinha finds a "excitement for Turkey" in India during the Turkish War
of Independence. Sinha also notes these facts; Gandhi strongly supports the
Turkish Independence War and he thinks that the conflicts between the Turks and
the Greeks and Armenians were distorted
due to the Turkish
hostility and he also thinks that
this distorted image was transferred to the western public. R. K. Sinha, Kurtuluş
Savaşı, Devrimler, Mustafa Kemal ve Mahatma Gandi (1919-1928), Milliyet
Yayınları, İstanbul, 1972, p. 150, 174-175, 180.
14 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, p. 21.
15 It was adopted in January 1920.
16 Ibid, p. 52-54.59, 149-150.
17 In order
to give a very striking
picture of the perception of the Turkish
Independence War in various countries, after the division
of Czechoslovakia with the Munich Treaty, Ceska Slova, published in that country,
wrote about the death of Atatürk: "We are tend to envy Turkey because they have a man in this high creation. Because
we are in a situation similar to that of Turkey
at the time when Mustafa Kemal appeared on the world scene today.” See Koloğlu, op.
cit., pp. 177-178.
18 Ibid, p. 155-156.
19 A.Afetinan, Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara,
1998, p. 51.
20 Tarih I: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941), Kaynak
Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 17.
21 Some contemporaries viewed Atatürk
among the important strong men of his age. For
instance, General Charles
H. Sherrill, US Ambassador
to
Turkey from 1932 to 1933, compared F.
D. Roosevelt, Benito Mussolini and Mustafa Kemal as great men of that time. See General
Sherrill, Üç
Adam: Kemal Atatürk, Roosevelt-Mussolini, trs. Cemal
Büyükerman, Cumhuriyet Matbaası,
İstanbul, 1937. Another
example was the work of Count Carlo Sforza -who had known Mustafa Kemal since the Turkish War of Independence. Although he viewed
Mustafa Kemal as one
of the European dictators, Count
Sforza underlined the differences of the Turkish
case and wrote that “ The
Turks feel, with instinct which rarely fails the Orientals, that Kemal’s is an
involuntary dictatorship
- a dictatorhisp (I shoul dare to say)
aiming at making autocrats and dictators impossible in the self- government
of a renovated free nation.” See Count Carlo Sforza, European Dictatorhips, George Allen&Unwin Ltd, London, 1932,
pp. 195-208. Yet, Count Sforza wasn’t exempt from critics despite his moderate
approach, since Turkish intellectuals as well as Turkish leaders were sensitive
to the use of the word “dictatorship” to
define the Turkish regime. E.g. see Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, “Yeni Türk Rejimi ve Diktatörlük”, Tan (29
May 1935).
22 In the changes that took place after the Lausanne (Straits
Question and Hatay),
Turkey
preferred diplomatic ways and these changes
were non-revisionist revisions that did not come as a part of a revisionist policy.
23 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 109.
24 Joan Bird, “Atatürk”, in New Makers of Modern Culture, Vol. 1, Ed. Justin Wintle, Routledge, New
York, 2007, p. 59.
25 İlhan Başgöz-Howard E. Wilson, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Eğitim ve Atatürk, Dost Yayınları,
Ankara, 1968, p. 241.
26 Arnold Reisman,
Turkey’s Modernization: Refugees From Nazism and Ataturk’s Vision, New Academia Publishing, Washington, 2006; Emre Dölen,
Türkiye
Üniversite Tarihi 3: Darülfünun’dan Üniversiteye Geçiş-Tasfiye ve Yeni Kadrolar, İstanbul
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010.
27 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, pp. 88-99.
28 See Howard M. Sachar, The Assassination of Europe 1918-1942, University of Toronto Press, Ontario, 2015, pp 145-147.
29 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1939, pp. 519-520.
30 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, p. 166.
31 As Stephen Lee
put it: “Others have found similarities
with Mussolini’s Italy, especially in the role of nationalism, of
the legitimacy of a one-party system, of the personality cult and of a populist
type of corporativism. There were, however, more differences than
similarities between Kemalism and Fascism. The latter was a popular movement, orchestrated by Mussolini; Kemal,
by contrast, introduced his changes on a largely
indifferent population. Nor did Kemal have any expansionist programme; if anything his whole rationale was an
acceptance of the collapse
of a past empire rather than on an attempt to create a future one. With that in mind, together
with Kemal’s affinity with western ideas, it would clearly be wrong to consider
Turkey to be in any way fascist.” Stephen
J. Lee, European Dictatorships 1918-1945,
Routledge, London&New York, 2016, p. 360.
32 See “Biz Asyai Bir Hükümet Değiliz”, Cumhuriyet (18 August 1929).
33 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, p. 167.
