木户幸一的评论非常有趣，它表明原子弹不仅是一个重要原因，也是投降的有效借口：

木户幸一的评论非常有趣，它表明原子弹不仅是一个重要原因，也是投降的有效借口：

如果军事领导人能够说服自己，他们是被科学的力量打败的，而不是因为缺乏精神力量或战略失误，他&1们就能在一定程度上挽回面子。/@

(这让我不禁怀疑，日本军国主义者对面子的渴望在多大程度上促成了他们继续战争的决心）。

所以总的来说，原子弹派赢了。 我已经提供了大量证据，证明真正促使日本领导人投降的是原子弹，而不是苏联的侵略。 虽然苏联的军事行动并非无足轻重，但它充其量只是加强而非决定投降的因素。 如上所述，日本人已经放弃了满洲。 他们的首要目标是越后。 他们期待着美国入侵本土群岛，并为此做好了准备，他们将在那里给美国侵略者造成可怕的伤亡，以迫使美国领导人缔结和平条约，使日本人能够维护国家独立和民族荣誉。 他们并不关心满洲的命运。

最终，原子弹对日本的最终投降起到了决定性的作用，这正是因为它使日本军国主义者不再错误地认为美国人必须入侵本土才能打败日本人。 在接连投下两颗原子弹后，他们（错误地）认为美国人拥有更多的原子武器，他们可以简单地继续向日本投掷原子弹，杀死更多的日本平民和士兵，摧毁更多的城市，而无需入侵日本。 由于这种错误的想法，日本领导人得出结论："越后 "毫无用处，延长战争也是徒劳的。 为了避免战败，他们已经无能为力。 是时候屈服于盟军无条件投降的要求了。

参考资料

1/ Downfall - The End of the Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank（这是一部出色的作品，打破了人们对太平洋战争最后几天所发生事件的许多误解，尤其是关于日本准备投降的神话。）

2/ Hell to Pay： D. M. Giangreco（一本有用的书籍，提供了大量有关日本和美国军事实力的统计数据，并详细描述了日本军队在本土岛屿进行决战的决心和计划）。

3/ Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan - Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

I shall conclude this section with a very interesting comment made by Koichi Kido which showed that the atomic bombs not only served as an important cause but also as a valid excuse for surrendering:

If military leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of science but not by lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, they could save face to some extent.

(It makes me wonder the extent to which the desire for face-saving contributed to Japanese militarists’ determination to carry on with the war.)

So all in all, the atomic-bomb faction wins. I have provided ample evidence demonstrating that it was the atomic bombs rather than Soviet aggression that really drove Japanese leaders to surrender. While not completely dismissing Soviet military action as insignificant, it was at best a reinforcing but not decisive factor underlying the decision to surrender. As I explained above, the Japanese had written off Manchuria. Their foremost goal was Ketsu-Go. They were expecting and prepared for an American invasion of the Home Islands where they would inflict horrific casualties on the American invaders to force US leaders to conclude a peace treaty that would allow the Japanese to preserve national independence and national honor. The fate of Manchuria was of little concern to them.

At the end of the day, the atomic bombs played the decisive role in Japan’s ultimate surrender precisely because it disabused Japanese militarists of their mistaken assumption that the Americans would have to invade the Home Island to defeat the Japanese. After two atomic bombs were dropped in quick succession, they believed (mistakenly) that the Americans had more atomic weapons that they could simply keep dropping on Japan to kill more Japanese civilians and soldiers and destroy more cities without the need to invade Japan. With that erroneous belief, Japanese leaders concluded that Ketsu-Go was useless and prolonging the war was futile. There was nothing they could do to preclude defeat. It was time to yield Allied demands for unconditional surrender.

Reference(s)

1/ Downfall - The End of the Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank (an excellent work that shatters a lot of misconceptions about the events in the last days of the war in the Pacific, particularly the myth that Japan was prepared to surrender)

2/ Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945–1947 - D. M. Giangreco (a useful books that provides a lot of statistical data concerning military strengths of Japan and the US as well as meticulously describes the Japanese military’s determination and plan to fight the decisive battle on the Home Islands).

3/ Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan - Tsuyoshi Hasegawa