34 Ibid, p. 175.
35 Ibid, p. 176.
36 Ibid, pp. 177-179.
37 Ibid, p. 203.
38 For 1935 General Elections, see İhsan Güneş, Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye’sinde Milletvekili Genel
Seçimleri 1919-1935, Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017.
39 Sachar, op. cit, p 142-144.
40 Actually, the
Nazis “grew up” with Namibia
Genocide: “When Göring was asked to speak
briefly about his life before 1914 he outlined, what he called ‘a few points which
are significant with relation to my later development. He told the
court [in Nuremberg] of this father who had been the ‘first Governor of
South-West Africa’, pointing out that
in that capacity the elder Göring had had ‘connections at that time with two
British statesmen, Cecil Rhodes and the elder Chamberlain. (…) Eighteen years after
the Herero-Nama Genocide, Hitler bacame
closely associated with a veteran of the conflict. In 1922 he was recruited
into an ultra-right-wing militia in Munich
that was indirectly under the command of the charismatic General Franz Von Epp,
who had been a lieutenant during
Germany’s wars against the Herero and Nama.” Olusoga and Erichsen also suggest
to examine Nazi
ideology and practices as a part of a “longer trend” within European history :“(…) the comforting fantasy that
the Nazis were a new order of monsters and that their crimes were without
precursor or precedent. They were not.
Much of Nazi ideology and many of the crimes committed in its name were part of
a longer trend within European history.
Nazism was both a culmination and a distortion of decades of German and European history and philosophy. It was, in part, the final homecoming of theories and
practices that Europeans had developed and perfected in far-flung corners of the world during the last phase of
imperial conquest.” See David
Olusoga- Casper
W. Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism, Faber&Faber, London, 2010, p. 3, 5-6,
11.
41 According
to Jamil Hasanli, the publication on the activities of pan-Turkists was part of
the Soviet propaganda and orders were given
in this regard. See. Jamil Hasanli, Stalin
and The Turkish Crisis of the Cold War 1945-1953, Lexington
Books, Lanham, 2011, p. 89.
42 Before the Tehran Conference, at a meeting
between Britain, the United States
and the USSR, US
Secretary of State Cordell Hull assessed Turkey's
entry into the war and the equipment aid can be done to them
on October 28, 1943 and he pointed out that “Turkey has
neither the necessary shipping nor
supplies that would enable her to proceed efficiently with military movement.
Furthermore, there is not enough U.S. shipping avaible to back up Turkey in
a war at this time.” See FRUS (Foreign
Relations of the United States), “The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943”, United States Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1961, p. 124.
43 See Baskın
Oran, “Dönemin Bilançosu [Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye:
Görelik Özerklik-2 1939- 1945]”,
in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1- (1919- 1980), Ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim
Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p. 394; Mustafa Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye 1939-1945, in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1- (1919-1980), Ed. Baskın Oran, İletişim
Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 418-421,
431-434
44 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 1.
45 See H. Seçkin Çelik, İnönü Döneminde Kemalizm: Değişim ve Süreklilik (1938-1950), Hacettepe University Atatürk Institute
PhD Thesis, Ankara,
2016, p. 505.
46 See Zeki Kuneralp, İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaset:
Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın Onbir Telgrafı, İstanbul Matbaası, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 51-64.
47 See Ministry of Foreign Affaris of The USSR
Archives Division: German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy
in Turkey, 1941-1943, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow,
1948, pp. 25-
26. In his telegram
to German Foreign Office in 1942, Papen expressed his views on “the Turkish opinion” about the “Anglo-American bloc”:
“In the Turkish opinion, of the partners
of Anglo-American bloc, America ise invincible. Consequently, the Axis
Powers could secure a decision in their favour only by smashing the British world empire.
That is the total smashing
of the Empire, is not the interest
of Turkey, I have often pointed out.” Idem, p. 50.
48 Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Geçen Yılın Münakaşaları Arasında”, Ulus (2 January 1943).
49 Valentin
Berojkov, Yeni Bir Dünyaya Doğru: Tahran
1943, trs. Hasan Âli Ediz, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, pp. 117-118.
50 At the Tehran Conference, Stalin said these expressions about Turkey “an ally of Great Britain and at the same time had relations
of friendship with the United
States and the Soviet Union.” See FRUS, “The
Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943”, p. 496.
51 Ibid.
52 See Çelik, op. cit., pp. 476-500, 557-566.
53 Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu Sırasında 60 Yıl Hizmet (1918-1977), Vol. 2,
Deniz Basımevi, İstanbul, 2005, pp. 431-432, 438, 454, 528.
54 See Cemil Bilsel, Türk
Boğazları, İsmail Akgün Matbaası,
İstanbul, 1948; Aydın,
op.
cit., pp. 466- 467.
55 Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination, p. 225.
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